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The Tattvārthādhigama1 (TA) is a foundational text for the Jaina tradition. It was the 
first text that presented the Jaina worldview in a clear and systematic way and it 
functioned as the basis for the development of Jaina philosophy. Since its 
composition in the first half of the 1st millennium CE, the TA has been regarded as an 
authoritative compendium of Jaina thought and it still has a quasi-scriptural status 
for the contemporary Jaina community.2 Yet, little is known about the historical 
circumstances in which the TA was composed. The text is often associated with an 
author named ‘Umāsvāti’, but the details of this figure are not clear and the 
attribution of the TA to Umāsvāti is contested. The same goes for the first 
commentary on the text, the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya (TABh). Even though some 
scholars and a large section of the Jaina community assume that the TABh was 
written as an auto-commentary, there is no scholarly consensus about the 
authorship of the bhāṣya. 
 Since the TA and the TABh played a crucial role in the development of an 
important intellectual tradition, it is quite unsatisfactory that we know so little 
about the historical background of each text. Moreover, research on the 
philosophical content of the texts is lagging far behind comparable studies on 
seminal works from other traditions, such as the Yogasūtra and Nyāyasūtra and 
their first commentaries. The TA is written in the style of the sūtra texts and is hard 
to understand without the help of a commentary. However, no one has published an 
integral translation of the TABh into any European language as yet, which makes 
both texts largely inaccessible for many scholars in the field of Indian philosophy.3 
 
1  The Tattvārthādhigama is more commonly known as the ‘Tattvārthasūtra’ or 
‘Tattvārthādhigamasūtra’. In this study, I will use the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama’, which is 
mentioned in the introductory verses and colophon that accompany the first commentary on 
the text. For further discussion of the title of the work, see § 2.3, Authorship of the TA and the 
TABh. 
2 Dundas 1992: 87. 
3 The tenth chapter of the TABh has been translated into English by Robert Zydenbos (1983). 
A German translation of the TA has been published by Hermann Jacobi (1906). Several 
English translations of the TA have appeared since the second half of the previous century, 
including an influential translation by Nathmal Tatia, which was published by Yale University 
Press in 2011 (first published by the Institute of Jainology in 1994). The available English 





 This study provides the first English translation of the philosophical sections 
of the TABh and an analysis of their content. My textual analysis has a dual purpose. 
On the one hand, it is an attempt to get a better understanding of the philosophical 
ideas that are expressed in the TA and the TABh. On the other hand, by examining 
the way in which the texts relate to other intellectual movements, this study tries to 
shed some light on the historical positions of the TA and the TABh and, more 





The research for this thesis was conducted as a part of the ERC Synergy project 
‘Beyond Boundaries: Religion, Region, Language and the State’, an interdisciplinary 
research project that focuses on the Gupta Age (circa 320 to 550 CE).4 This period is 
commonly associated with a great efflorescence of culture and relative political 
stability. The overall aim of the project is to improve our understanding of this 
important period in the history of Central, South, and Southeast Asia by working 
across the disciplinary boundaries. My task in the project was to investigate the role 
of the Jainas in the Gupta Age. It was clear from the beginning that this would be a 
major challenge since little is known with certainty about the history of the Jainas at 
that time.  
Given the paucity of material and epigraphical evidence, some scholars have 
speculated that the Gupta Age must have been a particularly difficult period for the 
Jainas. In an important study on the TA, Suzuko Ohira writes that it was ‘one of the 
darkest ages for the Jainas’, and she speculates that large numbers of Jainas were 
forced to migrate as a result of the rise of Hinduism under the Guptas.5 However, it is 
far from clear how the Jaina and Hindu communities related to each other at the 
time and the different studies that deal with the history of the Jainas in the Gupta 
Period draw very different conclusions on the basis of the available sources. 
 
suitable for scholarly studies. Chapters 1, 2, 5, and 8 of the TABh have been translated into 
Polish by Piotr Balcerowicz in his unpublished MA thesis, which was submitted at the 
Oriental Institute of the University of Warsaw in 1990. 
4 The ERC Synergy project is hosted by the British Museum, the British Library, SOAS, and 
Leiden University (2014-2020). 





The different scenarios that reoccur in scholarly studies are largely based on 
the few material and epigraphical sources that are available and are, therefore, 
highly speculative in nature.6 Yet, there is another important source of evidence that 
is still largely unexplored. The Jainas produced a huge corpus of literature between 
the beginnings of the movement and the middle of the 1st millennium CE. In one of 
his articles on the early history of Jainism, Paul Dundas rightly remarks that the 
‘huge textual culture of early Jainism and the manner and context in which it was 
produced have generally eluded adequate scholarly interpretation’.7 Even though a 
large part of the texts that Dundas refers to predate the 4th cent. CE, there are several 
important texts that can be situated in the Gupta Period, including the 
Anuyogadvārasūtra, the Nandīsūtra, the TA and the TABh, and the Sarvārthasiddhi.  
It is precisely in this period that the Jainas begin to write philosophical 
works that increasingly reflect their intellectual surroundings. The majority of Jaina 
texts that predate the Gupta Age are inward looking and deal with topics such as the 
conduct of ascetics. By contrast, the texts from the Gupta Period begin to include 
discussions on ontology and epistemology in a way that resembles the philosophical 
treatises of the Hindu and Buddhist movements, which seems to indicate some 
change in the underlying relations between the Jainas and the other socioreligious 
groups.  
The TA holds a special position amongst the Jaina texts that were written in 
the Gupta Period. It was the first Jaina text that was composed in Sanskrit instead of 
Prākrit, the language of the Jaina scriptures. It was also the first text that was 
written as a systematic compendium in the style of the foundational texts of the 
philosophical schools of the Hindus. Even though the text forms a break with the 
tradition, it was well received by the different Jaina sects, which indicates that the 
TA filled an important need for the Jaina community. As such, the text raises many 
questions.  
As the TA reflects a pivotal point in the history of the Jainas that coincides 
with the Gupta Period, I have decided to focus my research on this particular text. 
Even though the TA is mainly a philosophical text and does not contain any explicit 
references to the history of the Jainas, the aim of this study is not only to analyse the 
 
6 I will elaborate on this observation in § 2.2. 





philosophical content of the work but also to investigate what the text can tell us 
about the circumstances in which the TA was composed.  
This thesis consists of two parts.8 The first part contains a study of the 
historical position of the TA and the TABh (chapter 2) and a textual analysis of the 
philosophical sections of the TA and the TABh (chapter 3). The second part contains 
an English translation of these sections. 
My textual analysis deals with three of the ten chapters of the TA. I focus on 
these chapters because they deal with philosophy in a more narrow sense of the 
term. Although the TA is usually seen as a philosophical work in its totality, it also 
includes chapters that are largely doctrinal in nature. For example, the third chapter 
deals with the different classes of gods and the sixth, eighth, and ninth chapter 
discuss the Jaina theory of karman. These chapters are less suitable for the purpose 
of this study since they mainly summarise the positions that can be found in earlier 
scriptures. As such, they cannot tell us much about the intellectual surroundings of 
the text. By contrast, the first, second, and fifth chapter of the TA — which are the 
parts that I have selected for this thesis — provide a systematic philosophical 
account. Since these chapters contain new ideas for the Jaina tradition that are 
clearly formulated in response to theories of other schools, they are more useful for 
an investigation of their context.9  
The question of how we can acquire knowledge about reality forms the 
common thread in the philosophical chapters. The first chapter of the TA deals with 
the Jaina theory of knowledge. One of the important innovations of this chapter is 
the way in which the author presents the classification of knowledge that can be 
found in the Jaina scriptures. Instead of listing these five types of knowledge (jñāna) 
in the traditional way, the author presents them as the two ‘means of cognition’ 
(pramāṇa). This technical term was at the centre of one of the most important 
debates between the different schools in Indian philosophy. However, the traditional 
Jaina texts did not contain a theory about the means of cognition, which made it 
 
8 I refer to these parts as ‘Part I’ and ‘Part II’ throughout this study. 
9 I realise that it is somewhat arbitrary to distinguish the philosophical sections from the 
more doctrinal parts of the TA. One could argue that this is an anachronistic distinction. Yet, 
the topics and character of the passages that I have selected are typically associated with 
philosophy, unlike the remaining parts. Moreover, there is another reason to focus on the 
parts that I identify as the philosophical sections. Most of the later citations of the TA come 
from these sections, which shows that these parts had the largest impact on the development 





difficult to have a formal debate with any other school. By presenting the five 
traditional types of knowledge as the two sources of cognition, the composer of the 
TA made the Jaina theory of knowledge compatible with the model that was used by 
other schools. Apart from a discussion of the sources of cognition, the first chapter 
also includes an exposition of the Jaina theory of perpectives (naya). The second 
chapter of the TA deals with the soul (jīva), which is the seat of knowledge in the 
Jaina theory. A large part of this chapter (II.8 - 25) discusses the way in which the 
soul relates to the senses (indriya). As it is relevant for the Jaina theory of knowledge, 
I have included this section in my analysis.10 The fifth chapter of the TA presents an 
analysis of the constituents of reality. It deals with the different types of substance 
(dravya) and provides a theory of existence (sat) and atoms (pudgala).  
In short, the philosophical sections of the TA provide a full epistemological 
account: they discuss the valid means of knowledge (Ch. I), the objects of knowledge 
(Ch. V), and the way in which knowledge emerges in living beings (Ch. II.8-25). My 
textual analysis of these sections (chapter 3) is focused on the following questions: 
 
i. Which philosophical standpoints are presented in the TA and the TABh and 
what are the arguments for these positions? 
ii. How do the theories in both texts relate to the views of other intellectual 
traditions? 
iii. What are the underlying aims and strategies of the composers?  
 
As mentioned before, the TA is composed in a very concise manner which often 
makes it difficult to understand the ideas that are expressed in the text. My textual 
analysis clarifies the concepts and ideas in the TA based on a close reading of the TA 
and the TABh. By comparing the standpoints in the TA with the views that are 
expressed in the commentary, I also question the idea that both texts were written 
by the same hand.  
My textual analysis includes comparisons with the views of other schools, 
such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions. Even though these groups are not 
mentioned explicitly, it is very clear that the composers of the texts were well 
 
10 The other parts of the second chapter of the TA deal with different aspects of the soul, such 
as the relation between the various types of karman and the different states of the soul 






acquainted with their theories. By looking at the way in which the TA and the TABh 
present the Jaina views, my analysis investigates the aims of the composers and the 
underlying dynamics between the different philosophical traditions.  
 The historical analysis in chapter 2 focuses on the historical context of the 
TA and the TABh. In this chapter, I discuss the following questions: 
 
i. What is the position of the TA and the TABh in the development of Jaina 
philosophy? 
ii. What do we know about the role of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and how 
can we sitatue the TA and the TABh in this socio-historical context? 
iii. Who composed the TA and the TABh?  
 
The first section (§ 2.1) provides a brief overview of the development of Jaina 
philosophy between the beginning of the 4th cent. CE and the end of the 6th cent. CE. 
In this section, I also investigate the role of the TA in the general development of 
Jaina thought. The second section (§ 2.2) deals with the Jainas in the Gupta Age. In 
this section, I discuss the different hypotheses that have been formulated by other 
scholars and evaluate their explanatory value when it comes to situating the TA and 
the TABh in this period. The last section of chapter 2 (§ 2.3) discusses the date and 
authorship of the TA and the TABh. In addition to a discussion of the existing 
literature, section § 2.3 also includes some of the outcomes of my textual analysis 
(chapter 3). An important question in the discussion of the authorship of the TA and 
the TABh is the reliability of the sambandhakārikās and the praśasti. These two 
compositions accompany the bhāṣya and provide some information about the 
author of the texts. However, it is unclear at which stage these passages were added 
to the bhāṣya. Given their importance, I provide a translation of these passages in 
Part II.11 The outcomes of my analysis of their content (§ 3.5) strongly suggest that 
the sambandhakārikās and praśasti were added at a later stage, which has some 
important implications for the debate about the authorship of the TA and the 
TABh.12  
 
11 The sambandhakārikās have not been translated into any European language before. Other 
translations of the praśasti can be found in Zydenbos 1983 and Dhaky 1996.  
12 As well as the sambandhakārikās and the praśasti, which are both composed in verse, the 
TABh also includes some passages in verse. These passages are introduced as citations. Since 







The paucity of evidence of the Jainas in the Gupta Age constitutes a general problem 
for the scholarly study on the Jainas in this period. Nevertheless, several scholars 
have tried to sketch a larger narrative. These accounts are inevitably quite 
speculative in nature. This does not necessarily invalidate their claims but these 
studies do not provide enough of a basis from which to move forward. Their claims 
often contradict each other and there is not enough material that can be used to 
evaluate the merit of the different accounts. Instead of developing a new account in 
this study, I have chosen to investigate one specific source, with the aim of gathering 
more information that can be used for future studies. This choice has some 
implications for the methodologies used in the different parts of this study.  
For my translation of the TA and the TABh, I stay very close to the Sanskrit 
text and try to give translations for technical terms that are close to their primary 
meaning. Although it is tempting to use later interpretations of obscure passages, I 
mainly try to interpret such passages in the light of the theories that are given in the 
TA itself. 13 In some cases, this means that their precise meaning remains unclear. 
Yet, it results in a translation that can be used as a source for other studies on the 
development of ideas in the history of Jaina philosophy. 
I use a similar approach for my analysis of the philosophical sections 
(chapter 3). My explanations of the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh are 
primarily based on the information that is provided in the texts themselves.14 The 
 
strange that the TA seems to include citations of other Jaina works in Sanskrit. A discussion 
of these verses and their implications can be found in § 3.5. 
13 For example, later sources interpret the Jaina theory of standpoints (nayavāda) as a form 
of perspectivism, i.e., the idea that truth consists in the totality of individual views, which 
may seem contradictory at first sight. As such, it is sometimes seen as a model for intellectual 
tolerance. The last part of the first chapter of the TA deals with this theory of standpoints. 
However, a critical reading of the text and the explanation in the bhāṣya shows that this 
theory has very little to do with philosophical perspectivism. Instead, it provides an 
exegetical tool that can be used to determine the intended meaning of a sentence and to 
explain the problem of change. This shows that the Jaina theory of standpoints did change 
over time and that the term ‘nayavāda’ refers to different ideas at different moments in the 
history of Jaina philosophy. 
14 My approach differs from the methodologies in most other studies that deal with the 
epistemological account of the TA. For example, several studies by Jayandra Soni try to 
reconstruct the ‘system’ of Jaina epistemology by linking elements from different texts, 
including the TA and the TABh (Soni 2018). This approach allows Soni to answer some 





building blocks of the philosophical theories in the TA are often scattered across the 
text but the overall theories become clearer once the different elements are put 
together.15 Yet, in some cases, the theories seem to be incomplete or inconsistent 
with other parts of the text. In such cases, I try to get a better understanding of these 
passages by comparing them with external sources that deal with similar problems. 
This sometimes shows that the composers of the TA and the TABh incorporate 
views that are derived from other texts, such as the Nyāyasūtra, even if these ideas 
do not fit perfectly within the larger context of the TA. In other cases, the 
inconsistencies indicate later additions to the text. As such, my conceptual analysis 
of the text does not only help to get a better understanding of the philosophical ideas 
in the TA but it also reveals anomalies that help to identify historical layers in the 
text and links with external sources, which are useful to situate the TA and the TABh 
in their historical context.  
 
The TA and the historiography of philosophy 
 
The TA is a seminal text in the history of an important philosophical tradition. As 
such, my study of the TA does not only aim to contribute to our understanding of a 
specific moment in the history of Indian thought but it also attempts to contribute to 
the historiography of philosophy in general. Even though the text is well known in 
the Jaina tradition and in the field of Jaina studies, few scholars who study the 
history of philosophy are aware of the existence of the text. Some of them might 
even question, after reading the text, whether the TA should be regarded as a 
philosophical treatise. In the end, the TA is a religious text that outlines a path to 
 
that never existed in history. A different approach can be found in Balcerowicz’s article on 
the logical structure of the naya method (Balcerowicz 2001c). In this study, he uses the 
concepts and methods of contemporary logic to investigate the theory of nayas in the TABh. 
This effort might be interesting from a conceptual point of view but does not help much to 
get a better understanding of the historical development of Jaina philosophy. In fact, the 
passage in which the nayas are discussed in the TABh seems to consist of several historical 
layers. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that the theory is based on a coherent logical model. For 
a discussion of the theory of nayas, see § 3.2 The perspectives. 
15 I rely heavily on the TABh for my interpretation of the TA. As such, it is possible that some 
of my explanations of the TA do not correspond with the original views of the composer of 
the TA and reflect the ideas of the composer of the bhāṣya. Yet, the dates of the TA and the 
TABh seem to be relatively close and the bhāṣya rarely deviates from the views in the TA, 
which makes the TABh an important source for our understanding of the TA. Throughout my 





enlightenment (mokṣa) and it contains many elements that are quite different from 
the topics that are usually studied in the discipline of philosophy, which mainly 
focuses on the Euro-American traditions.16 Yet, even if one uses a narrow definition 
of the word ‘philosophy’, it is still evident that the TA deals with philosophy. 
Immanuel Kant, who had a strong impact on the shape of the discipline of 
philosophy, summarised the main questions of philosophy as follows: 
 
All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the 
following three questions: 
 
i. What can I know? 
ii. What should I do? 
iii. What may I hope?17 
 
These questions form an interesting parallel with the opening of the TA, which says:  
 
samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ || 1.1 || 
 
The path to liberation [is constituted by] right worldview (samyagdarśana), [right] 
knowledge (jñāna) and [right] conduct (cāritra).  
 
These three elements form the subject of the TA. The first chapters of the TA deal 
with right knowledge (jnāna) and provide an answer to the question ‘What can I 
know’? The middle part of the TA discusses right conduct (cāritra), which answers 
the question ‘What should I do?’. The last chapter of the TA examines the state of 
liberation (mokṣa), which is the Jaina answer to the question ‘What may I hope?’. In 
other words, one could reasonably argue that the TA addresses the main questions 
of philosophy in a Kantian sense of the word. 
 
16 The fact that some traditions focus on different topics is, in itself, not a reason to say that 
they are not involved in philosophy. This would exclude many texts in the history of 
European philosophy from the discipline of philosophy. Moreover, such an argument could 
also be used by some Chinese or Indian traditions to claim that there is no real philosophy in 
the Euro-American tradition. 
17 Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) A805/B833 (Kant 1781b: 677). ‘Alles 
Interesse meiner Vernunft (das spekulative sowohl als das praktische) vereinigt sich in 
folgenden drei Fragen: i. Was kann ich wissen? ii. Was soll ich tun? iii. Was darf ich hoffen?’ 






 When it comes to the sections of the TA that have been selected for this 
study, one cannot reasonably deny that we are dealing with philosophy. These 
chapters address the basic questions that dominated the history of Euro-American 
philosophy: What is knowledge? What are the ontological constituents of the world? 
And what is the relation between human knowledge and the external world? Even 
though the arguments for the positions that are summarised in the TA are not 
always provided, it is often easy to understand the underlying rationale for these 
positions. The fact that the argumentation is not always explicit might be strange 
from the perspective of Euro-American philosophy. Yet, it is important to keep in 
mind that the TA was written as a compendium of Jaina thought that was probably 
used in educational settings. As such, it is likely that teachers would orally transmit 
the underlying argumentations for the positions in the TA and that the TA mainly 
functioned as a mnemonic device. This poses some challenges for the contemporary 
scholar, who only sees the outcomes of the debates and has to reconstruct the 
underlying argumentation without the help of a teacher. This does not imply, of 
course, that the text is not a significant document for the history of philosophy. 
 Even though the TA clearly deals with the fundamental questions of 
philosophy that Kant indentifies, it is doubtful that Kant would be inclined to study 
the text, if the TA had been available to him. In Kant’s infamous characterisation of 
the different races, Kant describes ‘the Hindus’ as follows: 
 
[The Hindus] do have motivating forces but they have a strong degree of passivity 
(Gelassenheit) and all look like philosophers. Nevertheless they incline greatly 
towards anger and love. They thus can be educated to the highest degree but only in 
the arts18 and not in the sciences. A great hindustani man is one who has gone far in 
the art of deception and has much money. The Hindus always stay the way they are, 
and can never advance, although they began their education much earlier.19 
 
In Kant’s perspective, South-Asians are very limited in their intellectual capacities, 
notwithstanding the fact that he writes that they all look like philosophers. He 
contrasts the characteristics of the ‘Hindus’ with the capacities of the ‘Whites’, whom 
he describes as follows:  
 
 
18 German: ‘Künsten’. 





The white race possesses all motivating forces and talents in itself.20  
Whites contain all the impulses of nature in affects and passions, all talents, all 
dispositions to culture and civilization and can as readily obey as govern. They are 
the only ones who always advance to perfection.21 
 
Although Kant’s ideas about the characteristics of different racial groups are 
repulsive from a contemporary perspective, they strongly influenced the views of 
later historians. As shown by Peter K.J. Park, the ideas about the history of 
philosophy radically changed after Kant. Asian and African traditions were actively 
written out of the history of philosophy by historians who came up with an entirely 
white canon. If the non-European traditions were mentioned, they were described 
as ‘pre-philosophical’ movements.22  
When the first logical texts of the Nyāya tradition were ‘discovered’ by Henry 
Thomas Colebrooke in the 19th century, it was quite a surprise to many European 
intellectuals that such a rational philosophical tradition existed outside of Europe. 
Yet, some historians were quick to dismiss the Nyāya texts as proper philosophy. 
For example, Heinrich Ritter, who published a famous handbook on the history of 
philosophy in 1846, wrote the following:  
 
[The Nyāya] can lay but slight claims to accuracy of exposition. This is proved clearly 
enough by the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of 
three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by introduction of an 
example in the third the universality of the conclusion is vitiated. [...] [In] its 
exposition the Nyāya is tedious, loose and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of 
this philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic 
developments of ideas.23  
 
Ritter’s perspective on the Nyāya tradition clearly echoes Kant’s idea about the 
unscientific mind of ‘the Hindus’. It is quite striking that the European intellectuals 
in the 19th century failed to recognise the value of the Nyāya texts as important 
philosophical works. One might wonder whether the reception of Indian philosophy 
would have been different had there been proper translations and studies available.  
 
20 Ibid. 
21 Mills 2005: 173 
22 Park 2013. 





Up until the present day, Indian philosophical texts have been largely 
ignored by the discipline of philosophy. Yet, more scholars are becoming aware that 
the Eurocentric perspective of the discipline of philosophy is no longer acceptable.24  
Research into the history of Indian philosophy, however, has been greatly hampered 
by a lack of analytical studies of the primary texts and accurate translations of the 
commentaries. For this reason, I have chosen to analyse the TA and TABh primarily 
from a conceptual perspective, in an attempt to clarify their philosophical content. It 
is, thus, my hope that this study of the philosophical chapters of the TA, which 
includes the first English translation of the bhāṣya on these chapters, will also 
















The Tattvārthādhigama (TA) is regarded as the oldest extant philosophical treatise 
of the Jaina tradition. The style and content of the TA deviate from earlier Jaina 
sources and the text reflects new developments in Jaina thought. Even though some 
older Jaina texts also deal with the theory of knowledge and the objects of 
knowledge, the TA is the first text that presents a systematic account of Jaina 
philosophy, including a clear presentation of Jaina epistemology and ontology. 
Moreover, the TA is the first Jaina treatise in Sanskrit and differs in this respect from 
the canonical texts, which are all composed in Prākrit. Despite the fact that the TA 
signifies a break with the older tradition, it was well received by the Jaina 
community. It strongly influenced other Jaina thinkers and the text is still accepted 
as an authoritative treatise by the different Jaina sects. This raises the question as to 
why the TA, which deviated from the existing tradition, was so well received. And 
which need the TA filled for the Jaina community at the time of its composition? 
Although there is no scholarly consensus about the exact date of the TA and 
the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya (TABh), it is safe to say that the text became an 
important philosophical treatise in the Gupta Period (ca. 320 – 550 CE).25 
Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to reconstruct the history of the Jainas in the 
Gupta Period due to a paucity of sources. Given our limited knowledge of the Jainas 
in this era, it is far from easy to identify the motives behind the composition of the 
TA and the historical factors that explain the positive reception of this innovative 
text. In this chapter, I will investigate the intellectual and socio-historical landscape 
of the Jainas in the Gupta Period in an attempt to situate the TA and the TABh in 
their historical context.  
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of Jaina philosophy in 
the Gupta Period. The second section deals with the socio-historical situation of the 
 
25 Most scholars agree that the TABh was composed in the Gupta Period. However, there are 
different views on the relationship between the sūtra and the commentary and the proposed 
dates for the TA range from the 2nd to the 5th cent. CE. Since there is no external evidence for 
the TA that predates the 5th cent. CE, it is challenging to date the TA more accurately. See 
§ 2.3 for a discussion of the date of the TA and the bhāṣya. The way in which the term ‘Gupta 





Jainas in the Gupta Period. In that section, I will discuss the main scholarly accounts 
of this part of the history of the Jainas and will assess whether these accounts can 
help to identify the historical motives that lead to the composition of the TA. I will 
argue that our present understanding of the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period 
is strongly limited and that the available source materials do not provide enough 
evidence to reconstruct the historical background of the TA in a convincing way.26 
The last section of this chapter discusses the date and authorship of the TA and the 
TABh. This section contains an overview of the different scholarly positions on this 
issue and includes some outcomes of my textual analysis in chapter 3 of this study 
that are relevant for the date and authorship of both texts.  
 
26 This does not imply that there is nothing to say about the intellectual milieu of the TA. As I 
will demonstrate in the third chapter of this thesis, it is possible to trace several explicit and 
implicit debates with rival intellectual movements in the text of the TA and the TABh and 
these textual elements do provide some clues about the environment of the composers of the 





2.1 Jaina Philosophy in the Gupta Period 
 
The development of Jaina philosophy 
 
If we want to understand the historical significance of the TA, we need to situate the 
TA and the TABh in the larger development of Jaina thought. Yet, there are very few 
scholarly accounts that provide an overview of the history of Jaina philosophy. One 
of the few studies that deal with the history of Jaina philosophy in general is K.K. 
Dixit’s Jaina Ontology (1971). Even though the dates of authors and texts in Dixit’s 
work are often speculative or omitted altogether, his work is still widely read and 
the way in which he differentiates several historical layers in the philosophical 
literature of the Jainas has strongly influenced the work of others scholars in the 
field of Jaina studies.  
Dixit’s work divides the history of Jaina philosophy in two periods, which he 
labels as ‘the age of Āgamas’ and ‘the age of logic’. Dixit characterises the ‘age of 
Āgamas’ as a period in which the philosophical ideas of the Jainas become gradually 
more systematic. The term ‘age of Logic’ is used by Dixit to describe the period in 
which writers use ‘logical faculties’ to analyse philosophical problems. 27  He 
mentions Siddhasena, Mallavādin, and Kundakunda as the first authors who wrote 
in this style. Both periods are further divided into three stages.28 The three stages of 
the ‘age of Āgamas’ are represented respectively by: 
 
i. [T]he old parts of the Bhagavatī and by the philosophical parts of the 
Ācāraṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga and Daśavaikālika (5th – 2nd cent. BCE) 
ii. [...] Prajñāpanā (plus the new parts of the Bhagavatī) and by the 
philosophical parts of Jīvājīvābhigama, Rājapraśnīya, Uttarādhyayana 
(minus chapter 28) (2nd cent. BCE – 1st cent. CE). 
iii. [T]he Tattvārthasūtra (plus the Uttaradhyāyana chapter 28) and by the 




27 Dixit 1971: 9. 
28 Ibid., 7 – 10. The different stages have no specific names and are simply labelled as ‘first 
stage’, ‘second stage’, and ‘third stage’. 





The stages of the ‘age of Logic’ are described as the stages that are represented 
respectively by the writings of: 
 
i. Mallavādin (5th cent. CE) 
ii. Vidyānandin (8th – 9th cent. CE) 
iii. Yaśovijaya (18th cent. CE)30 
 
Following Dixit’s classification, we can say that the Gupta Period signifies the 
transition from the third stage of the ‘age of Āgamas’ to the first stage of the ‘age of 
Logic’. Even though it is somewhat artificial to draw a hard line between the two 
periods that Dixit identifies, it is indeed rare to find any formal arguments in the 
texts that predate Siddhasena and the general style of most texts that are written in 
the ‘age of Logic’ differs from the style of the canonical texts that were written in the 
‘age of Āgamas’. In a further qualification of the ‘age of Logic’, Dixit remarks that 
authors in this period start to criticise the views of the different Brahmanical and 
Buddhist schools in an effort to establish the validity of their own doctrine of non-
one-sidedness (anekāntāvāda).31 In other words, the philosophical activity of the 
Jainas does not only get a new style during the Gupta Period but it also has a 
different aim.  
The ontological and epistemological theories that can be found in Jaina texts 
that predate the TA are usually presented in the form of lists that specify the 
different types of substance, the varieties of knowledge, etc. The texts do not 
typically provide arguments for these positions and do not explain how these 
positions relate to the philosophical ideas of other schools. By contrast, the texts 
that are composed after the TA frequently refer to other schools and try to 
demonstrate the superiority of the Jaina theories. Even though we know that this 
transformation happened during the Gupta Period, it is not evident what accounted 
for these changes.  
The fact that the Jainas also started using Sanskrit for their philosophical 
works since the Gupta Period suggests that the change cannot be explained in terms 
of an internal development alone. In the rest of this section, I will provide a short 
overview of philosophical Jaina texts that illustrate the transition from the canonical 
period, i.e., Dixit’s ‘age of Āgamas’, to the period in which Jaina thinkers started to 
 
30 Ibid., 10 - 11. The dates represent the dates that Dixit suggests. 





compose argumentative philosophical treatises, i.e., Dixit’s ‘age of logic’. After listing 
the different philosophical texts, I will critically assess Dixit’s model of the 
development of Jaina philosophy. 
 
Early philosophical Jaina texts 
 
According to Dixit, the following Jaina philosophical texts were composed in the 
third stage of the ‘age of Āgamas’ and the first stage of the ‘age of Logic’:32  
 
Early Philosophical Jaina Texts mentioned in Dixit 1971 
 
 Title Author 






Tattvārthasūtra33 (sabhāṣya) Umāsvāti 










Dixit writes that several theoretical innovations took place during the third stage of 
the ‘age of Āgamas’. He mentions the development of exegetical models 
(anuyogadvāras and nikṣepas) and the theory of viewpoints (nayas), the Jaina 
perspective on the means of cognition (pramāṇas), and the doctrine of karman as 
the main contributions of this period.34 With the exception of the TA, Dixit does not 
provide dates or any information about the authorship of the texts in ‘the age of 
 
32 Ibid., 65 – 87, 89. 
33 The titles of texts in this table correspond with the titles that Dixit mentions. In the rest of 
this study, I use the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama’, which is mentioned in the introductory verses 
(sambandhakārikās) that accompany the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya. 





Āgamas’. His differentiation of the three stages is mainly based on the content of the 
different texts. Dixit seems to assume that there is a linear development of Jaina 
philosophy and that philosophical models and concepts become more systematic 
and advanced over the course of time. 
The different developments that Dixit associates with the third ‘age of 
Āgamas’ lead up to Umāsvāti’s work, which he describes as the ‘crowning 
achievement of the age of Āgamas’. In his view, the chapters of the TA ‘lucidly 
summarize the Āgamic position on different important questions related to 
philosophy, ethics and mythology’.35 The TA plays an important role in Dixit’s 
analysis of the development of Jaina philosophy since it closes the ‘age of Āgamas’ 
and makes way for the ‘age of Logic’. Yet, he supposes that the TA primarily 
summarises the Jaina views that were developed in texts such as the 
Anuyogadvārasūtra and Nandīsūtra.  
The fact that he situates the TA at the very end of the ‘age of Āgamas’ seems 
to result from his idea that philosophy evolves in a linear way and that theories 
become more coherent over time. This assumption might have some heuristic value 
but can be misleading. It is likely that the individual texts that are associated with 
Dixit’s third stage of ‘the age of Āgamas’ contain different historical layers.36 
Moreover, the composers of the Jaina philosophical texts sometimes favour 
traditional theories over theories that are more recent. As such, the conceptual 
development of ideas does not necessarily follow a linear path. There are good 
reasons, therefore, to question Dixit’s idea that the TA comes at the very end of the 
‘age of Āgamas’ and that the TA only summarised the positions that were already 
present in canonical texts. 
Moreover, the labels that Dixit uses to describe different periods in the 
history of Jaina philosophy are somewhat misleading. The way in which Dixit 
distinguishes the texts in the ‘age of Āgamas’ from those in the ‘age of Logic’, 
suggests that all texts before the TA are mostly doctrinal and that the philosophical 
texts after the TA are non-doctrinal treatises that are composed in a “proper” 
philosophical style.  
 
35 Ibid., 83. 
36 Dixit is well aware of the fact that the canonical Jaina texts often contain later 
interpolations. He mentions several interpolations in his discussion of the evolution of 





Apart from Dixit’s work, there are very few studies that deal with the general 
history of Jaina philosophy and Dixit’s work is still valuable, despite the fact that the 
organisation of the material is largely based on his idealistic view on the 
development of philosophy. Over the last decades, some scholars have made 
important contributions to our understanding of the history of Jaina philosophy by 
focusing on the history of particular texts, authors, and concepts. These studies 
indicate that the history of Jaina philosophy is more complex than Dixit suggests.37  
The complexity of the matter is clearly shown in the first volume on Jaina 
philosophy in Potter’s Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies.38 The encyclopedia briefly 
summarises the Jaina texts that deal with philosophical issues and introduces these 
texts with a short discussion of their date and context. These short introductions 
often highlight how little is known with certainty about the date and authorship of 
most texts that predate the 7th century CE. Nevertheless, by putting the different 
texts together, it is possible to see some general trends in the development of Jaina 
philosophy. 
In the table below, I have listed those texts that are dated before the 7th cent. 
CE in Potter’s work. The encyclopedia mentions considerably more texts than Dixit, 
including other works by Umāsvāti, Kundakunda, Samantabhadra, Siddhasena 
Divākara, and Jinabhadra Gaṇi. However, Potter’s encyclopedia omits all the texts 
that Dixit situates in the ‘age of Āgamas’ with the exception of the TA. In order to 
make the overview of early Jaina philosophical texts more comprehensive, I have 
added the texts that Dixit mentions in his discussion of the third stage of the ‘age of 
Āgamas’. The table contains the title of the works, the name of the author (or the 
name that is traditionally associated with the text), the sectarian affiliation of the 
author, the language of the text, and the date that is mentioned in Potter’s 
encylopedia. In some cases, I rely on other sources for the dates of the texts. In these 
cases, the sources are specified in the footnote. In addition, I have added a brief 
description of the content of the texts, which provides insight into some general 




37 For example, Balcerowicz’s study of the development of the Jaina theory of knowledge 
convincingly shows that newer ideas were frequently replaced by traditional theories 
(Balcerowicz 2016d). 





I. Early Philosophical Jaina Texts (300 – 600 CE) 
Title Author Affil.39 Lang. Date 
i. Tattvārthādhigama 
?40 Śvet./Dig. Skt. 350 (?) 
Treatise on epistemology, ontology, karman, conduct, and liberation. 
ii. Anuyogadvārasūtra 
Āryarakṣita41 Śvet. Pkt. 400-45042 
Treatise on exegetical methods, including the theory of viewpoints 
(naya).43 Canonical text belonging to the ‘outer corpus’ of the 
Śvetāmbara canon.44 
 
39 For some of the early texts, such as the Tattvārthādhigama, the sectarian affiliation of the 
author is a matter of debate. In fact, it is possible that some early philosophical texts predate 
the split between the different Jaina sects. Nevertheless, the early texts are usually only seen 
as authoritative by one of the two sects that are mentioned in the table, with the exception of 
the Tattvārthādhigama. 
40 The TA is usually attributed to Umāsvāti. The name ‘Umāsvāti’ appears for the first time in 
the praśasti that accompanies the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya. However, the date of the 
praśasti is uncertain and it is unlikely that Umāsvāti was the composer of the TA. See also the 
discussion of the authorship of the TA and the TABh below. For a discussion of the praśasti, 
see Part II.  
41 The Anuyogadvārasūtra is traditionally ascribed to Āryarakṣita but there is no evidence for 
the authorship of the text (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 69). 
42 It is unclear when the Anuyogadvārasūtra was composed. The Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya, 
Nandīsūtra, and Anuyogadvārasūtra seem to borrow from each other and the Nandīsūtra and 
Anuyogadvārasūtra are composed in a similar style. It is plausible, therefore, that they were 
composed in roughly the same period. Puṇyavijaya claims that the text predates the 4th 
century CE since the discussion of the pramāṇas does not follow the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika model 
(Puṇyavijaya 1968: 72). This is an unconvincing argument since other Jaina texts that 
postdate the Nyāyasūtra, such as the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya, also present a theory of 
pramāṇas that differs from the model that was propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. 
43 The text mentions the different sources of knowledge at the beginning and focuses on 
testimonial knowledge (śrutajñāna) (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 45).  
44 The text mentions at the beginning that it is a commentary on the Āvaśyakasūtra 
(Puṇyavijaya 1968: 45). The Āvaśyakasūtra deals with the six obligatory (āvaśyaka) duties of 
a mendicant (Dundas 1992: 75, see Dundas 1992: 169-173 for a description of theses duties). 
However, the Anuyogadvārasūtra mainly deals with other topics and only refers to the 






Devavācaka45 Śvet. Pkt. 400-45046 
Discussion of the different sources of knowledge.47 Canonical text 
belonging to the ‘outer corpus’ (aṅgabāhya) of the Śvetāmbara 
canon. 
iv. Āvaśyakaniryukti 
Bhadrabāhu48 Śvet. Pkt. 45049 
Commentary on the Āvaśyakasūtra. The text begins with a 
discussion of knowledge and discusses a wide variety of topics, 
including the relationship between faith and conduct. 
v. Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama 
Puṣpadanta & Bhūtabali50 Dig. Pkt. 400-50051 




Umāsvāti53 Śvet. Skt. 400-450 
Commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama. 
 
45 The name of Devavācaka is mentioned for the first time as the author of the Nandīsūtra in 
the cūrṇi (Prākrit prose commentary, 7th cent CE), which is attributed to Jinadāsa 
(Puṇyavijaya 1968: 41, Dundas 1992: 24).  
46 According to Puṇyavijaya, the Nandīsūtra was composed before 523 V.S. (i.e., 466 CE) 
(Puṇyavijaya 1968: 42-44).  
47 Some passages in the Nandīsūtra are derived from the Āvaśyakaniryukti (Puṇyavijaya 1968: 
41). It is unclear how the different Jaina philosophical texts that predate the 5th cent. CE 
relate to each other and the dates of these texts are hard to determine. Since different models 
of the sources of knowledge can be found in a single text, it is likely that the texts were 
composed over a longer period. 
48 The niryuktis (verse commentaries on canonical Śvetāmbara texts) are traditionally 
attributed to Bhadrabāhu. Most scholars agree that there were different Bhadrabāhus and 
there is much confusion about this name. For a brief summary, see Wiley 2004: 50.  
49 Ohira dates Bhadrabāhu II, the author of the niryuktis, in the 5th century and situates the 
niryuktis in the later 5th century CE (Ohira 1982: 71, 137). Given the unstructured 
organisation of the material, Dixit assumes that the text was not written by a single author 
(Dixit 1971: 75). 
50 The text is traditionally associated with the oral teachings of the monk Dharasena, who 
lived in the 2nd century CE and who passed on his knowledge of the sacred scriptures — that 
are now lost, according to the Digambara tradition — to the monks Puṣpadanta and 
Bhūtabali (Dundas 1992: 63-64). 
51 The date of the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama is matter of sectarian dispute. The different ideas about 
the date are summarised in Wiley 2008: 57, n. 36. Wiley refers to the position of Hiralāl Jain 
and A.N. Upadhye, the editors of the Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama, who date the text ‘around 993 V.N. 
(466/568 CE)’ (Wiley 2008: 57, n. 36).  
52 The Digambara tradition does not accept the Śvetāmbara canon as an authoritative body of 
texts.  
53 As I will discuss in § 2.3, it is unlikely that the TABh is an auto-commentary. Yet, the TA 







Umāsvāti54 Śvet. Skt. 400-450 
Treatise on non-attachment, karman, conduct, and liberation. 
viii. Pañcāstikāyasāra 
Kundakunda Dig. Pkt. 400 (?)55 
Treatise on ontology, karman, the self, and liberation. 
ix. Pravacanasāra 
Kundakunda Dig. Pkt. 400 (?) 
Treatise on the self, equanimity, omniscience, ontology, and 
monastic rules. 
x. Samayasāra 
Kundakunda Dig. Pkt. 400 (?) 
Treatise on the self, which is one and untouched by karman. 
xi. Niyamasāra 
Kundakunda Dig. Pkt. 400 (?) 
Treatise on the self, ontology, conduct, repentance, concentration, 
equanimity, knowledge and worldview. 
xii. Aṣṭaprābhṛta 
Kundakunda (?)56 Dig. Pkt. 400 (?) 
Collection of verses, praising right vision, the Jaina sūtras, right 
action, monasticism, purity of mind, liberation, nudity of the ascetic, 
and moral conduct.  
xiii. Dvādaśānuprekṣā 
Kundakunda (?) Dig. Pkt. 400 (?) 
Discussion of twelve topics on which a monk should reflect, 
including the unbound character of the soul and the causes of 
saṃsāra. 
xiv. Sarvārthasiddhi 
Pūjyapāda Dig. Skt. 48057 
Commentary on Tattvārthādhigama. 
xv. Iṣṭopadeśa 
Pūjyapāda Dig. Skt. 480 
A collection of aphorisms on the emancipation of the soul and a 
variety of moral topics. The aphorisms contain many similes. 
 
54 The authorship of the work is uncertain. Jinadāsamahattara’s Niśīthacūrṇi (7th cent. CE) 
attributes the work to Umāsvāti (Malvania 2007: 66).  
55 Malvania & Soni situate the works of Kundakunda ca. 400 CE. However, the date of 
Kundakunda is quite uncertain, and the proposed dates range from the 2nd to the 8th cent. CE 
(Dundas 1992: 107). Given the subject and style of Kundakunda’s writings, the date that 
Malvania and Soni suggest seems to be rather early. 
56  The Aṣṭaprābhṛta and Dvādaśānuprekṣa are traditionally ascribed to Kundakunda. 
According to Malvania & Soni, it is unlikely that Kundakunda composed these works 
(Malvania 2007: 94).  
57 Malvania & Soni date Pūjyapāda’s works ca. 480 CE. This corresponds with the view of 
Bronkhorst, who situates Pūjyapāda shortly after 455 CE (Bronkhorst 1985: 161). 
Balcerowicz proposes a later date and situates Pūjyapāda ca. 540 – 600 CE (Balcerowicz 






Pūjyapāda Dig. Skt. 480 
Treatise on the self, meditation, and liberation. 
xvii. Sanmatitarka 
Siddhasena Divākara Śvet. Pkt. 450-50058 
Treatise on epistemological topics (e.g., theory of viewpoints, 
awareness of the omniscient, and sevenfold predication) and 
ontology (e.g., theory of substance, atoms, and categories).  
xviii. Dvātriṃśikā 
Siddhasena Divākara59 Śvet. Skt. 550 
A group of short metrical texts of 32 stanzas each, discussing a 
variety of topics, such as eulogies of Mahāvīra and the refutation of 
rival views, including Nyāya and Sāṃkya theories. 
xix. Nayacakra 
Mallavādin Śvet. Skt. 550 
Refutation of different philosophical doctrines, written as a debate 
between 17 disputants. The text deals with Sāṃkhya, Buddhist, and 
Vaiśeṣika theories amongst others. 
xx. Viśeṣāvaśyaka-
bhāṣya 
Jinabhadra Gaṇi Śvet. Pkt.60 600 
Commentary on (the first chapter of) the Āvaśyakaniryukti. 
xxi. Dhyānaśataka 
Jinabhadra Gaṇi Śvet. Pkt. 600 
Treatise on meditation, discussing four types of concentration (ārta, 
raudra, dharmya, śukla). 
xxii. Āptamīmāṃsā 
Samantabhadra Dig. Skt. 600 (?)61 
Treatise on ontology (being, unity, permanence, causality), 
knowledge (realism and idealism), liberation, and ethics. Advocates 
nayavāda and anekāntavāda, and criticises rival theories. 
xxiii. Yuktyanuśāsana 
Samantabhadra Dig. Skt. 600 (?) 
Treatise about substance, qualities, and the problem of change. 
Advocates syādvāda. 
xxiv. Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī 
Siṃhasūragaṇi Śvet. Skt. 600 
Commentary on Mallavādin’s Nayacakra. 
 
58 Balcerowicz 2016d: 996. 
59 See Fujinaga 1999a for a discussion of the authorship of the different works that are 
attributed to Siddhasena. Fujinaga argues that there were two Siddhasena’s.  
60 The (auto-)commentary on the Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya is in Sanskrit. 
61 Malvania & Soni date Samantabhadra ca. 430 CE. However, they date Samantabhadra’s 






The information in the table above provides several reasons to rethink Dixit’s 
account of the early history of Jaina philosophy. First, Dixit’s idea about the role of 
the TA in the development of Jaina philosophy seems inaccurate. In Dixit’s account, 
the TA and the TABh — which he attributes to the same author — summarise the 
traditional philosophical viewpoints that were developed during the ‘age of Āgamas’ 
and form the last texts of this period. However, it is highly unlikely that the TABh 
was written as an auto-commentary and there is no hard evidence that the TA was 
written after the composition of the Nandīsūtra and Anuyogadvārasūtra.62 Since the 
TA responds in many passages to issues that are raised in the Nyāyasūtra but never 
refers to discussions in the Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya, there is a good reason to assume that 
the text was composed well before the 5th century CE.63 This means that the TA was 
probably not only a summary of the positions that are found in the later canonical 
texts. If the TA indeed predates the latest strata of the Jaina canon, it is more likely 
that the TA played a rather innovative role and influenced texts such as the 
Nandīsūtra and Anuyogadvārasūtra. As such, it makes sense to regard the TA as the 
first philosophical texts of the Jainas. 
 Second, it is quite problematic to draw a line between the ‘age of Āgamas’ 
and the ‘age of Logic’. Dixit writes that texts from the ‘age of Āgamas’ are 
characterised by a ‘closed door atmosphere’.64 He explains that none of these texts 
ever refers to a rival view that is known from other literature. By contrast, texts 
from the ‘age of Logic’ explicitly name and criticise non-Jaina schools, and the 
standpoints that are mentions are ‘always followed by more or less cogent 
arguments supporting them’.65 In other words, texts in the ‘age of Logic’ differ in two 
respects from the previous texts according to Dixit: they are explicitly refuting non-
Jaina schools and they use philosophical arguments to support their own 
standpoints.  
However, the idea that the early philosophical texts of the Jainas do not 
respond to positions of other schools is inadequate. The TA does clearly respond to 
Nyāya positions, even if this school is not mentioned explicitly. In order to see the 
underlying debates, one has to examine the positions in the text carefully and 
 
62 For a detailed discussion of the argument, see § 2.3. 
63 See chapter 3 for a discussion of the relationship between the TA, TABh and the 
Nyāyasūtra.  
64 Dixit 1971: 88.  





compare these views with positions in contemporary texts. Dixit is right when he 
says that only later texts mention the other schools by name but one could say that 
this is simply a matter of style. On the other hand, there is considerable number of 
Jaina philosophical texts that postdate ‘the age of Āgamas’ that do not deal explicitly 
with other schools. For example, Pūjyapāda’s Samādhitantra and Jinabhadra Gaṇi’s 
Dhyānaśataka deal with meditation and liberation, and these texts have little to do 
with the refutation of other views.  
Furthermore, the idea that the positions in these later texts are always 
supported by proper arguments only applies to some texts, such as Mallavādin’s 
Nayacakra. Most other texts in the table, however, consist for the main part of 
statements for which no explicit arguments are given in the text. 
Even though Dixit’s model has some heuristic value to reconstruct the 
development of Jaina philosophy, it cannot be used to order the texts in a 
chronological way. Texts that lack a clear structure, which are not dealing with rival 
views, and which do not contain proper arguments, do not necessarily predate those 
texts that have the opposite characteristics. It is important to realise that Dixit’s 
ideas about the development of Jaina philosophy can be misleading if we want to 
understand the history of early Jaina philosophy. Since Dixit’s work is one of the 
most comprehensive studies about Jaina philosophy, it had a strong influence on 
other scholars. In fact, the division between the ‘age of Āgamas’ and the ‘age of Logic’ 
also appears to have influenced the organisation of the first volume on Jaina 
philosophy in Potter’s Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. It does not deal with any 
texts from the ‘age of Āgamas’ except for the works that are attributed to Umāsvāti. 
In his introductory chapter on the Jaina canon, Potter writes that ‘the philosophical 
literature of the Jainas proper may be said to begin’ after the composition of the 
canonical texts.66 Commenting on the selection of texts that are discussed in the 
encyclopedia, he explains that the commentaries on the canonical works are ‘for the 
most part ignored’. Instead, the work focuses on ‘independent texts and 
commentaries on them’ that try to develop the Jaina worldview in a rational way.67  
It is unclear to me why it is relevant for the historiography of philosophy to 
separate the texts that were codified in the Jaina canon and the commentaries 
thereon from the ‘independent’ texts. The fact that a text is accepted as an 
 






authoritative scripture does not necessarily entail that the text itself differs from 
non-canonical texts. Potter’s approach reinforces the idea that there is no ‘real’ 
philosophy in the canonical texts, such as the Nandīsūtra and Anuyogadvārasūtra, 
and that there is a hard divide between philosophical speculation in the Jaina canon 
and the ‘independent’ work of later authors who wrote ‘proper’ philosophy. This 
seems to echo Dixit’s division between the ‘age of Āgamas’ and the ‘age of Logic’.  
The information in the table above clearly shows that the history of Jaina 
philosophy did not develop in a straight line from doctrinal thought towards rational 
philosophy. Treatises on proper ascetic conduct and meditation were written at the 
same time as treatises on epistemology and ontology, and both topics are often 
discussed in the same sources. Moreover, authors such as Jinabhadra Gaṇi wrote 
commentaries on canonical works and composed autonomous treatises as well. In 
short, the relevance of canonical thought for the development of Jaina philosophy 
did not end with the TA and independent thought went hand in hand with 
traditional writings. 
Nevertheless, Jaina philosophy did change over time. The texts that are 
written in a later period show several characteristics that were rarer at the earlier 
stages and vice versa. For example, the canonical literature and some early 
philosophical texts are composed in Prākrit and the later philosophical texts are 
mostly written in Sanskrit, even though some later authors also wrote in Prākrit. 
The TA is a significant text in this respect, since it is the oldest extant text in Sanskrit 
in the Jaina tradition. Apart from this linguistic shift, there is also a shift in the 
content of the works. Although the early works do reflect some developments in 
other philosophical traditions, there are more treatises in later times that explicitly 
refute the positions of other schools.  
Even though we know that these changes took place during the Gupta Period, 
it is not entirely clear how these changes can be explained. Some scholars have 
linked these developments with major changes in the Jaina community, such as mass 
migration. Others have suggested that these changes were caused by the need for 
royal patronage.68 In order to understand why Jaina thinkers started to favour 
Sanskrit for their philosophical texts and why they became more vocal in their 
criticism of other philosophical traditions, we need to situate the history of Jaina 
philosophy in a larger socio-historical context. For this purpose, I will discuss the 
 





history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period in the next section (§ 2.2). After my 
discussion of the socio-historical situation of the Jainas, I will address the date and 








2.2 The Jainas in the Gupta Period69 
 
As I will discuss in § 2.3, it is safe to assume that the TA and the TABh were 
composed in the Gupta period. Even if the composition of the TA itself would slightly 
predate the 4th cent. CE we know that the TA became an important text for the Jaina 
community during the Gupta period, since the different Jaina traditions wrote 
influential commentaries on the TA in the Gupta age. The fact that the style, content, 
and language of the TA substantially diverge from older Jaina texts raises some 
important questions: What urged the author of the TA to transform traditional ideas 
and present them in a way that strongly resembles philosophical works from non-
Jaina movements? And why did this particular text become such an important text 
for the Jainas? It is tempting to conjecture that this intellectual development reflects 
a change in the social position of the Jaina community. In order to investigate this 
hypothesis, this section will address the socio-historical situation of the Jainas in the 
Gupta period. My analysis is mainly based on the scholarly accounts of the history of 
the Jainas under the Guptas written by Suzuko Ohira, Johannes Bronkhorst, and Paul 
Dundas.70 After analysing their views, I will discuss the explanatory value of these 
accounts with respect to the composition of the TA. 
  
 
69 In this chapter, the term ‘Gupta period’ refers to the time during which the Gupta dynasty 
flourished in South Asia, i.e., from ca. 320 CE, when Candragupta I laid the foundations of the 
Gupta empire, until ca. 550 CE, when the reign of Viṣṇugupta ended (see, e.g., Agrawal 1989). 
However, the geographical scope of this chapter extends beyond the range of the Gupta 
Empire, and includes areas under the control of contemporary dynasties, such as the 
Vākāṭakas and Kadambas. The fact that 550 CE is used to indicate the end of the Gupta Period 
does not imply that there was a Gupta empire until that date. Even though there were still 
some Gupta kings after the middle of the 5th century CE, the heydays of the Guptas were 
already over by that time (Bakker 2015: 25). For a history of the later Guptas, see also Willis 
2005. 
70 I will limit my overview of the existing literature to scholarly accounts that deal primarily 
with the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and I will focus on those accounts that are 
particularly relevant for the understanding of the development of early Jaina philosophy. In 
order to understand the significance of the changes that happened to the Jaina community in 
the Gupta era, a larger study is needed that contextualises the history of the Jainas in the 







In her study of the TA, Ohira gives the first comprehensive account of the Jainas in 
the Gupta period.71 Although she portrays the Gupta period in general as an age of 
‘long stabilized peace and prosperity’, bringing out ‘the most creative period in the 
history of India in all its fields of its cultural activities’, she concludes that it was ‘one 
of the darkest ages’ for the Jainas.72 Moreover, she holds that the Jaina community 
underwent significant changes during the Gupta period. She summarises the overall 
situation as follows:  
 
[T]he social impact of the days drove them to the other parts of India from the North, 
which ultimately became, together with the accidental factor of the natural calamity 
of long famine inviting the call of the Third Valabhī Council, the cause of the great 
schism into the present day Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras.73  
 
But what is the basis of Ohira’s extremely negative analysis of the situation of the 
Jainas in the Gupta period? And what does she mean exactly by ‘the social impact of 
the days’ in the passage cited above? In her general overview of the Gupta age, she 
characterises the period between 320 CE and the end of the 5th cent. CE as ‘the 
golden age of the Hindus’.74 To underpin this view, she mentions the records of 
Faxian (法顯), a Chinese Buddhist monk who travelled to South Asia in the early 5th 
 
71 Ohira 1982: 113-134. 
72 Ohira’s general account of the Gupta period is mainly based on R. C. Majumdar’s The 
Classical Age (The History and Culture of the Indian People, vol. 3), published in Bombay in 
1954. This explains her overly optimistic characterisation of the Gupta period, even though 
she describes the Gupta period as a dark age for the Jainas. As Upinder Singh observes, it was 
common for ‘Indian historians who lived during the period of nationalist resistance to 
colonial rule’ to portray the Gupta period as a golden age, as a reaction to ‘imperialist 
historiography’, highlighting the ‘political unification of a large part of the subcontinent’ and 
the efflorescence of art and literature (Singh 2009: 473). In his review of The Classical Age, 
written in 1954, Louis Renou already points out that there is ‘a certain amount of fallacy’ in 
the presentation of the Gupta period as a classical age (Renou 1954: 125). He mentions that 
‘the obscurities and gaps in our information concerning the previous epochs’ and the fact 
that ‘the history of India has been constructed out of literary material [...] composed by 
holders of the Brahmanic ideals’ seriously hinder our understanding of the Gupta period 
(Renou 1954: 126). 
73 Ohira 1982: 113. The last part of this section addresses Ohira’s account of the supposed 






cent. CE and portrays the Gupta Empire as very peaceful and prosperous.75 Further, 
she points to the promotion of Sanskrit under the Guptas. Unlike the inscriptions 
from the previous Mauryan and Kuṣāṇa period, which are mostly written in Prākrit 
or hybrid Sanskrit, the Guptas established Sanskrit as the official language of the 
state. Sanskrit authors composed numerous works in this era, ranging from poetry 
to history, philosophy, and mathematics. However, unlike the Buddhists, who 
adopted Sanskrit at an early stage, the Jainas continued writing in Prākrit, and Ohira 
points out that Umāsvāti’s choice to use Sanskrit must be a response to the 
patronage of Sanskrit writing under the Guptas.76 She also suggests that the 
attachment of the praśasti 77 to the TA, which is the first praśasti in the history of 
Jaina literature, reflects the composition of royal genealogies in the purāṇas.78 
Further, Ohira links the ‘longstanding peace’ and patronage of scholarship to the 
systematisation of thought and commentarial activities in the various philosophical 
schools. She claims that the TA was the Jaina response to what she describes as ‘the 
call of time’, i.e., the systematisation of the different philosophical traditions.79  
 In her discussion of religion in the Gupta era, Ohira portrays the Guptas as 
tolerant towards all religions, even though Vaiṣṇavism was the official religion. At 
the same time she suggests that the Buddhists and Jainas must have ‘suffered from 
the loss of royal patronage which they had enjoyed in the Mauryan and Kuṣāṇa 
dynasties’. Nevertheless, she writes that the Buddhists, unlike the Jainas, still 
enjoyed royal favour but the evidence that she provides for this difference is 
problematic. Ohira contrasts the paucity of epigraphical evidence for Jaina 
patronage with the information in the Chinese travel records of Faxian and 
Xuanzang, which portray a favourable attitude of the kings towards the Buddhists.80 
However, as previously noted, it is highly problematic to interpret these travel 
 
75 Ibid., 114. Recent scholarship problematises the decontextualised use of historical Chinese 
travel reports, such as those of Faxian (法顯) and Xuanzang (玄奘). After all, these records 
are based on the experience of Buddhist monks who went as pilgrims to the land of the 
Buddha and whose targeted audience was in their homeland (e.g., Deeg 2012).  
76 Ibid. 
77 A short text with the details of the author. See § 3.5 for an analysis of the praśasti. A 
translation of the praśasti can be found in Part II. 
78 Ibid. 
79  Ibid., 115. She mentions the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya, and the 
Nyāyavārttika as examples of this ‘historical trend’. 
80 Ibid., 115-116. There is some evidence for royal patronage of the Jainas under the Guptas. 
For example, there are three well-known Jaina images that were found in Dujanpur (Vidiśā), 





records as accurate descriptions of the historical situation.81 Despite this, she rightly 
observes that the paucity of Jaina inscriptions in the Gupta period strongly contrasts 
with the abundance of Jaina inscriptions in Mathurā under the Kuṣāṇas.82  
 In order to explain this change, Ohira discusses the history of the Jaina 
community in Mathurā, an important commercial centre along the trade route 
between Pāṭaliputra and Takṣaśila (Taxila). Mathurā is the main source of Jaina 
antiquities from North India. The first epigraphical evidence of Jainas at Mathurā 
dates from the 2nd cent. BCE and the number of inscriptions culminates under the 
Kuṣāṇas, especially during the reign of Kaniṣka and Huviṣka (2nd cent. CE).83 Ohira 
suggests that the Jaina community in Mathurā acquired an important economic 
position under the Kuṣāṇas due to their activities as bankers (śreṣṭhin), traders 
(sārthavāha), and merchants (kulika), which is supported by the fact that most Jaina 
inscriptions of this period relate to lay donations, mostly found on images.84 The 
Mathurā inscriptions also suggest that the Jaina community under the Kuṣāṇas came 
from all over Northern India and that Mathurā became a centre of Jainism around 
the 2nd cent. CE.85  
It is interesting that the Jaina inscriptions of this period outnumber the 
Buddhist inscriptions, even though Kaniṣka and Huviṣka both favoured Buddhism.86 
However, there is a sudden decrease of Jaina images and inscriptions from Mathurā 
at the beginning of the Gupta period, which leads Ohira to the conclusion that ‘the 
Jaina activities at Mathurā [...] suffered a sudden blow with the entry of the Gupta 
era’ after which the Jainas migrated ‘en masse’ to places in South and West India, 
 
81 Ohira mentions that Xuanzang refers to nirgranthas (interpreted as Jaina mendicants) in 
Kapiśa, Lanpo, and Siṃhapura but not in North India proper (see also Ohira 1982: 118). 
However, it is far from clear whether the term ‘nirgrantha’ in Xuanzang’s text actually refers 
to Jaina mendicants, and whether these remarks were based on his own observation. For 
example, he mentions that there were numerous nirgranthas in Eastern Bangladesh (Salles 
1995: 535, n.11). However, there is no archaeological evidence for the presence of large 
groups of Jainas in this region. 
82 Ohira 1982: 116. 
83 Ibid., 119. See Falk 2001 for a discussion of the dates of the Kuṣāṇa kings. 
84 Ibid., 120-121. The inscriptions by lay donors include the names and lineages of their 
preceptors, which shows that the lay communities ‘were under the guidance of particular 
spiritual teachers’ who were dependent on the lay community for their subsistence (Ohira 
1982: 124). 
85 Ibid., 119. Ohira’s claim is based on an analysis of the names of monastic lineages (gaṇas, 
kulas, and śākhās) mentioned in the Mathurā inscriptions (Ohira 1982: 43-44). 
86 Ohira mentions Lüders’s study of 159 Kuṣāṇa inscriptions from Mathurā, out of which 87 





‘which have continued to be centres of Jainism up to the present age’.87 But what 
could explain such a dramatic change?  
 Ohira writes that the commercial activities of the Jainas were organised in 
powerful guilds (śreṇi) and that the representatives of these guilds had an influential 
position in the local government. However, the Guptas were Vaiṣṇavas and Ohira 
conjectures that Mathurā, as the mythical birthplace of Lord Kṛṣṇa, was handed over 
to the Vaiṣṇavas in the wake of the ‘Hindu revival movement’.88 Interestingly, by the 
end of the Kuṣāṇa period, Kṛṣṇa and his elder brother Balarāma appear in Jaina 
images as the attendants of Neminātha, the 22nd tīrthaṅkara. Moreover, the Kṛṣṇa 
theme makes its entrance in the Jaina canonical literature from this era, albeit in a 
non-divine role.89 This leads Ohira to the conclusion that there was an aggressive 
religious struggle going on between the Hindu and non-Hindu sects during the late 
canonical and post-canonical period, which resulted in the decline of Jainism in 
Mathurā.90 She states that the subsequent migration of the Jainas was initiated by 
the move of the mercantile class and that the ‘exodus of the lay Jaina communities 
from Mathurā naturally caused the migration of the ascetic saṅghas as well because 
the latter had to depend on the former for their material needs’.91  
From Mathurā, the Jainas moved to important commercial centres in the 
South and West, such as Kāñcī, Madurai, Ujjayinī, and Valabhi.92 Unlike the Jaina 
communities in the West, the Jainas in the South managed to secure royal support in 
the Gupta era, as attested by land grants from the 4th to the 6th cent. CE. However, 
since there are no records of image donations in the South from this period, Ohira 
concludes that there were yet to be any Jaina temples. Moreover, she suggests that 
 
87 Ohira 1982: 120.  
88 Ibid., 121. 
89 Ohira lists the following canonical texts: Uttarādhyayana 22, Antakṛddaśāḥ, 
Jñātādharmakathāḥ 16, Vahnidaśa 1, and Daśavaikālika. Ohira argues that the Hindu literary 
works of this time make parallel moves. She refers to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, in which Ṛṣabha, 
the first tīrthaṅkara, appears as one of Viṣṇu’s avatāras (Ohira 1982: 121-122). However, it 
is not entirely clear to me how this supports Ohira’s argument since the Bhāgavata Purāṇa 
seems to be of a much later date (perhaps 8th cent. CE). Dundas points out that the 
relationship with Vaiṣṇavism dates back to the 2nd cent. BCE, ‘with the figure of Kṛṣṇa being 
assimilated to the biography of the twenty-second tīrthaṅkara Nemi’ (Dundas 2006: 397).  
90 Ibid., 122.  
91 Ibid., 123. 





the Jaina lay communities started to invite ascetics in order to win royal patronage, 
which is supported by epigraphical evidence from Karnataka.93  
 To sum up, Ohira characterises the Gupta period as a turbulent era for the 
Jaina community. The prevalent ‘Hindu revival movement’ directly threatened the 
powerful Jaina guilds in Mathurā. This prompted Jaina merchants to relocate to 
other commercial centres in the South and West, and the Jaina ascetics had to follow 
them given their dependence on the laity. Even though Ohira’s account is quite 
comprehensive, there are some questions that remain unanswered. For example, 
she argues that the TA was composed in the early 5th cent. CE in Kusumapura, which 
is another name for Pāṭaliputra. However, her account of the Jainas in the Gupta 
period does not provide any information about the Jaina community in Pāṭaliputra. 
In general, Ohira presents a story that is well connected to the evidence but she 
tends to take the implications of the evidence, and the lack of it too far. For example, 
is it legitimate to conclude that there was a mass migration just because of a paucity 
of evidence in one place and a growing number of inscriptions elsewhere?94 And can 
we assume that the Jaina merchants were indeed suppressed as a result of the 
Vaiṣṇava identity of the Guptas?  
 Unlike Ohira, Bronkhorst thinks that the TA was composed in the South and 
that the bhāṣya was written in Pāṭaliputra by a different author (see also § 2.3).95 In 
a self-admittedly speculative article, Bronkhorst provides another account of the 
Jainas under the Guptas, in an effort to explain why the practice of stūpa worship 
disappeared from the Jaina tradition. His account has some valuable observations on 
the possible context of the TA and provides new hypotheses, especially with respect 
to the relation between the Jainas and the Buddhists. Based on an analysis of several 
concepts in the Śvetāmbara canon, such as the atomic nature of matter and the 
momentariness of all that exists, Bronkhorst claims that Jainism was strongly 
influenced by Sarvāstivāda Buddhism.96 He suggests that this took place in north-
western India during the ‘final centuries preceding the Common Era and the first 
ones following it’, adding that ‘[i]t seems to be a safe bet to conclude that it was in 
 
93 Ibid., 124-125.  
94 Ohira’s account of the supposed ‘mass migration’ of the Jainas during the Gupta period and 
the way in which this event impacted the Jaina tradition will be discussed later on in this 
section. 
95 Bronkhorst 2010.  





Mathurā that the Jainas were confronted with these new ideas’.97 This theory fits 
nicely with the presence of a large Jaina stūpa in Mathurā.98 It seems that this 
practice of stūpa worship was shared with the Buddhists, even though it was later 
abandoned by the Jaina tradition. The question as to why relic worship mainly 
disappeared from the Jaina tradition has puzzled several scholars and Bronkhorst 
tries to answer this question in his article.99 His main argument is that the Jainas in 
Mathurā responded to the competition with the Buddhists by abandoning relic 
worship and ‘concentrating on other things’.100 However, there is no direct evidence 
that indicates that stūpa worship was abandoned by the Jainas to distance 
themselves from the Buddhists. Therefore, Bronkhorst’s theory should be treated 
with caution.  
 In order to understand the adoption of Sanskrit in the Jaina tradition, 
Bronkhorst draws a comparison with the Buddhist attitude towards Sanskrit in 
north-western India under the Kuṣāṇas. He suggests that the ‘massive change from a 
Middle Indic language to Sanskrit’ was just an aspect of the larger ‘in-depth 
Brahmanization of Buddhism in this region’.101 He claims that the underlying reason 
for the changing attitude towards Sanskrit is that the Brahmins ‘had come to play 
central roles at and around the royal court’ and that ‘[a]ll others who depended 
upon royal support had to be able to plead their cause in Sanskrit’.102 
 Yet, Bronkhorst believes that the Jainas, unlike the Buddhists, adopted 
Sanskrit ‘many centuries after the Kuṣāṇas’ and that Mathurā does not play a role in 
this process. He sees the TA, which he dates between 150 and 350 CE, as an 
 
97 Bronkhorst 2010: 2-3. His reason to situate this encounter in Mathurā is that Gandhāra 
and Mathurā were the main centres under the Kuṣāṇas, and that there is little evidence of the 
Jainas around Gandhāra (see also Dundas 2006: 405-406), while there is ample evidence of 
the Jainas in Mathurā. 
98 Ibid., 3. This stūpa was excavated from Kaṇkālī Ṭilā and is the centre of the archaeological 
and inscriptional evidence for the connection of the Jainas with Mathurā (Dundas 1992: 113). 
99 For a discussion of the history of relic worship, see Cort 2010.  
100 Bronkhorst 2010: 5-6. He also suggests that the later importance of vegetarianism in 
Jainism (see also Ohira 1994: 18-19), which seems to be a break with the practices 
mentioned in canonical texts, might be ‘inspired by similar motives’. However, this argument 
seems to be flawed. If the abandonment of relic worship can be explained by the wish to be 
distinguished from the Buddhist, one can hardly claim that embracing vegetarianism has the 
same background, since vegetarianism does not distinguish the Jainas from the Buddhists. 
101 Bronkhorst 2010: 8 





exception.103 He points out that only two other Jaina texts written in Sanskrit before 
the 6th cent. CE have been transmitted, i.e., the TABh and the Sarvārthasiddhi. Since 
the TABh was probably composed in Pāṭaliputra and the Sarvārthasiddhi 
somewhere in the South, Bronkhorst concludes that Mathurā did not play a role in 
the adoption of Sanskrit in the Jaina tradition.104 This raises the question as to why 
the Buddhists and Jainas in Mathurā had a different attitude towards Sanskrit. 
Bronkhorst explains this by pointing out that the Buddhist community needed royal 
support in order to maintain their ‘sometimes big monasteries’ and stūpas.105 By 
contrast, the Jainas were moving away from stūpa worship and the presence of the 
temple-dwelling monks was a matter of debate. Moreover, the Jaina ascetics could 
rely on the wealthy lay donors, which ‘left them relatively independent of the royal 
court, allowing them to continue using Prakrit rather than Sanskrit’.106 This would 
explain why there is no epigraphical evidence from North India that refers to land 
grants. By contrast, the Jainas in the South had a ‘different relationship to the royal 
court’ and possessed ‘caves and monasteries accompanied by substantial land 
endowments’.107 Bronkhorst speculates that we have to situate the TA in this context; 
it was the need for royal support for the Jainas in South India that urged the Jainas to 
present their doctrines in Sanskrit at the ‘brahmanized courts’.108  
 Bronkhorst’s account diverges from Ohira’s by situating the TA in South 
India instead of Pāṭaliputra. This reflects a more fundamental difference between 
their hypotheses: Ohira assumes that the Jainas in North India received royal 
patronage, while Bronkhorst thinks that the Jaina community in the North avoided 
dependence on royal favours, which distinguished them from the Buddhists. Further, 
Ohira thinks that the adoption of Sanskrit was an immediate response to the 
patronage of Sanskrit under the Gupta rulers. By contrast, Bronkhorst assumes that 
the change to Sanskrit happened in the South. Yet, both authors agree that the Jainas 
adopted Sanskrit in order to secure royal favour.  
 
103 Ibid. See also § 2.3. 
104 Ibid., 10. See § 2.1 and § 2.3 for the date and origin of these texts. 
105 Ibid., 11. He cites a study by Gregory Schopen, which mentions that the maintenance of 
permanent quarters requires ‘long-term relationships with donors’, and Bronkhorst assumes 
that the royal court must have played a role in this. 
106 Ibid., 12. 
107 Ibid., 13. 





 While both Ohira and Bronkhorst tend to make large claims about the Jainas 
in the Gupta period based on rather fragmentary evidence, Dundas provides a more 
careful interpretation of the available data.109 For example, in one of his more recent 
articles on Jainism in the Gupta period, he states that ‘attempts to provide a firm 
chronological location within the Gupta period for Jain authors and their writings’ 
are unsatisfactory, and he adds that we cannot even be sure that the TA was 
composed in the Gupta period.110 However, his work contains valuable observations 
and suggestions with respect to the topics discussed by Ohira and Bronkhorst. In 
addition to the epigraphical and material evidence that forms the basis of Ohira’s 
and Bronkhorst’s accounts, Dundas brings in a wide range of literary sources in 
order to get a better understanding of the situation of the Jainas under the Guptas.111  
 In The Jains, Dundas’ seminal handbook on Jainism, he explains how the 
early Jaina community moved from the Ganges basin, the place of its origin, to the 
West and the Dravidian South following the trade routes.112 Even though there is an 
inscription from Hāthīgumphā, which shows that there were Jainas in the East 
before the beginning of the Common Era, Dundas states that it ‘is the westward shift 
to the city of Mathurā and its environs which provides the best evidence for 
generalising about early Jain society’.113 As mentioned previously, the stūpa of 
Kaṅkālī Ṭilā forms the centre of the archaeological and epigraphical evidence for the 
early presence of the Jainas in Mathurā. Dundas points out that an inscriptional 
reference to this stūpa from 157 CE, which mentions that the stūpa was ‘created by 
 
109 Relevant discussions of the Jainas under the Guptas can be found in Dundas 1996b, 2002, 
2006, and 2014. 
110 Dundas 2014: 231. He writes that it is ‘perfectly plausible’ that the TA was written under 
the Kuṣāṇas, even though he writes that there is a ‘strong possibility’ that the TA was written 
during the Gupta period. This corresponds with his view in The Jains, where he states that 
the TA was written in the fourth or 5th cent. CE (Dundas 1992: 86). 
111 In the introduction to his chapter in The Jains on the history of the Jainas ‘from early times 
to the late medieval period’, Dundas writes: ‘I would contend that it will only be possible to 
gain some sense of it if there is brought into play a wider range of source materials such as 
stories, legends, belles-lettres, clan and sectarian traditions, hagiographies and so on, not all 
of which constitute unimpeachable documentary evidence of the sort usually required in the 
writing of history but which nonetheless provide a distinctively Jain perspective on the 
religion’s past.’ (Dundas 1992: 112).  
112 Dundas 1992: 113. He remarks that even the Jains who are nowadays living in Bihar ‘are 
descendants of those who migrated back from the West of India for economic reasons’. 
113 Ibid., 113. The Hāthīgumphā inscription of king Khāravela (ca. 1st cent. BCE) mentions the 
seizing of a Jaina image from another kingdom, which indicates that image worship was 





the gods’, suggests that the stūpa ‘by that period [...] was reckoned to be of 
considerable antiquity’.114 Further, the donative inscriptions from Kaṅkālī Ṭilā prove 
that Jainism in this early stage was not just an ascetic movement and that the 
interaction of lay followers with the monks and nuns ‘provided the means for the 
maintenance of the religion.’115 Even though Dundas agrees with Ohira that 
substantial sections of the Jaina community from Mathurā drifted to the West during 
the Gupta period, he points out that a large Pārśva image was dedicated in Mathurā 
in 980 CE. This somehow nuances Ohira’s portrayal of the ‘mass migration’ of the 
Jainas. Even though Dundas remarks that the purāṇas reflect a negative attitude 
towards the Jaina ascetics, he does not think that there is evidence of Hindu 
persecution of the Jainas in the North.116 He speculates that the Jaina community 
under the Guptas responded to external and internal ‘political pressures’ by 
gradually migrating to the West, which offered new business opportunities.117 This 
shift from Mathurā to the West fits well with the fact that the penultimate Jaina 
council was held at Valabhī and Mathurā, while the last council was held in Valabhī 
alone.118  
 Although these important events took place in North and West India, Jaina 
culture was certainly not confined to this area; epigraphical evidence testifies the 
presence of Jaina laymen and ascetics in the South in the second and 1st cent. BCE.119 
It is far from clear what the place of this early Jaina community in the South exactly 
was, and there is a gap in the epigraphical evidence from the first centuries of the 
Common Era. Yet, based on the analysis of story literature, Dundas points out that 
the later literary tradition preserved ‘some distant memory of wandering Jaina 
mendicants’ who ‘acted as transmitters of a northern, prestigious culture’.120 Further, 
 
114 Ibid. Dundas mentions a medieval story by Jinaprabha Sūri, in which the Buddhists and 
Hindus claim the stūpa for their own. Likewise, Somadeva (tenth cent. CE) writes how the 
stūpa was founded after rivalry with the Buddhists. These stories match the archaeological 
evidence for the cohabitation of different religious groups in Mathurā and the similarity of 
their religious architecture (Dundas 1992: 114).  
115 Ibid., 115.  
116 He writes that the ‘archetypical heretic’ in the purāṇas is ‘an amalgam of the Jain and 
Buddhist monk and a demonic and anti-social figure’ (Dundas 1992: 115). 
117 Ibid. He mentions that the kingdom of the Maitrakas of Valabhī offered ‘new overseas 
trading opportunities’ from the 5th cent. CE onwards.  
118 For a study on the dates of the Jaina councils, see Wiles 2006.  
119 For an overview these early inscriptions, such as the Kalugumalai hill inscriptions and the 
cave inscriptions from Madurai, see Ohira 1982: 116-117.  





he claims that the ‘religious and political ideologies’ of the Jainas had a significant 
impact on literature and kingship in the South.121 Even though the older Jaina texts 
say that ascetics cannot accept alms from kings, Dundas suggests that Jaina monks in 
the South ‘forged close relationships with kingly patrons’. Interestingly, he remarks 
that ‘there is no epigraphic mention in Karnataka of Jains of a mercantile or 
bourgeois background until the tenth century’ and that ‘the picture of Jainism up to 
this point is very much of a religion sponsored by kings and warrior aristocrats’.122  
 But what can Jaina ascetics offer these groups? Why would politically 
powerful persons want to be associated with the Jaina ideology, which focuses on 
the abandonment of worldly matters? Dundas argues that the Jaina ideology of 
‘heroic individualism and self-perfection’ was often ‘expressed in ‘images of striving, 
battle and conquest’. This applies in particular to the Digambaras, who were the 
dominant sect in the South, and one can argue that this imagery must have been 
appealing to the ruling class.123 Second, Jaina ideology might have been attractive for 
its association with ‘prestigious northern culture’, in contrast to the ‘peasant, Hindu 
society’ in the South. The fact that the Ādipurāṇa of Jinasena (9th cent. CE) contains a 
prescription for the conduct of kings, might indicate that Jaina intellectuals actively 
tried to secure a connection with the royal court. In this account, the institution of 
kingship is presented as a ‘necessary but potentially dangerous’ institution, which 
requires the ‘controlling presence’ of ‘Jain, rather than Brahman, advisers.’ 
Nevertheless, Dundas remarks that it hard to prove that there were ever kings 
whose religious affiliation was exclusively Jaina.124 
 As Dundas discusses in his study of early Jaina history, titled ‘A Non-Imperial 
Religion?’, Jainism received ‘a strong degree of bourgeois support but only sporadic 
royal sponsorship’ during its first eight centuries.125 This attitude was backed up by 
 
121 Ibid. Among the Jaina contributions to Tamil literature, Dundas mentions the earliest 
Tamil grammar, a collection of maxims (the Tirukkuraḷ), and the oldest Tamil epic (the 
Śilāpaḍikkāram) which he situates in the 5th cent. CE.  
For a discussion of Jainism and kingship in medieval western India, see Cort 1998: 85 - 110. 
122 Ibid., 118.  
123 Ibid., 119. A good example of such imagery is the giant Bāhubali statue at Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa, 
which was dedicated by general Cāmuṇḍarāya in 981 CE. Yet, Cāmuṇḍarāya also dedicated 
temples to Viṣṇu and Śiva (Dundas 1992: 120).  
124 Ibid., 119-120. More generally, he states that kingship in the South seems to have 
‘transcended conceptual or religious boundaries’. 





texts, which ‘are adamant that it is improper for monks to take alms from a king’.126 
Dundas points out that ‘there are no depictions of tīrthaṅkaras on royal coinage’ and 
that ‘early Jain images lack royal insignia, such as the parasol’.127 However, the 
mutual rapprochement of the Jaina community and the royal courts in the South 
seems to indicate a change in the social position of the Jainas. So, why did the Jainas 
in the South develop a different stance towards royal patronage?  
As mentioned previously, Bronkhorst suggests that the Jaina ascetics in the 
South needed royal patronage since they owned properties, such as caves and 
monasteries. However, this explanation ignores the underlying question as to why 
the Jainas in the South had a different attitude towards property in the first place. 
According to Dundas, it was ‘the institution of dāna, the giving of alms and 
temporary shelter by lay people to ascetics,’ which developed into the donation of 
‘rock-cut caverns’ and eventually the ‘building alongside temples of monasteries 
which were accompanied by substantial land endowments’.128 While some of the 
rock-cut caves in Tamil Nadu predate the Common Era,129 Dundas states that the 
monasteries (maṭhas) ‘begun to be built near temple complexes from about the fifth 
century CE’.130 These monasteries gave shelter to the temple-dwelling monks 
(caityavāsin). It is hard to determine when Jaina monks started living around 
temples, but the practice might have begun around the 4th cent. CE.131  
This change seems to be part of a wider transformation of Jaina practices 
during the Gupta period, in which image worship and pūjā became important 
elements of the ritual practice. Even though Jaina laymen and ascetics were both 
involved in image worship from an early period, there is evidence that this practice 
was subject to discussion in the Gupta era.132 Dundas suggests that the emergence of 
 
126 Dundas 1992: 118. He mentions Vaṭṭakera’s Mūlācāra and Haribhadra’s commentary on 
Āvaśyakaniryukti 153 (Dundas 1992: 292, n16). For a discussion of the ambivalent attitude 
of the Jaina community towards kings, see Cort 1998: 85 - 110. His account focuses on 
literary sources on Jainism and kingship in medieval western India. 
127 Dundas 2006: 391. 
128 Dundas 1992: 123.  
129 For an overview of early rock-cut caves in South India, see, e.g., Chatterjee 2000, vol. 1: 
113ff.  
130 Dundas 1992: 123.  
131 Dundas writes that ‘by Śvetāmbara reckoning, the temple-dwelling monks appeared in 
about the 4th cent. CE, but it is impossible to trace their early history beyond the odd 
reference such as that to a king of Pāṭan who banned non-temple-dwelling monks from his 
city’ (Dundas 1992: 136). 





a story around the 5th cent. CE about an image of Mahāvīra, which according to the 
story had been made during his lifetime, can be seen as evidence of an attempt to 
refute those critics ‘who claimed that it had no place in an authentic, textually based 
Jainism’.133 Further, textual sources from the 6th cent. CE show a ‘broad consensus’ 
about the ‘basic elements for the most common form of Jaina pūjā’.134  
The fact that multiple texts discuss pūjā in a similar way indicates that pūjā 
became an important topic in the period preceding these texts. Even though Dundas 
writes that ‘the origins of pūjā in Jainism are obscure’, he claims that the practice of 
pūjā in Jainism reflects ‘a common ritual culture shared and developed with 
Hinduism’.135 This overlap with Hindu culture can also be seen in the fact that the 
Jainas absorbed local goddesses into their religion, which became prevalent from 
the beginning of the Common Era.136 Eventually some of these goddesses became 
linked with specific tīrthaṅkaras. The first ‘fully iconic example of this phenomenon’ 
is a Ṛṣabha image with attendant goddesses from western India, which can be dated 
to 550 CE.137 This suggests that that the Jaina community did not simply follow new 
religious trends but that they actively reframed significant elements from a wider 
cultural sphere, thus negotiating the Jaina identity.  
 In his article on the Jaina attitude towards Sanskrit, Dundas sketches a 
similar pattern with respect to languages. Instead of interpreting the gradual shift 
from Prākrit to Sanskrit as a passive process, in which the Jainas conformed to a 
dominant language, Dundas argues that Jaina authors started using Sanskrit in an 
attempt to reach a wider audience. Yet, texts that were intended for internal use, 
continued to be written in Prākrit.138 He rejects the idea that Sanskrit was used by 
Jainas as a result of the conversion of Brahmans to Jainism, pointing out that the 
conversion of Brahmans also happened long before the first use of Sanskrit.139 
Instead, he proposes that ‘it was the willingness of the Jains to countenance a form 
 
133 Ibid. The image is known as the Jīvantasvāmi.  
134 Both Digambara and Śvetāmbara authors agree on the eight substances used for the 
worship of an image (Dundas 1992: 206).  
135 Ibid., 206. 
136 Ibid., 212. 
137 Ibid., 213.  
138 Dundas 1996b: 147. He gives Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatāra and Dvātriṃśikā as examples of 
Sanskrit texts aimed at a wider audience, and the Prākrit Sanmaitakka, which deals with 
‘specifically Jain issues of epistemology’, as a work for ‘internal consumption’ (Dundas 1996b: 
147). However, he admits that his general distinction between the use of Sanskrit and Prākrit 
does not apply to the entire history of Jaina literature (Dundas 1996b: 148).  





of Sanskrit – Prākrit bilingualism [...] which may have acted as a positive lure to 
many scholarly converts from the brahman cast’. Dundas suggests that this shift to 
Sanskrit took place in Mathurā, where there was a strong presence of brahman 
users of Sanskrit, spreading from there to the West and South.140  
 
Situating the TA in the history of Jainism 
 
The above summary of the different scholarly accounts of the Jainas in the Gupta era 
shows that there is wide variety of ideas about the history of the Jainas in this period. 
The different authors all suggest that the Gupta Period was a transformative time for 
the Jainas but they have different hypotheses about the nature of the supposed 
changes. Ohira argues that the Jainas used to receive royal patronage in the North 
but were forced to migrate ‘en masse’ to the South and the West as a result of the 
Hindu revival under the Guptas. This forced the Jainas to seek for royal patronage in 
these new areas. By contrast, Bronkhorst does not think that the Jainas suffered as a 
result of a Hindu revival. Instead, he proposes that the Jainas mainly changed their 
practices in order to compete with the Buddhists. For this reason, the Jainas in the 
North moved away from stūpa worship. He further speculates that the Jainas in the 
South began to rely on royal patronage for their rock-cut caves and monasteries. 
Dundas agrees that the Jaina ascetics in the South needed patronage for their caves 
and monasteries but he does not think that they relied on royal patronage. Instead, 
he suggests that these practices were sponsored by the lay community. He also 
agrees with Bronkhorst that the Jainas were not forced to move from the North 
because of a Hindu revival. Instead, he suggests that they migrated to the West 
because of business opportunities and a declining political climate in the North. 
 





 Even though there are significant differences between these three accounts, 
there are several elements that reoccur in their theories. First, they all try to explain 
why the evidence for Jaina activity in the North declines while there seems to be an 
increase of sources from the West and the South. Second, the different accounts 
suggest that there are some changes in the religious practices of the Jainas. Stūpa 
worship declines, the first temples are built, and there seems to be a rise in monastic 
activity. There is no consensus, however, about the causes for these changes. 
One of the main problems for the historiography of Jainism in the Gupta 
Period is that it is unclear how the available evidence relates to the actual historical 
situation. For example, the fact that the number of inscriptions from Mathurā 
declines during the Gupta Period does not necessarily imply that the Jaina activities 
in Mathurā radically changed. Even if the number of images and inscriptions in a 
certain region declines while there is an increase of such sources in another region, 
there is no need to assume that there was a mass migration going on. In the end, the 
number of historical sources that relate to the Jainas in the Gupta Period is so 
limited that it can be highly misleading to reconstruct a larger narrative on the basis 
of apparent patterns in the data. 
 A comprehensive overview of the material evidence of the Jainas in the 
Gupta Period can be found in the first volume of Asim Kumar Chatterjee’s study on 
the history of Jainism. In his overview, he discusses approximately 20 stone 
inscriptions and copperplates that relate to the Jainas from the beginning of the 4th 
to the end of the 6th cent. CE.141 A few other inscriptions are mentioned in Ram 
Bhushan Singh’s study of Jainism in early medieval Karnataka but Chatterjee argues 
that these are later forgeries.142 Apart from these inscriptions, which mainly relate 
to land donations, Chatterjee discusses a couple of Jaina images. Some of these 
images contain inscriptions as well.  
 
141 Chatterjee 2000, vol. I: 79-132. 
142 Singh 1975: Appendix A. Singh mentions the Altem copper plates of Pulakeśin I and the 
copper plates of the Gaṅga king Avinīta found at Mercāra. Chatterjee suggests that both sets 





The inscriptions and images that relate to the Jainas in the Gupta Period 
were found in different places, ranging from the North to the South of the Indian 
subcontinent. The map below provides an overview of the places where the 
evidence was found.143 As can be seen on the map, most of the evidence derives from 
three different regions. The first region is situated in the Northeast and stretches 
from Mathurā to Pāṭaliputra. The second region stretches from Vallabhī in the West 
to Nāchnā in Madhya Pradesh. The third area stretches from Palāśikā in Karnataka 
to Kāñcī in Tamil Nadu. The map suggests that there is a concentration of activity in 
Karnataka. However, this is mainly due to the fact that several sets of copper plates 
were found together in Palāśikā (Halsi). It is hard to tell whether this indeed 
indicates that there was 
more Jaina activity in 
this region or whether it 
was just a matter of luck 
that a larger number of 
items were found in this 
region. Taking into 
account that most of the 
pre-Gupta evidence 
comes from the North, it 
is easy to see why some 
scholars believe that 
there was a movement 
of the Jainas from the 
North to the West and 
the South.144 However, the present number of available sources is simply too limited 
to get an accurate idea of the actual movements of the Jaina community and the 
changes that happened to the Jainas in the Gupta Period.145  
 
143 The map indicates the sites that are mentioned as the finding places of the stone 
inscriptions and copperplates that are discussed in Chatterjee 2000, vol. I. Since it is possible 
that the finding places of some of these objects differ from the places from where they 
originate, it is dangerous to draw any conclusions based on this map. The main purpose is 
simply to show the geographical spreading of the evidence. 
144 For example, there are 172 surviving jina images from Mathurā that predate the Gupta 
Period (Dundas 2006: 398). This number forms a sharp contrast with the few surviving Jaina 





 Although Ohira claims that the author of the TA was clearly responding to 
‘the call of time’, 146 there is not enough material evidence to see which historical 
circumstances could have urged the Jainas to come up with their first compendium 
of Jaina thought. The inscriptions from the Gupta Period mostly consist of land 
grants and they do not indicate that there was, for example, some rivalry with either 
the Buddhists or the Hindus. Moreover, it is hard to infer any regional differences on 
the basis of the inscriptions and there is nothing in the content of the text that 
indicates that the TA should be situated in a specific region.147 In short, it seems that 
the material evidence does not provide enough information to make an educated 
guess about the situation in which the TA was composed.148  
Apart from the material evidence, there are some literary sources that could 
be relevant for our understanding of Jainism in the Gupta Period, such as the latest 
layers of the Śvetāmbara canon. Yet, thorough textual analyses of these sources are 
needed in order to derive any historical clues from these documents and the number 
of available studies on these texts is too small to facilitate a more general 
overview.149 
In short, the present status of scholarly work on the material evidence and 
literary sources is insufficient to create a larger historical narrative that has actual 
explanatory value and that would allow us to situate the TA in the socio-historical 
context of Jainism in the Gupta Period. Even though the number of scholars in the 
field of Jaina studies is growing and many valuable studies on the Jaina tradition 
 
145 This does not imply that that the available sources cannot be used at all. By contrast, more 
studies on these sources are needed in order to develop new ideas and to test some existing 
hypotheses about the Jainas in the Gupta age. Dundas’s study of the Titthogālī (Dundas 2014) 
is a relevant example.  
146 Ohira 1982: 115. 
147 The situation is different for the TABh since the TABh is accompanied by a praśasti that 
situates the composition of the text in Pāṭaliputra. For a discussion of the validity of the 
information in the praśasti, see § 2.3. 
148 The paucity of historical sources has led R.W. Williams to describe the early history of the 
Jainas, i.e., from its beginning to the 5th cent. CE, as the ‘dark age’ of Jainism (Williams 1963: 
xii.). As pointed out by Dundas, this label is somewhat misleading. The ‘huge corpus of 
literature’ that was composed in this early phase, suggests that Jainism was a flourishing 
cultural and religious movement (Dundas 2006: 383). Yet, Dundas rightly remarks that ‘if 
darkness connotes obscurity, then Williams may be deemed to have been partially correct, 
for the huge textual culture of early Jainism and the manner and context in which it was 
produced have generally eluded adequate scholarly interpretation’ (Dundas 2006: 383). 
149 Dundas’s study of the Titthogālī (2014) is a relevant example of the way in which literary 
sources can be explored in order to get a better understanding of the historical context of 





have been published over the last decades, most parts of the history of Jainism are 
still heavily understudied. It is, therefore, not surprising that the scholarly accounts 
that try to provide a general narrative of Jaina history in the Gupta Period tend to be 
highly speculative. For this reason, I am reluctant to add another layer of speculation 
to the existing accounts by linking the composition of the TA with specific historical 
trends that are identified in these studies. Yet, this does not imply that we cannot 
say anything about the historical context of the TA at all. In the third chapter of this 
study, I will discuss how the content of the philosophical chapters might provide 
some clues about the historical context of the TA and the way in which the TA fits in 







2.3 Date and Authorship 
 
Even though the TA is widely regarded as a seminal text in the history of Jaina 
philosophy, there are strongly divergent ideas about the date and authorship of the 
TA and the TABh. In this section, I will discuss the date and authorship of both texts. 
Apart from an overview of the different positions in the scholarly literature, I will 
also include some of the outcomes of my textual analysis from chapter 3.150  
 
Is the TABh an auto-commentary? 
 
The first issue that needs to be addressed in order to situate the TA and the TABh is 
the question as to whether the TABh is an auto-commentary or not. The Śvetāmbara 
tradition assumes that the TA was written by Umāsvāti, who is also regarded as the 
author of the TABh. By contrast, the Digambara tradition does not accept the TABh 
as an authoritative commentary and regards Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi as the first 
commentary on the TA.151 Over the last decades, scholars have defended both 
positions. Most of the arguments for the same authorship of both texts can be found 
in Sanghvi 1974, Ohira 1992, and Dhaky 1996. The counterarguments can be found 
in Williams 1963, Phoolchandra 1997, Zydenbos 1983, Balcerowicz 2008, 
Bronkhorst 1975 & 2010.152 None of the individual arguments that have been put 
forward are strong enough to prove beyond doubt whether the TABh is an auto-
commentary or not. Nevertheless, there are enough arguments that cumulatively 
suggest that the TABh was written at a later stage.  
 
150 My discussion primarily deals with the views in the following studies: Williams 1963, 
Sanghvi 1974, Phoolcandra 1997, Ohira 1982, Zydenbos 1983, Dundas 1992 & 1997, Dhaky 
1996, Balcerowicz 2008, and Bronkhorst 1985 & 2010. Other scholarly discussions of the 
dates of the TA and the TABh usually refer to the views that are expressed in these sources.  
151 The Digambara tradition favours the variant name ‘Umāsvāmin’ instead of ‘Umāsvāti’, 
even though the name ‘Umāsvāti’ is also used (Sanghvi 1974: Introduction, p 14). Some ideas 
that are mentioned in the bhāṣya go against traditional Digambara views. I will discuss these 
aspects in my discussion of the sectarian affiliation of the author(s) of the TA and the TABh 
below. 
152 Most contemporary scholars assume that the TABh is not an auto-commentary. I am not 
aware of any study on this topic that postdates Dhaky’s article and which claims that the 





The scholars who think that the TABh is an auto-commentary have provided 
the following main arguments:153 
i. The praśasti, a short composition of six verses that accompanies the bhāṣya, 
mentions that the ‘Tattvārthādhigama’ was written by ‘vācaka Umāsvāti’. 
Haribhadra’s Śāstravārtasamuccaya cites a passage of the TABh, which he 
attributes to Umāsvāti. This suggests that not only the TA but also the TABh 
was written by Umāsvāti.154  
ii. Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā contains some remarks that suggest that the sūtra and 
bhāṣya were composed by the same person.155 Devagupta’s commentary on 
the sambandhakārikās makes the same claim.156 
iii. Some expressions in the TA suggest that the author of the sūtra composed 
the bhāṣya as well. For example, TA 1.23 reads ‘yathoktanimittaḥ 
ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām’.157 The expression ‘yathokta’ seems to refer to a 
specification that is given in the bhāṣya (see TABh 1.21.1). If the bhāṣya was 
not written together with the sūtra, the sūtra cannot refer to a passage in the 
bhāṣya. Hence, one could argue that both texts must have been composed 
together.158  
iv. The bhāṣya and the introductory verses (sambandhakārikās) use terms such 
as ‘vakṣyāmi’ and ‘pravakṣyāmi’159 to refer to passages in the sūtra. As such, 
the composer of the bhāṣya suggests that he is also the author of the sūtra.160 
v. Some authors argue that the bhāṣya does not deviate from the theory in the 
sūtras, which is seen as evidence for the same authorship of both texts. This 
is further supported by the fact that the bhāṣya does not suggest any 
alternative readings of the sūtras.161 
 
153 This is not an exhaustive list of the arguments but it summarises the most relevant 
arguments that reoccur in the studies mentioned above.  
154 See Part II for a translation and analysis of the praśasti. Umāsvāti is mentioned as the 
author of the work in the fifth verse of the praśasti. 
155 Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 31. The relevant passages are listed by Sanghvi. 
156 Ibid.  
157 ‘The other [beings] [have cosmic perception] that is caused as it is said. [This variety of 
cosmic perception has] six forms.’ See also the translation in Part II.  
158 Ohira 1982: 33-34. 
159 ‘I will teach’. See, e.g., Sambandhakārikās 22 and 31. 
160 For some similar expressions in the TABh, see Bronkhorst 1985: 169.  





vi. Several studies mention that the language and style of the sūtra and bhāṣya 
are similar. Ohira also argues that both works reflect similar historical 
circumstances. 
 
Most of the arguments mentioned above have been convincingly refuted by 
Zydenbos.162 For this purpose, Zydenbos analyses the debate between Sukhlal 
Sanghvi and Phoolchandra Shastri about the authorship of the TA and the TABh. 
Since Sanghvi writes from a Śvetāmbara view — which traditionally accepts the 
TABh as an authoritative auto-commentary — it is not surprising that he argues in 
favour of the same authorship of both texts in the introduction to his own 
commentary on the TA. By contrast, Phoolchandra adheres to the Digambara 
perspective. Since the Digambaras do not accept the bhāṣya as an authoritative 
work — even though the TA has a quasi-canonical status for them — Phoolchandra 
rejects all arguments by Sanghvi in the introduction to his edition of the 
Sarvārthasiddhi. It is important to realise that the different positions in these studies 
have a sectarian background and one cannot take the analyses in these works at face 
value.163 
The first argument mentioned above is certainly not conclusive. The 
argument hinges on the assumption that the praśasti was composed by the author of 
the bhāṣya. However, it is not clear at which point in history the praśasti was added 
to the bhāṣya. As I will demonstrate in the third chapter of this study, the praśasti 
contains several odd historical references that do not correspond with any other 
sources.164 Furthermore, if we look at the manuscripts of the TA, there are good 
reasons to question whether the praśasti was composed by the author of the bhāṣya. 
Ohira’s study provides an overview of the manuscripts of the ‘western version’ of 
 
162 Zydenbos 1983: 10-12. 
163 The discussion often has a polemical character and many ‘arguments’ are merely 
rhetorical in nature. For example, Sanghvi writes that Phoolchandra’s view is ‘as much 
contradicted by logic as it goes against the findings of history’ and ‘that he is so much bent 
upon establishing his position that a clear meaning of words either does not occur to him or 
is ignored by him’. By contrast, Sanghvi characterises his own position as ‘the only royal road 
to truth’ (Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 10, 18). 
164 See § 3.5 for an analysis of the praśasti. Ohira claims that the praśasti contains ‘the 
authentic record of Umāsvāti’. However, her analysis of the names and lineages that are 
mentioned in the praśasti clearly shows that the different historical sources on the lineage of 
Umāsvāti are contradicting each other. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that she 
concludes her investigation by confirming that the praśasti is a trustworthy source of 





the TA, with and without the bhāṣya.165 The oldest of these manuscripts is a palm 
leaf manuscript from 1303 V.S. (i.e., 1246 CE). Apart from one other palm leaf 
manuscript, which seems to be a copy of the oldest manuscript, all other 
manuscripts are paper manuscripts that postdate the 16th century.166 Only four of 
the seventeen manuscripts that Ohira consulted are accompanied by the bhāṣya. 
Three of the four manuscripts that have the bhāṣya also contain the praśasti. The 
bhāṣya is not included in the two early manuscripts but one of these early 
manuscripts includes two verses of the praśasti at the end of the verses that 
conclude the last chapter of the TA.167 This might indicate that the praśasti has its 
own history and that it is not necessarily composed by the author of the bhāṣya.  
Of course, this evidence is not conclusive but the manuscripts do not provide 
sufficient ground to assume that the six verses of the praśasti were written at one 
moment in time and that it was composed together with the bhāṣya. Nevertheless, 
Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā comments on the full version of the praśasti, which shows that 
the complete praśasti already accompanied the bhāṣya at the time of the 
composition of the ṭīkā (9th cent. CE). However, if we do not know for sure whether 
the praśasti was written by the author of the bhāṣya, we should be hesitant to accept 
the claim that is made in the praśasti about the authorship of the TA.  
The fact that Haribhadra attributes some verses of the bhāṣya to Umāsvāti 
shows that the bhāṣya was associated with the name ‘Umāsvāti’ at Haribhadra’s time. 
However, Haribhadra’s works date from the 8th cent. CE, which is three centuries 
after the composition of the bhāṣya.168 It is perfectly possible that Śvetāmbara 
scholars at the time of Haribhadra attributed the bhāṣya to Umāsvāti but this does 
not prove anything about the actual authorship of the text.  
The same goes for the second argument. The fact that Devagupta and 
Siddhasenagaṇi suggest that the sūtra and bhāṣya were composed by the same 
 
165 The southern tradition has the Digambara version of the TA, which does not include the 
Sambandhakārikās, bhāṣya, and praśasti. The manuscripts from the western tradition include 
Śvetāmbara and Digambara versions, and several manuscripts have mixed characteristics 
(Ohira 1982: 1-4). 
166 Ohira 1982: 1. 
167 Ibid., 3-4. 
168 Sanghvi raises some doubts about the identification of Haribhadra, the commentator on 
the TABh, with the famous Śvetāmbara writer Haribhadra. He mentions that Haribhadra’s 
commentary was written by at least three different authors, and that this commentary 
follows Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā. This would imply that the commentary is of later date 





person is not a strong reason to believe that this was actually the case. It is not clear 
who Devagupta actually was and his date is quite uncertain. He must predate 
Siddhasenagaṇi since he included Devagupta’s commentary on the 
sambandhakārikās in his own ṭīkā.169 However, Siddhasenagaṇi probably wrote his 
ṭīkā in the early 9th cent. CE.170 If we take into account that there was a sectarian 
dispute about the authority of the bhāṣya, it is clear that the opinion of a 9th century 
Śvetāmbara author cannot be used to prove that the bhāṣya is an auto-
commentary.171  
The third argument is also not conclusive. It is indeed odd that the sūtra 
seems to refer to a passage in the bhāṣya. However, as I will show in the third 
chapter, it is most likely that the expression ‘yathokta’ in TA 1.23 originally referred 
to a part of the sūtra that was accidentally moved to the bhāṣya.172 This explanation 
is supported by the fact that the expression to which TA 1.23 refers is included in 
the sūtra text in the Sarvārthasiddhi. 
The fourth argument, about the fact that the forms ‘vakṣyāmi’ and 
‘pravakṣyāmi’ are used in the sambandhakārikās with reference to the sūtra, is also 
not conclusive. It is not unusual for commentators to write from the perspective of 
the composer of the sūtra. The Sarvārthasiddhi uses similar forms, even though it is 
obvious that Pūjyapāda is just the commentator and not the author of the TA.173  
The fifth argument is quite problematic. The idea that the bhāṣya does not 
deviate from the sūtra has been convincingly refuted by Bronkhorst, who identified 
a list of ideological differences between the sūtra and the bhāṣya.174 Bronkhorst also 
suggests that the author of the bhāṣya intentionally modified the sūtra at several 
 
169 Ohira 1982: 25. 
170 For the date of Siddhasenagaṇi, see Bronkhorst 1985: 155-157. 
171 In fact, Siddhasenagaṇi was well aware of the problem of the authorship of the bhāṣya. He 
raises this issue in his commentary on TABh 1.11.2. This passage of the bhāṣya writes about 
the author of the sūtra in the third person (see Part II, TABh 1.11.2). However, he concludes 
that the author of the sūtra and the bhāṣya are nevertheless the same. 
172 See my discussion of TA 1.21 – 1.23 in § 3.2 Cosmic perception, mental perception, and 
absolute knowledge. 
173 Zydenbos 1983: 10-11. Zydenbos’s refutation is based on Phoolchandra’s discussion of 
this phenomenon. 
174 For example, the bhāṣya lists 11 classes of gods, even though sūtra 4.4 mentions that there 
are only 10 classes of gods. Likewise, sūtra 2.41 – 2.43 explains that each soul in saṃsāra has 
a taijasa body, which is denied in the bhāṣya. For a detailed discussion of the disagreements 





points.175 This could explain some of the differences between the Śvetāmbara 
version of the sūtra and the Digambara version, which is not accompanied by the 
bhāṣya. As such, the fact that the bhāṣya does not offer any variant readings of the 
sūtra certainly does not entail that the bhāṣya is an auto-commentary. 
Likewise, the idea that the similarity of the language of the sūtra and bhāṣya 
indicates the same authorship is not very strong. In fact, the bhāṣya uses a different 
vocabulary at several points in the text, which suggests the opposite.176  
Lastly, Ohira’s claim that the TA and the TABh reflect the same historical 
circumstances is quite farfetched. This argument is based on the fact that the 
composer of the introductury verses that accompany the TABh stresses how difficult 
it is to summarise the words of the jina in a brief compendium. Ohira argues that 
this statement is only ‘comprehensible in the historical context wherein the author 
was placed’, i.e., the Gupta period. Ohira argues that the Jainas in the Gupta period 
did not have a standard text, unlike the other schools. Therefore, the author of the 
TA was facing a difficult challenge. She adds that it would be impossible for a later 
interpolator to write about these challenging circumstances.177 This argument is 
rather weak. The introductory verses simply state how difficult it is to summarise 
the teachings of the jina in a short compendium. There is no reason to assume that a 
later writer could not write such an introduction. 
To summarise, there is no hard evidence for the position that the bhāṣya is 
an auto-commentary, even though it seems that some elements in the bhāṣya and 
the verses that accompany the bhāṣya try to suggest that both works derive from the 
same hand. This might be explained as a matter of style but there could also be 
another motive. It is not unlikely that the sambandhakārikās and the praśasti were 
composed in order to establish the bhāṣya as an authoritative auto-commentary at a 
time in which several aspects of the bhāṣya had become a matter of sectarian 
disagreement.178 However, the fact that the bhāṣya uses a different vocabulary and 
 
175 Bronkhorst 1985: 174. 
176 For example, TA 1.19 and 1.22 use the word ‘anindriya’ and the commentary on these 
passages uses the peculiar word formation ‘noindriya’ (see also § 3.2 Ordinary cognition). For 
an overview of some other diverging choices of words, see Bronkhorst 1985: 168. 
177 Ohira 1982: 28-29. 





contains several ideas that are not in line with the sūtra strongly suggests that the 
bhāṣya was written by a later author.179  
As I will demonstrate in my analysis of the bhāṣya in chapter 3, it is often 
easier to explain some problematic passages in the bhāṣya if we assume that we are 
dealing with the commentary of a different author. Furthermore, if we accept that 
the bhāṣya was not composed as an auto-commentary, it is also easier to understand 
why the Digambaras did not accept the bhāṣya even though they accepted the TA as 
an authoritative text. It would be difficult, however, to explain how the text could get 
this status if it was accompanied from the start by an auto-commentary that 
contained unacceptable doctrines. In such a case, one would expect that the author 
of the whole text would be regarded as a heretical thinker.180  
In short, there is no single argument that is strong enough to prove that the 
bhāṣya is an auto-commentary. If we assume that the bhāṣya is not an auto-
commentary, we are in a better position to explain some textual and theoretical 
problems, such as diverging word choices and some doctrinal differences. Moreover, 
this assumption makes it easier to understand why the bhāṣya is not accepted by the 
Digambaras. Therefore, if we want to get a better understanding of the development 
of early Jaina philosophy, there is sufficient reason to treat the TA and the TABh as 
two independent texts that were written at different stages in the history of Jaina 
philosophy.  
  
Authorship of the TA and the TABh 
 
As I have argued above, it is likely that the TA and the TABh were composed by 
different authors. However, it is still unclear who the composers of these texts 
actually are. The TA is usually attributed to a writer with the name Umāsvāti or 
Umāsvāmin but very little is known with certainty about this figure. Moreover, the 
fact that the praśasti mentions Umāsvāti as the composer of the TA does not 
necessarily imply that this is a historical fact. As I will demonstrate in § 3.5, there are 
 
179 At some points in the text, it is doubtful whether the author of the bhāṣya fully 
understands the meaning of the sūtra. For example, the commentary on TA 1.20 fails to 
explain the meaning of ‘matipūrva’ and merely rephrases the text of the sūtra. See also the 
discussion of TA 1.20 in § 3.2 Testimony.  
180 Of course, it is not impossible that a community accepts one part of a text and rejects the 






good reasons to assume that the praśasti was a later addition to the bhāṣya, which 
might have been added to give some authority to the TA and the TABh at a time 
when the TABh had become a subject of sectarian dispute. As such, we should not 
only question the authorship of the bhāṣya but also of the TA itself. In the following 
section, I will discuss the identities of the authors of the TA and the TABh. In the first 
part, I will focus on the author of the TA and his sectarian affiliation. Thereafter, I 
will discuss the profile of the author of the bhāṣya.  
 The last two verses of the praśasti, which is the only part of the praśasti that 
accompanies the oldest Śvetāmbara manuscripts of the TA, provide the following 
details about the name of the author and the title of the work:  
 
idam uccairnāgaravācakena sattvānukampayā dṛbdham | 
tattvārthādhigamākhyaṃ spaṣṭam umāsvātinā śāstram ||5|| 
yas tattvādhigamākhyaṃ jñāsyati ca kariṣyate ca tatroktam | 
so ’vyābādhasukhākhyaṃ prāpsyaty acireṇa paramārtham ||6|| 
 
This compendium (śāstra), called ‘Tattvārthādhigama’, was composed (dṛbdha) in 
an intelligible way out of compassion for the living beings by vācaka Umāsvāti of the 
uccairnāgara [śākhā]. 
He who will know [this compendium] called ‘Tattvādhigama’ and also does what is 
said therein, he will soon attain the highest goal, [which is also] called unimpeded 
happiness.181 
 
Even though the TA is nowadays commonly known as the ‘Tattvārthasūtra’ or 
‘Tattvārthādhigamasūtra’, the fifth verse of the praśasti describes the work as a 
‘śāstra’ with the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama’. Nevertheless, the Sanskrit word ‘dṛbdha’ 
(lit. ‘tied’ or ‘strung’), which I translate as ‘composed’, might indicate that the TA was 
regarded as a sūtra (lit. ‘thread’ or ‘string’) at the time of the composition of the 
praśasti.182 This goes against the view of Zydenbos and Phoolchandra, who suggests 
that the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama’ was used for the bhāṣya and that the root text was 
titled ‘Tattvārthasūtra’.183 
 
181 See Part II for a full translation of the praśasti with notes on the translation. 
182 The word ‘dṛbdha’ is not commonly used with the meaning of ‘composed’. One would 
expect ‘saṃdṛbdha’. 
183  Zydenbos’ argument is based on the following observations that are made by 





It is somewhat odd that the sixth verse mentions the title ‘Tattvādhigama’ 
instead of ‘Tattvārthādhigama’. Even though the words ‘tattva’ and ‘tattvārtha’ are 
used as synonyms in the TA, it is still curious that the praśasti refers to the work in 
two different ways.184 Sambandhakārikā 22 uses the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama’, 
which corresponds to the title that is mentioned in the fifth verse of the praśasti. It 
describes the work as a short text (laghugrantha) and as a summary (saṃgraha) of 
‘some of the words of the arhat’ (arhatvacanaikadeśa).185 This suggests that the 
composer of this verse uses the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama’ with reference to the root 
text. In the end, it would be strange to characterise the commentary as a ‘short text’ 
and as a ‘summary’ since the bhāṣya is a relatively long text and certainly not a 
summary.186  
The praśasti does not only mention the title of the TA but also provides the 
name of the author, i.e., Umāsvāti. There are good reasons, however, to question the 
validity of this attribution. If the TA significantly predates the bhāṣya, it is possible 
that it was unclear at the time of the composition of the praśasti who actually 
composed the TA. Moreover, since there was sectarian disagreement about the 
status of the commentary, the attribution of the TA to Umāsvāti might have been a 
strategic choice.187  
 
the root text. This title is also used in the colophons (puṣpikā) at the end of the work. By 
contrast, the puṣpikās at the end of each chapter of the bhāṣya mention the title 
‘Tattvārthādhigama’ (Zydenbos 1983: 11-12). However, it is unclear when the puṣpikās were 
added to the text since the oldest manuscripts date from the 14th century CE. Moreover, the 
oldest manuscript that has the last two verses of the praśasti does not include the bhāṣya. 
This suggests that the titles that are mentioned in the praśasti refer to the root text and not 
to the commentary. As such, the observations by Phoolchandra only indicate that various 
titles were used to refer to the root text and the bhāṣya over the course of time. 
184 For the use of the terms ‘tattvārtha’ and ‘tattva’ in the TA, see, e.g., TA 1.2 and TA 1.4 in 
Part II. Since the praśasti is composed in verse, it is possible that the author abbreviated the 
title for the sake of the metre. 
185 See Part II for a translation of the sambandhakārikās. 
186 Since my study primarily deals with the version of the TA that is accompanied by the 
bhāṣya, I refer to the root text as the ‘Tattvārthādhigama’ (TA), corresponding with the title 
used in the sambandhakārikās and praśasti. It cannot be ruled out that the TA was already 
known as the ‘Tattvārthā(dhigama)sūtra’ at the time of the composition of the TABh. 
However, since the TABh, the sambandhakārikās, and the praśasti do not refer to the TA as a 
‘sūtra’, there is insufficient reason to assume that the text was already known as the 
‘Tattvārthā(dhigama)sūtra’. 
187 For example, if Umāsvāti was known as the author of the bhāṣya, it would make sense for 
the Śvetāmbaras to attribute the TA to the same person since they view the bhāṣya as an 






Apart from the name ‘Umāsvāti’, various other names have been connected 
with the TA in the Jaina tradition. A valuable overview of the historical references to 
the name of the author of the TA can be found in M.A. Dhaky’s study of the 
authorship of the TA and the TABh.188 Dhaky’s article discusses how the ‘southern’ 
and the ‘northern’ tradition have dealt with the authorship of these texts.189 It seems 
that the southern tradition did not have a clear idea about the authorship of the TA 
for a long time.190 Akalaṅka’s Tattvārthavārttika (8th cent CE) does not say anything 
about the name of the author and some later sources attribute the work to a certain 
‘Gṛdhrapicchācārya’.191 The first text that mentions this name as the author of the TA 
is Vīrasena’s Dhavalāṭīkā (9th cent. CE). The same name is mentioned in 
Vidyānanda’s Tattvārthaślokavārttika (10th cent. CE) and in several other texts that 
date from the 10th to the 11th cent CE.192 Some southern manuscripts mention the 
variant name ‘Umāsvāmi’ instead of ‘Umāsvāti’. This seems to be a late development 
that starts with Śrutasāgara’s Tattvārthavṛtti (15th – 16th cent. CE).193 
 
188 See Dhaky 1996. 
189 The southern recension is the version that can be found in the Digambara tradition and 
the northern version is the version that is favoured by the Śvetāmbara tradition. Since it is 
not clear when the split between the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects happened exactly, it 
makes sense to refer to the two versions of the TA as the southern and northern (or, in 
Ohira’s terminology, ‘western’) tradition. The differences between the two versions might 
predate the split of the two sects. Ohira’s overview of the western manuscripts shows that 
the western manuscripts often include elements of the southern recension (Ohira 1982: 2-4).  
190 Dhaky mentions that Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi, which is the first commentary on the 
southern recension of the TA, refers to the author as ‘some Nirgrantha pontiff’ (kaścid ... 
nirgranthācārya), which would confirm that Pūjyapāda did not know the name of the auhor 
of the TA (Dhaky 1996: 53). However, Dhaky’s comment seems to be based on an erroneous 
reading of the opening lines of the Sarvārthasiddhi, since ‘kaścid’ does not refer to the 
compound ‘nirgranthācārya’. Instead, it refers to ‘bhavyaḥ’ (souls that are suitable for 
liberation) (Piotr Balcerowicz, personal communication). See, e.g., Phoolchandra 1997: 1.1, 
§1. 
191 There is a later legend that tells that Umāsvāti flew through the air to Videha and dropped 
his peacock-feather broom. He then took the feathers of a vulture (gṛdhra) that was flying in 
the sky, which explains the name ‘Gṛdhrapiccha’ (lit. ‘tail feather of a vulture’) (Ohira 1982: 
141).  
192 Dhaky 1996: 53-54. 
193 Ibid., 54. The name ‘Umāsvāmi’ is used in many contemporary Digambara sources. 
Balcerowicz attributes the TA to ‘Umāsvāmin’ and the TABh to ‘Umāsvāti’ (Balcerowicz 
2008:35, n. 23). Williams makes a similar distinction between Umāsvāmin, the author of the 
TA, and Umāsvāti, the author of the Śrāvakaprajñapti (Williams 1963: 3, n4). Since the name 
‘Umāsvāmi(n)’ only appears after the 15th cent. CE, it is quite unlikely that this was the name 





Apart from the textual sources, there are also some inscriptions that are 
relevant for the authorship of the TA. A group of seven inscriptions from Śravaṇa 
Beḷgoḷa mentions the name ‘Gṛddhrapiñcha’, which must be the same as the name 
‘Gṛdhrapicchācārya’ that is mentioned in the texts. These inscriptions date from 
1115 CE to 1409 CE. Five of these inscriptions are located at Candragiri and two at 
Vindhyagiri. The five inscriptions at Candragiri predate the inscriptions at 
Vindhyagiri. They all contain a verse that mentions ‘Gṛddhrapiñcha’ as an alias of 
‘Umāsvāti’.194 However, these five inscriptions do not mention anything about the 
TA. By contrast, the two inscriptions from Vindhyagiri mention that Umāsvāti was 
the author of the ‘Tattvārthasūtra’. The first of these two inscriptions (1398 CE) 
mentions that Gṛddhrapiñcha was a disciple of Umāsvāti. The other inscription 
(1409 CE) provides the same information as the five inscriptions from Candragiri. 
Apart from the inscriptions at Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa there is one other inscription that 
mentions the TA. This inscription, which is located in Humcha, attributes the TA to a 
certain ‘Āryadeva’.195 
In short, none of the southern sources that predate the 9th cent. CE mention 
the name of the author of the TA. After that, the name Gṛdhrapiccha appears in 
textual sources as the author of the TA. From the 12th cent. CE, the name 
Gṛdhrapiccha/Gṛddhrapiñcha is mentioned in inscriptions as an alias of Umāsvāti. 
However, the first inscription that identifies this Umāsvāti as the author of the TA 
dates from the end of the 14th cent. CE. Since the TABh is not accepted in the 
southern tradition, there are no references to the authorship of the TABh in the 
southern sources. 
There are no inscriptions from the northern tradition that refer to the TA.196 
Yet, several literary sources that postdate the praśasti identify the author of the TA. 
Agastyasiṃha’s cūrṇī on the Daśavaikālikasūtra cites two passages from the TA and 
two passages from the TABh and attributes them to Umāsvāti.197 As mentioned 
previously, Haribhadra’s incomplete commentary on the bhāṣya and 
Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā both attribute the two works to Umāsvāti. From the 12th cent. 
CE onwards, Umāsvāti is frequently mentioned as the author of the TA and the TABh 
 
194 ‘abhūd Umāsvāti munīśvaro asau ācāryā śabdottara gṛddhrapiñchaḥ’ (Dhaky 1996: 51). 
195 Dhaky 1996: 52. 
196 Ibid., 57. 





in brief eulogies.198 In short, the sources in the northern tradition unequivocally 
attribute the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti. However, there are no sources that refer 
to the author of the TA that predate the praśasti.  
Given the consistent attribution of the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti in the 
northern tradition, Dhaky’s study concludes that both works were written by 
Umāsvāti. He speculates that the southern tradition came up with a different name, 
i.e., Gṛdhrapiccha, since they realised that Umāsvāti did not belong to the Digambara 
sect.199 However, Dhaky’s conclusion rests on the assumption that the TABh is an 
auto-commentary. As I have argued previously, it is rather unlikely that the TA and 
the TABh were composed by the same person. This implies that we cannot take the 
information in the northern sources for granted, since they all attribute the TA and 
the TABh to the same person. If the bhāṣya is not an auto-commentary, it is still a 
possibility that either the TA or the TABh was written by Umāsvāti but at least one 
of these attributions must be wrong. 
If we suppose that Umāsvāti did not compose the bhāṣya but only the TA 
itself, it would be difficult to explain why the southern tradition completely forgot 
the name of the author, even though the Jainas in the North were well aware of his 
name. In the end, it is safe to assume that there was contact between the northern 
and southern tradition.200 Dhaky’s idea that the Digambaras in the South consciously 
avoided to use Umāsvāti’s name since they knew that he was not a Digambara seems 
to be a bit farfetched. In such as case, it would be hard to understand why they 
accepted the TA as an authoritative text in the first place. 
Therefore, it seems more plausible that the name of the composer of the TA 
was not known in the North and the South when both traditions wrote their first 
commentaries on the text.201 This suggests that there was a considerable amount of 
time between the composition of the TA and the first commentaries. Otherwise, it 
would be somewhat odd that the name of the author was so quickly forgotten. If 
Umāsvāti did not write the TA, it is still possible that he wrote the bhāṣya. Since the 
 
198 Ibid., 57. 
199 Ibid., 55. 
200 The fact that a substantial number of manuscripts of the TA from the North contain 
elements of the southern recension, shows that the two traditions did not evolve completely 
independent from each other.  
201 In chapter 3, I will demonstrate that the TA was probably the outcome of a longer process 
and that the text contains several historical layers. This would also explain why the text is 





bhāṣya was a matter of sectarian dispute, it would make sense if the northern 
tradition tried to legitimise the bhāṣya by claiming that the two texts were written 
by the same hand.  
Even though it is more likely that Umāsvāti was the author of the bhāṣya 
instead of the sūtra, it is also possible that the bhāṣya was composed by a different 
author whose name is unknown to us. There is very little information about 
Umāsvāti in the Jaina sources, and the information about the teachers and lineage of 
Umāsvāti in the praśasti does not match the records in other texts.202  
According to the praśasti, Umāsvāti stayed for some time in Kusumapura 
(Pāṭaliputra). As I will discuss later in this section, it is most likely that the TABh was 
composed in the first half of the 5th cent. CE. If Umāsvāti was indeed the author of the 
bhāṣya and if the information in the praśasti is correct, we can reasonably assume 
that the bhāṣya was composed in Pāṭaliputra during the Gupta Period. Given the 
problematic status of the praśasti, however, there is very little that can be said with 
certainty about the author of the bhāṣya.203 The same goes for the composer of the 
TA itself. If his identity was already unclear at the time of the composition of the first 
commentaries, it is unlikely that we will ever precisely know who the author of the 
TA was.204 
 
Sectarian affiliation of the TA and the TABh 
 
Even if we cannot identify the names of the authors of the TA and the TABh with 
certainty, it is still possible to investigate some aspects of their identity based on the 
 
202 Ohira has argued that the information about Umāsvāti in the praśasti is valid (Ohira 1982: 
42-53). However, it is quite clear from her discussion that the sources are in fact 
contradicting each other and she admits that the historical genealogies disagree with each 
other ‘to a great extent’ (p. 49). Her reconstruction of the lineage of Umāsvāti is partly based 
on the identification of the name ‘Umāsvāti’ and the name ‘Svāti’. However, this identification 
seems to have its origin in the 16th cent. CE (Dharmasāgaragaṇi’s Tapāgaccha paṭṭāvali) and 
is, therefore, not very reliable. For an overview of the relevant paṭṭāvalis, see Ohira 1982: 45-
48. 
203 See § 3.5 for a further discussion of the biographical information in the praśasti.  
204 Zydenbos also argues that Umāsvāti was not the author of the TA. Nevertheless, he 
suggests that Umāsvāti did compose the TABh (Zydenbos 1983: 10-11).  
Bronkhorst has suggested that the TA was composed ‘in the South’. His main argument for 
situating the TA in the South is his observation that the TA has some Digambara and 
Yāpanīya features (Bronkhorst 2010: 10). However, this suggestion has not led to any 
further clues about the identity of the composer. See also the discussion of the sectarian 





ideas that are expressed in the texts themselves. On the basis of some doctrinal 
issues in the TA and the TABh, scholars have tried to identify the sectarian affiliation 
of the composers. Since the TA has some characteristics that go against Digambara 
views but also do not fit completely within the Śvetāmbara framework, the scholarly 
views on the sectarian affiliation of the TA are divided. This debate is further 
complicated by the fact that the Digambara recension of the text differs from the 
Śvetāmbara version. Since the manuscripts all postdate the first commentators, who 
might have changed the text, it is hard to determine which version of the text is 
older.205 
 Sanghvi argues that the TA is a Śvetāmbara work. In his argumentation, he 
first eliminates the possibility that the composer of the TA belonged to the 
Digambara sect. He argues that the Uccairnāgara śākhā, which is mentioned in the 
praśasti as Umāsvāti’s branch, cannot be situated in the Digambara tradition since 
this śākhā is not mentioned in the Digambara sources.206 However, as I have 
previously argued, it is unlikely that Umāsvāti composed the TA, which invalidates 
Sanghvi’s first argument. Sanghvi further claims that several passages, such as TA 
5.38 which states that time (kāla) is a substance, go against Digambara views. 
However, even if later Digambara sources have different views on these matters, we 
do not have to assume that their theories never changed. Pūjyapāda’s commentary 
on TA 5.38, explicitly confirms the view that time is a substance and even provides 
additional arguments for this idea. Hence, it seems that Pūjyapāda, who belonged to 
the Digambara tradition, did not have any problems with this idea at all.  
After discussing why the TA cannot be a Digambara work, Sanghvi tries to 
show that the TA must be a Śvetāmbara work. His arguments for this claim are 
rather weak. Again, he refers to the śākhā and lineage that are mentioned in the 
praśasti, which both appear in some Śvetāmbara paṭṭāvalīs.207 Even though this 
suggests that the praśasti, and perhaps also the bhāṣya, was composed in a 
Śvetāmbara milieu, it does not solve the problem of the sectarian affiliation of the TA 
 
205 In her discussion of the differences between the Śvetāmbara and Digambara version of 
the TA, Ohira suggests that Pūjyapāda revised the TA in his Sarvārthasiddhi (Ohira 1982: 20). 
However, as I will demonstrate in the third chapter, some problems in the text suggest that 
the composer of the bhāṣya changed the text of the TA. For example, the last verse of the first 
chapter of the TA (TA 1.35) only exists in the Śvetāmbara version of the text and seems to 
have been added by the commentator (see also § 3.2). 
206 Sanghvi 1974, Introduction: 31. 





itself. He further argues that no ‘ancient or modern Śvetāmbara masters’ have 
challenged the authority of the text, unlike ‘their Digambara counterparts’. Further, 
he argues that some aspects of the Praśamarati, which is often attributed to 
Umāsvāti, deals with the clothes and utensils of monks in a way that is only 
acceptable for Śvetāmbara ascetics.208 However, the authorship of the Praśamarati is 
far from clear and even if it was written by Umāsvāti, we cannot use this argument 
to say anything about the TA if Umāsvāti did not compose the TA. 
 Contrary to Sanghvi’s view, R. Williams argues that the TA cannot be a 
Śvetāmbara work. His claim is based on the discussion of lay practice in the seventh 
chapter of the TA. This chapter contains several rules that are only found in 
Digambara sources and some of them contradict the rules that are mentioned in the 
Śvetāmbara canon.209 He even argues that the development of the corpus of rules for 
the layman (śrāvakācāra) ‘is only understandable if the Tattvārtha-sūtra is regarded 
as belonging originally to the Digambaras’.210 Just as in the case of Sanghvi, Williams 
seems to assume that rules and doctrines within a particular tradition do not change 
over time, and that the canonical scripures cannot be contradicted in later literature. 
However, even though Williams thinks that the TA is a Digambara work, he writes 
that the TABh is ‘markedly Śvetāmbara in tone’.211 If the chapter on lay conduct had 
gone against the Śvetāmbara views at the time of the composition of the bhāṣya, it is 
hard to explain why a Śvetāmbara composer would write a commentary on the TA 
without even modifying the text.212 
Since the TA has some characterics that do not correspond with traditional 
Śvetāmbara views and some other features that go against some later Digambara 
ideas, some scholars have argued that the author of the TA did not belong to the 
Śvetāmbara or Digambara sect. Instead, they situate the text in a Yāpanīya 
context.213 This position is favoured by Bronkhorst (1985, 2010).214 He proposes 
 
208 Ibid. 
209 Williams 1963: 2.  
210 Ibid., 3. 
211 Ibid., 2, n1. 
212 Two sūtras that are part of the Digambara recension of the TA (TA 4 and 8) are included 
in the bhāṣya in the Śvetāmbara recension. Apart from this, there are no differences between 
the Digambara and Śvetāmbara version of the chapter on lay conduct (Williams 1963: 2). 
213 Wiley’s Historical Dictionary of Jainism provides the following information about the 
Yāpanīyas: The Yāpanīya sect is an ‘early mendicant lineage that combined features from the 
Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions’. They appear in ‘numerous inscriptions from the 5th 





that the TA is close to the Digambara perspective but he points out that it is 
unacceptable from a Digambara perspective that a jina would eat or drink. 
Nevertheless, TA 9.11 mentions that there are eleven sufferings (pariṣahā) that a 
jina must bear. Two of these sufferings are hunger (kṣudh) and thirst (pipāsā).215 
Bronkhorst concludes, therefore, that it is unlikely that the TA is a Digambara work.  
Bronkhorst further argues that the views of the Yāpanīyas were very close to 
the Digambara ideas. However, the Yāpanīyas did not believe that a jina cannot eat 
or drink and they would not have any problem with the reference to the eleven 
hardships in TA 9.11. This leads Bronkhorst to the conclusion that the TA was 
probably a Yāpanīya text.  
Since the TA has some aspects that do not fit perfectly in the Śvetāmbara or 
Digambara realm, it would be an attractive solution if we could situate the TA in a 
sectarian context that was neither Śvetāmbara nor Digambara. The Yāpanīya sect is 
an interesting candidate for this purpose since we do not have any information 
about the views of the Yāpanīyas that contradicts the doctrines in the TA. 
Nevertheless, the attribution of the TA to the Yāpanīyas is certainly not a problem 
free solution. First, there is not a single historical source that associates the TA or 
even Umāsvāti with the Yāpanīya sect. Second, our understanding of the views of the 
Yāpanīyas is very limited. Apart from the fact that they have no problems with the 
partaking of food of the jina, we simply do not know whether the views of the 
Yāpanīyas correspond with the views in the TA. There are only some minor issues 
that complicate the identification of the TA as a Śvetāmbara or Digambara text, and 
one can easily imagine that we would have similar problems if we had more sources 
from the Yāpanīyas. Third, the composers of the TABh and the Sarvārthasiddhi did 
not change the text of TA 9.11.216 If this passage had radically opposed the views of 
 
Kuṣāṇa images from Mathurā are associated with the Yāpanīyas. Unlike the Digambaras, they 
believed ‘that women can attain liberation’ and that ‘an omniscient (kevalin) being partakes 
of food’. There are only two extant texts that are associated with the Yāpanīyas, which deal 
with the liberation of women and ‘the taking of food by an omniscient being’. Their lay 
followers, who were apparently ‘quite affluent’, ‘built a number of temples in northern 
Karnataka’ (Wiley 2004: 238-239). 
214 Several other scholars hold similar positions. Nathooram Premi and A.N. Upadhye even 
claim that not only the TA but also the TABh is a Yāpanīya work (Dhaky 1996: 62). 
215 Bronkhorst 1985: 177. 
216 See Ohira 1982: 21-23 for a discussion of both commentaries on TA 9.11. It seems that the 
verse was problematic for Pūjyapāda since he tries to alter the meaning of the verse in a 





both sects at the time of the first commentaries, it is difficult to understand why the 
commentators would not have changed the text or rejected the TA altogether. It is 
also hard to imagine why the Śvetāmbara and Digambaras would accept the TA as a 
compendium of Jaina thought if the text had evident Yāpanīya characteristics. 
Fourth, as mentioned previously, it is unrealistic to expect that the ideas of 
particular traditions do not change over time. The fact that a group like the 
Yāpanīyas could emerge and that they had slightly different ideas precisely indicates 
that the views of the Jainas in general were subject to change. As such, we cannot 
rule out that the view in TA 9.11 was acceptable for different Jaina groups at the 
time of the composition of the TA. 
 Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the author of the TA 
belonged to the Yāpanīya sect, there are other ways in which we can deal with the 
fact that the TA does not perfectly match the Śvetāmbara or Digambara views. 
Taking into account that the history of the split of the different Jaina sects is far from 
clear, some scholars have suggested that the TA predates the hard schism of the 
Jaina community. For example, Dhaky suggests that the TA was composed by a ‘pre-
Śvetāmbara or non-Śvetāmbara [...] Northern Nirgrantha holyman’.217 As discussed 
previously, Dhaky assumes that the TABh is an auto-commentary. This probably 
explains why he still tries to connect the text with the Śvetāmbara tradition, albeit in 
a somewhat vague manner.218 Holding a somewhat similar position, Dundas writes 
that ‘although a case can be made for Umāsvāti having been a Śvetāmbara, it seems 
better to assume that he was writing at a time before the sectarian traditions had 
fully crystallised’.219 Even though Dhaky and Dundas both propose that the TA 
predates the hard division between the Śvetāmbara and Digambara communities, 
they still suggest that there are reasons to assume that the text was close to the 
Śvetāmbara realm. However, this idea seems to rest on the assumption that the TA 
and the TABh were composed by the same hand. Since it is rather unlikely that the 
TABh is an auto-commentary there is no need to link the TA with the 
(pre-)Śvetāmbara community although it seems plausible that the bhāṣya was 
written in an early Śvetāmbara context.  
 
not to an ‘ayoga kevali’ (Ohira 1982: 21). However, there is nothing in the text of the TA that 
suggests that this is indeed the intending meaning. 
217 Dhaky 1996: 62.  
218 It is unclear to me what the expression ‘non-Śvetāmbara’ in Dhaky’s analysis could 
possibly mean. 





Given the lack of clarity about the sectarian identity of the composer of the 
TA and given the wide acceptance of the TA in the different Jaina sects, there is a 
strong case to be made for the view that the TA was composed before a hard 
ideological schism had appeared in the Jaina community.220 
 
Date of the TA and the TABh 
 
Apart from the fact that there is much uncertainty about the identity of the 
composers of the TA and the TABh, there is also no consensus about the dates of the 
texts. Since there is no reliable information about the authors that can be used to 
date the texts, scholars have come up with different arguments to situate the TA and 
the TABh in time. The suggested dates for both texts range from the 1st to the 5th 
cent. CE.221  
Bronkhorst’s article ‘On the Chronology of the Tattvārtha-sūtra’ contains a 
detailed analysis of the dates of the TA and the TABh. Bronkhorst concludes that the 
TA was composed between 150 and 350 CE and that the TABh is likely to have been 
composed at some point during the 4th cent. CE. His argument is based on a textual 
analysis of the TA and the TABh and the dates of Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā and 
Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi. He argues that Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā can be dated to 
the first half of the 9th cent. CE, which implies that the TA and the TABh must predate 
the 9th cent. CE.222 However, there is more evidence that suggests that both texts 
were written in a much earlier period. Bronkhorst’s article situates Pūjyapāda’s life 
not long after 455 CE, which means that the TA at least predates the middle of the 5th 
cent. CE.223 It is doubtful whether the date of the Sarvārthasiddhi can be used as an 
upper limit for the bhāṣya as well. Ohira writes that it is ‘self-evident’ that the bhāṣya 
 
220 In the same article in which Bronkhorst suggests that the TA was written by a Yāpanīya 
author, he also admits that it is strange that the TA does not say anything about the 
liberation of women, which was a fundamental issue for the Yāpanīyas. Therefore, he does 
not rule out the possibility that the text was perhaps ‘composed in a time when there was no 
disagreement as yet on this topic, or even in the time before a split had occurred between the 
Yāpanīyas and the Digambaras’ (Bronkhorst 1985: 178).  
221 An overview of the different positions can be found in Balcerowicz 2008: 35, n23. Another 
brief overview can be found in Zydenbos 1983: 12. Zydenbos mentions that the dating of the 
TA is a ‘difficult matter’ and he does not provide a further analysis of the possible date of the 
text. 
222 See, e.g., Williams 1963: 7 and Bronkhorst 1985: 157. 





predates the Sarvārthasiddhi but her arguments are not fully convincing. She writes 
that the explanations of technical terms are more clear in the Sarvārthasiddhi, and 
that Pūjyapāda’s text refers more often to other schools. In Ohira’s view, this 
demonstrates that the Sarvārthasiddhi was written after the TABh and that 
Pūjyapāda had the TABh in front of him when he composed his commentary.224  
It does make sense to say that the style of the Sarvārthasiddhi seems to be of 
a later date but Ohira’s argument is certainly not conclusive. Yet, Bronkhorst 
provides another argument that enables us to date the TABh before the middle of 
the 5th cent. CE. Based on a citation from a version of the Dhātupāṭha that predates 
450 CE that appears in the TABh, Bronkhorst infers that the TABh must have been 
composed before 450 CE.225 He concludes his analysis of the date of the TABh with 
the idea that the bhāṣya was probably written in 4th cent. CE. He writes that this 
century ‘saw the establishment of the Gupta empire in and around Pāṭaliputra’, 
which is mentioned in the praśasti, and that this period was characterised ‘by the 
increased use of Sanskrit’ and ‘religious tolerance’. This last part of his analysis is 
somewhat speculative and does not necessarily imply that the TABh was actually 
composed before the 5th cent. CE. Since Bronkhorst attributes the TA to the 
Yāpanīyas, he argues that the TA must postdate the origin of the Yāpanīya sect, 
which he dates to 150 CE. Hence, he concludes that the TA was composed ‘in all 
probability’ between 150 and 350 CE. 226 
Even though some older studies suggest earlier dates for the TA, most 
studies from the last decades have suggested dates for the TA and the TABh that are 
largely similar to Bronkhorst’s proposal. The main difference exists between those 
studies that regard the bhāṣya as an auto-commentary and others that assume that 
the works were composed by different authors. The last group often dates the TA 
itself earlier in time, although both groups agree that the bhāṣya belongs to the 4th or 
5th cent. CE. For example, Ohira suggests that the TABh was composed ‘somewhere 
in the late middle’ of the 5th cent. CE.227 Dhaky, who also assumes that the TABh is an 
 
224 Ohira 1982: 40. Bronkhorst writes that ‘no evidence is known’ that Pūjyapāda ‘was 
acquainted with’ the TABh (Bronkhorst 1985: 172). 
225 Bronkhorst 1985: 161-163. 
226 Ibid., 178. 
227 Ohira’s analysis is mainly based on the relationship between the TA and the TABh and 
other philosophical works. The fact that she assumes that the TA and the TABh were both 
written by Umāsvāti makes her analysis problematic. She also argues that the TA and the 





auto-commentary dates both texts to 350-375 CE.228 Leaving the question of the 
authorship of the bhāṣya aside, Dundas dates the TA to the ‘fourth or fifth’ cent. CE.229  
The exact date of the TABh will probably remain unclear unless further 
evidence is discovered but the general scholarly consensus suggests that it is safe to 
situate the TABh somewhere between 350 and 450 CE. The date of the TA itself is a 
difficult matter. Since the TA is clearly responding to some passages in the 
Nyāyasūtra, we can be quite sure that the TA postdates the Nyāyasūtra.230 The 
strong focus on epistemological matters in the first chapter of the TA also indicates 
that the TA was written at a moment when the theories of knowledge became a 
popular philosophical theme. Therefore, I am inclined to situate the TA not too far 
from the rise of epistemological works in the Buddhist and Hindu traditions in the 
5th cent. CE. As I have argued previously, it is likely that some time passed between 
the composition of the TA and the TABh. It seems, therefore, reasonable to accept 
Balcerowicz’s position, who summarises his view as follows:  
 
[W]hen we take into consideration the structure of the text, simplicity of lucid 
Sanskrit, a moderate level of philosophical depth, clear influence of ideas present in 
the Nyāya-sūtra (but not in the Nyāya-bhāṣya), no reference to later philosophical 
ideas, we can assign Umāsvāmin’s Tattvārtha-sūtra to c. 350-400, and Umāsvāti’s 
Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya to c. 400-450 (there are strong reasons to believe that 
the Bhāsya was written by a different person than Umāsvāmin, the author of TA). 
The upper limit for the Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya is the Council of Valabhī 
(between 450-480; traditionally in Vīra Saṁvat 980 or 993, i.e. in 453 or 466 C.E.), 
presided over by Devarddhi-gaṇin Kṣamā-śramaṇa, where the Śvetāmbara Canon 
was finally codified (TBh 1.20 reflects an earlier list of the Canonical works).231  
 
 
works (Ohira 1982: 135). Since there are no direct quotations of these works in the TA and 
the TABh, it is not evident that the composers of the TA and the TABh were actually 
acquainted with these works. 
228 Dhaky 1996: 61. 
229 Dundas 1992: 86. 
230 See chapter 3 for an analysis of the relationship between the TA and the Nyāyasūtra. 
There is no evidence that the composers of the TA and the TABh were acquainted with the 
Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya. This is another reason to situate the TABh before the middle of the 5th 
cent. CE.  
231 Balcerowicz 2008:35, n. 23. For a discussion of the wrong attribution of the TA to 





The upper limit that Balcerowicz proposes is based on the fact that the bhāṣya 
provides a list of the canonical works, which deviates from the canon that was 
established during the third Jaina council. This argument has some strength, even 
though we cannot be sure that the outcomes of the council were immediately 
accepted and represented in all texts that were written after this event.232 
Nevertheless, Balcerowicz’s proposal largely corresponds with the ideas of the 
majority of recent scholarly studies and his dating of the TA and the TABh seems to 
be a plausible account in the light of the available evidence.  
 To sum up, it is reasonable to situate the composition of the TA at some 
point between 350 and 400 CE. We do not know the name of its author and it seems 
that he wrote his text at a point in time when the boundaries between the different 
Jaina sects were not as pronounced as at the time of the first commentaries. The 
TABh was probably composed between 400 and 450 CE. Umāsvāti might have been 
the author of this commentary. If the record in the praśasti can be trusted, we can 
situate him in a Śvetāmbara milieu in Pāṭaliputra. Since it is hard to determine the 
date of the sambandhakārikās and the praśasti and since there are good reasons to 
assume that the composer(s) of these verses tried to legitimise the authority of the 
bhāṣya, we should treat the claims in these verses with caution. Hence, as long as no 
further evidence for the authorship of the TA and the TABh emerges, scholars will 









2.4 Conclusion of the Historical Analysis 
 
The aim of the foregoing sections was to get a better understanding of the historical 
position of the TA and the TABh. The first section (§ 2.1) provided an overview of 
the development of early Jaina philosophy (300 – 600 CE). This survey shows that 
Jaina philosophy did not develop in a linear way and that the distinction between 
the ‘age of Āgamas’ and the ‘age of Logic’, made by Dixit, is quite problematic. It is 
clear that the TA played a seminal role in the developments of Jaina thought but it 
certainly did not form the end of the ‘age of Āgamas’, as suggested by Dixit. The texts 
that were written by the Jainas after the TA had a diverse character and doctrinal 
ideas went hand in hand with rational analysis. Moreover, the later canonical texts 
seem to contain different historical layers and it is likely that the TA influenced some 
of these scriptures, such as the Nandīsūtra and Anuyogadvārasūtra. The idea that the 
TA simply summarises the positions in the canonical texts is, therefore, untenable. 
Likewise, there is no sudden shift from Prākrit to Sanskrit. The TA is an important 
text in this development, given its status as the oldest extant Sanskrit text of the 
Jainas. Yet, authors such as Kundakunda, Siddhasena Divākara, and Jinabhadra Gaṇi 
wrote several treatises in Prākrit, which clearly shows that Sanskrit did not replace 
Prākrit as a philosophical language after the TA.  
 The second section (§ 2.2) discussed the position of the Jainas in the Gupta 
Age. This section shows that the Gupta Period was a transformative era for the 
Jainas even though there is no scholarly consensus on the nature of the changes that 
took place. There available evidence suggests a decline in increase of activity in the 
North and a rise of activity in the West and South. Ohira links this phenomenon to 
the Hindu revival movement under the Guptas, Bronkhorst suggests that there was 
some rivalry with the Buddhists, and Dundas suggests that there was a general 
decline in political stability in the North and a more promising business climate in 
the West. Their views about the position of the Jainas in the South are also different. 
While Ohira and Bronkhorst believe that the Jainas were actively looking for royal 
patronage, Dundas thinks that the support was mainly provided by the mercantile 
class. Even though some scholars have suggested that the TA was composed in order 
to compete with other movements for royal patronage, there is not enough evidence 





 The third section (§ 2.3) investigated the date and authorship of the TA and 
the TABh. This section shows that it is highly unlikely that the TABh has been 
composed as an auto-commentary. This has some implications for the reliability of 
the sambandhakārikās and praśasti, which seem to claim the opposite. I also argued 
that there is no reason to assume that the TA was composed by the Umāsvāti, 
although he might have been the composer of the bhāṣya. When it comes to the 
sectarian affiliation of the texts, I have argued that there is insufficient evidence to 
situate the TA in an Yāpanīya context, and that it is more likely that the TA predates 
the hard split between the different sects. Yet, the TABh seems to be written in a 
Śvetāmbara context. Even though the dating of both texts remains a matter of 
speculation, I propose to date the TA at some point in the 4th cent. CE and the TABh 
in the first half of the 5th cent. CE.  
 The analysis of the historical context of the TA and the TABh leaves many 
questions unanswered. It is hard to interpret the evidence of the Jainas in the Gupta 
Period and it is even more complex to situate the composition of the texts in this 
context. For this reason, I have argued that it is more promising to investigate the 
texts themselves in an attempt to uncover the aims and strategies of their authors 
and to get a better understanding of their intellectual surroundings. The next 
chapter contains the results of my research into these aspects, together with an 






3. Textual Analysis 
 
3.1 General Structure of the Tattvārthādhigama 
 
The TA differs in many respects from canonical Jaina texts that deal with similar 
topics, such as the Nandīsūtra.233 The TA provides a soteriology (mokṣamārga)234 
which is firmly rooted in an ontological and epistemological framework, and the text 
is composed in a concise and systematic manner. By contrast, the canonical texts 
that deal with epistemological and ontological concepts do not present these 
theoretical elements as a system and the different types of knowledge and 
substances are usually listed in a merely encyclopaedic way. The order of the ten 
chapters of the TA clearly indicates that the composer of the text tried to position 
Jaina soteriology within an overall theory of reality and wanted to legitimise this 
account by providing a theory of knowledge. The different chapters deal 
respectively with the following topics: 
 
I. The means of cognition and perspectives 
 
II. Types and characteristics of the soul 
III. Cosmology — the lower and the middle regions 
IV. The gods 
V. Non-sentient substances 
 
VI. The influx of karman 
VII. The vows  
VIII. Karmic bondage 
IX. Inhibiting and wearing off karman  
X. Liberation 
 
The whole text can be divided into three parts, which are indicated by the horizontal 
lines in the table above.235 The first part (chapter I) presents the Jaina theory of 
 
233 See § 2.1 for an overview of early Jaina philosophical texts. 
234 The first sūtra of the TA uses the term ‘mokṣamārga’ (see TA 1.1). 
235 The proposed division relates only to the conceptual structure of the text and does not 





knowledge (jñāna). The second part (chapters II – IV) provides a description of 
reality from an ontological perspective. It discusses the layout of the universe, which 
consists of non-sentient (ajīva) matter and principles — including space, time, and 
motion — as well as sentient elements (jīva) that animate living organisms, such as 
plants, animals, human beings, and gods. The third part (chapters VI – X) discusses 
how the material world affects the non-material soul, and how the soul can cut its 
bonds with the material world in order to reach a state of liberation. The way in 
which the chapters are divided is clearly based on the traditional Jaina categories 
(tattva), which Umāsvāti presents as follows:236 
 
 
II. The seven categories of reality (tattva) (TA 1.4) 
i. jīva (soul) 
ii. ajīva (non-soul, i.e., non-living substance) 
iii. āsrava (influx of karmic particles that stick to the soul) 
iv. bandha (binding; the bondage which results from karmic influx) 
v. saṃvara (the way to stop the accumulation of karman) 
vi. nirjarā (destruction; wearing off collected karmic particles through asceticism) 
vii. mokṣa (liberation) 
 
These seven categories contain the basic elements of Jaina soteriology and form a 
sequential series.237 The different tattvas can be connected with the individual 
chapters of the TA as follows: 
 
 
236 The Jaina tattvas are mentioned in TA 1.4, which reads: ‘jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvara-
nirjarāmokṣās tattvam’. See also Part II.  






III. Chapters of the Tattvārthādhigama and the tattvas 
Chapters tattvas 
I. The means of cognition and perspectives -  
II. Types and characteristics of the soul i. jīva 
III. Cosmology — the lower and the middle regions -  
IV. The gods -  
V. Non-sentient substances ii. ajīva 
VI. The influx of karman iii. āsrava 
VII. The vows -  
VIII. Karmic bondage iv. bandha 
IX. Inhibiting and wearing off karman  v. saṃvara 
vi. nirjarā 
X. Liberation vii. mokṣa 
 
Even though it is evident that the chapters of the TA largely follow the sequence of 
the tattvas, it is also clear that the TA wants to provide more than a manual on the 
tattvas. Chapters I, III, IV, and VII — which deal respectively with knowledge, 
cosmology, gods, and the vows — do not address any of the tattvas and they form a 
substantial portion of the whole text.238 It remains a question whether this was a 
response to an external intellectual movement or whether the author simply 
thought that these topics should be part of a compendium on Jaina doctrine even 
though he could not connect them to the traditional list of tattvas.239 
 
238 One may argue that chapter III and IV can be subsumed under one of the tattvas; since 
these chapters deal with the different cosmic realms and its inhabitants, it makes sense to 
see these chapters as a further elaboration on the first tattva (i.e., jīva), which is discussed in 
chapter II. Yet, it remains a given that the composer of the TA dedicated separate chapters to 
these topics. 
239 I am not aware of any Jaina text that predates the TA and has a similar tenfold structure, 
and one may wonder why the composer of the TA did not choose a sevenfold structure in 
accordance with the tattvas. The structure of the text has some similarities with the layout of 
the Abhidharmakośakārikā and it is noteworthy that chapters III and IV of the TA — which 
do not correspond with one of the tattvas — deal with the same topic as the third chapter of 
the Abhidharmakośakārikā, titled ‘Lokanirdeśa’ (for a French translation of this chapter, see 
La Vallée Poussin 1919). Partly based on this observation, Ohira assumes that the composer 
of the TA was directly influenced by the Abhidharmakośakārikā (Ohira 1982: 59-60). 
However, since there are no direct references to Vasubandhu’s work in the TA, it is hard to 
determine whether the composer of the TA was indeed acquainted with the 
Abhidharmakośakārikā or not. Mark Mejor has shown that Siddhasenagaṇi and 





It is remarkable that the TA opens with a chapter on knowledge — a topic 
that is not included in the tattvas — and one may wonder why the author gives such 
a prominent positon to epistemology. Looking at the overall structure of the TA, one 
could argue that the composer of the text started with an epistemological discussion 
in order to maintain a conceptually clear order. This is a feature that strongly 
characterises the whole text. For example, the TA opens by saying that ‘the path to 
liberation is constituted by right worldview, right knowledge, and right conduct’ (TA 
1.1). Immediately after that, the text explains the first element in this list — i.e., right 
worldview — which is defined as confidence in the tattvas (TA 1.2). Then, after a 
remark on the causes of right worldview (TA 1.3), the text continues with an 
enumeration of these tattvas (TA 1.4). In the same way, the author deals with the 
other two items that are mentioned in TA 1.1, i.e., right knowledge and right conduct. 
In other words, the questions that are raised by the individual sūtras are 
systematically answered in the subsequent sections.240 A similar pattern applies to 
the text as a whole. To illustrate, chapter III starts with a general layout of the 
cosmos. This is followed by an explanation of the different realms, i.e., hells, the 
middle region, and the heavens. Next, the TA discusses the ontological categories in 
chapter V. This answers the question as to what ultimately constitutes the cosmos. 
Only after introducing the ontological categories, which includes material substance 
(pudgala), does the TA continue with an analysis of karman — which is seen as a 
material element — and the way in which karman influences the soul’s inherent 
urge for liberation. However, the Jaina doctrine had to compete with different 
worldviews, such as those of the Buddhists and Brahmins, and the Jaina doctrine is 
not self-evident. This is precisely where the first chapter comes in. By discussing the 
different means of cognition — including verbal testimony which gives an 
 
and Siddhasenagaṇi even mentions Vasubandhu’s name (Mejor 2008: 142). This indicates 
that Jaina authors after the TA not only knew Vasubandhu’s work but also found the 
Abhidharmakośakārikā a relevant work for a discussion of the TA. This seems to support 
Ohira’s hypothesis. 
240 For a contemporary reader it might seem obvious that philosophical texts are always 
composed in a systematic way and that the order of sections makes sense for the audience. 
However, this is certainly not a given for the sūtra texts of the classical Indian philosophical 
traditions. The fact that the structure of the TA is fairly systematic, suggests that a significant 
part of the composition of the text, or at least its redaction, can be attributed to a single 





authoritative status to traditional Jaina texts — the first chapter provides an 
epistemological basis for the Jaina doctrine.241  
While it was new for the Jaina tradition to open a text with a discussion of 
knowledge, it seems that the overall structure of the TA was influenced by another 
tradition. The Nyāyasūtra, which was one of the most influential treatises on 
epistemology in the history of Indian philosophy, opens with a discussion of the 
means of cognition (pramāṇa). As I will show in § 3.2, the TA clearly relied on this 
part of the Nyāyasūtra for its presentation of Jaina epistemology. It seems likely, 
therefore, that the choice of the composer of the TA to start with a chapter on the 
sources of knowledge was influenced by the Nyāyasūtra.  
The importance that the TA gives to epistemology appears to signify a 
change in the intellectual tradition of the Jainas. Yet, it is unclear what urged the 
author of the TA to present the Jaina doctrine in a new way. Since there is not 
enough external evidence to situate the TA and the TABh conclusively in a historical 
context, this chapter will focus on an internal analysis of the text.242 This analysis 
serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it will clarify how the texts relate to other schools and 
movements. By examining the presentation of the material, including the vocabulary 
and the way in which specific ideas are discussed, I will show the relationship 
between the TA and other philosophical texts that were written in the first half of 
the 1st millennium CE. This will contribute to a better understanding of the 
intellectual landscape in which the TA and the TABh were composed and will help to 
situate the text in a socio-historical context. Secondly, this analysis will also help to 
clarify the philosophical content of the TA and the TABh. Even though the TA had a 
major influence on later Jaina philosophers and is regarded nowadays as a standard 
compendium of Jaina doctrine, there are many passages in the text that are difficult 
to understand. Therefore, this chapter explores the philosophical content of the TA 
and the TABh in an effort to clarify its main purport. 
My textual analysis will be limited to chapters I, II.8 – 25, and V, which are 
translated in Part II of this thesis. Unlike the other chapters, which mainly discuss 
matters of faith such as the different classes of gods and hellish beings, these 
chapters provide a philosophical analysis of the constituents of reality (chapter V) 
 
241 Likewise, the sambandhakārikās, which introduce the TA and the TABh, mention that the 
TA is a summary of the words of the jina, which implies that the text is derived from an 
indisputable source of knowledge (see sambandhakārikā 22). 





and the way in which we can gain valid knowledge about this reality (chapter I). 
Sūtras II.8 – 25 provide an account of the sense faculties and form, as such, a logical 
link between the chapters on ontology and epistemology since ordinary knowledge 
results from the contact between sense faculties and the surroundings of the subject 
of knowledge. Apart from the fact that the selected chapters form a consistent whole, 
there are two more reasons to focus on these parts.  
First, if we want to find out more about the intellectual milieu in which the 
TA was written, it makes sense to look at those chapters that are more likely to 
reflect external influences. The TA shows little change in doctrinal matter, such as 
the theory of karman, while there is significant conceptual change in the theory of 
knowledge. Since there was a lively debate about the theory of knowledge amongst 
the different philosophical schools in the first half of the 1st millennium CE, one can 
assume that the TA reflects some of the aspects of this wider philosophical debate in 
its discussion of knowledge and in the underlying ontological framework. Therefore, 
this chapter will examine whether the philosophical parts of the TA and the TABh 
reflect any influences from contemporary movements, such as the Nyāya and 
Vaiśeṣika schools. This will provide a better basis to understand the position of the 
TA and the TABh in the history of Indian philosophy.  
The second reason why it makes sense to focus on the selected chapters is 
that these chapters were the most influential parts of the text. The large majority of 
citations of the TA in later Jaina texts are derived from chapter I, II and V.243 This 
demonstrates that the tradition itself regarded these chapters as the most significant 
parts of the text.244 
Apart from a study of the content of the philosophical parts of the TA, this 
chapter of the thesis also provides an analysis of the introductory verses, the 
colophon, and some peculiar verses that are found in the TABh. Even though these 
parts may not be directly relevant for our understanding of the philosophical 
account that can be found in the TA, they are most relevant for the authorship of the 
 
243 Ohira provides an overview of references to the TA in the Jaina commentarial literature 
up to the 10th cent. CE (Ohira 1982: 71-78).  
244 One could argue that it is anachronistic to make a distinction between the more rational 
or philosophical parts of the text on the one hand, and the doctrinal or religious parts on the 
other. However, the fact that later authors focused on precisely those chapters that one could 
label as the ‘philosophical chapters’ indicates that these chapters are not only significant 





TA and the TABh, which has important implications for the interpretation of both 





245 The translated passages of the TA and the TABh that I cite in this chapter sometimes 
deviate from the way in which these passages are translated in Part II. In order to facilitate a 
better understanding of the expressed ideas, I sometimes opt for a less literal translation and 






3.2 Tattvārthādhigama Chapter I 
 
The overall content of the first chapter of the TA can be represented as follows: 
 
1.1 The path to liberation 
1.2 – 1.3 The right worldview 
1.4 The categories of reality 
1.5 – 1.8 The modes of analysis and viewpoints  
1.9 – 1.12 Knowledge and means of cognition 
1.13 – 1.30 Five types of knowledge  
1.13 – 1-19 Ordinary cognition 
1.20 Testimony 
1.21 – 1.23 Cosmic perception 
1.24 – 1.26 Mental perception 
1.27 – 1.30 Domains of the five varieties of knowledge, 
including omniscience 
1.31 Co-presence of varieties of knowledge 
1.32 – 1.33 Misapprehension  
1.34 – 1.35 The perspectives 
 
The path to liberation 
 
As mentioned above, chapter I opens by stating that the way to liberation consists of 
right worldview (darśana), right knowledge (jñāna), and right conduct (cāritra). 
This idea is not new to the Jaina tradition. Several canonical texts, like the 
Uttarādhyayana246 and the Sūtrakṛtāṇga247 already contain similar expressions. The 
three elements that are mentioned are known as the ‘three jewels’, a concept which 
has a parallel in the Buddhist tradition.248 However, the author of the TA deviates 
from the earlier sources by putting darśana before jñāna and one may wonder why 
he felt the need to change the traditional order. Since the three jewels are listed in 
the first sentence of the text and determine the order of the following sections, it is 
 
246 Uttarādhyayana 23.33 (Jacobi 1985: 337). See also Ohira 1982: 55. 
247 Sūtrakṛtāṇga 1.6.17 (Jacobi 1985: 447). See also Dundas 1992: 87. 
248 The concept of the three jewels plays a prominent position in both Jainism and Buddhism, 
and one could argue that the Buddhist version — in which the three jewels stand for the 
Buddha, his teachings, and the community — is conceptually close to the Jaina version 





unlikely that this was an accidental change. In an effort to explain the significance of 
this change, Dundas writes the following:  
 
By putting faith249 at the beginning of the first rule of the Tattvārthasūtra which 
defines the very nature of Jainism, Umāsvāti is both drawing attention to its role as 
an essential component on the path to salvation and at the same time broadening 
Jainism’s range of spiritual reference beyond early Hinduism for whom faith, at least 
textually, did not have such a central and formally enunciated position.250  
 
Is it possible that the author of the TA did indeed try to demonstrate the superiority 
of the Jaina doctrine by stressing an element that is absent in rival soteriologies?251 
Apart from the fact that the TA deviates from the traditional order, the text also adds 
the adjective ‘samyañc’ to the three jewels.252 This seems to be an innovation of the 
TA. Interestingly, the word does not appear very often in Jaina texts and it is 
tempting to see a connection with the Buddhist tradition, which uses the word 
‘samyañc’ in the formulation of the ‘eightfold path’.253 In short, the opening verse of 
the TA consists of a traditional Jaina expression but the small changes of the 
formulation seem to indicate that the author of the TA was well aware of rival views 
and tried to overtrump them. 
After the introductory sūtra, chapter I begins with a discussion of right 
worldview (samyagdarśana), which is characterised as ‘confidence in the categories 
of reality’ (tattvārthaśraddhāna) (TA 1.2). This is a new idea for the Jaina tradition, 
even though there seems to be a precedent in the Uttarādhyayana, which states that 
‘[h]e who verily believes in the true teaching of the (above nine) fundamental truths, 
possesses righteousness’ (Uttarādhyayana 28.15).254 However, the TA is making a 
 
249 Dundas translates darśana as ‘faith’, which he defines as follows: ‘For Jainism, faith does 
not imply some kind of blind belief but is rather the correct way of looking at things, a 
positive and well-informed disposition’ (Dundas 1992: 87).  
250 Dundas 1992: 87. 
251 It should be remarked that the TA is not the first text in which the three jewels appear in a 
new order. Even though the Uttarādhyayana mentions the three jewels several times in the 
traditional order, one can already find the order that the TA uses in Uttarādhyayana 28.29-
30 (See also Ohira 1982: 55). Interestingly, Sambandhakārikā 1 seems to prioritise jñāna, 
and presents darśana as an aspect of jñāna (see Part II, sambandhakārikā 1). 
252 ‘samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ’ (TA 1.1). 
253 A description of the āryāṣṭāṅgamārga can be found in Buswell 2014: 763-764. 
254 ‘tahiyāṇaṃ tu bhāvāṇaṃ sabbhāve uvaesaṇaṃ | bhāveṇaṃ saddahaṃtassa sammataṃ taṃ 





different claim. While the Uttarādhyayana states that belief in the categories (tattvas) 
is an indicator of righteousness (samyaktva), the TA defines samyagdarśana as belief 
or confidence in the categories.255 Since samyagdarśana is presented as the first 
element of the way to liberation (TA 1.1), it seems that the author of the TA presents 
confidence in the categories as the prerequisite of mokṣa. This is a new idea for the 







Par la connaissance juste des moyens-de-connaissance-droite, des objets-de-
connaissance-droite, du doute, du but <de la démonstration>, de l’illustration, de la 
conclusion, des <cinq> membres <du raisonnement dialectique>, de l’argumentation, 
de la connaissance définitive, de la discussion, de la dispute, de la chicane, des 
pseudo-raisons, des sophismes, des ripostes sophistiques et des situations de défaite,  
on atteint le bonheur indépassable (NS I.1.1).257 
 
As can be seen in the above passage, the Nyāyasūtra promises that knowledge of the 
different categories that the Nyāya tradition propounds leads to ‘the highest good’ 
(niḥśreyasa). The similarity between the opening of the TA and the Nyāyasūtra 
seems to indicate that the author of the TA was acquainted with this text. The fact 
that he followed the Nyāya model in his compendium of Jaina doctrine raises the 
question as to how the Jaina intellectuals related to the adherents of the 
Brahmanical schools. In any case, it is clear that the author of the TA conformed to 
the Nyāya model, which suggests that the text was composed in an environment in 
which the people adhering to the Naiyāyika theory provided the dominant 
philosophical blueprints. 
In addition to TA 1.2, sūtra 1.3 explains that right worldview either results 
from learning or occurs by nature. Even though the bhāṣya remains somewhat vague 
when it explains the latter option — which is caused by ‘a particular transformation’ 
(pariṇāmaviśeṣa) (TABh 1.3.6) — it is clear that the text tries to solve an important 
 
255 See also Ohira 1982: 55. 
256 Ohira 1982: 56. 





epistemological problem. If right worldview could only be obtained from learning, 
one could question how the teacher obtained his knowledge, and one would end up 
with an infinite regress. However, by stating that right worldview spontaneously 
occurs in some beings, the text has an answer to this question, even though it does 
not have much explanatory value. To summarise, the elements of the way to 
liberation can be presented as follows:  
 
 
IV. The threefold path to liberation (mokṣamārga) (TA 1.1) 
i. samyagdarśana (right worldview) 
nisargasamyagdarśana  
(right worldview by nature) (TA 1.3) 
adhigamasamyagdarśana  
(right worldview from learning) (TA 1.3) 
ii. samyagjñāna (right knowledge)  
iii. samyakcāritra (right conduct)  
 
The categories of reality 
 
Next, TA 1.4 lists the categories of reality (tattvas).258 As discussed by Ohira, the TA 
deviates from previous presentation of the tattvas and reduces their number from 
nine to seven, as can be seen in the table below.259  
 
 
V. Order of the tattvas in canonical texts and in the TA 
Sthāna 9.867 Uttarādhyayana 28.14 TA 1.4 
jīva-ajīva jīva-ajīva jīva 
puṇya-pāpa bandha ajīva 
āsrava-saṃvara-nirjarā puṇya-pāpa āsrava 
bandha-mokṣa āsrava-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣa bandha 
  saṃvara 
  nirjarā 
  mokṣa 
 
 
258 See also § 3.1. 





Unlike the lists that appear in older texts, the TA organises the categories in a causal 
order. It begins with the primary ontological distinction between the soul (jīva) and 
non-living entities (ajīva). Because of the influx (āsrava) of karmic particles, the soul 
becomes entangled with ajīva (bandha). By subsequently stopping the influx of 
karman (saṃvara) and removing karmic residue from the soul through asceticism 
(nirjarā), the soul finally gets liberated from its state of bondage and reaches mokṣa. 
It is interesting to note that the categories of merit (puṇya) and demerit (pāpa), 
which appear in the older texts, are completely ignored in the TA. Some scholars 
have suggested that these categories can be subsumed under āsrava, and that the 
author therefore omitted these categories.260 The TA does not give a reason for this 
omission and the TABh also does not mention puṇya and pāpa in its discussion of 
the categories.261 Even if we follow the standard explanation that the TA reduced the 
number of categories in an attempt to make the Jaina doctrine more systematic, it 
remains hard to understand why this change of a traditional list was acceptable for 
the audience of the text. 
Even though the enumeration of categories at the beginning of the text 
resembles the start of the Nyāyasūtra, it is clear that the Jaina categories or tattvas 
have very little to do with the categories of the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika school, which are 
mainly ontological and dialectical categories. Instead, the Jaina categories provide 
the basic elements of their soteriological account. It is noteworthy that the bhāṣya 
explicitly mentions that the tattvas are the seven ‘padārthas’ (TABh 1.4.2). As far as I 
am aware, the word ‘padārtha’ is not used in earlier Jaina discussions of the Jaina 
tattvas but it is the standard word for the ontological categories in the Vaiśeṣika 
tradition. The fact that the bhāṣya explains the word ‘tattva’ with the term ‘padārtha’ 
indicates that the audience of the text was familiar with basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 
theory.262 Moreover, it confirms that the TA and the TABh tried to present the Jaina 
doctrine as an alternative that can compete with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account. 
 
260 See for example Dixit’s introduction to Sanghvi’s commentary on the TA (Sanghvi 1974: 
12). 
261 The TABh talks about ‘the fruit of merit and demerit’ (puṇyapāpaphala) but does not refer 
to these terms as categories. See [1.3.6]. 
262  For example, Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.4 reads ‘dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarma-
sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānān 
niḥśreyasam’ (The highest good results from particular merit [and is obtained] by means of 
the similarity and dissimilarity of the categories, substance, attribute, action, generality, 






Nevertheless, it also indicates that the Jainas were well aware that the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika movement provided the dominant vocabulary for the discussion. 
 
The modes of analysis 
 
Following the list of categories, TA 1.5 introduces the four modes of analysis (nyāsa), 
which can be applied to the categories. These hermeneutical tools deal with the 
complex relationship between entities, words, and meanings. For example, when the 
deity Indra is depicted in a painting or a sculpture, we can use the word ‘Indra’ to 
refer to this figure, and we have to interpret such a reference from the perspective of 
representation (sthāpanā) (TABh 1.5.8). In other words, the modes of analysis point 
to the different references of a word, such as ‘Indra’, which facilitates a better 
understanding of the precise meaning of sentences and helps to see why two 
seemingly contradictory statements can be both true. The bhāṣya labels these modes 
of analysis (nyāsa) with the traditional word ‘doors of examination’ (anuyogadvāra) 
(TABh 1.5.1). Apart from the list of perspectives given in TA 1.5, the text provides 
two more lists in TA 1.7 and TA 1.8. The TABh adds a fourth list in TABh 1.8.8, as can 
be seen in the following table.  
The TA and the TABh do not explain how these different lists relate to each 
other and the origin of the lists is not clear. They partly overlap with some of the 
lists that are mentioned in the Anuyogadvārasūtra. 263  Yet, the date of the 
Anuyogadvārasūtra is quite uncertain and it is hard to determine whether the lists in 
the TA and the TABh are derived from the Anuyogadvārasūtra or whether the TA 
influenced some parts of this text. 
 The fourth list that is mentioned in the bhāṣya deviates from the three lists 
that the TA mentions and mostly relates to aspects that are particular for the Jaina 
worldview, such as the theory about the colours of the soul (leśyā) and the threefold 
path to liberation (jñāna, darśana, cāritra). By contrast, the first three lists address 
more general aspects, such as number (saṃkhyā), place (kṣetra), cause (sādhana), 
etc. As such, these lists strongly relate to grammatical categories.264 
 
263 The different doors of examination are mentioned throughout the Anuyogadvārasūtra, in 
a rather unsystematic manner. The text has been translated by Hanaki (1970). 
264 Several modes of analysis also correspond to some elements of the Vaiśeṣika theory such 
as the category (padārtha) ‘substance’ (dravya) and the qualities (guṇa) ‘touch’ (sparśa) and 







VI. The doors of examination (anuyogadvāra) (TA 1.5, 1.7, 1.8) 
The four modes of 
analysis (nyāsa) 
(TA 1.5) or 




The six doors of 
examination 
(anuyogadvāra) 
(TA 1.7, TABh 
1.7.1) 
The eight doors of 
examination 
(anuyogadvāra)  
(TA 1.8, TABh 1.8.4) 








i. sat  
(existence) 












iii. sādhana  
(cause) 
iii. kṣetra  
(place) 
iii. kāya  
(body) 






iv. yoga  
(activity) 
 v. sthiti 
(duration) 
v. kāla  
(time) 
v. kaṣāya  
(passion) 
 vi. vidhāna 
(classification) 
vi. antara  
(interval)  
vi. veda  
(feelings) 
  vii. bhāva  
(state) 
vii. leśyā  
(colouring) 




   ix. jñāna  
(knowledge) 
   x. darśana  
(worldview) 
   xi. cāritra  
(conduct) 
   xii. āhāra  
(taking food) 
   xiii. upayoga  
(cognitive operation) 
 
The author of the TA is very brief in his explanation of this hermeneutical theory and 
does not mention the traditional term ‘anuyogadvāra’. By contrast, the TABh 
provides an elaborate commentary on the sūtras that enumerate these modes of 
analysis and even adds a fourth list that is not mentioned in the sūtra. This might 
indicate that the topic had become more important in the Jaina tradition at the time 
of the composition of the bhāṣya. It is also possible that the composer of the TA was 
 





less interested in this theory because it did not relate to the general epistemological 
discussions of the other schools.  
 
Classification of the means of cognition 
 
After the enumeration of the modes of analysis, the TA continues with a description 
of the means of cognition (pramāṇas) — one of the main topics in Nyāya philosophy. 
This part runs from TA 1.9 to TA 1.31 and forms the largest part of chapter I. Hence, 
it seems that the author of the TA did not only follow the Nyāyasūtra by opening his 
treatise with a chapter on knowledge. He also dedicates most of the chapter to an 
epistemological discussion that is less important in the Jaina tradition while the 
more traditional Jaina topics are only briefly mentioned.266  
TA 1.6 explains that one can understand the categories through the means of 
cognition (pramāṇa) and the perspectives (naya). TA 1.9 and TA 1.10 state that 
there are five types of knowledge, which can be subsumed under two pramāṇas, as 
shown in the following table. 
 
VII. The five varieties of knowledge (jñāna) (TA 1.9) or  
two means of cognition (pramāṇa) (TA 1.10) 
parokṣa (indirect cognition) (TA 1.11) pratyakṣa (direct cognition) (TA 1.12) 
i. mati (ordinary cognition) iii. avadhi (cosmic perception)267 
ii. śruta (testimony) iv. manaḥparyāya (mental perception)268 
  v. kevala (absolute knowledge) 
 
 
266  The sūtra and the bhāṣya differ in this respect. While the largest part of the 
epistemological theory in the TA deals with a discussion of the pramāṇas, the TABh provides 
more information on traditional Jaina topics, such as the different lists of anuyogadvāra. 
Likewise, the TA is very brief in its discussion of avadhi, manaḥparyāya, and kevala. These 
means of knowledge are specific for the Jainas and were not accepted by other schools. The 
bhāṣya provides a more elaborate discussion of all the subclassifications of these types of 
knowledge, and their individual ranges. This might indicate that the author of the bhāṣya felt 
that he had to compensate for the omission of important elements of the more traditional 
Jaina theory of knowledge. 
267 For a discussion of the meaning and translation of this term, see § 3.2, Cosmic perception, 
mental perception, and absolute knowledge.  
268 A more literal translation of the term ‘manaḥparyāya[jñāna]’ would be ‘[knowledge of] 






It seems that there were different views on the classification of these five varieties of 
knowledge.269 Even though the TA clearly refers to two pramāṇas, the bhāṣya 
mentions that some people (eke) claim that there are four pramāṇas.270 The text 
does not explain whether this alternative view can be attributed to other Jaina 
intellectuals or whether it is a reference to a different philosophical movement. 
Since the Nyāya school propounded that there are four pramāṇas, Jacobi assumes 
that the text refers to the Nyāya position.271 However, the TABh rarely refers to non-
Jaina positions, and it is far from clear what the motive for mentioning the Nyāya 
view could have been. In his commentary on TA 1.9, which lists the Jaina means of 
cognition, Jacobi tries to explain the reference to the view of the others (eke) as 
follows:  
 
Diese Einteilung zeigt, wie weit man von Logik und Psychologie noch entfernt war, 
als man sie aufstellte. Da sie im Kanon gilt und also kanonische Geltung hatte, 
mussten sich die Jainas damit abfinden, was ihnen nicht leicht war, nachdem der 
Nyāya die Erkenntnistheorie wissenschaftlich begründet hatte (Jacobi 1906: 294). 
 
In other words, Jacobi assumes that the author of the TA had to present the 
traditional Jaina view on the different types of knowledge, even though he was well 
aware that the Nyāya school had a better theory. However, there seems to be a 
better explanation for the reference to the four pramāṇas.  
In his discussion of the evolution of pramāṇa theory in the Jaina tradition, 
Dixit states that some early Jaina texts mention four pramāṇas, which correspond to 
the four pramāṇas that were accepted by the Nyāya tradition.272 The remark in the 
TABh that others ‘claim that that there are four pramāṇas’273 could, therefore, refer 
to the fact that other Jaina texts mention these four means of cognition. Yet, Dixit 
assumes that the canonical passages that mention the four pramāṇas are later 
interpolations. His argument for this idea, however, is rather weak. He simply states 
that the pramāṇas are not discussed in other parts of these texts, that none of the 
‘old Āgamic texts’ deal with pramāṇa’, and that the āgamas usually speak about the 
 
269 The individual varieties of knowledge will be discussed in the next section. 
270 See TABh 1.6.3. 
271 ‘Diese eke waren natürlich die Anhänger des Nyāya’ (Jacobi 1906: 294). 
272 The Bhagavatī (Viyāhapannatti) 5.4.26 mentions perception (pratyakṣa), inference 
(anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). See also Balcerowicz 2016: 1004, 
n. 28 





‘five types of jñānas’.274 Nevertheless, the fact that the TA discusses the pramāṇas 
shows that the author was not only acquainted with pramāṇa theory but also 
thought that it was somehow relevant for a compendium of Jaina doctrine. This 
suggests that pramāṇa theory was not completely new for the Jainas at the time of 
the composition of the TA, which is a good reason to doubt Dixit’s line of 
argumentation.  
If we do not accept Dixit’s idea that earlier references to the pramāṇas in 
Jaina literature are all later interpolations, it remains a question whether the TABh 
refers to the Nyāya school when it mentions that some teachers believe that there 
are four pramāṇas. A recent study by Balcerowicz, which deals with the 
development of epistemological concepts in the history of Jaina philosophy, shows 
that the Jaina tradition adopted the pramāṇa concept in several stages.275 The first 
stage is represented by the Stānāṅgasūtra (Ṭhāṇaṁgasutta), in which four means of 
cognition are listed as ‘causes of valid cognition’ (hetu).276 The hetus that are 
mentioned in this text correspond with the set of pramāṇas that were accepted in 
the Nyāya tradition, i.e., pratyakṣa, anumāna, aupamya, and āgama.277 However, at a 
later stage, these four concepts were listed as pramāṇas.278  
One may wonder why the Jainas initially adopted the four means of 
cognition that were advanced by the Nyāya school, instead of coming up with their 
own list of pramāṇas. Balcerowicz speculates that ‘the notion of [pramāṇa] was 
introduced into Jainism with the ‘typological package’, i.e., already with the fourfold 
classification, not as a separate term’.279 In other words, he claims that before the 
time of the TA the term ‘pramāṇa’ automatically referred to the four pramāṇas listed 
above and was not seen as a general concept that could be redefined by the Jainas. 
This is certainly not inconceivable and provides a better explanation for the change 
that the TA proposes. If the concept of pramāṇas was completely absent in the Jaina 
tradition before the TA, it would not make much sense to claim that the jñānas are 
the pramāṇas. However, if Jaina thinkers incorporated the Nyāya model in earlier 
texts, even though this theory did not match the traditional theory of jñānas, there 
 
274 Dixit 1977: 22. 
275 Balcerowicz 2016d. 
276 Ibid., 1004. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Balcerowicz refers to the Bhagavatī (Viyāhapannatti) as an example of this stage 






would be a very good reason to claim that the traditional jñānas are the pramāṇas. 
In this way, the TA gets rid of a theoretical element that does not fit very well in the 
overall system that the TA tries to establish, and it clearly distinguishes the Jaina 
theory from its opponents.  
To sum up, Dixit’s claim that the references to the four pramāṇas before the 
TA are later interpolation should not be taken at face value. Further, it is perfectly 
plausible that the reference to four pramāṇas in the TABh refers to the fourfold list 
that the Jaina tradition had adopted before the composition of the TA. Unlike what 
Jacobi claims, the fact that the TA presents the five types of knowledge as the 
pramāṇas while the bhāṣya refers to the fourfold division, does not prove that the 
composer of the TABh thought that the traditional Jaina view was inferior to the 
Nyāya view. Instead, it shows that the TA wanted to present the orthodox position 
as a viable alternative to the Nyāya theory, which had influenced earlier Jaina text. 
Yet, the fact that the TA presents the traditional jñānas as the pramāṇas, instead of 
abandoning the pramāṇa concept, indicates that the Nyāya framework was seen as 
the dominant model. 
 
Direct and indirect types of knowledge 
 
After listing the varieties of knowledge (jñāna) in TA 1.9, the author divides these 
five varieties into two categories of pramāṇas:280  
 
ādye parokṣam ||1.11|| pratyakṣam anyat ||1.12|| 
 
The first two [varieties of knowledge are forms of] indirect cognition (parokṣa). The 
other [varieties of knowledge are forms of] direct cognition (pratyakṣa).  
 
In other words, the TA teaches that ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony (śruta) 
are forms of indirect cognition (parokṣa), while cosmic perception (avadhi), mental 
perception (manaḥparyāya), and absolute [knowledge] (kevala) are forms of direct 
cognition (pratyakṣa).281 At first sight, this seems a counterintuitive classification. 
 
280 See table above. 
281 Balcerowicz suggests that the classification that we find in the TA was based on the 
Prajñāpanāsūtra (Paṇṇavaṇāsutta), which ‘mentions the division into pratyakṣa and parokṣa 
in passing, but does not mention any division of cognitive criteria, or the term pramāṇa per 





From a phenomenological perspective, ordinary cognition — which includes visual 
experience — appears as a very direct way to acquire knowledge. It is, therefore, 
somewhat odd that the TA claims that ordinary cognition (mati) is a form of indirect 
cognition (parokṣa) instead of direct cognition (pratyakṣa). However, the inversion 
of the meaning of pratyakṣa and parokṣa can be seen as a legitimate move from the 
perspective of Jaina epistemology as presented in the TA. If one accepts that the soul 
can acquire knowledge by cosmic perception (avadhi), mental perception 
(manaḥparyāya), and omniscience (kevala) without the involvement of any sense 
organ, it makes sense to interpret these types of knowledge as more direct than 
ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony (śruta), which cannot take place without 
the interference of the sense organs. Yet, the fact that one can argue in favour of the 
Jaina model that we find in the TA does not sufficiently explain what urged the 
Jainas to change the original meaning of pratyakṣa and parokṣa.282  
In this section, I will discuss how this inversion relates to the standard 
interpretation of these terms, and I will explore whether this unique feature of Jaina 
philosophy can tell us something about the way in which Jaina intellectuals who 
propounded this model related to other philosophical traditons. For this goal, I will 
also discuss the bhāṣya on TA 1.11 – 1.12, which explicitly deals with some other 
views on the means of cognition.  
The idea that sense perception — which is included in ordinary cognition 
(mati) — is an indirect means of cognition (parokṣa) is not only unusual from a 
contemporary phenomemological perspective but also deviates from the standard 
interpretation of pratyakṣa and parokṣa in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya tradition, 
for example, clearly interprets perception (pratyakṣa) as an unmediated means of 
cognition, as can be read in Nyāyasūtra I.1.4:  
 
 
282 The interpretation of pratyakṣa in the Jaina tradition is not unprecedented. In his 
translation of NS 1.1.4, Angot remarks that the meaning of the word ‘perception’ (in French) 
does not fully correspond to the meaning of ‘pratyakṣa’ in Sanskrit. Even though he does not 
discuss the Jaina tradition, he mentions that memory and yogic experience were classified as 
‘pratyakṣa’ by other philosophical traditions (Angot 2009: 271, n.777). This shows that the 
Jainas were not alone in interpreting non-sensory cognition as direct forms of knowledge. 
See also Oberhammer 2006: 37-61 and Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001-1002. 
The simple fact that the sūtra mentions parokṣa before pratyakṣa indicates that we are 
dealing with an inversion of a pre-existing system. From a linguistic point of view, it is 





indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri 
vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam | 
 
La perception-immédiate c’est la connaissance produite par le contact d’un organe-
sensoriel avec un objet; elle est non-verbale, non sujette à l’erreur et consiste en une 
connaissance déterminée (NS I.1.4).283 
 
Note that the word ‘pratyakṣa’ in the Nyāyasūtra — which Angot translates as 
‘perception-immédiate’ — refers to the type of knowledge that is included in 
ordinary cognition (mati) in the TA. Yet, the TA does not classify ordinary cognition 
(mati) as a form of direct cognition (which is called ‘pratyakṣa’ in the TA) but as a 
variety of indirect cognition (parokṣa). This inversion is strange from a historical 
point of view. In his study of the historical development of Jaina epistemological 
terms, Balcerowicz notes that the distinction between pratyakṣa and parokṣa can be 
traced back to the Brāhmaṇas, in which pratyakṣa refers to that which is ‘directly in 
front of our eyes’ whereas parokṣa refers to ‘the realm of the divine, beyond our 
eyes’. 284 However, he demonstrates that the Jaina tradition developed a completely 
different understanding of these terms, and that ‘pratyakṣa came to denote direct 
cognition of the soul, unmediated by any physical organ, whereas parokṣa referred 
to cognitive acts by means of sense organs and/or the mind which served as 
instruments of cognition for the soul’.285 This is indeed the model that we find in the 
TA.  
It is plausible that this move was a conscious effort of the Jainas to 
distinghuish themselves from other philosophical traditions. Since there is no 
textual evidence that the Jaina tradition classified the five types of knowledge as 
pratyakṣa and parokṣa according to the model of the TA before, it is feasible that this 
move was initiated by the author of the TA. In fact, such a move would match the 
overall strategy of the TA, which is characterised by the reorganisation of traditional 
 
283 Angot 2009: 271-272. 
284 Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001. Balcerowicz has proposed a reconstruction of the different 
stages of the Jaina theory of knowledge. He suggests that the fivefold list of types of 
knowledge and the twofold classification of pratyakṣa and parokṣa represent different 
historical stages, which eventually merged. He tentatively dates the merging of these two 
models to the 2nd cent. CE (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1002). Unfortunately, he does not specify the 
texts that represent this stage and it is not clear why he assumes that the Jainas originally 
associated the term pratyakṣa with mati and śruta, while avadhi, manaḥparyāya, and kevala 
were seen as parokṣa (Balcerowicz 2016d: Appendix, Model IV).  





Jaina notions in such a way that it resembles the ideas of other movements but also 
demonstrates the uniqueness of the Jaina model. In fact, one could even say that this 
model has a certain theoretical advantage. Since the soul is the seat of knowledge in 
the Jaina system, it makes sense to describe the types of knowledge that are directly 
perceived by the soul, such as avadhijñāna, as direct sources of knowledge. By 
interpreting sense perception as an indirect means of cognition, the Jaina model can 
also explain why sense perception can sometimes be erroneous, which is a serious 
problem for theories that interpret sense perception as a form of direct perception. 
 
Other means of cognition 
 
While the TA teaches that there are only two pramāṇas, i.e., pratyakṣa and parokṣa, 
the bhāṣya discusses an alternative view on the means of cognition:  
 
anumānopamānāgamārthāpattisambhavābhāvān api pramāṇāni iti kecit 
manyante | tat katham etad iti |  
 
Some people think that inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, 
equivalence, and negation are means of cognition too. How, then, can this be 
explained (TABh 1.12.7 – 1.12.8)? 286 
 
This passage shows that the commentator was well aware of pramāṇa theories that 
differed from the theory that the TA presents. Yet, the list of pramāṇas that are 
mentioned in the bhāṣya is somewhat peculiar. The sixfold list — which consists of 
inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), verbal testimony (āgama), 
postulation (arthāpatti), equivalence287 (sambhava), and negation (abhāva) — does 
 
286 See also Part II. 
287 This translation of ‘sambhava’ follows MW, which explains that equivalence as a pramāṇa 
is 'illustrated by the equivalence between one shilling and pence'. Gerhard Oberhammer 
discusses the meaning and historical development of sambhava in his Terminologie der 
frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien. He mentions that the Carakasaṃhitā refers to 
‘sambhava’ as a cause or origin of things but the text does not connect this term with an 
epistemological theory. Although Oberhammer notes that later sources connect the 
epistemological use of sambhava with the ‘Paurānikas’, he writes: ‘Wer jene Lehrer waren, 
die den sambhava als eigenständiges Erkenntnismittel vertraten, läßt sich nicht wirklich 
klären’ (Oberhammer 2006: 232ff). The meaning of ‘sambhava’ clearly changed over time 





not correspond with any of the standard lists that are associated with the main 
philosophical schools and it also does not fit within the Jaina framework. The list 
comes very close to the list of pramāṇas that is associated with the Mīmāṃsakas but 
equivalence (sambhava) does not feature in the Mīmāṃsā theory.288 It is possible 
that the author of the TABh did not refer to the theory of a particular school and 
simply listed the different elements that were accepted as pramāṇas by other 
philosophical movements. Yet, even in that case, it is remarkable that the author 
included sambhava since none of the known philosophical movements claimed that 
sambhava should be accepted as a pramāṇa. Nevertheless, even though there is no 
textual source that claims that sambhava should be accepted as a pramāṇa, this 
position was sometimes attributed to others. For example, an opponent in 
Nyāyasūtra II.2.1 raises the following objection against the Nyāya position: 
 
na catuṣṭvam aitihyārthāpattisaṃbhavābhāvaprāmāṇyam | 
 
Il n’y a pas quatre moyens-de-connaissance-droite parce que le caractère de 
pramāṇa s’attache aussi à la tradition orale (aitihya), à la supposition nécessaire 
(arthāpatti), à l’inclusion (saṃbhava) et à l’absence (abhāva) (NS II.2.1).289 
 
Even though it is not clear what the identity of the opponent is, this passage 
indicates that some people interpreted sambhava as a pramāṇa. However, the 
Nyāyasūtra is the first text that mentions this position and later literature has little 
 
concept the author of the TABh had in mind when he included ‘sambhava’ in his list. In his 
French translation of the Nyāyasūtra, Angot translates sambhava as ‘inclusion’, which makes 
sense in the light of the interpretation that the Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya provides: ‘saṃbhavo 
nāmāvinābhāvino ’rthasya sattāgrahaṇād anyasya sattāgrahaṇam | yathā droṇasya 
sattāgrahaṇād āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇam, āḍhakasya [ca] sattāgrahaṇāt prasthasyeti’ (‘Ce 
qu’on nomme saṃbhava ‘inclusion’, c’est le fait de connaître l’existence de quelque chose en 
connaissant l’existence d’une autre sans laquelle nécessairement elle n’existerait pas. Par 
exemple c’est connaître l’existence du poids d’un āḍhaka parce qu’on connaît l’existence du 
poids d’un droṇa, celle du prastha parce qu’on connaît l’existence de l’āḍhaka.’) (Angot 2009: 
479-480). The idea seems to be that one can infer the existence of a prastha (¼ of the weight 
of an āḍhaka, which is in turn ¼ of a droṇa) of something by knowing that there is an āḍhaka 
of something, just as one can infer that there is a gram of gold when one perceives a kilo of 
gold. This type of knowledge does indeed rely on sense perception, as claimed in 
TABh 1.12.10. 
288  Śabarasvāmin’s commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra lists six pramāṇas: pratyakṣa, 
anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti, and abhāva (see, e.g., Oberhammer 2006: 70). 





to say about the identity of the proponents of this theory. One may, therefore, 
question whether the author of the TABh had a specific opponent in mind when he 
mentioned the view that sambhava is a pramāṇa. In fact, it is possible that he simply 
followed the Nyāyasūtra. While there is not enough evidence to answer this question 
definitively, it is noteworthy that TABh 1.12.7 is phrased as an objection while NS 
II.2.1 likewise contains the voice of an opponent. This strongly indicates that the 
author of the TABh was influenced by NS II.2.1.290  
Furthermore, the counterargument that is provided in the TABh resembles 
the counterargument in the Nyāyasūtra but the counterargument does not fit very 
well in the overall theory that is presented in the TA. The TABh refutes the view of 
the opponent as follows:  
 
sarvāṇy etāni matiśrutayor antarbhūtāni, indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt |  
 
All these [means of cognition] are within ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony 
(śruta) since they are caused by the connection of the object with the sense organ 
(TABh 1.12.10). 
 
In other words, the author claims that inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), 
verbal testimony (āgama), postulation (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), [and] 
negation (abhāva) are in fact forms of ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony 
(śruta). This is legitimised by stating that these varieties of cognition are all 
dependent on sense contact (indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-nimitta). The first part of this 
counterargument is similar to Nyāyasūtra II.2.2, which refutes the opponent in II.2.1 




290 Alternatively, it is possible that the objection was a common trope in the discussion of 
pramāṇas at the time of the composition of the TABh and that TABh 1.12.7 was not directly 
influenced by the Nyāyasūtra. Even in that case, however, the similarity between the 
objections in the TABh and the Nyāyasūtra suggests that the TABh derived some of its 





śabda aitihyānarthāntarabhāvād anumāne ’rthāpattisaṃbhavābhāvānar-
thāntarabhāvāc cāpratiṣedhaḥ | 
 
Parce que la ‘tradition’ n’a pas d’objet qui soit différent de celui du témoignage 
verbal et que ‘supposition nécessaire’, ‘inclusion’ et ‘absence’ ne diffèrent pas de 
‘l’inférence’, cette dénégation n’est pas justifiée (NS II.2.2).291 
 
The Nyāyasūtra claims that the means of cognition that the opponent mentions are 
not proper means of cognition, since they are forms of verbal testimony (śabda) and 
inference (anumāna).  
While the form of this argument is identical to the form of the argument in 
the TABh,292 the argument in the Nyāyasūtra seems to make more sense. It is 
perfectly understandable why the Nyāyasūtra classifies traditional instruction293 
(aitihya) as a type of verbal testimony (śabda) and it is also not difficult to see why 
postulation (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), and negation (abhāva) are 
classified as forms of inference (anumāna). In the end, these means of cognition 
seem to refer to different types of inferential reasoning. By contrast, the claim in the 
TABh that inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), verbal testimony (āgama), 
postulation (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), and negation (abhāva) are all 
forms of ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony (śruta) is less obvious. First, the 
TABh does not explain which of these means of cognition are specifically included in 
ordinary cognition (mati) and which means of cognition are subsumed under 
testimony (śruta). Second, the counterargument that the TABh provides is not fully 
consistent with the theory about ordinary cognition (mati) in the TA itself. TABh 
1.12.10 states explicitly that the other types of cognition result from ‘the connection 
of the object with the sense organ’ (indriya-artha-sannikarṣa) but it is not self-
evident that inferential reasoning (anumāna etc.) is always caused by sense 
perception. Yet, TA 1.14 mentions that mati is caused by the senses (indriya) and the 
mind (anindriya) and one could argue, therefore, that inferential reasoning is a form 
of mati that is caused by the mind. 294 If the author of the TABh wanted to say that 
 
291 Angot 2009: 480. 
292 In both texts, the pramāṇas that are mentioned by the opponent are subsumed under the 
accepted pramāṇas. 
293 This translation of aitihya follows MW. Angot translates ‘tradition’. 
294  Likewise, TA 1.13 explicitly states that mental activities such as remembrance, 





inferential reasoning is included in mati since it is caused by the mind (anindriya), it 
is hard to explain why he only talks about the sense organ (indriya) in his 
counterargument. The fact that the argument in TABh 1.12.10 strongly resembles 
the argument in NS II.2.2 while it does not fit very well within the epistemological 
framework of the TA, suggests that the author of the TABh strongly relied on the 
presentation of pramāṇa theory in the Nyāyasūtra. 
Further, it is somewhat odd that the terminology in the counterargument 
corresponds with the terminology that the Nyāyasūtra uses to qualify pratyakṣa. The 
well-known definition of pratyakṣa in NS I.1.4 states that perception (pratyakṣa) is 
the knowledge that results from the contact of the object with the sense organ 
(indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam ... pratyakṣam). However, the TABh uses the 
same description to demonstrate that anumāna etc. are forms of indirect cognition 
(parokṣa). Perhaps the author used this terminology on purpose to stress that the 
Jaina model interprets ordinary cognition — which includes sense perception — as 
parokṣa instead of pratyakṣa.  
 Even though the counterargument in TABh 1.12.10 is perhaps not fully 
convincing, it is still worth questioning why the author tried to refute a different 
view on the number of pramāṇas. Can this passage tell us anything about the 
opponent and the audience of the TABh? Since the list of mentioned pramāṇas 
cannot be connected with one particular movement but includes pramāṇas that 
were accepted by different opponents, we can assume that the TABh does not try to 
refute a particular rival. The fact that the list includes sambhava, which is an unusual 
element in pramāṇa theory and might be derived from Nyāyasūtra II.2.1, further 
supports the idea that the author is refuting a merely theoretical option and not the 
actual position of a rival movement. The passage defends the Jaina position by ruling 
out that there is any other authoritative pramāṇa — apart from the five types of 
knowledge that the TA identifies — and serves, as such, an apologetic goal. The way 
in which the counterargument is presented only makes sense if one already accepts 
the Jaina position, which interprets sense perception and mental activity as indirect 
means of cognition (parokṣa). It is, therefore, likely that this passage was mainly 
written for a Jaina audience that was eager to hear about the superiority of Jaina 
 
cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram). From this perspective, it is not hard to understand why 
anumāna etc. can be seen as forms of mati. It is curious that the author of the TABh does not 





philosophy. This also explains why the author adds the following remark to his 
counterargument: 
 
apramāṇāny eva vā | kutaḥ | mithyādarśanaparigrahāt viparītopadeśāc ca | 
  
Or, [they are] indeed not means of cognition. Why? Due to adoption of wrong view 
and since [it results] from false teaching (TABh 1.12.12 – 1.12.14).295 
 
This is a purely rhetorical remark and not an argument that can be used in any 
actual debate with a real opponent. Nevertheless, it is clear that the author of the 
TABh knew the debates in the Nyāyasūtra, and the way in which he uses Nyāya 
vocabulary and phrases suggests that his audience was acquainted with the 
Nyāyasūtra too. Therefore, it is likely that the author wrote for a Jaina audience that 
was acquainted with Nyāya thought but wanted to distinguish itself from the 
upholders of Nyāya philosophy.  
 
The five types of knowledge 
 
 
After explaining that the five types of knowledge (jñāna) are the two pramāṇas, and 
that the additional pramāṇas that are accepted by other movements are in fact 
forms of parokṣa, the TA continues with a discussion of the individual types of 
knowledge. This section forms the largest part of the first chapter and runs from TA 
1.13 up to TA 1.30. The discussion is structured as follows:  
 
 






TA 1.13 – 1.19 Ordinary cognition (mati) 
 TA 1.13 Synonyms of ordinary cognition  
 TA 1.14 Relation to the senses and the mind 
 TA 1.15 Stages of ordinary cognition 
 TA 1.16 – 1.17 The objects of ordinary cognition  
TA 1.17 – 1.18 Perception of the vyañjana 
TA 1.20 Testimony (śruta) 
 
[Indirect cognition] 
TA 1.21 – 1.23 Cosmic perception (avadhi) 
TA 1.24 – 1.25 Mental perception (manaḥparyāya) 
TA 1.26 Difference between cosmic and mental perception 
TA 1.27 – 1.30 Ranges of the different types of knowledge 
TA 1.27 Range of ordinary cognition and testimony  
TA 1.28 Range of cosmic perception 
TA 1.29 Range of mental perception  
TA 1.30 Range of omniscience (kevala) 
 
The discussion of the types of knowledge starts with an investigation of ordinary 
cognition (mati). First, it defines the concept by giving a list of synonyms (TA 1.13), 
followed by an explanation of its relation to the senses and the mind (TA 1.14) and 
an analysis of the different stages that are involved in the process of ordinary 
cognition (TA 1.15). Next, the sūtra deals with the objects of ordinary cognition (TA 
1.16 – 1.17) and the role of what is called the vyañjana296 in the perceptual process 
(TA 1.18 – 1.19). The discussion of testimony (śruta) is limited to one sūtra (TA 
1.20). This sūtra clarifies the way in which testimony relates to ordinary cognition 
and explains that ‘testimony’ refers to the different collections of canonical texts. 
Cosmic perception (avadhi) is discussed in three sūtras, which mention that there 
are two classes and six types of cosmic perception (TA 1.21 – 1.23). In a similar way, 
the sūtra mentions that there are two types of mental perception (manaḥparyāya) 
(TA 1.24 – 1.25). This is followed by one sūtra, which clarifies the difference 
 
296 Since I am not sure about the exact meaning of the term ‘vyañjana’, I have left the term 
untranslated. The prime meaning of the word ‘vyañjana’ is ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ (MW). However, 
these translations do not match the use of ‘vyañjana’ in the TA. See the discussion of TA 1.18 





between cosmic and mental perception. The final four sūtras of the section that 
deals with the types of knowledge discuss the range of the individual types of 
knowledge (TA 1.27 – 1.30). The last sūtra discusses the range of omniscience 
(kevala) (TA 1.30). 
Apart from the comparison of the range of omniscience with the range of 
other types of knowledge, there is no separate discussion of omniscience. In fact, all 
types of direct cognition (i.e., avadhi, manaḥparyāya, and kevala) are only briefly 
discussed, and the sūtra does not provide a proper definition of these means of 
cognition. Even though the sūtra mentions that there are different varieties, it does 
not explain how these types of knowledge function. By contrast, the discussion of 
ordinary cognition is quite elaborate and makes it clear what ordinary cognition is 
and how it functions. The fact that the discussion of knowledge mostly focuses on a 
type of knowledge that was also accepted by other schools, while the types of 
knowledge that are not accepted as valid means of cognition by other movements 
are only briefly mentioned, suggests that the composer of the sūtra wanted to clarify 
the Jaina perspective on ordinary cognition vis-à-vis the views of other movements. 
In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the different types of knowledge in the TA 
in further detail, with reference to the commentary in the bhāṣya. By analysing the 
way in which the types of knowledge are discussed, I will demonstrate that the TA 
and the TABh consciously position the Jaina theory of knowledge in a wider 




The TA introduces the discussion of ordinary cognition (mati) by giving a list of 
synonyms:  
 
matiḥ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram ||1.13|| 
 
‘Ordinary cognition’, ‘remembrance’, ‘recognition’, ‘thought’, [and] ‘apprehension’ — 
[these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms).297 
 
At first sight, this list seems to suggest that ordinary cognition is predominantly seen 
as mental activity.298 However, TS 1.14 states explicitly that mati is ‘caused by the 
 





organs of sense (indriya) and the mind (anindriya)’.299 This raises the question as to 
what the role of the senses in ordinary cognition exactly is. The bhāṣya on TA 1.14 
explains that ordinary cognition that is caused by the sense organs is fivefold, i.e., 
derived from the five senses; ordinary cognition that is caused by the mind has two 
varieties: activity of the mind (manovṛtti) and instinctive knowledge (oghajñāna).300  
This indicates that ‘ordinary cognition’ (mati) has a very wide meaning — it refers 
to all types of sensory cognition and includes conscious and unconscious mental 
activity.  
 The sūtra continues with a description of the four stages of ordinary 
cognition (TA 1.15). This list suggests that the process of ordinary cognition — from 
the initial sense perception to the final grasping of its content — involves both the 




[The phases of ordinary cognition are]:  
 sense perception (avagraha) 
 endeavour to obtain (īhā) 
 elimination (apāya)301 [and] 
 holding (i.e., remembrance) (dhāraṇā). 
 
This list explains the way in which knowledge is obtained from ordinary cognition. 
First, there is sense perception (avagraha), which should be understood as the 
initial contact between a sense organ and its object.302 This initial impression is 
followed by the ‘endeavour to obtain’ (īhā), i.e., the attempt of the cogniser to grasp 
 
298 The meaning of the word ‘abhinibodha’ (or ābhinibodhika-jñāna) is not as obvious as the 
meaning of the other synonyms in the list and is not mentioned in standard Sanskrit 
dictionaries. Bhatt writes that the later Jaina tradition interpreted ‘ābhinibodhika-jñāna’, 
which frequently appears in the canonical sources, as a synonym of mati. Eventually, the 
term ‘mati-jñāna’ replaced ‘ābhinibodhika-jñāna’ (Bhatt 1978: 75).  
299 tad indriyānindriyanimittam (TA 1.14). 
300 The five senses, which are mentioned in TABh 1.14.3, are listed in TA 2.20. The term 
oghajñāna seems to refer to instinctive knowledge. See the translation of TABh 1.14.4 for a 
discussion of this term. 
301 Sanghvi reads avāya. He remarks that both readings are possible according to Akalaṅka 
(Sanghvi 1974: 4, footnote 4). Balcerowicz notes that ‘apāya’ is used in the Śvetāmbara 
tradition and ‘avāya’ in the Digambara tradition (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).  





the object completely.303 Next, the cogniser determines the right interpretation of 
the perception by eliminating alternative interpretations. This stage is called 
‘elimination’ (apāya). After determining the right interpretation of the sense 
perception, the cogniser can retain the acquired knowledge. This final stage is 
labelled ‘holding’ (dhāraṇā).  
This fourfold analysis of the process of ordinary cognition is perfectly 
comprehensible from a common sense point of view and matches ordinary 
experience. Moreover, it provides a model that can account for the fact that ordinary 
cognition can lead to false knowledge. To illustrate, when someone walks along the 
beach, her eye might suddenly be attracted to a shiny object at a short distance 
because the sun reflects its light on its surface. At this point, the perceiver is not 
paying proper attention to the object and she does not know yet what it is. This is 
the stage of ‘sense perception’ (avagraha), i.e., the initial contact between the object 
and the sense organ. Next, she might focus her attention on the object to find out 
what it is. In the end, it might be something valuable, like a silver coin. This is the 
‘endeavour to obtain’ (īhā). By approaching the object and examining it more 
carefully, the perceiver can find out that there is no silver coin but just a shell that is 
coated in mother-of-pearl. This is the stage of ‘elimination’ (apāya). Finally, the 
perceiver knows what the object is. Having acquired knowledge about the initial 
sense perception, she can remember this knowledge episode when she is confronted 
with a similar situation. This is called ‘holding’ (dhāraṇā).  
Since a perceiver only acquires knowledge when the initial sense perception 
is properly investigated, it is possible that one ends up with false cognition 
(ajñāna).304 For example, when someone sees a coin but does not know that there 
are counterfeit coins, it is likely that this person will falsely determine the object as a 
genuine coin.305  
Even though this fourfold analysis nicely explains how sensory perception 
can lead to knowledge, it is remarkable that this model assumes that all ordinary 
 
303 TABh 1.15.6 explains ‘īhā’ as ‘the desire to know the particularities by inquiry’ (niścaya-
viśeṣa-jijñāsā). TABh 1.15.7 mentions ‘tarka’ as a synonym. 
304 See TABh 1.32.3. See § 3.2 False knowledge for a discussion of the theory of error. 
305 Epistemological models that interpret perception as a linear process in which knowledge 
automatically results from sense perception face problems in explaining the possibility of 
error. The four stages of ordinary cognition provide a model in which sense perceptions can 





cognition begins with sense perception.306 This does not seem to match the 
description of ordinary cognition in TA 1.13, which interprets ordinary cognition as 
mental activity. Of course, one could claim that all forms of thought are ultimately 
based on sensory input and it is not unlikely that this is the idea behind the 
discussion of ordinary cognition in the TA. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why the 
TA deals with ordinary cognition in a rather confusing way: TA 1.13 equates 
ordinary cognition with mental activity, TA 1.14 states that ordinary cognition is 
caused by the sense organs and the mind, and the remainder of the discussion (TA 
1.15 – TA 1.19) deals with ordinary cognition as sensory cognition. As such, it seems 
that there are two different views on ordinary cognition, which are only connected 
by the claim in TA 1.14. This might indicate that the Jaina tradition did not have a 
consistent view on ordinary cognition at the moment of the composition of the sūtra 
and that the author of the TA tried to unite these views in a single discussion.  
Balcerowicz suggests that the Jaina tradition developed its theory about the 
fourfold stages of perception under influence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought.307 It is 
hard to trace exactly how the development of Jaina epistemology took place before 
the TA but it is clear that Nyāya epistemology influenced the traditional Jaina 
perspective. This process is reflected in the Bhagavatī, which lists the four means of 
cognition that the Naiyāyikas accept as authoritative pramāṇas. The same text also 
mentions the four stages of ordinary cognition that are listed in TA 1.15, which 
supports Balcerowicz’ claim that this theory developed under Nyāya influence.308 It 
seems likely, therefore, that the first Jaina epistemological theories had little to say 
about sense perception. More advanced theories about pratyakṣa in other schools 
probably urged the Jainas to include a theory about sensory perception in their own 
system. The different layers of this process seem to be reflected in the presentation 
of ordinary cognition in the TA. The analysis of the role of the vyañjana in ordinary 
cognition in TA 18 – 19 provides further evidence that the Jainas were still 
 
306 The bhāṣya explicitly states that the four stages apply to all forms of ordinary cognition, 
i.e., those that are caused by the senses and those that are caused by the mind (See TABh 
1.15.1).  
307 Balcerowicz notes that the fivefold division of knowledge in the Jaina tradition does not 
reflect any external influence but that the ‘particular solutions and definitions of respective 
cognitions’ show influence from outside (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001).  
308 See, e.g., Shastri 1990: 202. The oldest layers of the epistemological theory of the Jainas do 





developing their theories against the background of Nyāya thought at the time of the 
composition of the TA.  
After listing the stages of ordinary cognition, the TA continues with a 
description of the objects of ordinary cognition:  
 
bahubahuvidhakṣiprāniśritānuktadhruvāṇāṃ setarāṇām ||1.16|| 
 
 [The objects of ordinary cognition appear as] much (bahu), of many sorts 
(bahuvidha), swift (kṣipra), independent (aniśrita), non-verbal (anukta), and 
constant (dhruva) together with their opposites. 
 
It is not exactly clear to me what the idea behind this list is.309 The fact that these 
qualifications are supposed to have their opposites indicates that this list tries to 
categorise the objects of perception in a systematic way, even though it is hard to 
understand the underlying principles. The explanation in the bhāṣya is not very 
helpful. It simply mentions that the objects of ordinary cognition throughout its four 
stages are qualified as described in the sūtra (TABh 1.16.1). While these 
qualifications most likely relate to the objects (artha)310 of ordinary cognition, it 
seems that some of them actually qualify the perception itself. In other words, it is 
not entirely clear whether the terms in TA 1.6 are ontological or phenomenological 
descriptions. This ambiguity is also reflected in the Sarvārthasiddhi. In his 
commentary on TA 1.16, Pūjyapāda explains that the list provides a subdivision of 
avagraha but in the commentary on the following sūtra he states that bahu etc. 
qualify the objects of apprehension.311  
 It is hard to decide which interpretation of TA 1.16 is more plausible based 
on the text alone. Apart from the list of adjectives and the reference to their 
opposites (itara), there is no additional information in TA 1.16 that provides any 
context. The qualifications are in genitive plural and seem to relate syntactically to 
the four stages of perception (avagraha etc.) that are listed in TA 1.15 in nominative 
plural. If we combine these two sūtras, we end up with the basic structure: ‘[There is] 
 
309 Jacobi points out that the Jaina commentaries have different interpretations of the 
meaning of ‘aniśrita’ (Jacobi 1906: 296). Further, a variant version of the text reads 
‘sandigdha’ (unambiguous) instead of ‘anukta’ (see also Part II). It seems, therefore, that the 
Jaina tradition struggled to agree on the meaning of this sūtra. 
310 See TA 1.17. 





sense perception (avagraha) etc. of many (bahu ...) etc.’312 However, this combined 
sentence still needs a noun that is qualified by bahu etc. This noun is provided in TA 
1.17, which consists of one word only, i.e., ‘arthasya’. It is unclear to me why ‘artha’ 
does not correspond in number with the adjectives in TA 1.16.313 The underlying 
idea of TA 1.15 – 1.17 seems to be that there is sense perception etc. of sense objects 
that are many, of many sorts, swift etc.314 One could argue that the text allows for 
this interpretation, even though ‘artha’ and ‘bahu[...]’ do not correspond in number. 
Yet, the bigger problem is formed by the three last adjectives. While it is perfectly 
plausible to describe sense objects as ‘many’ (bahu), ‘of many sorts’ (bahuvidha), 
and ‘swift’ (kṣipra), it is harder to understand how sense objects could be 
‘independent’ (aniśrita), ‘non-verbal’ (anukta), and ‘constant’ (dhruva).  
 The translation of the TA by Tatia solves this problem by taking the first 
items in TA 1.16 as qualifications of the sense objects and the last items as 
qualifications of the process of perception.315 Unfortunately, Tatia’s work does not 
refer to a source that legitimises this interpretation. The definition of direct 
perception (pratyakṣa) in the Nyāyasūtra, however, contains a threefold 
qualification that resembles the last three adjectives in TA 1.16:  
 
 
312 The full translation of TA 1.15 and 1.16 is provided above. 
313 One would expect ‘arthānām’ instead of ‘arthasya’. It is also possible to read TA 1.17 
together with TA 1.18: ‘arthasya ||1.17|| vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18||’ ([There is] sense 
perception of the vyañjana [and] the sense object.) Pūjyapāda discusses ‘arthāvagraha’ and 
‘vyañjanāvagraha’ in his commentary on TA 1.18, which indicates that he reads TA 1.17 
together with TA 1.18 (S.A. Jain 1992: 26 - 27). In fact, it is not impossible that the author of 
the TA used ‘artha’ as the object of the preceding and the following sūtras.  
314 A more straightforward organisation of the content in TA 1.15 – 1.17 would be: 
bahubahuvidhakṣiprāniśritānuktadhruvāṇāṃ setarāṇām arthānām avagrahehāpāyadhāraṇāḥ. 
315 Tatia translates TA 1.16 as follows: ‘The objects perceptible by relatively pure mental 
faculties are multiple and complex and the comprehension of them is quick, partially 
exposed, unspoken and constant. The objects perceptible by relatively impure mental 
faculties are few and simple and the comprehension of them is slow, completely exposed, 
spoken and inconstant’ (Tatia 2011: 16-17). He obviously reads a lot into the rather concise 
sūtra and the meaning of the adjectives that qualify the ‘comprehension’ is still obscure. 
Nevertheless, the idea that some of the adjectives qualify the sense object while the others 





indriyārthasaṃnikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri 
vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam | 
 
La perception-immédiate c’est la connaissance produite par le contact d’un organe-
sensoriel avec un objet; elle est non-verbale, non sujette à l’erreur et consiste en 
une connaissance déterminée (NS I.1.4).316 
 
Of course, the individual words in TA 1.16 and NS I.1.4 are quite different but it is 
remarkable that both sūtras are dealing with sense perception and that both 
passages use the qualifications ‘non-verbal’ (anukta in the TABh, avyapadeśya in the 
NS) and ‘definitive’ (dhruva in the TABh, vyavasāyātmaka in the NS).317 It is unlikely 
that this correspondence is completely coincidental. Even though there is not 
enough evidence to say that TA 1.16 was directly influenced by NS I.1.4, the 
matching terms do suggest that at least some of the adjectives in TA 1.16 qualify the 
perceptual process (avagraha etc.) instead of the objects (artha). The fact that this is 
not evident from the syntax of the sūtra might explain why later commentators did 
not agree on its interpretation and why we ended up with different versions of this 
sūtra.  
The content of the sūtras that immediately follow TA 1.15 – 1.17 provides 
further evidence that this passage was indeed influenced by the discussion of 
pratyakṣa in the Nyāyasūtra. TA 1.18 – 1.19 addresses a technical debate about the 
precise object of sense perception:  
 
vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18|| na cakṣuranindriyābhyām ||1.19|| 
 
[There is] sense perception of the vyañjana. [However, there is] no [sense 
perception of the vyañjana] by the eyes (cakṣus) or the mind (anindriya). 
 
 
316 Angot 2009: 271-272 (emphasis mine). As demonstrated above, the counterargument in 
TABh 1.12.10 seems to be based on the first part of this sūtra.  
317 Dasti translates ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ as ‘definitive’ (Dasti 2017: 20). This is very close to the 
prime meaning of ‘dhruva’, which is given as ‘unchangeable’, ‘permanent’, etc. in MW. It is 
hard to evaluate whether the term ‘aniśrita’ in the TA possibly relates to ‘avyabhicārin’ in the 
Nyāyasūtra. As mentioned above, the reading and meaning of this term is contested in the 





The word ‘vyañjana’ is difficult to translate but seems to refer to the actual contact of 
a sense organ with its object.318 TA 1.19 points out that the eye and the mind cannot 
perceive the ‘vyañjana’ and the bhāṣya explicitly states that the other senses do have 
the vyañjana as its object.319 This suggests that the term ‘vyañjana’ refers to the 
physical contact between the sense organ and the object, which is possible in the 
case of the other sense organs but not in the case of the eye or the mind.320 Hence, 




VIII. Types of ordinary cognition (mati) that have vyañjanāvagraha (TA1.19) 
indriya vyañjanāvagraha 
i. sparśana + 
ii. rasana + 
iii. ghrāna + 
iv. cakṣus - 
v. śrotra  + 
anindriya  
vi. manas - 
 
The idea that there is no direct contact between the eye and its object goes against 
the view on pratyakṣa in NS I.1.4, which says that pratyakṣa — which includes visual 
perception for the Naiyāyikas — results from the contact of the object with the sense 
organ (indriyārthasaṃnikarṣa).321 Hence, it seems that the author of the TA is trying 
to present a slightly different view by excluding the possibility of direct contact 
between the object and eye or the mind. 
 The TABh on TA 1.18 explains that the phrase ‘vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ’ entails 
that the vyañjana is the object at the first stage of ordinary cognition only. In other 
words, there is only sense perception (avagraha) of the vyañjana, and not the 
 
318 Jacobi translates the term ‘vyañjana’ as ‘eine unbestimmte Empfindung’ (Jacobi 1906: 
296). Tatia translates ‘contact-awareness’ (Tatia 1951:35). 
319 ‘caturbhir indriyaiḥ śeśair bhavati’ (TABh 1.19.2). 
320 The Sarvārthasiddhi illustrates this point as follows: ‘The sense-organ of sight is one 
without contact, for it does not apprehend an object in contact with it. If it were one with 
contact, it would perceive the collyrium applied to the eye. But it does not perceive it; so it is 
a sense without contact like the mind’ (S.A. Jain 1992: 27 - 28). 
321 The relation between TA 1.18 - 1.19 and NS I.1.4 has been previously observed by Ohira 





endeavour to obtain (īhā) etc.322 Ordinary cognition, however, is directed at the 
object (artha) throughout its four stages.323 Hence, the way in which the different 
stages of ordinary cognition relate to the object and the vyañjana can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
 
IX. Objects of the different phases of ordinary cognition (mati) (TA1.17 – 1.18) 
 artha vyañjana 
avagraha + + 
īhā + - 
apāya + - 
dhāraṇā + - 
 
If the vyañjana indeed refers to the physical contact between the sense organ and 
the object, the above table makes perfect sense. In the end, the three last stages of 
ordinary cognition (īhā, apāya, and dhāraṇā) are predominantly mental activities 
and do not engage with the object in a physical way.  
 It is remarkable that the bhāṣya on TA 1.19 uses the peculiar word formation 
‘noindriya’ instead of ‘anindriya’, which is used in the sūtra itself.324 Since both words 
are clearly used to refer to ‘mind’, one could argue that the bhāṣya uses a synonym 
to clarify the term. However, synonyms are explicitly indicated as such in the 
bhāṣya.325 It is also unlikely that we are dealing with a scribal error since the same 
phenomenon occurs in the commentary on TA 2.22, in which the bhāṣya uses the 
word ‘noindriya’ in the first sentence after the sūtra while the sūtra says 
 
322 ‘vyañjanasyāvagraha eva bhavati nehādayaḥ’ (TABh 1.18.1). 
323 ‘īhādayas tv arthasyaiva’ (TABh 1.18.3). 
324 The sūtra states: ‘na cakṣuranindriyābhyām’ (TA 1.19) and the bhāṣya comments: 
‘cakṣuṣā noindriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati’ (TA 1.19.1). The word ‘noindriya’ is 
uncommon in classical Sanskrit. It probably derives from ‘na u indriya’ (and not ‘indriya’). 
The particle ‘u’ can indicate a restriction or an antithesis (MW). 
In her article on sensory cognition in the Nandīsūtra, Clavel points out that the Nandīsūtra 
uses the term ‘noindriya’ in reference to two different meanings: it is used to label the types 
of cognition that are included in pratyakṣa (avadhi, manaḥparyāya, and kevala) but it is also 
used as a name for non-sensory cognition that is caused by the mind. The TABh uses the 
term in this second sense. In the same article, Clavel remarks that the difference between the 
TA and the TABh illustrates that the philosophical terminology of the Jainas was subject to 
change at the time of the composition of these texts. She relates this change of vocabulary 
and the shifting classifications of cognition to the influence of the Naiyāyikas (Clavel 2015). 
325 The bhāṣya usually adds ‘anarthāntaram’ when a word is explained with synonyms. See, 





‘anindriya’.326 Since the word ‘noindriya’ was used in different ways in early treatises 
on Jaina epistemology, it is possible that there was some controversy about the exact 
meaning of the term. Since the bhāṣya uses both ‘noindriya’ and ‘anindriya’ while the 
context of these terms does not indicate that they refer to different concepts, it is 
hard to tell whether these terms had a different meaning for the author of the 
bhāṣya.327 The difference can be seen as an argument for the position that the author 
of the sūtra did not write the bhāṣya, even though this cannot be taken as conclusive 
evidence.  
 After discussing the different types of ordinary cognition (mati) and their 
objects (artha and vyañjana), the bhāṣya concludes the commentary on mati by 
summing up the divisions and subdivisions of mati: 
 
evam etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ caturvidham aṣṭāviṃśatividham aṣṭaṣaṣṭy-
uttaraśatavidhaṃ ṣaṭtriṃśattriśatavidhaṃ ca bhavati | 
 
So, this ordinary cognition (matijñāna) is twofold, fourfold, 28-fold, 168-fold, and 
336-fold (TABh 1.19.3). 
 
The bhāṣya does not provide any further explanation about this enumeration and it 
is hard to interpret the meaning of these numbers on the basis of the sūtra and 
bhāṣya alone.328 This suggests that the author of the bhāṣya refers to a classification 
of the types of ordinary cognition that was well known when the bhāṣya was 
composed. In the table below, I provide a possible interpretation of the numbers. 
The organisation of the table corresponds to the organisation of the types of 
ordinary cognition in the Nandīsūtra, which successively lists four types of 
‘vyañjanāvagraha’, and six types of ‘arthāvagraha’, six types of ‘īhā, six types of 
‘avāya’, and six types of ‘dhāraṇā’.329 The number six in these lists refers to the five 
 
326 While the sūtra says ‘śrutam anindriyasya’ (TA 2.22), the bhāṣya comments ‘śrutajñānaṃ 
dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ noindriyasyārthaḥ’ (TABh 2.22.1). 
327 The bhāṣya uses the term ‘anindriya’ in different parts of the commentary, such as TABh 
1.1.9, 1.14.1, and 1.20.36. Unlike the bhāṣya, which seems to use the two terms 
interchangeably, the sūtra only uses ‘anindriya’.  
328 The bhāṣya mentions the twofold division of mati in TABh 1.18.2 and the fourfold division 
in TABh 1.15.1. The other numbers are not mentioned before. 





senses (indriya) and the mind (manas). Since the eye and the mind cannot perceive 
the vyañjana, the list of types of vyañjanāvagraha is only fourfold.330 
 
 


















Four types of 
vyañjanāvagraha 
(TABh 1.19.1-2) 
avagraha sparśana bahu alpa sparśana 
īhā rasana bahuvidha ekavidha rasana 
apāya ghrāna kṣipra cireṇa ghrāna 
dhāraṇā cakṣus aniśrita niśrita  
 śrotra  anukta333 ukta śrotra 
manas dhruva adhruva  
4 6 6 6 *4 
28 [= (4 × 6) + 4*] 12 (= 2 × 6)  
168 (= 28 × 6)  
336 (= 28 × 12) 
 
The numbers that are mentioned in TABh 1.19.3 are emphasized in the above table. 
The twofold division refers to the types of ordinary cognition that are caused 
respectively by the sense organs and the mind (TA 1.14).334The fourfold division 
relates to the stages of the perceptual process, as mentioned in TA 1.15. The larger 
numbers result from the multiplication of the stages of ordinary cognition by the 
types of ordinary cognition and their objects. The 28-fold division results from the 
application of the four stages of ordinary cognition to the five senses and the mind 
 
330 Since the vyañjana is the object of sense perception (avagraha) only, the vyañjana is not 
the object of ‘īhā’ etc. (TABh 1.18.1). Therefore, apart from the four types of vyañjanāvagraha 
(related to sparśana, rasana, ghrāna, and śrotra), all other types of ordinary cognition are 
directed at the object (artha) (TA 1.17).  
331 The five indriyas are listed in TA 2.20. 
332 As discussed above, it is possible that some of the qualifications in TA 1.16 refer to the 
perceptual process instead of the objects. 
333 Other versions of the TA read ‘asandigdha’ instead of ‘anukta’. See also above. 
334 Alternatively, it could refer to the type of ordinary cognition that relate to the object 
(artha) and the vyañjana, as mentioned in TA 1.17 – 1.18. The commentary on these sūtras 





(which gives 24 varieties) together with the four types of vyañjanāvagraha. The 
number 168 results from the application of the 28 varieties to the six sorts of 
objects. By adding the six opposite sorts of objects to the same calculation, the 





After discussing ordinary cognition (mati), the TA addresses testimony (śruta), 
which is seen as a form of indirect knowledge (parokṣa).336 Testimonial knowledge 
is discussed as follows: 
 
śrutaṃ matipūrvaṃ dvyanekadvādaśabhedam ||1.20|| 
 
Testimony (śruta) is preceded by ordinary cognition (mati). [It consists of] two 
[varieties], the many [outer limbs] and the twelve [inner limbs]. 
 
The sūtra is very concise, and the TA does not provide any further information about 
testimony as a source of knowledge. It is striking that there is only one sūtra that 
deals with testimony while ordinary cognition is discussed in seven sūtras. This 
suggests that the composer of the TA did not feel the need to defend the Jaina 
perspective on testimony vis-à-vis the views of other movements. The sūtra further 
suggests that the meaning of ‘two’(dvi), ‘many’ (aneka) and ‘twelve’ (dvādaśa) was 
evident for the audience of the TA, since the TA does not explain their meaning. The 
number ‘two’ (dvi) in the sūtra seems to refer to the division of texts as listed in the 
bhāṣya, i.e., the twelve ‘inner limbs’ and many ‘outer limbs’.337 The bhāṣya explains 
that the disciples of the jina (gaṇadharas) composed the first group of texts, while 
the second group was composed by later teachers (ācāryas).338 While the bhāṣya 
does not comment on the number ‘two’, it does explain the reference of ‘many’ and 
‘twelve’ as follows: 
 
 
335 The table is based on the analyses of the TABh by Tatia (Tatia 1951: 44) and Sanghvi 
(Sanghvi 1974: chapter 1, p. 36).  
336 See TA 1.11. 
337 The ‘inner limbs’ and ‘outer limbs’ are listed in the table below. 
338  TABh 1.20.19 – 22. This interpretation is in line with the explanation in the 





aṅgabāhyam anekavidham [...] aṅgapraviṣṭaṃ dvādaśavidham |  
 
The [corpus of] outer limbs (aṅgabāhya) [is] manifold (TABh 1.20.5). The [corpus of] 
inner limbs (aṅgapraviṣṭa) [is] twelvefold (TABh 1.20.8). 
 
The word ‘limb’ (aṅga) in the commentary refers to a section of the corpus of 
authoritative Jaina texts or ‘āgamas’.339 The TABh explains that there are twelve 
‘inner limbs’ (aṅgapraviṣṭa) and many ‘outer limbs’ (aṅgabāhya), which can be 
interpreted as ‘core teachings’ and ‘additional teachings’.340 The titles of these texts 
are given in the table below. 
 
 
XI. Testimonial knowledge (śrutajñāna): The Jaina scriptures 
The corpus of outer limbs (aṅgabāhya) 
(TABh 1.20.7) 
The corpus of inner limbs (aṅgapraviṣṭa) 
(TABh 1.20.10) 
i. Sāmāyika i. Ācāra 
ii. Caturviṃśatistava ii. Sūtrakṛta 
iii. Vandana iii. Sthāna 
iv. Pratikramaṇa iv. Samavāya 
v. Kāyavyutsarga v. Vyākhyāprajñapti 
vi. Pratyākhyāna vi. Jñātadharmakathāḥ341 
vii. Daśavaikālika vii. Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ 
viii. Uttarādhyāyāḥ viii. Antakṛddaśāḥ 
ix. Daśāḥ ix. Anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ 
x. Kalpavyavahārau x. Praśnavyākaraṇa 
xi. Niśītha xi. Vipākasūtra 
xii. Ṛṣibhāṣitāni xii. Dṛṣṭipāta 
Etc.342   
 
 
339 Dundas notes that the terminology that is used to describe the two main parts of the 
contemporary Śvetāmbara canon (i.e., aṅga and upāṅga) ‘may have been borrowed from 
Vedic learning and indicate an original desire to organise Jain writings on the model of those 
of the brahmans’. The Jaina tradition compares their body of scriptures to the human body, 
which both have twelve limbs (aṅga), i.e., ‘feet, calves, thighs, forearms, arms, neck and head’ 
(Dundas 1992: 73).  
340 The Nandīsūtra divides the Jaina corpus in a similar way into ‘inner limbs’ (aṅgapraviṣṭa) 
and ‘outer limbs’ (aṅgabāhira, anaṅgapraviṣṭa). It attributes the first group to Mahāvīra’s 
disciples and the second group to later monks (Dundas 1992: 77). The same view about the 
composers of these two groups of text is expressed in the Sarvārthasiddhi (1960: 31).  
341 Some manuscripts read ‘jñātādharmakathā’ (Mody 1903: 20).  
342 The TABh adds ‘evam ādi’ to the list, which indicates that there are more texts that belong 





The list of twelve ‘inner limbs’ (aṅgapraviṣṭa) in the TABh corresponds to the 
twelvefold list of aṅgas that is accepted by the Śvetāmbara and Digambara 
traditions.343 The Sarvārthasiddhi mentions a similar list in its commentary on TA 
1.20.344 However, the Sarvārthasiddhi explains the word ‘many’ (aneka) in the sūtra 
by giving only two examples of outer limbs (aṅgabāhya) instead of twelve: the 
Daśavaikālika and the Uttarādhyayana.345 This suggests that the composers of the 
TABh and the Sarvārthasiddhi had different views on the ‘outer limbs’.346 The fact 
that the TA refers to the ‘many’ (aneka) outer limbs instead of giving an exact 
number indicates that there had yet to be a standard list of ‘outer limbs’, or that 
there was no consensus about the list. By contrast, it must have been generally 
accepted that there were twelve ‘inner limbs’, since the sūtra explicitly refers to a 
‘twelvefold’ list. 
 Whatever the precise reference of the ‘many’ and ‘twelvefold’ texts might be, 
the reference to the ‘inner and outer limbs’ in TA 1.20 suggests that the author of the 
TA interprets testimonial knowledge (śruta) as the knowledge that is derived from 
sacred teachings and not simply as knowledge that is conveyed by any credible 
person.347 However, the first part of the sūtra states that testimony is preceded by 
ordinary cognition (matipūrva). The meaning of this expression is open to various 
interpretations since it is not specified whether testimony is preceded by ordinary 
 
343 Even though the Digambara tradition agrees that these titles refer to the twelve aṅgas, 
they assume that the original texts are lost. Unlike the Śvetāmbaras, they do not accept the 
outstanding versions of these texts as authoritative works. It is unclear how and when the 
crystallisation of these different perspectives on the Jaina scriptures took place (Dundas 
1992: 79-80). Dixit assumes that the Digambara view on the authority of the aṅgas started to 
change in the 6th – 7th cent. CE (Dixit 1971: 2). 
344 The Sarvārthasiddhi reads ‘Jñātṛdharmakathā’ instead of ‘Jñātadharmakathāḥ’ (alt. jñātā), 
‘Upāsakādhyayana’ instead of ‘Upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ’ and Dṛṣṭivāda instead of Dṛṣṭapāta 
(see also Fujinaga 2007: 4). These minor variations might result from the fact that these texts 
are composed in Prākrit while the titles are provided in Sanskrit. Nevertheless, these 
differences indicate that the titles of the twelve aṅgas were not completely standardised yet 
at the moment of the composition of the TABh. 
345 The TABh uses the name ‘Uttarādhyāyāḥ’.  
346 It is unclear to me what the source of the list of outer limbs in the TABh is. 
347 The explanation in the bhāṣya confirms this view: ‘‘Testimony’ (śruta), ‘the words of the 
āpta’ (āptavacana), ‘scriptural tradition’ (āgama), ‘teaching’ (upadeśa), ‘tradition’ (aitihya), 
‘sacred tradition’ (āmnāya), ‘sacred writings’ (pravacana), [and] ‘the words of the jina’ 
(jinavacana) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (śrutam āptavacanaṃ 
āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanaṃ jinavacanam ity anarthāntaram)’ (TABh 
1.20.2). This list strongly suggests that āptavacana — the second synonym in the list — 





cognition for the receiver or for the conveyer of testimony. In other words, it is 
unclear whether the sūtra tries to say that scriptural knowledge is ultimately 
derived from ordinary cognition or that one cannot acquire scriptural knowledge 
without ordinary cognition since one has to hear it. The bhāṣya on TA 1.11, which 
deals with indirect cognition, discusses the relationship between ordinary cognition 
and testimony as follows: 
 
tatpūrvakatvāt paropadeśajatvāc ca śrutajñānam | 
 
Knowledge from testimony (śrutajñāna) [is an indirect means of cognition] from the 
quality of being preceded by that (i.e., by ordinary cognition) (tatpūrvakatva) and by 
the quality of being caused by the instruction of others (paropadeśajatva) (TABh 
1.11.8). 
 
Even though this passage in the bhāṣya does explain why testimony is not a direct 
form of cognition, it does not fully clarify the exact relationship between ordinary 
cognition and testimony. The bhāṣya on TA 1.20 comments on the phrase ‘preceded 
by ordinary cognition’ (matipūrva) but does not satisfactorily explain its meaning. It 
basically repeats the statement in the sūtra without giving much more 
information.348 Therefore, one might question whether the author of the bhāṣya had 
a clear idea about the precise meaning of the expression in the sūtra. 
The Sarvārthasiddhi addresses the relationship between ordinary cognition 
and testimony in greater detail. It states explicitly that ordinary cognition is the 
instrumental cause of testimony. Following this statement, Pūjyapāda discusses 
several objections to this view, such as the idea that testimony cannot be eternal if it 
is caused by ordinary cognition. He tries to counter this argument by applying 
different perspectives, which leads Pūjyapāda to the conclusion that testimony is 
both eternal and non-eternal, depending on one’s perspective.349 This argument is 
hardly convincing for anyone who does not adhere to the Jaina theory of 
perspectives. Given the difficulties of the position that testimony results from 
ordinary cognition, it is hard to understand why the composer of the TA added this 
 
348 The bhāṣya on TA 1.20 simply comments that ‘[k]nowledge from testimony is preceded by 
knowledge from ordinary cognition’ (śrutajñānaṃ matijñānapūrvakaṃ bhavati) (TABh 
1.20.1). At the end of the commentary on TA 1.20, the bhāṣya uses the expression ‘tatpūrvaka’ 
again but does not elaborate on its meaning (see TABh 1.20.37).  





phrase to its description of testimony. In the end, there is nothing in the context of 
TA 1.20 that asks for a specification of the relationship between ordinary cognition 
and testimony and it would have been sufficient if TA 1.20 simply said ‘śrutaṃ 
dvyanekadvādaśabhedam’ and omitted ‘matipūrvam’. 
As shown previously, the discussion of ordinary cognition in the TA seems to 
respond to the definition of direct perception (pratyakṣa) in Nyāyasūtra I.1.3. It is, 
therefore, remarkable that the next sūtra (i.e., NS I.1.4) uses an expression that is 
very similar to the phrase ‘preceded by ordinary cognition’ (matipūrva) in TA 1.20: 
 
atha tatpūrvakaṃ trividham anumānaṃ pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca | 
 
Maintenant l’inférence précédée de cette <perception>; elle est de trois sortes 
appelées pūrvavat ‘avec précédent’, śeṣavat ‘avec conséquent’ et sāmanyatodṛṣṭa ‘vu 
à partir d’un trait commun’ (NS I.1.5).350 
 
Even though this sūtra deals with inference (anumāna) and not with testimony, 
there are some striking similarities between TA 1.20 and NS I.1.5. First of all, NS I.1.5 
immediately follows the discussion of pratyakṣa, while TA 1.20 immediately follows 
the discussion of mati. The expression ‘tatpūrvaka’ in NS I.1.5 means ‘preceded by 
pratyakṣa’, which is very close to the meaning of ‘matipūrva’ in TA 1.20. Both 
expressions play a similar role in the text: they connect the discussion of the first 
and second source or type of knowledge.351 Further, after stating that inference is 
preceded by pratyakṣa, NS I.1.5 explains that there are three types of inference. 
Likewise, the TA classifies testimony in a threefold manner by pointing to a twofold, 
manifold, and twelvefold division of texts. In other words, the structure of both 
sūtras can be rendered as ‘X is preceded by Y and has three varieties’. It seems, 
therefore, that the composer of the TA used NS I.1.5 and twisted its meaning when 
he wrote his definition of testimony. This might explain why the suggested relation 
between ordinary cognition and testimony is not evident and caused some 
difficulties for the early commentators; the expression ‘matipūrva’ in the TA 
basically echoes ‘tatpūrvaka’ in the Nyāyasūtra but the concepts in both sūtras are 
fundamentally different. Hence, it is not surprising that the relationship between 
 
350 Angot 2009: 280.  





ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony (śruta) is not as evident as the relationship 
between direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna).  
 The similarity between TA 1.20 and NS I.1.5 confirms my earlier observation 
that the composer of the TA was well acquainted with Nyāya theory. As mentioned 
previously, the discussion of knowledge in the TA suggests that the composer of the 
TA wrote his compendium for an audience that was familiar with Nyāya 
epistemology. The author of the bhāṣya must have been well aware of the content of 
the Nyāyasūtra as well, which is evident from his commentary on TA 1.20.352 At the 
end of the discussion on testimony, the bhāṣya states the following: 
 
 
matijñānam indriyānindriyanimittam ātmano jñasvabhāvyāt pāriṇāmikaṃ | 
śrutajñānaṃ tu tatpūrvakam āptopadeśād bhavatīti | 
 
Knowledge from ordinary cognition is caused by the senses and the mind 
(indriyānindriyanimitta), resulting from a natural disposition (pāriṇāmika), due to 
the own nature of knowing (jña-svabhāvya) of the self (i.e., since knowing is the 
essence of the self); but knowledge from testimony, which is preceded by that 
(tatpūrvaka), arises from the teaching of the āptas (āptopadeśa) (TABh 1.20.36 – 
1.20.37). 
 
First of all, instead of using the phrase ‘preceded by ordinary cognition’ (matipūrva) 
which is used in the sūtra, the bhāṣya says ‘preceded by that’ (tatpūrvaka). As 
mentioned above, it is likely that the expression ‘matipūrva’ in TA 1.20 echoes the 
phrase ‘tatpūrvaka’ in NS I.1.5. The fact that the bhāṣya uses the expression that is 
found in the Nyāyasūtra, suggests that the author of the bhāṣya was well aware of 
the connection between NS I.1.5 and TA 1.20. 353  It is unlikely that this 
correspondence between these phrases in the bhāṣya and the Nyāyasūtra is merely 
coincidental, since the expression in the bhāṣya is immediately followed by a 
definition of testimony that seems to be directly derived from the Nyāyasūtra. While 
 
352 This does not oppose my earlier observation that the author of the bhāṣya has difficulties 
to explain the meaning of ‘tatpūrva’. Even if one knows Nyāyasūtra I.1.5, which served as the 
model for TA 1.20, it is still hard to explain TA 1.20 since the concepts in both passages are 
radically different. 





the TA does not mention the role of āptas354 in testimony, the Nyāyasūtra defines 
testimony as follows:  
 
āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ | 
 
Le śabda ‘mot, verbalité’ c’est le témoignage des personnes fiables (NS I.1.7).355 
 
The fact that the final sentence on testimony (śabda) in the bhāṣya adds that 
testimonial knowledge originates from the teachings of the āptas — which is 
precisely the definition that NS I.1.7 provides — shows again that the Nyāyasūtra 
was a relevant source for the author of the bhāṣya. Since he does not further explain 
the meaning of the expression ‘āptopadeśa’, it is likely that his audience was 
acquainted with the Nyāya definition of testimony as well. 
 As mentioned above, the TABh does not elaborate on the relationship 
between ordinary cognition and testimony, which raises the question whether the 
author had a clear idea about the precise meaning of the expression ‘matipūrva’. Yet, 
it is possible that the concept of testimony was simply ambiguous and that the 
author could not be more precise without contradicting himself. On the one hand, 
testimony clearly refers to scripture, which is evident from the definition in TA 1.20. 
On the other hand, however, the TABh explains that testimony is the type of 
knowledge that is conveyed by an authoritative person (āpta), which seems to 
indicate that testimony is a wider category of knowledge than scripture alone. If 
testimony is interpreted in this more general way, it is easy to understand why 
testimony is preceded by ordinary cognition. In the end, the knowledge that the āpta 
conveys must have a proper foundation. However, the same model does not work 
for all scriptures. The TABh explicitly states that testimony has the ‘three times’ as 
its object (i.e., past, present, and future), while ordinary cognition only relates to the 
present. 356 Since ordinary cognition can only provide knowledge about the present, 
 
354 The word ‘āpta’ can be translated as ‘credible or authoritative person’ (MW). 
355 Angot 2009: 286. 
356 The TABh explains the difference between the respective ranges of ordinary cognition 
and testimony as follows: ‘That which perceives objects that have been produced and are not 
[yet] destroyed, having the present time as its range, that is knowledge from ordinary 
cognition; but knowledge from testimony has the three times as its range and perceives 
objects that have been produced, that are destroyed, and are not [yet] produced 
(utpannāvinaṣṭārthagrāhakaṃ sāmpratakālaviṣayaṃ matijñānam śrutajñānaṃ tu trikāla-





it is impossible that all testimony — including scriptural knowledge about the 
future — is based on ordinary cognition. This suggests that testimony (śruta) in fact 
refers to two different types of knowledge: scripture and general testimony. This 
would be in line with Nyāyasūtra I.1.8, which explicitly mentions the dual character 
of testimony:  
 
sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt | 
 
Ce <témoignage verbal>, parce que son objet est soit visible soit non-visible, est de 
deux sortes (NS I.1.8).357  
 
In his commentary on this sūtra, Vātsyāyana explains that the two types of 
testimony relate respectively to sages (ṛṣi) and ordinary people (laukika).358 It is 
possible that the composer of the TA had this division in mind when he wrote that 
testimony has two varieties.359 Nevertheless, the author of the TABh does not follow 
this line of interpretation but explains that the twofold division relates to the ‘inner 
limbs’ and ‘outer limbs’: 
 
vaktṛviśeṣād dvaividhyam | yad bhagavadbhiḥ [...] uktaṃ bhagavacchiṣyair [...] 
gaṇadharair dṛbdhaṃ tad aṅgapraviṣṭam | gaṇadharānantaryādibhis tv [...] 
ācāryaiḥ [...] yat proktaṃ tad aṅgabāhyam iti | 
 
The twofold variance results from the difference of expounder (vaktṛviśeṣa): That 
which has been spoken by the jinas (bhagavat) [...] — which is composed by the 
gaṇadharas, who are the pupils of the jinas (bhagavacchiṣya) [...] — that is the 
corpus of inner limbs (aṅgapraviṣṭa). And that which is taught by the ācāryas [...] — 
who are the successors of the gaṇadharas etc. — that is the corpus of outer limbs 
(aṅgabāhya) (TABh 1.20.20 – 22). 
 
Even though this interpretation of the twofold nature of testimony clearly differs 
from the explanation in NS I.1.8, it seems that these two accounts are not completely 
incompatible. The bhāṣya qualifies the jinas — who are the source for the inner 
limbs — as ‘all-knowing (sarvajña) and all-seeing (sarvadarśin) most excellent sages 
 
357 Angot 2009: 288. 
358 ‘evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṃ vibhāga iti’ (Angot 2009: 288). 





(paramarṣi)’.360 This corresponds to the way in which the ṛṣis are described in the 
Nyāyasūtra as the source of testimony about that which is invisible (adṛṣṭārtha). By 
contrast, the ācāryas — who composed the outer limbs — are described as having 
‘highly superior powers of speech, ordinary cognition and mind’ (parama-prakṛṣṭa-
vāc-mati-buddhi-śakti).361 Even though the ācāryas have above average cognitive 
capacities, this description suggests that their powers are quite different from those 
of the jinas. As such, one could interpret the difference between testimony that is 
conveyed by the jinas and ācāryas along the lines of the twofold division between 
testimony by the sages (ṛṣi) and ordinary people (laukika) in NS I.1.8.  
It is hard to evaluate whether the author of the TABh consciously tried to 
connect the dual nature of scripture with the two types of testimony that are 
specified in the Nyāyasūtra, or whether the parallels are merely coincidental. 
However, the passage in the TABh that deals with the twofold nature of testimony is 
remarkably elliptical and the sentences are unusually long.362 This might be an 
indication that the author struggled to present his view on the twofold nature of 
testimony in a way that would please the Jaina audience, without being at odds with 
the wider accepted view of testimony as described in the Nyāyasūtra. 
 
Cosmic perception, mental perception, and absolute knowledge 
 
While it is evident that the composer of the TA was more interested in ordinary 
cognition (mati) than in testimony (śruta), it is also clear that he does not have much 
to say about the three types of knowledge that are classified as direct sources of 
knowledge (pratyakṣa). Cosmic perception (avadhi) is discussed in three short 
sūtras, mental perception (manaḥparyāya) in two sūtras, and absolute knowledge 
(kevala) is only briefly mentioned in a more general discussion of the respective 
ranges of the different types of knowledge.363  
Cosmic perception (avadhi), which is the first type of direct knowledge 
(pratyakṣa) that is mentioned in the TA, is discussed as follows:  
 
360 TABh 1.20.21. See also Part II. 
361 Ibid.  
362 The above quote omits substantial parts of the passage. The complete passage can be 
found in Part II (TABh 1.20.21 - 22). The style of these sentences deviates from the general 
style of the bhāṣya, which is usually more straightforward. 
363 TA 1.21 – 23 discusses avadhi, TA 1.23 – 24 discusses manaḥparyāya. Kevala is mentioned 






dvividho ’vadhiḥ ||1.21|| bhavapratyayo nārakadevānām ||1.22|| yathokta-
nimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām ||1.23||  
 
Cosmic perception (avadhi) has two varieties (TA 1.21). Hellish beings and gods 
[have cosmic perception] caused by birth (bhavapratyaya) (TA 1.22). The other 
[beings have cosmic perception] that is caused as it is said. [This variety of cosmic 
perception has] six forms (TA 1.23). 
 
There are several problems with this explanation of cosmic perception. First, the TA 
does not clarify what cosmic perception actually is. It mentions that there are 
several varieties but it does not give a proper definition of the term. Even though 
ordinary cognition and testimony are also not well defined, the TA does at least 
provide synonyms of mati and explains that śruta refers to the Jaina scriptures. 
Moreover, the meaning of mati and śruta can be easily derived from the prime 
meaning of these words in Sanskrit. By contrast, ‘avadhi’ usually refers to ‘limit’ or 
‘boundary’, and it is not immediately evident what ‘avadhi’ could mean in an 
epistemological context. The fact that the sūtra does not give a proper explanation of 
the term strongly indicates that the TA was written for a Jaina audience that was 
already familiar with basic Jaina terminology.  
Based on the commentary in the bhāṣya, one could say that cosmic 
perception is the ability to perceive things that are beyond the range of the senses 
directly.364 As mentioned in the sūtra, there are two types of cosmic perception (TA. 
1.21). The first type belongs to gods and hellish beings, for whom cosmic perception 
is an innate capacity (TA 1.22). The second type of cosmic perception appears as a 
 
364 Although the term ‘avadhi’ is usually translated as ‘clairvoyance’ (see, e.g., Tatia 2011), I 
prefer the translation ‘cosmic perception’ for two reasons. First, this translation relates 
directly to the prime meanings of the Sanskrit word ‘avadhi’. Monier-Williams gives 
‘avadhijñāna’ as ‘perception extending as far as the furthest limits of the world’, which nicely 
connects to the meaning of ‘avadhi’ as ‘limit’. This view is supported by the bhāṣya, which 
explains that avadhi provides knowledge of extended substances (rūpīṇi dravyāṇi, TABh 
1.26.4), ranging from an extremely small part of the world up to the whole cosmos (ā 
sarvalokāt, TABh 1.23.10). This is the basis of my translation ‘cosmic perception’. Another 
reason to avoid the translation ‘clairvoyance’ is the vagueness of the term in English. 
Depending on one’s interpretation, ‘clairvoyance’ can also refer to the ability to read other 






result of favourable karmic circumstances365 and has six varieties (TA 1.23). These 
varieties are listed in the TABh as follows:  
 
 
XII. Varieties of cosmic perception (avadhi) (TABh 1.23.6) 
i. anānugāmika (the one that is not following) 
ii. ānugāmika (the one that is following) 
iii. hīyamānaka (the one that weakens) 
iv. vardhamānaka (the one that increases)  
v. anavasthita (the one that is not continuous)  
vi. avasthita (the one that is continuous) 
 
The first variety occurs at a specific location to someone and disappears when this 
person moves away (TABh 1.23.7). By contrast, the second variety remains with the 
person, even if the person goes to another place (TABh 1.23.8). The third variety 
initially reveals a large part of the world, after which the range of the perception 
gradually contracts (TABh 1.23.9). The fourth type does exactly the opposite (TABh 
1.23.10). The range of the fifth variety increases and diminishes constantly, like 
waves (TABh 1.23.11). The sixth variety never goes away but remains until the 
person reaches absolute knowledge (kevala) (TABh 1.23.12). 
 Even though the bhāṣya properly explains the different aspects of cosmic 
perception that are mentioned in the sūtra, the description of the second variety of 
cosmic perception in the sūtra itself is somewhat odd. TA 1.23 explains that this 
variety is ‘caused as it is said’ (yathoktanimitta). However, it is very clear that this 
refers to the explanation given in the bhāṣya on TA 1.21, which says:  
 
bhavapratyayaḥ kṣayopaśamanimittaś ca | 
 
[There are two varieties of cosmic perception], [i.e., cosmic perception] that 
originates in birth (bhavapratyaya) and [cosmic perception] caused by destruction 
and cessation [of karman] (kṣaya-upaśama-nimitta) (TABh 1.21.1). 
 
 







In other words, ‘yathoktanimitta’ in TA 1.23 refers to the expression 
‘kṣayopaśamanimitta’ in TABh 1.21.1. Since the sūtra never refers to the bhāṣya, it is 
highly suspicious that TA 1.23 apparently refers to TABh 1.21.1 here. Ohira 
interprets this as proof of the common authorship of the sūtra and the bhāṣya.366 
This is not a farfetched conclusion, since it is hard to explain how the sūtra could 
possible refer to a passage from a later commentary. However, there are certainly 
other possible scenarios since there is a good reason to doubt the textual 
transmission. The Digambara version of the TA, which follows the reading of the 
sūtra in the Sarvārthasiddhi, omits TA 1.21, and adds ‘avadhi’ to the following 
sūtra. 367  This version also reads ‘kṣayopaśamanimittaḥ’ instead of 
‘yathoktanimittaḥ’.368 The differences between the two versions of the passage on 
cosmic perception are highlighted in the table below:  
 
TA 1.21 – 23: Version A 
(TA with bhāṣya) 
TA 1.21 – 22: Version B 
(Sarvārthasiddhi) 
dvividho ’vadhiḥ || [bhavapratyayaḥ 
kṣayopaśamanimittaś ca (TABh 1.21.1)]  
bhavapratyayo nārakadevānām || 
yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām || 
 
 
bhavapratyayo ’vadhir devanārakānām || 
kṣayopaśamanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām || 
  
It is hard to tell how these two versions evolved exactly. Yet, it is clear that the first 
sentence of the bhāṣya is an essential part of version A; if it is left out, the expression 
‘yathokta’ does not make any sense. This might indicate that a part of the original 
sūtra ended up in the bhāṣya.369 If we accept TABh 1.21.1 as a part of the TA itself, 
the whole problem of the reference to the bhāṣya disappears.370 If this happened 
before the Sarvārthasiddhi was composed, it is understandable why Pūjyapāda felt 
the need to reformulate the sūtra, which does not make sense without the bhāṣya. In 
 
366 Ohira 1982: 33-34.  
367 Ibid., 10. 
368 Ibid., 9.  
369 It is striking that the first two sentences of the bhāṣya on TA 1.24 have the exact same 
structure as TA 1.21 and TABh 1.21.1: ‘manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ dvividham | ṛjumati-
manaḥparyāyajñānam vipulamatimanaḥparyāyajñānaṃ ca’ (TABh 1.24.1 – 2). This might 
indicate that TA 1.21 used to be part of the bhāṣya. In that case, it is unclear what the original 
sūtra could have been.  
370 Even if the bhāṣya were an auto-commentary, it would still be unlikely that the author of 
both texts refers to the bhāṣya in the sūtra itself since this would go against the conventional 





any case, as long as there is no further evidence for the exact textual transmission of 
this part of the sūtra, one cannot take this passage as proof of the common 
authorship of the sūtra and the bhāṣya. 
 After the discussion of cosmic perception, the TA continues with two sūtras 
on mental perception (manaḥparyāya):  
 
ṛjuvipulamatī manaḥparyāyaḥ ||1.24|| viśuddhyapratipātābhyāṃ tadviśe-
ṣaḥ ||1.25|| 
 
Mental perception (manaḥparyāya) [has two varieties]: direct perception (ṛjumati) 
and extensive perception (vipulamati).371 Their difference results from purity 
(viśuddhi) and permanence (apratipāta).  
 
As in the case of cosmic perception, the TA does not explain what mental perception 
(manaḥparyāya) is exactly. The bhāṣya explains that the knowledge that is obtained 
by extensive mental perception (vipulamati) is more pure and stable than the 
knowledge that is obtained from direct mental perception (ṛjumati). However, the 
exact character of mental perception remains unclear. TA 1.29 mentions that the 
range of mental perception is an infinitesimal part of the range of cosmic perception. 
This seems to suggest that mental perception does not have extended substance as 
its object but the subtle matter that makes up the mind. This would also be in line 
with the term ‘manaḥparyāya’, which can also be translated as ‘modifications of the 
mind’.372 As such, manaḥparyāyajñāna can be seen as direct knowledge about the 
modifications of the mind.373  
The passage on cosmic perception and mental perception finishes with a 
comparison between the different ranges and objects of these types of knowledge 
(TA 1.26 – 1.28). At the end of this section, the TA says:  
 
371 The exact meaning of the terms ‘ṛjumati’ and ‘vipulamati’ in this context is not entirely 
clear to me. The prime meaning of ‘ṛju’ and ‘vipula’ is respectively ‘straight’ and ‘extensive’, 
which is interpreted as ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ by other translators (e.g., Tatia). The intended 
meaning might be ‘mental perception of simple cognitions’ and ‘mental perception of 
complex cognitions’. However, if ‘ṛjuvipulamati’ were the object of ‘manaḥparyāya’ one 
would rather expect a genitive construction.  
372 TA 5.37 explains that substance has qualities and modes (guṇaparyāyavad dravyam). See 
also § 3.4. 
373 Since it is not clear whether this type of knowledge includes the capacity to read other 







sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya ||1.30|| 
 
[The domain of] absolute knowledge (kevala) [consists of] all modes of all 
substances (sarvadravyaparyāya). 
 
This is the only passage in the first chapter of the TA that deals with absolute 
knowledge (kevala). The sūtra makes it clear that kevala is the most extensive type 
of knowledge and that everything falls in its range.374 Apart from the comparison of 
the range of absolute knowledge with the range of other varieties of knowledge, the 
TA does not elaborate on the meaning of absolute knowledge. It seems that the 
author of the bhāṣya felt that absolute knowledge was not properly discussed in the 
first chapter of the TA. After discussing cosmic perception and mental perception, he 
addresses the lack of a separate discussion of absolute knowledge in the following 
way:  
 
uktaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānam | atha kevalajñānaṃ kim iti | atrocyate | kevala-
jñānaṃ daśame ’dhyāye vakṣyate | mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāya-
kṣayāc ca kevalam iti | 
 
Knowledge from mental perception has now been discussed. But what is absolute 
knowledge (kevalajñāna)? At this point, it is said: Absolute knowledge will be 
discussed in the tenth chapter; [there it will be said that] ‘absolute knowledge 
results from the destruction of deluding [karman] (mohakṣaya) and from the 
destruction of knowledge[covering], worldview-covering, and obstacle-creating 
[karman] (jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāya)’ (TABh 1.26.18 – 1.26.22).375 
 
In other words, the bhāṣya notes that absolute knowledge is omitted in the 
discussion of knowledge in the sūtra and refers to the tenth chapter, which indeed 
deals with kevala. However, the chapter discusses kevala as the state of the liberated 
soul and does not deal with the kevala as a type of knowledge. Hence, the fact that 
kevala is not discussed in the first chapter remains a significant omission in the 
epistemological theory in the TA. The fact that the TA discusses the two indirect 
 
374 While the term is frequently translated as ‘omniscience’, I translate ‘kevala’ as ‘absolute 
knowledge’, which still preserves the prime meaning of ‘kevala’. 





types of cognition (i.e., mati and śruta) in a more precise way than the three direct 
types of knowledge (i.e., avadhi, manaḥparyāya, and kevala) and barely deals with 
kevala in the first chapter, might indicates that the TA was written in an 
environment in which the epistemological debates were mainly focused on sense 
perception and that there was little discussion of yogic perception between the 
different schools at the time of composition of the TA.376  
 
Concomitance of the varieties of knowledge  
 
After discussing the different varieties of knowledge, the TA addresses the possible 
co-occurrence of the varieties of knowledge: 
 
ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasminn ā caturbhyaḥ ||1.31|| 
 
One up to four [varieties of knowledge] can be shared simultaneously in one [soul].  
 
Commenting on this sūtra, the bhāṣya explains that one can simultaneously have 
knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati) etc.377 but that there cannot be a 
concomitance (sahabhāva) of absolute knowledge (kevalajñāna) and one of the 
other varieties of knowledge.378 The idea that absolute knowledge cannot co-exist 
with other varieties of knowledge is certainly understandable since absolute 
knowledge already entails knowledge of all substances in all modes.379 However, it 
seems that there were different views on this issue at the time of the composition of 
the bhāṣya since the TABh mentions the view of some teachers who claim that the 
other varieties of knowledge are still there for someone with absolute knowledge, 
even though they do not have a real function anymore. This view is illustrated 
 
376 See Isaacson 1993 for a discussion of the early history of yogic perception. 
377 ‘In some soul[s] there is one of the [varieties of knowledge, i.e.] ordinary cognition etc. 
(mati-ādi). In some soul[s], there are two. In some, there are three. In some, there are four 
(kasmiṃścij jīve matyādīnām ekaṃ bhavati | kasmiṃścij jīve dve bhavataḥ | kasmiṃścit trīṇi 
bhavanti | kasmiṃścic catvāri bhavanti)’ (TABh 1.31.2 – 1.31.5). The expression ‘ordinary 
cognition etc.’ (matyādi) most likely refers to ordinary cognition (mati), testimony (śruta), 
cosmic perception (avadhi), and mental perception (manaḥparyāya). However, the bhāṣya 
only mentions the co-occurrence of ordinary cognition and testimony in the subsequent 
discussion (TABh 1.31.6 – 1.31.8). 
378 TABh 1.31.10. 
379  ‘[The domain of] absolute knowledge [extends to] all modes of all substances 





through a comparison between absolute knowledge and the blazing light of the 
sun:380 
 
yathā vā vyabhre nabhasi āditya udite bhūritejastvād ādityenābhibhūtāny 
anyatejāṃsi jvalanamaṇicandranakṣatraprabhṛtīni prakāśanaṃ prati akiṃcit-
karāṇi bhavanti tadvad iti |  
 
Or just like the other lights, such as shining jewels, the moon and the stars, [being] 
surpassed by the sun when the sun rises in the cloudless sky — since [the sun] is a 
strong light — become likewise non-functional (akiñcitkara) with regard to that 
which is illuminating (prakāśana) (TABh 1.31.14). 
 
In other words, by surpassing the light of other celestial bodies, the sun makes their 
light irrelevant, just as other varieties of knowledge are non-functional when the 
soul reaches the state of absolute knowledge.  
This discussion about the concomitance of absolute knowledge and other 
varieties of knowledge relates to a broader debate about the nature of a liberated 
soul and the activities of a liberated being (kevalin).381 The inclusion of a different 
view in the bhāṣya might indicate that the author of the bhāṣya wanted to provide a 
commentary on the sūtra that was acceptable for different groups within the Jaina 
community. In fact, the metaphor of the sun — which is primarily used to illustrate 
the other view — works well to mitigate the contrast between the two views. By 
describing the other varieties of knowledge as ‘non-functional’ or ‘non-significant’ 
(akiñcitkara), just like the stars in daytime, it remains somewhat vague whether 
these types of knowledge can co-occur with kevalajñāna or not. In fact, the metaphor 
could even be used by the opposite party to illustrate that other types of knowledge 
cannot go together with absolute knowledge. As such, it seems that the author of the 
bhāṣya tried to mitigate the differences between the two views. This is further 
supported by his use of vocabulary. The difference between the idea that the kevalin 
cannot have knowledge from ordinary cognition etc. and the idea that the other 
varieties of knowledge are ‘non-significant’ for someone with kevalajñāna seems 
almost trivial. Therefore, one could question whether the bhāṣya discusses the other 
 
380 TABh 1.31.11 - 1.31.14.  
381 Kundakunda discusses this issue in several works. For an analysis of Kundakunda’s view 





view to highlight the differences between the two doctrinal standpoints or to 




The theory of knowledge in the TA presupposes ontological realism and could be 
classified as a correspondence theory. 382  It assumes that the world exists 
independent of the observer and that knowledge corresponds to the state of affairs 
in the external reality. In order to acquire knowledge, therefore, the process of 
cognition should reveal reality as it is. However, every epistemological account that 
claims that the process of cognition reveals the world as it is faces the problem of 
erroneous cognition. The TA describes ordinary cognition, testimony, etc. as reliable 
means of knowledge. However, these means of cognition can also lead to erroneous 
cognition.  
Therefore, the epistemological theory in the TA needs an account of false cognition 
in order to disambiguate knowledge from error. The TA addresses this issue in the 
following two sūtras: 
 
matiśrutāvadhayo viparyayaś ca ||1.32|| sadasator aviśeṣād yadṛcchopa-
labdher unmattavat ||1.33|| 
 
[There is knowledge from] ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception, 
and the opposite. [Erroneous cognition results] from accidental-perception 
(yadṛcchopalabhdi) because of indistinction between [things that are] real and 
unreal, like a madman. 
 
TA 1.32 is very short and the intended meaning is not immediately obvious. The 
sūtra seems to say that ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception each 
have their opposite. Even though it is not explained in the sūtra what these 
opposites exactly are, one can infer from TA 1.33 that ‘the opposite’ must refer to 
erroneous cognition. Commenting on TA 1.32, the bhāṣya explains that the ‘opposite’ 
(viparyaya) refers to ajñāna, i.e., the opposite of knowledge (jñāna).383 While the 
 
382 See David 2016 for a discussion of the correspondence theory of truth. 
383 ‘The opposite of knowledge is false knowledge (jñānaviparyayo ’jñānam iti)’ (TABh 





term ‘ajñāna’ can be translated as ‘ignorance’, the example of the madman 
(unmattavat) in TA 1.33 clearly indicates that we are dealing with erroneous 
cognition and not with an absence of cognition.384  
Since there are five varieties of knowledge, one would expect that there are 
also five varieties of false knowledge. However, in the commentary on TA 1.35, the 
bhāṣya uses the phrase ‘all eight’, 385 in reference to the varieties of knowledge and 
their opposites. Since there are five varieties of knowledge, one can infer that there 
are only three varieties of false knowledge. This corresponds with the text in TA 
1.32, which only mentions the opposite of the first three varieties of knowledge. The 
bhāṣya specifies these three types of false knowledge as follows:  
 
matyajñānaṃ śrutājñānaṃ vibhaṅgajñānam iti | avadher viparīto vibhaṅga ity 
ucyate | 
 
False knowledge from ordinary cognition (maty-ajñāna), false knowledge from 
testimony (śruta-ajñāna) and deceptive knowledge (vibhaṅga-jñāna). It is said that 
deceptive knowledge is the opposite of cosmic perception (TABh 1.32.11 – 12).386 
 
 
translates: ‘Sensory knowledge, knowledge of scripture, clairvoyance also are [or: can be] 
erroneous.’ The word ‘viparyaya’ is sometimes used as ‘misapprehension’ or ‘error’ (MW) 
and this translation does make sense in the context of TA 1.32 - 33. However, the bhāṣya 
clearly interprets ‘viparyaya’ as opposite. In the commentary on TA 1.32, the bhāṣya explains 
‘viparyaya’ by contrasting ‘jñāna’ and ‘ajñāna’, and uses metaphors such as ‘shade and 
sunshine’ and ‘heat and cold’ (chāyātapavac chītoṣṇavac ca) to illustrate the difference 
between jñāna and ajñāna (TABh 1.32.3 - 1.32.6). Therefore, I prefer to translate ‘viparyaya’ 
as ‘opposite’ instead of ‘erroneous’. 
384 As Soni remarks in his study of the Jaina theory of error, it is somewhat odd that the TA 
first introduces the five varieties of knowledge as pramāṇas, and later explains that mati, 
śruta, and avadhi can also lead to erroneous cognition (Soni 2018: 57). In the end, pramāṇas 
are usually seen as reliable means of knowledge. Soni tries to explain this by pointing out 
that TA 1.9 deals with the varieties of knowledge as pramāṇas, while TA 1.32 deals with the 
same varieties of knowledge as forms of jñānopayoga (i.e., cognitive operation in the form of 
knowledge) (Soni 2018: 63-64). Yet, this does not solve the central problem that the varieties 
of knowledge that are listed in TA 1.9 as pramāṇas are not fully reliable, which goes against 
the concept of pramāṇa. As explained above, the pramāṇa theory in the TA consists of 
several historical layers, and the five varieties of knowledge already existed before the 
concept of pramāṇa was introduced in Jaina theory. It is, therefore, not entirely surprising 
that the TA discusses these varieties of knowledge in a way that does not fully match the 
standard idea of pramāṇas. 
385 naigamādayas trayaḥ sarvāṇy aṣṭau śrayante (TABh 1.35.77). 
386 See also Part II. It is unclear to me why the opposite of cosmic perception (avadhi) is 





Following the explanation in the bhāṣya, the eight varieties of knowledge and false 
knowledge can be classified as shown in the table below:  
 
 
XIII. The eight varieties of knowledge (jñāna) and false knowledge (ajñāna)387  
jñāna (TA 1.9) ajñāna (TABh 1.32.3) 
i. knowledge from ordinary cognition 
(matijñāna) 
vi. false knowledge from ordinary 
cognition (matyajñāna) (TABh 
1.32.11) 
ii. knowledge from testimony  
(śrutajñāna) 
vii. false knowledge from testimony 
(śrutājñāna) (TABh 1.32.11) 
iii. knowledge from cosmic perception 
(avadhijñāna) 
viii. deceptive knowledge (vibhaṅga) 
(TABh 1.32.12) 
iv. knowledge from mental perception 
(manaḥparyāyajñāna) 
 




The overall account of the opposites of the varieties of knowledge makes a rather 
unsystematic impression. As can be seen in the table above, there is no opposite of 
knowledge from mental perception (manaḥparyāyajñāna).388 However, the sūtra 
and the bhāṣya do not explain why only the first three varieties of knowledge have 
their opposite. Furthermore, it is unclear to me why the opposite of cosmic 
perception (avadhi) is labelled ‘vibaṅgajñāna’ instead of ‘avadhyajñāna’. The 
unsystematic presentation of these opposites suggests that the Jaina theory of 
erroneous cognition was not yet fully developed, and that the author of the TA 
combined some pre-existent ideas in an effort to address the problem of error. 
 Apart from a lack of clarity when it comes to the classification of knowledge 
and false knowledge, the sūtra also does not clearly identify the cause of error, even 
 
387 TA 2.9 refers to the eight and four varieties of cognitive operation (upayoga). This 
eightfold list corresponds to the eight types of jñānopayoga that are listed in TABh 2.9.5. TA 
2.8 defines upayoga as the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the soul. This passage will be further 
discussed below. 
388 One could argue that it is not possible to have the opposite of absolute knowledge 
(kevalajñāna), which could explain why there is no opposite of this means of cognition 






though this is a crucial element in any theory of error. According to TA 1.33, the 
opposites of ordinary cognition etc. arise by accidental perception 
(yadṛcchopalabdhi). This explanation, however, has little explanatory value as it 
does not identify the actual cause of error. The bhāṣya offers a more detailed theory: 
 
yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati so ’śvaṃ 
gaur ity adhyavasyati gāṃ cāśva iti loṣṭaṃ suvarṇam iti suvarṇam loṣṭa iti 
loṣṭaṃ ca loṣṭa iti suvarṇaṃ suvarṇam iti tasyaivam aviśeṣeṇa loṣṭaṃ 
suvarṇaṃ suvarṇaṃ loṣṭam iti viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva 
bhavati – tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matiśrutāvadhayo ’py 
ajñānaṃ bhavanti | 
 
Just as a madman, whose senses and mind are damaged from the rising of karman, 
perceives the opposite (viparīta); he determines a horse as a cow and a cow as a 
horse, gold as clay and clay as gold, and [sometimes he determines] ‘clay as clay and 
gold as gold’; thus, that is certainly false knowledge for him who is determining the 
opposite (viparīta) without distinction, [saying] ‘clay is gold and gold is clay’. In the 
same way, ordinary cognition, testimony and cosmic perception of a person whose 
senses and mind are damaged due to wrong worldview (mithyādarśana), are also 
false knowledge (TABh 1.33.1). 
 
First of all, the commentary relates false knowledge to a defect of the senses and 
mind. This defect is the result of an unfavourable karmic process. In the last part of 
this passage, the bhāṣya relates the defect of the mind and senses to wrong 
worldview (mithyādarśana). Hence, there are two factors that result in a defective 
cognitive apparatus: unfavourable karman and wrong worldview. These two factors, 
however, are causally related. This is explained in TA 6.14, which says that 
disrespect for the Jaina religion results in worldview-deluding karman.389 In other 




389 This idea is expressed in TA 6.14, which says: ‘[The varieties of karmic influx related to] 
delusion of worldview (darśanamoha) are: blaming omniscient beings, scripture, the 
community, the dharma, and the gods’ (kevaliśrutasaṅghadharmadevāvarṇavādo 
darśanamohasya). In other words, disrespect for the Jaina religion causes worldview-






XIV. Causal factors of false knowledge (ajñāna) 
Disrespect for the Jaina religion (TA 6.14) 
↓ 
Influx of worldview-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karman 
(TA 6.14, TABh 1.7.37, TABh 1.33.1) 
↓ 
Wrong worldview (mithyādarśana) (TABh 1.33.1) 
↓ 
False knowledge (ajñāna) (TABh 1.32.3, TABh 1.33.1) 
 
 
For a person with wrong worldview (mithyādarśana), the cognitive process 
becomes unreliable. As mentioned in the bhāṣya, such a person will falsely 
determine sense objects, and ends up with false knowledge. The process of 
determination is random, which implies that one can accidentally identify an object 
as it is. However, the bhāṣya states that even in that case, one cannot say that this 
person has real knowledge. Instead, it is still labelled as false knowledge (TABh 
1.33.1).390  
The explanation of error in the bhāṣya suggests that cognition is always 
based on the state of affairs in a world that exists independent of human minds. 
Even in the case of false knowledge, there is an external object — such as a lump of 
clay or gold — that forms the basis for the erroneous cognition. This is probably why 
the five varieties of knowledge (jñāna) and the three varieties of false knowledge 
(ajñāna) are grouped together in the bhāṣya as a cluster of eight, as mentioned 
above.391 In both cases, the mind and the senses are directed at an object in the real 
world, which is grasped by the knower. However, only when an object is correctly 
identified by someone who is endowed with right worldview, can one speak of real 
knowledge. In all other cases, the outcome of the cognitive process is classified as 
false knowledge.  
When one compares the two sūtras on error with the explanation in the 
bhāṣya, it is clear that the bhāṣya has a more elaborate theory of error than the sūtra. 
For example, the bhāṣya deals with the question as to why someone with wrong 
 
390 In other words, the author of the bhāṣya claims that a true cognition (or belief) cannot be 
called ‘knowledge’ if it is not justified. 





views (mithyādṛṣṭi)392 can incidentally make right claims (TABh 1.32.15 – 1.33.1). 
Furthermore, the author of the bhāṣya introduces some technical terms that are not 
mentioned in the sūtra, such as ‘ajñāna’ and ‘viparīta’.393 While the word ‘viparīta’ 
clearly functions as a synonym of ‘viparyaya’, which is used in TA 1.32, it is 
noteworthy that the term ‘viparīta’ is associated with the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of 
error, which is known as ‘viparītakhyāti’.394  
Even though the bhāṣya has a more elaborate explanation of error than the 
sūtra itself, it remains an incomplete theory. It claims that a false cognition is based 
on the perception of an actual object — which the cognizer misidentifies due to 
wrong worldview — but it does not explain where the content of this false cognition 
comes from. One can only misidentify a lump of clay as gold if one knows the 
concept ‘gold’. One obvious solution would be to refer to memory as the source of 
these concepts. However, it is hard to explain how the concept of gold could ever 
enter memory if one assumes that a person with wrong worldview can only obtain 
false knowledge.395 The fact that the TA and the bhāṣya do not deal with this issue, 
suggest that the theory of error was not fully developed in the Jaina tradition at the 
time of the composition of these texts, even though the difference between the sūtra 
and the bhāṣya indicates that the theory of error had become more important by the 
time of the TABh.  
 
 
392 The term ‘mithyādṛṣṭi’ also refers to the lowest of the fourteen guṇasthānas (stages from 
bondage to liberation). See, e.g., Wiley 2004: 243-244. 
393 See TABh 1.33.1 (translated above): ‘yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir 
viparītagrāhī bhavati [...] viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva bhavati - tadvan 
mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matiśrutāvadhayo ’py ajñānaṃ bhavanti’. 
394 See, e.g., Rao 1998: 73ff. It is unclear to me whether there is a historical link between the 
theory of error in the TABh and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view since the TABh (5th cent. CE) 
largely predates Kumārila (fl. 700). The shared vocabulary suggests that there was an 
ongoing debate about error that transcended the boundaries of the different schools. This 
idea is supported by the fact that the term ‘viparītakhyāti’ was not exclusively used for the 
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view. For example, Jayanta uses the word ‘viparītakhyāti’ with reference to 
the Nyāya theory of error, which is usually called ‘anyathākhyāti’ (Rao 1998: 63).  
395 This problem relates to Prabhākara’s criticism of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of error 
(viparītakhyāti), propounded by Kumārila. Prabhākara thinks that memory must be involved, 
while the Kaumārilas assume that error can take place without memory being involved. For 
them, it is enough that the falsely perceived object (such as silver, when the actual object is a 







The last two sūtras of the opening chapter of the TA deal with the theory of 
perspectives (naya). This theory became important in the later Jaina tradition but 
the presentation of this doctrine in the TA is rather brief:396 
 
naigamasaṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ ||1.34||  
ādyaśabdau dvitribhedau ||1.35|| 
 
The perspectives are the commonplace [perspective] (naigama), the collecting 
[perspective] (saṅgraha), the practical [perspective] (vyavahāra), the linear 
[perspective] (ṛjusūtra), and the literal [perspective] (śabda). The first [perspective] 
(i.e., the commonplace perspective, naigama) and the literal perspective (śabda) 
[have respectively] two and three varieties. 
 
The two sūtras simply list five different perspectives and add that two of these 
perspectives have several varieties. The composer of the TA does not explain the 
meaning of the different perspectives and even does not specify the varieties that 
TA 1.35 hints at.397 
 While the Jaina tradition is well known for its advocacy for non-one-
sidedness (anekāntavāda), it is not that easy to understand the exact purpose of the 
theory of viewpoints that is presented in the TA. The general idea seems to be that 
objects of knowledge can be analysed from different perspectives that only grasp a 
particular aspect of that object. The bhāṣya defines the word ‘naya’ as follows:  
 
 
396 For a discussion of anekāntavāda throughout the history of Jainism, see Barbato 2018. A 
more detailed discussion of the different lists of perspectives in the Jaina tradition can be 
found in Balcerowicz 2003b. 
397 The Sarvārthasiddhi omits TA 1.35 and has a different reading of TA 1.34. The sūtra on the 
perspectives in the Sarvārthasiddhi reads as follows: ‘naigamasaṃgrahavyavahāraṛjusūtra-
śabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ’ (Sarvārthasiddhi 1.33, Tatia 2011: 23). Sarvārthasiddhi 
1.33 adds ‘samabhirūḍha’ and ‘evambhūta’ to the five perspectives that are listed in the 
version of the TA that is accompanied by the TABh. However, these two perspectives are 
listed as varieties of the literal perspective (śabda) in the TABh on TA 1.35 (see the table 
below). Since the Sarvārthasiddhi omits TA 1.35, which is the final sūtra of the first chapter, 






nayāḥ prāpakāḥ kārakāḥ sādhakā nirvartakā nirbhāsakā upalambhakā 
vyañjakā ity anarthāntaram | jīvādīn padārthān nayanti prāpnuvanti kārayanti 
sādhayanti nirvartayanti nirbhāsayanti upalambhayanti vyañjayantīti nayāḥ |  
 
‘Perspectives’ (lit. ‘leading’) (naya), ‘[that which is] causing to reach’ (prāpaka), 
‘[that which is] causing to make’ (kāraka), ‘[that which is] causing to accomplish’ 
(sādhaka), ‘[that which is] causing to bring about’ (nirvartaka), ‘[that which is] 
causing to illuminate’ (nirbhāsaka), ‘[that which is] causing to perceive’ 
(upalambhaka), ‘[that which is] causing to appear’ (vyañjaka) — [these are] not 
different (i.e., they are synonyms). The perspectives lead (nayanti), [i.e.], reach 
(prāpnuvanti), cause to make (kārayanti), cause to accomplish (sādhayanti), cause to 
bring about (nirvartayanti), cause to illuminate (nirbhāsayanti), cause to perceive 
(upalambhayanti), and cause to clarify (vyañjayanti) the categories (padārtha), 
beginning with soul (TABh 1.35.19 – 1.35.20). 
 
Simply put, the bhāṣya claims that the perspectives lead to knowledge of the 
categories (padārtha).398 The different perspectives that are mentioned in the TA 
and the TABh are given in the table below:399 
  
 
398 TABh 1.35.91 says that the perspectives (naya) can be used to investigate the tattvas 
(nayaiḥ parīkṣyāṇi tattvāni). This is in line with TA 1.6, which says that the categories can be 
understood through the means of cognition and the perspectives (see Part II).  
399 The way in which the TA and the TABh categorise the different perspectives is somewhat 
unusual. As can be seen in the table, the TA lists five nayas and the TABh adds several 
subtypes. Most other discussions, including the theory of perspectives in Siddhasena 
Divākara’s Sanmatitarka, list seven nayas. The etymological viewpoint (samabhirūḍha) and 
the exact viewpoint (evambhūta) — which the TABh mentions as subtypes of the literal 
perspective (śabda) — are usually seen as independent nayas. The present viewpoint 
(sāmprata) is not mentioned in the other discussions. The fact that the TABh adds several 
subtypes to the short list in the TA suggests that the theory of perspectives was not 
standardised yet at the time of the composition of the TA and the TABh. For an overview of 






XV. The perspectives (naya) (TA1.34 – 1.35) 
i. naigama  
(the commonplace perspective) 
deśaparikṣepin  
(encompassing partially) (TABh 1.35.2) 
sarvaparikṣepin  
(encompassing all) (TABh 1.35.2) 
ii. saṅgraha  
(the collecting perspective) 
 
iii. vyavahāra  
(the practical perspective) 
 
iv. ṛjusūtra  
(the linear perspective) 
 
v. śabda  
(the literal perspective) 
sāmprata  
(the present viewpoint) (TABh 1.35.3) 
samabhirūḍha  
(the etymological viewpoint) (TABh 1.35.3) 
evambhūta  
(the exact viewpoint)(TABh 1.35.3) 
 
As mentioned above, it is hard to understand the exact meaning of the different 
perspectives as described in the bhāṣya, especially since the descriptions of several 
perspectives seem to be partly similar. In the following passage, I will summarise 
the explanation of the perspectives that the bhāṣya provides.400 
When one analyses something from the ‘commonplace perspective’ 
(naigama), one grasps the object (artha) and the meaning of words (śabdārtha) as 
used in daily undertakings (nigama). This perspective reveals either a part or the 
whole401 (TABh 1.35.7). For this reason, it is said that there are two varieties: the 
 
400 Another discussion of this passage in the bhāṣya can be found in Balcerowicz 2001c: 382ff. 
Balcerowicz proposes that each item in the list of nayas ‘represents a further restriction of 
the point of reference’ (2001c: 383). However, I doubt whether the list of nayas in the TA 
was composed with this idea in mind since the list deals with different aspects of language 
that cannot be reduced to the same categories. For example, it is unclear to me how the point 
of reference of the practical perspective (vyavahāra) could be a further restriction of the 
point of reference of the collective perspective (saṅgraha). They seem to refer to two 
different ways in which language is used and their difference, therefore, relates more to 
pragmatics than to semantics.  
401 The compound ‘deśa-samagra-grāhin’ can be interpreted in different ways. It is not fully 
clear to me whether ‘deśasamagra’ refers to ‘a part and the whole’ or ‘a part or the whole’. 
Since the naigama perspective is said to have two varieties (deśaparikṣepin and 
sarvaparikṣepin), I interpret the compound as a disjunctive compound. This interpretation is 
supported by TABh 1.35.27, which uses the word ‘vā’ in the application of the naigama 





commonplace perspective that is ‘encompassing partially’ (deśaparikṣepin) and the 
commonplace perspective that is ‘encompassing all’ (sarvaparikṣepin) (TABh 1.35.2). 
The bhāṣya illustrates the different perspectives by applying them to a pot (ghaṭa). 
When the word ‘pot’ is interpreted from the commonplace perspective, it refers 
either to a particular pot or to all objects of the class (jātīya) of pots in general 
(TABh 1.35.27). 
The ‘collecting perspective’ (saṅgraha) perceives the ‘whole and the part’ 
(sarva-ekadeśa-grahaṇa) (TABh 1.35.8). 402  Applied to a pot, the collective 
perspective reveals the pot as being one (eka) or many (bahu), its name etc.403 
(nāma-ādi-viśeṣita), and the aspect of time, i.e., past, present, and future (sāmprata-
atīta-anāgata) (TABh 1.35.28). 
The practical perspective (vyavahāra) ‘equals the view of worldly men’ 
(laukika-sama) and is applied in a ‘pragmatic way’ (upacāra-prāya) with a ‘broad 
meaning’ (vistṛta-artha) (TABh 1.35.9). In the example of the pot, it reveals the pot 
from the perspective of its use (upacāra-gamya) (TABh 1.35.29). 
The linear perspective (ṛjusūtra) focuses on the present aspect of an object, 
and is not concerned with its past or future (TABh 1.35.10). In the example of the 
pot, it is the understanding of ‘pot’ as the pot that exists at present (sāmprata) 
(TABh 1.35.30).404  
The ‘literal perspective’ (śabda) is described as the ‘designation in 
accordance with reality’ (yathārtha-abhidhāna) and has three varieties (TABh 
 
(artha) and the ‘meaning’ (śabdārtha) that are mentioned at the beginning of the explanation, 
which can be interpreted as the particular and the universal.  
402 I follow Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā, which analyses this compound as a dvandva. Based on the 
explanation of the naigama perspective, one could argue that the phrase ‘the whole and the 
part’ (sarva-ekadeśa) refers to a particular object and its class. As such, the collecting 
perspective (saṅgraha) combines the two varieties of the commonplace perspective 
(naigama). According to John Cort, the saṅgraha perspective ‘describes an object in terms of 
its generic characteristics’ (Cort 2000: 326). This partly corresponds with the description in 
the bhāṣya, which talks about number, name, etc. However, it is not clear to me how this 
relates to ‘the whole and the part’ (sarva-ekadeśa), which are said to be known from the 
naigama perspective. 
403 The expression ‘name etc.’ (nāmādi) seems to refer to the four anuyogadvāras, which are 
listed in TA 1.5, i.e., name (nāma), representation (sthāpanā), substance (dravya), and state 
(bhāva). 
404 It is somewhat odd that the explanation of the linear perspective (ṛjusūtra) uses the word 
‘sāmprata’ to qualify the jar, even though ‘sāmprata’ is also presented as a variety of the 





1.35.11).405 The first variety of this literal perspective, which is the ‘present 
viewpoint’ (sāmprata), results from a word that has previously been coined, which 
is expressive of name etc. (TABh 1.35.12). Applied to a pot, it is the aspect of a pot 
that is actually present that is revealed by the word ‘pot’ (TABh 1.35.12).406 
The ‘etymological perspective’ (samabhirūḍha) makes distinctions between 
existing objects in accordance with their name (TABh 1.35.13).407 Applied to the 
same pot, it is the ‘delimitation of the apprehension’ (adhyavasāya-asaṅkrama) of 
the pots that are present (TABh 1.35.32). 
The exact viewpoint (evambhūta), which is the third variety of the literal 
perspective, distinguishes between the object and the sign (vyañjana) 408 (TABh 
1.35.3). It grasps the mutual dependence of the word and the object, such as the 
word ‘pot’ and the actual pot (TABh 1.35.33). 
Even though it is hard to understand the precise demarcation of the different 
perspectives on the basis of the explanation in the bhāṣya alone, the commentary 
does help to identify the underlying problem. Conceived as a whole, the system of 
nayas disambiguates the different ways in which words can be used. The example of 
the pot shows that the word ‘pot’ can refer to a particular pot or to pots in general. 
Further, it might point to a particular pot at different moments in time, i.e., a pot that 
does not yet exist, a pot that exists right now, or a pot that has been destroyed. In 
addition, the word ‘pot’ might refer to the word ‘pot’ itself. As such, the theory of 
perspectives addresses different philosophical problems that were discussed 
amongst the different philosophical schools: the status of universals, the problem of 
change, and the relationship between words and their meaning.409 The list of nayas 
 
405 Mehta explains that ‘[i]t treats synonymous words as all having the same sense’ (Mehta 
1971: 179).  
406 It is not entirely clear to me what the difference between the sāmprata variety of the 
śabda perspective and the ṛjusūtra perspective is. The list of perspectives in the version of 
the TA that is included in the Sarvārthasiddhi omits the sāmprata perspective. 
407 According to Mehta, the etymological perspective (samabhirūḍha) ‘holds that with the 
difference of the words expressing the object, the significance of the object also differs.’ He 
gives the example of a jar (kumbha), a pitcher (kalaśa), and a pot (ghaṭa) (Mehta 1971: 178).’ 
408 The meaning of the word ‘vyañjana’, which appears in TA 1.18, has been discussed above. 
In the context of the theory of perception, the term ‘vyañjana’ seems to refer to the physical 
contact between a sense object and a sense organ. In the commentary on the ‘literal’ 
perspective, ‘vyañjana’ is more likely to have the more common meaning of ‘sign’ or ‘letter’, 
referring to the words as it is written or pronounced. 
409 In his study of anekāntavāda, B. K. Matilal describes how the different standpoints 





in the TA suggests that the Jainas tried to contribute to these debates by pointing out 
that a single word can have different functions and by providing a model for the 
analysis of these functions. For example, Indian philosophers disagreed about the 
question as to whether a pot already exists right before the potter combines the two 
pot-halves that constitute the pot.410 Following the model of nayas, the Jainas could 
say that the pot does not exist from a practical perspective (vyavahāra), since the 
two pot-halves cannot be used as a pot yet. Nevertheless, taking the collecting 
perspective (saṅgraha), one could say that the pot already exists in terms of its 
substance (dravya). As such, the Jaina theory of perspectives accommodates 
seemingly contradictory positions, such as the idea that an object is both existent 
and non-existent. 
The theory of perspectives is usually seen as one of the elements of the Jaina 
theory of non-one-sidedness (anekāntavāda).411 According to this doctrine, reality is 
multifaceted, which leads to apparent contradictions in philosophical analysis. Jaina 
philosophers claim that a full understanding of reality, therefore, includes different 
viewpoints. Given the multifaceted nature of reality, they accept that the views of 
rival religio-philosophical movements can be partially true, even though their views 
are ultimately inferior because of their one-sided character.412 Even though the TA 
discusses the theory of viewpoints, one should be careful in attributing a 
perspectivistic view to the composer of the TA. Importantly, the TA does not contain 
the word ‘anekānta’ or ‘anekāntavāda’ and there is no explicit reference to the 
partial truth of the views of other schools.  
According to Dundas, the TA was the first text that brought the ‘inchoate and 
unconnected remarks’ about the standpoints that can be found in the canonical texts 
 
practical perspective (vyavahāra) as the position of the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya traditions 
and the literal perspective (śabda) as the perspective of the grammarians. This is based on 
the analysis of the nayas in Siddhasena Divākara’s Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa, which links the 
different nayas with the position of different schools (Matilal 1981: 32-34). 
410 The example of the pot-halves and the pot is a stock example in the discussion of 
causation in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. See, e.g., Potter 1977: 56. 
411 The other part is the theory of sevenfold predication (syādvāda). The following 
description of the theory of anekāntavāda is based on Wiley 2004: 36.  
412 In more recent times, the Jains have reinterpreted the doctrine of anekāntavāda as an 
‘attitude of tolerance in situations of religious pluralism’ (Wiley 2004: 36). This idea is often 
expressed with the term ‘intellectual ahiṃsā’. Cort argues that the historical understanding 
of anekāntavāda has nothing to do with ‘intellectual ahiṃsā’. Instead, Jaina philosophers 
mainly used this theory to criticise other philosophies because of their one-sided character 





together in a more systematic way; as such, it functioned as a ‘catalyst in the 
emergence of philosophical relativism.’413 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
theory of standpoints in the TA was already connected with the idea of philosophical 
relativism. Dundas assumes that Mallavādin was the first author who applied the 
theory of anekāntatva to rival intellectual systems and that the TA only deals with 
the theory of standpoints as a part of its theory on substance and modifications.414 
However, it seems that the composer of the TABh, which predates 
Mallavādin, was aware of a pluralistic interpretation of the theory of perspectives. 
After the explanation of the meaning of the different viewpoints, the bhāṣya raises 
the following question about the nature of the different perspectives:  
 
atrāha | kim ete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakṣa-
grāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti | atrocyate | naite tantrāntarīyā nāpī sva-
tantrāḥ matibhedena vipradhāvitāḥ | jñeyasya tv arthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇy 
etāni |  
 
At this point one says: Are these [perspectives] the proponents (vādin) of other sects 
(tantrāntarīya) or [proponents of] our own school (svatantra) who are taking the 
side of the objector (codaka-pakṣa-grāhin), [and who are] running in different 
directions (i.e., disagreeing) (vipradhāvita) by difference in opinion (matibheda)? At 
this point it is said: These [perspectives are] not [the proponents belonging to] other 
schools nor [proponents belonging to] our own school, [who are] running in 
different directions by difference in opinion. On the contrary, these are different 
apprehensions (adhyavasāya-antara) of the object to be known (TABh 1.35.21 – 
1.35.25). 
 
In other words, the bhāṣya denies that the perspectives represent the views of 
different schools and states that the perspectives are just different ways to 
apprehend an object. As far as I am aware, this would be the earliest reference to the 
idea that the perspectives represent the views of different schools, even though the 
text denies that one should interpret the theory of perspectives in this way. 
However, there are several reasons why we should be cautious in drawing 
conclusions about the section of the bhāṣya in which this passage occurs. First, the 
bhāṣya on the two sūtras on the standpoints consists of a hundred sentences, which 
 






is exceptionally long.415 Second, the structure of this passage of the bhāṣya is 
somewhat loose. The different topics that are discussed in the commentary on TA 
1.35 can be summarised as follows:416 
 
 
XVI. Content of the bhāṣya on TA 1.35 (TABh 1.35.1–100) 
i.  
1.35.1–3 The varieties of the commonplace perspective (naigama) and the 
literal perspective (śabda) 
1.35.4–14 Explanation of the different perspectives 
1.35.15–20 Definition of naya 
ii.  
1.35.21–25 Denial of contradictions between the standpoints of different 
schools 
1.35.26–33 The perspectives applied to the example of a pot 
1.35.34–38 Different views on the unity of reality 
iii.  
1.35.39–41 Comparison between the perspectives and the varieties of 
knowledge 
1.35.42–49 Summary of the perspectives in four verses in āryā metre 




Relationship between specific perspectives and varieties of 
knowledge 
1.35.89 Statement about the authoritativeness of direct perception, 
inference, comparison and verbal testimony 
1.35.90–99 Summary of the relation between the perspectives and the 
varieties of knowledge in five verses in āryā metre 
vi.  1.35.100 Closing sentence of the first chapter of the TABh 
 
The first three elements in this discussion (TABh 1.35.1–20) are fairly normal. It 
explains the meaning of the different perspectives, the varieties that are mentioned 
in the sūtra and it provides a definition of the word perspective ‘naya’. Next, the 
bhāṣya deals with seemingly contradictory statements of different philosophical 
schools, illustrated with the application of the perspectives to the example of a pot 
(TABh 1.35.21–33). In a similar way, the unity of reality is analysed from different 
 
415 See TABh 1.35.1 – 1.35.100. This is the only passage of the first chapter in which the 
bhāṣya exceeds fifty sentences and only a few verses have a commentary of more than 
twenty sentences. 
416 The division of this part of the commentary into six sections (i. – vi.) is based on my 





perspectives, which shows that reality can be said to be onefold, twofold, and 
manifold, depending on one’s perspective (TABh 1.35.34–38). Thereafter, the bhāṣya 
explains that the perspectives can be compared to the five varieties of knowledge 
(jñāna), which also reveal different aspects of an object without contradicting each 
other (TABh 1.35.39–40). Immediately following this comparison, the bhāṣya 
continues as follows:  
  
yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko ’rthaḥ pra-
mīyate svaviṣayaniyamāt na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā iti |  
 
Or, just as one object is understood by the means of cognition (pramāṇa), [i.e.], 
direct cognition, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony (pratyakṣa-anumāna-
upamāna-āptavacana) — and these are not contradictory (vipratipatti) on account 
of the limitation of their respective ranges — likewise, the statements [from the 
different] perspectives [are not incompatible] (TABh 1.35.41). 
 
The claim in this sentence is similar to the claim about the compatibility of the five 
varieties of knowledge in the passage that precedes this sentence.417 However, 
instead of mentioning the five varieties of knowledge, this sentence talks about the 
means of cognition (pramāṇa). It is striking that the means of cognition are specified 
as ‘direct cognition, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony’ (pratyakṣa-
anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana) since the TA claims that there are only two means 
of cognition, i.e., pratyakṣa and parokṣa. 418 Moreover, the listed means of cognition 
are the means of cognition that were associated with the Naiyāyikas and it is not 
evident what the exact purpose of the reference to the Nyāya means of cognition is. 
The passage clearly compares the perspectives with the means of cognition, pointing 
out that one can know an object in different ways without ending up with a 
contradictory understanding of that object. However, the bhāṣya already made that 
point with reference to the five varieties of knowledge, which is more in line with 
the general epistemological account of the TA. By repeating the same argument with 
reference to the means of cognition that were accepted by the Naiyāyikas, the 
bhāṣya seems to suggest that the Nyāya point of view is also a legitimate perspective. 
 
417 I.e., TABh 1.35.40. 
418 In the commentary on TA 1.6, the bhāṣya mentions the position of others who claim that 
there are four means of cognition (TABh 1.6.3). For a discussion of this passage, see the 





In fact, this interpretation is supported by another sentence that appears towards 
the end of the discussion of the perspectives: 
 
ataś ca pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanānām api prāmāṇyam abhyanu-
jñāyata iti |  
 
Hence, the authoritativeness (prāmāṇya) of direct perception, inference, comparison 
and verbal testimony (pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana) is also approved 
(TABh 1.35.89).  
 
This passage clearly supports the Nyāya position on the means of knowledge, even 
though the TA offers a different account. Hence, based on the commentary on TA 
1.35, one could say that the TABh provides the first account of philosophical 
pluralism in the Jaina tradition. It is clear that the author of these parts of the bhāṣya 
does not only interpret the theory of standpoints as a solution to the problems of 
change, universals, etc. but also applies this model to the compatibility of different 
philosophical traditions.419 Yet, just as the passage about the four means of cognition 
(TABh 1.35.41), the above sentence is not well connected with the topic that 
precedes it. TABh 1.35.74–88 discusses how the perspectives relate to the varieties 
of knowledge. It explains, for example, that the literal perspective (śabda) only 
applies to knowledge from testimony and absolute knowledge (TABh 1.35.83). Even 
though TABh 1.35.89 begins with ‘ataś ca’, which suggests an argumentative 
connection with the preceding passage, the conclusion in this sentence does not 
follow from the foregoing sentences. This might be a further indication that the 
commentary on TA 1.35 was not written at one moment in time. If this is indeed the 
case, we cannot say with certainty that the Jaina philosophers already applied their 
theory of perspectives to the different philosophical traditions when the core of the 
TABh was composed. 
 Looking at the different sections of the commentary on TA 1.35, as specified 
in the table above, it is possible to imagine that some of the sections were added at a 
later stage. If this passage was written at one moment in time, I would expect that 
 
419 Since the Naiyāyikas are not mentioned explicitly, it is possible that the bhāṣya simply 
argues for the compatibility of different views within the Jaina tradition. As discussed 
previously, some Jaina texts do indeed present a fourfold list of pramāṇas, which 
corresponds with the Nyāya model. Nevertheless, even in that case, it remains a fact that the 





the application of the perspectives to the word ‘soul’ (TABh 1.35.50–73) would 
immediately follow the application of the perspectives to the word ‘pot’ (TABh 
1.35.26–33). Furthermore, it is remarkable that the bhāṣya contains two passages in 
āryā metre, which strongly deviate from the overall style of the bhāṣya, which is 
composed in prose.420 To conclude, the disorderly presentation of this section of the 
bhāṣya and the reference to the Nyāya means of cognition as authoritative sources of 
knowledge suggest that this passage underwent changes over time. Since the first 
parts of the commentary on TA 1.35 are straightforward and in line with the general 
style of the bhāṣya, it is plausible that TABh 1.35.1–20 belonged to an early version 
of the TABh and that the remaining parts were added at a later stage. Given the lack 
of contemporary sources, it is hard to know whether this happened before or after 
Mallavādin.  
Despite this, it is likely that the theory of perspectives in the TA and the 
bhāṣya on this passage reflect several stages of a theory that was still in 
development when the sūtra and the main part of the bhāṣya were composed. As 
mentioned above, TA 1.34 lists five perspectives while the Sarvārthasiddhi lists 
seven perspectives. Yet, the additional two perspectives that the Sarvārthasiddhi 
mentions are included in the varieties of the literal perspective (śabda) that are 
mentioned in the bhāṣya on TA 1.35. This might indicate that the TA orginally only 
listed five perspectives and did not include TA 1.35, which states that the first and 
fifth perspective have several varieties. This sūtra was perhaps added at a later stage 
in order to make sure that the TA also included those perspectives that were missing 
in the original text. 421 The discussion in the bhāṣya about the connection between 
the perspectives and views of different philosophical schools probably reflects 
another stage in the development of the Jaina theory of perspectives, which ties in 
with the treatment of the topic by Mallavādin. The fact that these different aspects of 
the theory of perspectives are included in the present version of the TA and the 
TABh suggests that the TA was seen as a relevant text in the discussion and that 
later redactors of the TA and the TABh felt the need to bring the text in line with 
new ideas that emerged long after the TA itself was composed. 
 
420 The first of these passages occurs halfway through the commentary on TA 1.35 (TABh 
1.35.42–49) and the second passage occurs at the very end of the discussion of the 
perspectives (TABh 1.35.90–99). For a more detailed discussion of these passages, see § 3.5. 
421 The majority of Jaina authors follow the sevenfold list of perspectives, as listed in the 






3.3 Tattvārthādhigama Chapter II.8-25 
 
After the first chapter of the TA, which primarily deals with epistemology, the 
second chapter continues with a discussion of the soul (jīva). The soul is a central 
notion in Jaina thought and is an important element of different theories in the TA. 
First of all, the soul plays a crucial role in the soteriology of the Jainas. In the first 
chapter of the TA, the soul is mentioned as one of the fundamental categories of 
reality (tattva). These categories are the basic constituents of the path to liberation 
and the soul — the final goal of which is liberation from karmic influence and 
rebirth — is the very first category in this list. Apart from its role in the 
soteriological framework of the Jainas, the soul is also an important element in their 
ontological theories. The soul constitutes the essence of living beings and is listed in 
TA 5.2 as one of the five substances (dravya). From an ontological perspective, the 
soul is radically different from the other substances, which are inanimate 
(ajīvakāya).422 Finally, the soul is also the centre of knowledge and is, as such, the 
cornerstone of the epistemological account in the TA.  
The second chapter of the TA discusses various aspects of the Jaina theory of 
the soul. The first section of the chapter on the soul explains how different types of 
karman relate to different states (bhāva) of souls (TA 2.1 – 2.7). Next, the TA 
mentions different varieties of cognitive operation (upayoga), which is introduced as 
the hallmark of the soul (TA 2.8 – 2.9). Thereafter, the text deals with specific 
characteristics of different kinds of living beings, ranging from plants to gods (TA 
2.10 – 2.52). This section includes a discussion of the senses (indriya).  
Since the soul is the actual centre of knowledge, it forms an important link 
between the epistemological and ontological theories in the TA. For this reason, I 
have included an analysis of the relevant parts of the second chapter of the TA in 
this chapter. Since this study is mainly concerned with the epistemological account 
in the TA, I will focus my analysis on those parts that are directly relevant to the 
theory of knowledge. Therefore, I will leave out the first section (TA 2.1 – 2.7), which 
deals with karmic theory, and the last section (TA 2.26 – 2.52), which deals with the 
movements of the transmigrating soul, the varieties of rebirth, the different types of 
 





bodies, and the life span of beings. The middle part (TA 2.8 – 2.25), which forms the 
basis of the following analysis, discusses the following topics: 
 
i. Cognitive operation (upayoga) (TA 2.8 – 2.9) 
ii. Varieties of worldly souls (TA 2.10 – 2.14)  
iii. The five senses (TA 2.15 – 2.20) 
iv. The objects of the senses and the mind (TA 2.21 – TA 2.22) 
v. Number of senses in classes of beings (TA 2.23 – 2.25) 
 
Cognitive operation (upayoga) 
 
TA 2.8 – 2.9 discuss the notion of cognitive operation (upayoga), which is introduced 
as the defining characteristic of the soul:  
 
upayogo lakṣaṇam ||2.8|| sa dvividho ’ṣṭacaturbhedaḥ ||2.9|| 
 
[Cognitive] operation (upayoga) is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) [of the soul]. It is 
twofold and has eight and four varieties. 
 
The more general meaning of the term ‘upayoga’ is ‘use’ or ‘application’423 and the 
term usually does not refer to cognitive processes. However, the bhāṣya and other 
commentaries, such as the Sarvārthasiddhi, interpret upayoga as a generic term for 
the different varieties of knowledge (jñāna) and worldview (darśana), which are 
clearly cognitive aspects. Therefore, I translate the term as ‘cognitive operation’.424 




423 MW.  
424 The term ‘upayoga’ also appears in canonical sources, such as the Prajñāpanāsūtra 
(Paṇṇavaṇāsutta). However, it seems that the interpretation of the term in the commentaries 
on the TA differs from the canonical use of the term. In my analysis, I will only deal with the 
concept of upayoga as used in the TA and the TABh. For a more detailed study of upayoga in 





sa upayogo dvividhaḥ sākāro ’nākāraś ca jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś cety 
arthaḥ | sa punar yathāsaṅkhyam aṣṭacaturbhedo bhavati |  
 
This cognitive operation is twofold: having shape (sa-ākāra) and shapeless (an-
ākāra). The meaning is: cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge (jñāna-
upayoga) and cognitive operation [in the form of] worldview (darśana-upayoga). 
This [twofold cognitive operation] is again respectively eight- and fourfold (TABh 
2.9.1 – 2.9.2). 
 
First, the bhāṣya explains that cognitive operation falls into two categories: ‘having 
shape’ (sa-ākāra) and ‘shapeless’ (an-ākāra). These terms are explained as 
references to ‘cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge’ (jñāna-upayoga) and 
‘cognitive operation [in the form of] worldview’ (darśana-upayoga). However, the 
bhāṣya does not explain why jñānopayoga is qualified as ‘having form’ (sa-ākāra) 
and darśanopayoga as ‘shapeless’ (an-ākāra). Since the meaning of these terms is 
not self-evident in this particular context, it remains unclear what the composer of 
the bhāṣya means exactly by these qualifications. However, the two terms are not 
only used in the Jaina tradition but also feature in the discussion of perception in the 
Yogācāra tradition.425 The main question in this debate is whether cognition is 
representational or not. This ties in to the more general discussion in Indian 
epistemology about determinate (savikalpa) and indeterminate perception 
(nirvikalpa), i.e., the difference between the bare apprehension of an object and 
concept-laden perception.426 Yet, it is hard to tell whether the terms that are used in 
the bhāṣya on TA 2.9 have the same meaning as the terms that were discussed by the 
Yogacārins or the other schools. 
After making this distinction, the commentary explains that cognitive 
operation in the form of knowledge (jñāna-upayoga) and cognitive operation in the 
form of worldview (darśana-upayoga) have eight and four varieties respectively. 
These varieties are summed up in TABh 2.9.5 and 2.9.8 and are given in the table 
below. 
 
425 For a discussion of the sākāra – nirākāravāda controversy, see, e.g., Peter Della Santina 
2000 and Stephen Phillips 2011. 
426 Soni 2007: 208-209. Tatia translates ‘sākāra’ and ‘anākāra’ as ‘determinate’ and 
‘indeterminate’ (Tatia 1951: 70) and Sanghvi uses the same terms in his commentary in the 
TA (Sanghvi 1974: 82). It seems, therefore, that both authors interpret the terms ‘sākāra’ and 
‘anākāra’ as synonyms of ‘savikalpa’ and ‘nirvikalpa’. Since the bhāṣya does not explain the 







XVII. Varieties of cognitive operation (upayoga) (TA 2.8 – 2.9) 
 
jñānopayoga (TABh 2.9.1, 2.9.5) 
 
darśanopayoga (TABh 2.9.1, 2.9.8)  
i. matijñānopayoga  i. cakṣurdarśanopayoga  
ii. śrutajñānopayoga ii. acakṣurdarśanopayoga  
iii. avadhijñānopayoga iii. avadhidarśanopayoga  
iv. manaḥparyāyajñānopayoga  iv. kevaladarśanopayoga  
v. kevalajñānopayoga  
vi. matyajñānopayoga  
vii. śrutājñānopayoga  
viii. vibhaṅga427jñānopayoga  
 
The eight varieties of cognitive operation in the form of knowledge (jñānopayoga) 
correspond to the eight varieties of knowledge (jñāna) and false knowledge (ajñāna) 
that are listed in TA 1.9 and TABh 1.32.3. The four varieties of cognitive operation in 
the form of worldview (darśanopayoga) do not correspond to a previously 
mentioned list.428 The categorisation of these four varieties of darśanopayoga differs 
in several respects from the varieties of jñānopayoga. First, the list does not mention 
any opposites. The list of jñānopayoga also contains forms of cognitive operation in 
the form of false knowledge (ajñāna) but the list of darśanopayoga does not contain 
any elements that are related to wrong worldview (mithyādarśana).429 Second, the 
list of varieties of darśanopayoga contains two of the five varieties of knowledge — 
i.e., avadhi and kevala — but does not refer to mati, śruta, and manaḥparyāya. 
Instead, it uses the terms ‘cakṣus’ and ‘acakṣus’. This might refer to a distinction 
between two forms of ordinary cognition (mati) — i.e., ordinary cognition derived 
from visual perception and ordinary cognition derived from the other senses and 
the mind — but the bhāṣya does not clarify the meaning of these terms.  
 
427 vibhaṅgajñāna is the opposite of avadhijñāna (TABh 1.32.12). 
428 It is unclear to me whether this fourfold list of varieties of darśanopayoga is derived from 
an older source. Glasenapp discusses the different varieties of upayoga in his discussion of 
the soul but he does not specify his source. His explanation, however, seems to follow the 
TABh (Glasenapp 1925: 203-206). 





The order in which the bhāṣya introduces the terms sākāra/anākāra and 
jñānopayoga/darśanopayoga suggests that the varieties of jñānopayoga are qualified 
as sākāra and the varieties of darśanopayoga as anākāra. In other words, the 
varieties of cognitive operation in the form of knowledge are determinate (or 
concept-laden) and the varieties of cognitive operation in the form of worldview are 
indeterminate (or conceptless). The general idea seems to be that all varieties of 
darśana are non-representational. They are ways of ‘seeing’ the world in the form of 
bare perceptions. This could explain why testimony (śruta) and mental perception 
(manaḥparyāya) are not included in this list, even though the other varieties of 
cognition — such as cosmic perception (avadhi) and absolute worldview430 
(kevala) — are mentioned in the list of darśanopayoga. Testimony and mental 
perception are inherently conceptual and have, therefore, nothing to do with 
darśanopayoga, which is non-representational (anākāra). 
 
Varieties of worldly souls 
 
After the two sūtras on cognitive operation (TA 2.8 – 2.9), the TA continues with a 
discussion of the varieties of souls (TA 2.10 – 2.14). 
 
saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca ||2.10|| samanaskāmanaskāḥ ||2.11|| saṃsāriṇas 
trasasthāvarāḥ ||2.12|| pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ ||2.13|| tejovāyū 
dvīndriyādayaś ca trasāḥ ||2.14|| 
 
[There are] worldly (saṃsārin) and liberated (mukta) [souls]. [Souls exist] with 
minds (samanaska) and without minds (amanaska). Worldly souls (saṃsārin) are 
mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara). Earth (pṛthivī), water (ap), and plants 
(vanaspati) 431 are immobile (sthāvara). Fire (tejas) and air (vāyu) and [beings with] 
two senses (indriya) etc. are mobile (trasa). 
 
 
430 In the first chapter of the TA, the term ‘kevala’ is only used with reference to ‘kevalajñāna’. 
For this reason, I have translated the term ‘kevala’ as ‘absolute knowledge’. However, in this 
context, the bhāṣya differentiates between kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana. Therefore, the 
appropriate translation of ‘kevala’ in this context is ‘absolute worldview’.  
431 The first meaning of ‘vanaspati’ is ‘tree’ (MW). However, TABh 2.13.4 explains that this 
category begins with ‘śaivala’, which is a kind of duckweed. Hence, it seems that the term 





First, TA 2.10 makes a distinction between worldly (saṃsārin) and liberated (mukta) 
souls. Then, the next sūtra adds that there are souls with minds (manaska) and souls 
without minds (amanaska). The TA and the TABh do not specify whether this relates 
to worldly and liberated souls, or to worldly souls only. However, the 
Sarvārthasiddhi explicitly mentions that these two qualifications relate to worldly 
souls.432 TABh 2.25.2 explains that all gods, hellish beings, human beings, and some 
mammals are provided with a mind (samanaska).  
Next, the TA 2.12 explains that worldly souls are either mobile (trasa) or 
immobile (sthāvara). The souls of earth, water, and plants are classified as immobile 
and the souls of fire, air, and beings with two or more senses are qualified as 
mobile.433 The classification of souls in TA 2.10 – 2.14 can be represented as follows:  
  
 
432 S.A. Jain 1992: 60 - 61. The TABh on TA 2.11 is less clear. It says: ‘Succinctly, these souls 
are twofold: with minds and without minds. We will explain them later on (see TA 2.25) 
(samāsatas ta eva jīvā dvividhā bhavanti samanaskāś cāmanaskāś ca | tān parastād 
vakṣyāmaḥ)’ (TABh 2.11.1 – 2.11.2). The commentary does not explicitly exclude the 
possibility that the qualifications in TA 2.11 relate to worldly and liberated souls since it is 
not obvious what the reference of ‘ta (< te)’ is exactly. If one reads TA 2.11 together with the 
next sūtra, the phrase ‘samanaskāmanaskāḥ’ would qualify the word ‘saṃsāriṇaḥ’. In fact, if 
the daṇḍa that separates TA 2.11 and TA 2.12 would be placed after ‘saṃsāriṇaḥ’ in TA 2.12, 
we would end up with the following reading: ‘saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca | samanaskāmanaskāḥ 
saṃsāriṇaḥ | trasasthāvarāḥ | pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ | tejovāyū dvīndriyādayaś ca 
trasāḥ’. With this minor change, the whole passage would be more straightforward and the 
ambiguity of TA 2.11 would disappear. 
433 The Sarvārthasiddhi has a variant reading of TA 2.13 – 2.14 and categorises the souls of 







XVIII. Varieties of souls (jīva) (TA 2.10 – 2.14) 
   
sthāvara (immobile)  
(TA 2.12, TABh 2.13.1) 
 
trasa (mobile)  
























(having two senses) 
 
trīndriya 
(having three senses) 
 
caturindriya 
(having four senses) 
 
pañcendriya 
(having five senses) 
samanaska434 
(having a mind) 
(TABh 2.25.2) 
 
This model shows a general distinction between more complex beings with more 
than one sense and simple one-sensed beings, which are specified as earth-, water-, 
plant-, air-, and fire-bodied beings.435 The TABh gives some examples of these beings, 
such as snow (hima), duckweed (śaivala), and charcoal (aṅgāra).436 
 
434 Not all five-sensed beings have a mind (manas). Gods, hellish beings, and humans have a 
mind but not all animals that have five senses are provided with a mind (TABh 2.25.2). 
435 TA 2.23 explains that the souls of earth etc. have only one sense, which is the sense of 
touch (TABh 2.23.1). Since the Jainas attribute a soul and the sense of touch to these entities, 
we can qualify their ontology as a form of hylozoism, i.e., the view that matter is in some 
sense alive. Even though this idea might sound very outlandish from a contemporary 
perspective, we can find similar ideas attributed to, e.g., Thales, Anaximander, and 
Anaximenes. For a general outline of their philosophical ideas, see Guthrie 1962. 
436 TABh 2.13.2 – 2.14.2. The TA and the TABh do not mention nigodas, which are often 
included in Jaina classifications of beings. P.S. Jaini explains that these minute beings are 
smaller than the elements, are provided with the sense of touch only, ‘permeate the bodies of 





The five senses 
 
After the basic outline of the different varieties of living beings, the TA provides an 
explanation of the senses (TA 2.15 – 2.20):  
 
pañcendriyāṇi ||2.15|| dvividhāni ||2.16|| nirvṛttyupakaraṇe dravyendri-
yam ||2.17|| labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam ||2.18|| upayogaḥ sparś-
ādiṣu ||2.19|| sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇi ||2.20|| 
 
There are five senses (pañcendriya). [The five senses are] twofold (dvividha). The 
sense organ (dravyendriya) [consists of] the ‘manifestation’ (nirvṛtti) [and] the 
instrument (upakaraṇa). The sense faculty (bhāvendriya) [consists of] acquisition 
(labdhi) and cognitive operation (upayoga). Cognitive operation (upayoga) relates to 
touch (i.e., touchable objects) (sparśa) etc. [The five senses are] the sense of touch 
(sparśana), taste (rasana), smell (ghrāṇa), sight (cakṣus) and hearing (śrotra).437 
 
TA 2.15 states that there are five senses (indriya), which are specified in TA 2.20. TA 
2.16 adds that the senses are twofold. The twofold distinction is explained in the 
next two sūtras (TA 2.17 and 2.18), which deal respectively with the sense organ 
and the sense faculty. The bhāṣya on these two sūtras describes the sense organ 
(dravyendriya) as the physical component of the senses and the sense faculty 
(bhāvendriya) as the cognitive power of the senses.  
Next, TA 2.17 divides the physical sense organ into the ‘manifestation’ 
(nirvṛtti) and the ‘instrument’ (upakaraṇa). 438 The TABh explains the term ‘nirvṛtti’ 
as the apertures of the senses (indriyadvāra) — which are brought about (nirvartita) 
by body-determining karman (TABh 2.17.2) — and ‘upakaraṇa’ as the part that is 
 
Jaini 1998: 109). The beings that are mentioned in the TABh as the earth-bodied 
(pṛthivīkāyika) etc. take the elements as their bodies. The idea that these simple entities are 
provided with a soul and the sense of touch explains why certain professions that involve 
harm to these beings are forbidden. For a discussion of the forbidden professions, see 
Williams 1963: 117-123. 
437 The discussion of the senses in the Bhagavatī (Viyāhapannatti) presents the senses in the 
inversed order (Bhagavatī 2.4.1). Since the TA says that one-sensed beings have the sense of 
touch only, while the sense of hearing only appears in complex beings such as humans (TA 
2.23 – 2.24), it makes sense to begin the list with the sense of touch. 
438 Even though the terms ‘nirvṛtti’ and ‘upakaraṇa’ suggest that the sūtra makes a distinction 
between the physical and instrumental aspect of the senses, they are both used to describe 





‘assisting’ (upakārin) that which is brought about (nirvartita) (TABh 2.17.5).439 TA 
2.18 says that sense faculties (bhāvendriya) have, likewise, two components: 
acquisition (labdhi) and cognitive operation (upayoga). The bhāṣya explains the 
term ‘acquisition’ as something that results from different karmic processes, such as 
the destruction of knowledge-covering karman (TABh 2.18.2).440 The meaning 
seems to be that the capacity of the sense faculty is determined by karmic factors. 
The term ‘cognitive operation’ (upayoga)441 seems to refer to the power of the sense 
faculty, which links the cognitive apparatus with the objects of the sense.442 The 
bhāṣya on TA 2.19 further explains that perception cannot take place in the absence 
of one of the different components (i.e., nirvṛtti etc.) (TABh 2.19.6). The different 
components of the five senses can be represented as follows: 
  
 
439 The explanation of these terms in the bhāṣya is not entirely clear to me. The 
Sarvārthasiddhi explains that the ‘manifestation’ (nirvṛtti) is a minute part of the soul that 
takes the shape of the sense. The term ‘upakaraṇa’ refers to a part of the physical sense 
organ that assists this process, such as the eyeball and eyelid. This subtle division of the 
sense organ into the general physical aspect and the involvement of the soul seems to be a 
way to bridge the gap between the mental and physical aspects of sense perception (S.A. Jain 
1992: 64). 
440 The bhāṣya adds that acquisition (labdhi) is fivefold, related to the five senses (TABh 
2.18.3 – 2.18.5). 
441 See also TA 2.8, which introduces cognitive operation (upayoga) as the characteristic of 
the soul.  
442 TA 2.19 explains that cognitive operation applies to the objects of the five senses 
(sparśādi). This sūtra is omitted in the Sarvārthasiddhi. The objects of the different senses are 
listed in TA 2.21. The bhāṣya gives ‘joining’ (āyoga) as one of the synonyms of ‘upayoga’, 
which confirms the idea that upayoga is the power that links the sense object with the sense 






XIX. Structure of the five senses (pañcendriya) (TA 2.15 – 2.20) 
sense organ (dravyendriya) 
(TABh 2.16.2) 









(TA 2.18, TABh 2.18.5) 
cognitive operation 
(upayoga) 
(TA 2.18 – 2.19) 
 
related to the sense of touch 
(sparśanendriyalabdhi) 
related to touch 
(sparśa) 
related to the sense of taste 
(rasanendriyalabdhi) 
related to taste  
(rasa) 
related to the sense of smell 
(ghrāṇendriyalabdhi) 
related to smell 
(gandha) 
related to the sense of sight 
(cakṣusindriyalabdhi) 
related to colour 
(varṇa) 
related the sense of hearing 
(śrotrendriyalabdhi) 
related to sound 
(śabda) 
 
The objects of the senses and the mind 
 
At the end of the discussion of the structure of the senses, the TA lists the five senses 
and their objects (TA 2.20 – 2.21), which are given in the table below. The bhāṣya 
briefly comments that the five items in TA 2.20 are the five senses and the items in 
TA 2.21 their respective objects. After listing the objects of the five senses, TA 2.22 
adds that testimony (śruta) is the object of the mind (anindriya).443  
 
 
443 The bhāṣya on TA 2.22 uses the word ‘noindriya’ instead of ‘anindriya’. The same 
phenomenon occurs in TABh 1.19.1. For a discussion of this peculiar word formation, see 






XX. The senses and their objects (TA 2.20 – 2.22) 
indriya (sense) artha (sense object) 
i. sparśana (sense of touch) i. sparśa (touch) 
ii. rasana (sense of taste) ii. rasa (taste) 
iii. ghrāṇa (sense of smell) iii. gandha (smell) 
iv. cakṣus (sense of sight) iv. varṇa (colour) 
v. śrotra (sense of hearing) v. śabda (sound) 
anindriya (mind) (TA 2.22) śruta (testimony) 
 
Unlike the longer and complex explanations on the preceding sūtras that deal with 
the structure of the senses, the bhāṣya on TA 2.20 – 2.22 is remarkable short and 
straightforward. Furthermore, it is a somewhat odd that TA 2.20 lists the five senses 
without mentioning that these are the senses (indriya) and puts this sūtra at the 
very end of the discussion of the structure of the five senses. A more obvious place 
for this sūtra would be after TA 2.15, which says that there are five senses. If one 
joins TA 2.15 and TA 2.20 by taking out TA 2.16 – 2.19, one would end up with a 
more straightforward passage (pañcendriyāṇi | sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥ-
śrotrāṇi). This might be an indication that the discussion of the senses has several 
historical layers. 
 
Number of senses in classes of beings 
 
The last part of the discussion of the senses explains how the different senses relate 
to different types of beings: 
 
vāyvantānām ekam ||2.23|| kṛmipipīlikābhramaramanuṣyādīnām ekaika-
vṛddhāni ||2.24|| saṃjñinaḥ samanaskāḥ ||2.25|| 
 
[Living beings] up to the air[-bodied]444 (vāyv-anta) have one [sense]. [The number 
of senses of] worms (kṛmi), ants (pipīlikā), bees (bhramara), human beings 
(manuṣya), etc. increases one by one (i.e., worms have two senses, ants three, etc.). 
Conscious beings (saṃjñin) are provided with minds (samanaska). 
 






TA 2.23 explains that the simplest beings have one sense only. The expression ‘up to 
the air[-bodied]’ (vāyvanta)’ refers to the souls that inhabit the elements, which are 
mentioned in TA 2.13 – 2.14.’445 The bhāṣya on TA 2.23 mentions that these beings 
have the sense of touch (sparśana) only (TABh 2.23.1). Beings that are more 
complex have more senses, as specified in TA 2.24. The table below provides an 




XXI. Number of senses in the different classes of living beings (TA 2.23 – 2.25) 
 
Classes of beings (jīva)446 
 
Senses (indriya) 
 sparśana rasana ghrāṇa cakṣus śrotra 
i. one-sensed beings (pṛthivī, ap, 
vanaspati, tejaḥ, vāyu) 
x     
ii. worms (kṛmi) etc. x x    
iii. ants (pipīlikā) etc. x x x   
iv. bees (bhramara) etc. x x x x  
v. human beings (manuṣya) etc. x x x x x 
 
In addition to this model, TA 2.25 adds that conscious beings (saṃjñin) are provided 
with a mind (samanaska). This suggests that the mind (manas) was somehow seen 
as a sixth sense. The bhāṣya explains the term ‘samanaska’ as a form of moral 
 
445 I.e., pṛthivīkāyika (earth-bodied), apkāyika, (water-bodied), vanaspatikāyika, (plant-
bodied), tejaḥkāyika, (fire-bodied), and vāyukāyika (air-bodied) (TABh 2.13.1, 2.14.1 – 
2.14.2). See also above.  
446 The bhāṣya provides more examples of beings of each class (see TABh 2.24.4 – 2.24.7). 






consciousness,447 which is attributed to all gods, hellish beings, human beings, and 
some mammals.448  
Even though the model is understandable to a certain extent, the suggested 
link between the classes of beings and the number of senses is not fully evident. For 
example, the beings in the class of bees etc. do not have the sense of sight according 
to the theory in the TA. This is somewhat odd, since the eyes of bees and similar 
insects449 are clearly visible. This could be an indication that the classifications of 
beings was originally not connected with the theory about the senses.  
To conclude, the model that is presented in the TA demonstrates a close link 
between epistemology and ontology in the conceptual framework of the Jainas. The 
different classes of beings are organised on the basis of the number of senses. 
Furthermore, the different senses correspond to the different varieties of matter 
(pudgala).450 In the next section, I will discuss the ontological account of the TA, 






447 TABh 2.25.1 uses the term ‘recognition of deliberation’ (saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā), which is 
explained in TABh 2.25.3 as the capacity of making a distinction between merit and vice 
(guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-ātmikā).  
448 TABh 2.25.2. Animals such as fishes, snakes, and birds — which are listed as examples of 
the class of ‘humans etc.’ in TABh 2.24.7 — seem to be excluded. 
449 The bhāṣya mentions several other beings that belong to the class of bees etc., such as 
gnats (daṃśa) and mosquitos (maśaka) (TABh 2.24.6). 






3.4 Tattvārthādhigama Chapter V 
 
The fifth chapter of the TA deals with the different types of substance (dravya). The 
discussion mainly focuses on the inanimate entities (ajīva-kāya).451 As such, it forms 
the counterpart of chapter II, III and IV, which provide a discussion of souls (jīva).452 
Unlike the previous chapters, which contain many lists of types of karman, gods, 
hellish beings, and cosmic realms, chapter V is composed in a more systematic way 
and presents a concise and coherent ontological account. Even though this study is 
mainly concerned with the epistemological account of the TA, there are several 
reasons to look at the ontological theory as well. First, the TA assumes a direct 
relation between the sense organs and the sense objects, which exist independently 
of the knower. As such, the ontological makeup of the world determines the 
knowledge that results from ordinary cognition. Second, the explanation of the 
differences between mind-reading (manaḥparyāya), cosmic perception (avadhi), 
and absolute knowledge (kevala) 453 in the first chapter of the TA cannot be 
understood without a proper understanding of the notion of substance (dravya) and 
its modifications (paryāya).454 Given its relevance to the epistemological account in 
the TA, this section will provide an outline of the ontological theory in the fifth 
 
451 The term ‘ajīva’ literally translates as ‘non-soul’, and refers to all ontological categories 
that are not living, such as space and matter (TA 5.1).  
452 Even though chapter II, III, and IV address different topics — including karman, the 
senses, hellish beings and gods, and the different realms of the cosmos that are inhabited by 
living beings — they all discuss aspects of the soul (jīva). The introductory sentences of 
chapter II and V in the bhāṣya, indicate that the composer of the bhāṣya regards chapters II - 
IV as a unity. The bhāṣya introduces the first sūtra of the second chapter by asking what the 
soul is and what its characteristic is (ko jīvaḥ kathaṃ lakṣaṇo veti) (TABh 2.0.1) and opens 
the fifth chapter by saying that souls have now been discussed and that the next chapter will 
address inanimate entities (uktā jīvāḥ | ajīvān vakṣyāmaḥ) (TABh 5.0.1 – 5.0.2).  
453 I.e., the three direct types of knowledge that are classified as pratyakṣa in the TA. See § 3.2.  
454 TA 1.27 – 1.30 says: ‘The range (nibandha) of ordinary cognition and testimony [extends 
to] all substances (sarvadravya) but not in all modes (asarvaparyāya). [The range] of cosmic 
perception [extends to all things] having extension (rūpin). [The range of] mental perception 
[extends to] an infinitesimal part of that. [The range of] absolute knowledge [extends to] all 
modes (paryāya) of all substances’ (matiśrutayor nibandhaḥ sarvadravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu | 
rūpiṣv avadheḥ | tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya | sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya). The 
bhāṣya adds that the domain of cosmic perception extends to all extended substances 





chapter of the TA.455 The chapter consists of 44 sūtras and discusses the following 
topics: 
 
i. The substances (dravya) (TA 5.1 – 5.6) 
ii. Space-points (pradeśa) (TA 5.7 – 5.16) 
iii. Function (upakāra) of the substances (TA 5.17 – 5.22) 
iv. The material elements (pudgala): atoms and aggregates (TA 5.23 – 5.28) 
v. Existence (sat) and permanence (TA 5.29 – 5.31) 
vi. Connection of material elements (bandha) (TA 5.32 – 5.36) 
vii. Qualities (guṇa), modes (paryāya), and transformation (pariṇāma) (TA 5.37 – 5.44) 
 
The substances (dravya) 
 
The first sūtra of the fifth chapter opens with an enumeration of the four inanimate 
entities (ajīvakāya). The second sūtra explains that the inanimate entities together 
with the soul are the substances (dravya) (TA 5.2). This implies that there are five 
types of substance, which are given in the table below: 
  
 
XXII. The five substances (dravya) (TA 5.1 – 5.2) 
ajīvakāya (the non-living entities)  
i. dharma (motion) 
v. jīva (souls) 
ii. adharma (rest) 
iii. ākāśa (space) 
iv. pudgala (material elements) 
[kāla (time), TA 5.38] 
 
The first two inanimate substances (dharma and adharma) facilitate movement 
(gati) and inertia (sthiti).456 The terms that are used for these categories is peculiar 
 
455 The prime goal of the analysis in this section is to present the different components of the 
ontological account of the TA. My analysis is mainly based on the text of the TA and the 
explanation in the bhāṣya. Since this study is primarily focused on the epistemological 
account in the TA, my discussion of the ontological account will be relatively brief and I will 
not analyse its historical relationship with other texts or schools. For a comparative study of 
the ontological theory in the TA and the ontological account of Kundakunda, see Bajželj 2013. 
456 The functions of motion (dharma) and rest (adharma) is explained in TA 5.17, which will 





since ‘dharma’ and ‘adharma’ usually refer to ethical categories. However, the idea 
that one needs an ontological category to explain movement or change is not unique 
to the TA. Similar ideas are expressed in influential ontological treatises such as the 
Vaiśeṣikasūtra and the Sāṃkhyakārikā.457 Apart from motion and rest, the TA 
mentions two other inanimate substances, i.e., space (ākāśa) and material elements 
(pudgala). The soul (jīva) forms the counterpart of the inanimate entities. It is the 
cause of life, the locus of knowledge, and explains the agency of living beings. 
The ontological categories that the TA proposes, provide a relatively simple 
but coherent model. It reduces the plurality of phenomena to a limited number of 
substances that are fundamentally different and cannot be further reduced. The idea 
that the world exists of material elements (pudgala), which occur in space (ākāśa), 
which can move or be stationary because of the principles of motion and rest 
(dharma and adharma), and which can be animated by a sentient principle (jīva) has 
some explanatory value and the text does not postulate special entities such as 
universals, individuators, or the relation of inherence, which can be found in rival 
theories.  
Even though the TA presents a fairly coherent ontological model, it seems 
that the text reflects different stages of the Jaina theory of substance. In the last part 
of the chapter, the TA adds that some teachers also regard time (kāla) as one of the 
 
in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, which is the locus classicus for the theory of categories. The TA and the 
TABh do not explain why motion (dharma) has an opposite (adharma). The 
Dravyasaṃgraha — a later Jaina text by Nemicandra (fl. 10th cent. CE) — explains that the 
principle of rest (adharma) helps matter (pudgala) and living entities (jīva) to stay in the 
same place, just like shade helps travellers to remain at the same place (Dravyasaṃgraha 18, 
in Balbir 2010: 10 – 11). The inclusion of a principle of rest can also be found in other 
traditions. The Sāṃkhyakārikā, for example, mentions tamas as one of the three strands 
(guṇa) of prakṛti (Sāṃkhyakārikā 13 in Burley 2007: 166 - 167).  
457 The Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS) includes motion (karman) as one of the ontological categories 
(padārtha) (VS 1.1.4, Gough 1873: 4). It is remarkable that the ontological categories in the 
TA correspond to several of the Vaiśeṣika categories. However, the vocabulary that is used to 
describe the different ontological categories deviates from the vocabulary that is used in the 
VS. For example, the different categories are listed as different types of ‘dravya’. By contrast, 
the VS uses the term ‘padārtha’ to refer to the categories. However, it uses ‘dravya’ to refer to 
the material elements, which are called ‘pudgala’ in the TA. Space (ākāśa) is seen as one of 
the substances (dravya) in the VS but the list of categories in the same text does not include 
time. As such, the TA proposes a radically different ontological account even though the 
similarity of some of the terms suggests that the models in the TA and the VS emerged from a 
shared intellectual context. For a general overview of the meaning of ‘padārtha’ in the 





substances (TA 5.38).458 The TA does not refute this idea, even though time is not 
listed as one of the substances at the beginning of the chapter in TA 5.1 – 5.2. 
Furthermore, the discussion of the function (upakāra) of the different substances 
also deals with the function of time (TA 5.22) after discussing the function of the five 
substances that are mentioned in TA 5.1 – 5.2, which suggests that the composer of 
that passage regarded time as one of the substances.459 
After enumerating the substances, the TA continues with some general 
qualifications of the substances. The first two sūtras of this section read as follows: 
 
nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi ||5.3|| rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ ||5.4|| 
 
[These substances] are eternal (nitya), [their number is] fixed460 (avasthita), and 
[they are] formless (arūpa). The material elements (pudgala), [however], have form 
(rūpin). 
 
This description is somewhat confusing. TA 5.3 seems to suggest that all substances 
are eternal, that their number is fixed, and that they are formless. Nevertheless, 
TA 5.4 adds that the material elements (pudgala) do have form, even though the 
material elements are mentioned as one of the substances. The bhāṣya provides the 
following explanation of TA 5.3: 
  
etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti | tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam iti vakṣyate || 
avasthitāni ca | na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca vyabhicaranti || 
arūpāṇi ca | naiṣāṃ rūpam astīti | rūpaṃ mūrtir mūrtyāśrayāś ca sparśādaya 
iti || 
 
These substances (dravya) are eternal (nitya). It will be said461 that ‘[an entity that] 
does not change its condition (tadbhāvāvyaya) is eternal (nitya)’. Furthermore, [the 
substances] are fixed (avasthita) since they never deviate from the quality of being 
five (pañcatva) and the quality of being real (bhūtārthatva). And they are formless 
(arūpa). They have no form. ‘Form’ (rūpa) is ‘embodiment’ (mūrti) and [the objects 
 
458 For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.4 (Qualities, modes, and transformation). 
459 The function of the individual substances is discussed in TA 5.17 – 5.22. See also § 3.4 
(Function of the substances). 
460 See TABh 5.3.4. 





of the senses] beginning with touch (sparśa-ādi) are dependent on embodiment 
(mūrti-āśraya) (TABh 5.3.1 – 5.3.7). 
 
As can be seen in the passage above, the composer of the bhāṣya interprets the three 
terms in TA 5.3 (nitya, avasthita, arūpa) as qualifications of the substances. Since 
TA 5.4 says that the material elements (pudgala) have form, it would be strange if 
TA 5.3 is indeed trying to say that all substances are formless (arūpa). Moreover, if 
the three terms in the sūtra all qualify substance, one would expect a different 
syntactical structure of TA 5.3. The sūtra separates the third term (arūpa) from the 
first two terms, which are given in compound (nityāvasthita). If the three terms all 
qualify substance, it would be more obvious to write ‘nityāvasthitārūpāṇi’. However, 
if we do not follow the interpretation of the bhāṣya, we could read TA 5.3 – 5.4 
(nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi | rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ) in at least two other ways: 
 
i. The formless [substances are] eternal and [their number is] fixed. The material 
elements have form. 
ii. [The five substances are] eternal and [their number is] fixed. [There are] formless 
[substances]. The material elements have form. 
 
The first reading would imply that material elements are not eternal. The second 
reading does not necessarily entail the same idea about the material elements but it 
is not the most obvious reading. Unfortunately, the TA does not discuss whether 
material elements are eternal. Therefore, it is hard to decide how these sūtras 
should be interpreted exactly.462 Nevertheless, all the different readings entail at 
least the eternality of four substances, i.e., motion (dharma), rest (adharma), space 
(ākāśa) and souls (jīva). Since the qualification ‘fixed’ (avasthita) is not explained in 
the TA, it is not clear whether the sūtra tries to say that the number of types of 
substances is fixed or whether there is a fixed number of all substances, i.e., a fixed 
number of souls, material elements, etc. The bhāṣya chooses the first option and 
explains that the number of substances is five (TABh 5.3.4).463  
 
462 The ṭīkā discusses several interpretations of these sūtras and mentions the variant 
reading ‘arūpīṇi’, which is also given in Mody’s edition. Kapadia’s edition adds ‘ca’ at the end 
of TA 5.3. The fact that there are variant readings of the sūtra and different interpretations in 
the commentaries suggest that there was no consensus about the meaning of the sūtra and 
might indicate a problem in the textual transmission. 





The sūtra adds that motion, rest, and space are unique substances 
(ekadravya) and that they are inactive (niṣkriya). 464 The bhāṣya explains that souls 
(jīva) and matter (pudgala) are active (kriyāvat) and non-unique substances 
(anekadravya).465 The table below shows the different qualities of the substances as 
discussed in this passage:  
 
 









motion (dharma) x  x  
rest (adharma) x  x  
space (ākāśa) x  x  
matter (pudgala)   x  x 
souls (jīva)   x  x 
 
Space and space-points (pradeśa)  
 
After giving an overview of the five substances, the TA continues with a discussion 
of space (TA 5.7 – 5.16). The first sūtras of this section deal with the peculiar 
concept of ‘space-points’ (pradeśa). The general idea seems to be that space consists 
of atomic spatial units, which are called ‘pradeśa’.  
The substances motion (dharma), rest (adharma), and souls (jīva) are said to 
occupy innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) space-points (TA 5.7 – 5.8). Space (ākāśa) 
occupies infinitely many space-points (TA 5.9). Material elements (pudgala) can 
occupy numerable (saṅkhyeya), innumerable (asaṅkhyeya), or infinitely many 
(ananta) space-points (TA 5.10).466 However, individual atoms (aṇu) do not occupy 
space-points (TA 5.11). The bhāṣya explains that atoms have no beginning or 
 
464 ‘[The substances] up to space (i.e., motion, rest and space) (ā-ākāśa) are unique 
substances. And [they are] inactive’ (ākāśād ekadravyāṇi | niṣkriyāṇi ca) (TA 5.5 – 5.6). 
465 TABh 5.5.2 and 5.6.1. It is interesting that the material elements are seen as active 
(kriyāvat). The bhāṣya explains that action (kriyā) means ‘the action of going’ (gati-karman) 
(TABh 5.6.3). 
466 The bhāṣya does not explain why matter (pudgala) can occupy numerable, innumerable, 
or infinitely many space-points. The TA does mention that motion, rest, and souls, exist in the 
worldly realm (loka-ākāśa) (TA 5.12 – 5.15), which suggests that they do not exist in the part 





centre.467 The meaning seems to be that atoms cannot have further divisions and, 
therefore, cannot occupy multiple space-points.468 The number of space-points 
occupied by the different substances and the atoms, as mentioned in TA 5.7 – 5.11, 
are summarised in the table below:  
 
 









motion (dharma)   x  
rest (adharma)   x  
souls (jīva)    x  
space (ākāśa)    x 
matter (pudgala)   x x x 
atoms (aṇu) x    
 
As can be seen in the table above, the number of space-points that are occupied by 
motion, rest, and souls is large (innumerable) but ultimately limited (i.e., not 
‘infinitely many’). By contrast, the number of space-points that are occipied by space 
(ākaśa) is said to be infinitely many (TA 5.9). However, the bhāṣya explains that 
space (ākāśa) in the world (loka) occupies a limited number of space-points too, just 
like motion, rest, and souls. However, the bhāṣya makes a distinction between the 
world (loka) and that which is beyond the world (aloka) and adds that the space in 
these two realms together occupies infinitely many space-points, as stated in TA 
5.9.469 In other words, the cosmos as a whole (loka and aloka) has infinitely many 
space-points but the number of space-points in the worldly realm of the cosmos 
 
467 ‘There are no space-points for an atom (aṇu) since the infinitesimal particle (paramāṇu) 
is without beginning (anādi), without centre (amadhya) and without space-point (apradeśa)’ 
(aṇoḥ pradeśā na bhavanti | anādir amadhyo ’pradeśo hi paramāṇuḥ) (TABh 5.11.1 - 5.11.2). 
468 The size of an atom corresponds to the size of a space-point. Therefore, the sūtra says that 
there are no space-points in atoms. However, clusters of atoms can take up two or more 
space-points (TABh 5.14.3 - 5.14.6). Jacobi’s commentary on TA 5.11 says: ‘[Das Atom] ist 
eben ein Punkt und hat keine Punkte’ (Jacobi 1885: 513).  
469 ‘The worldly realm and that which is beyond the world (loka-aloka-ākāśa) have infinitely 
many space-points. However, [the number of space-points] in the worldly realm (loka-ākāśa) 
is equal to motion, rest and souls’ (lokālokākāśasyānantāḥ pradeśāḥ | lokākāśasya tu 





(loka) — which is inhabited by souls and in which the principles of motion and rest 
are present — is limited. 
 After discussing the number of space-points that are occupied by the 
different substances, TA 5.12 – 5.16 continues with a discussion of the presence of 
the substances in the worldly realm (loka):  
 
lokākāśe ’vagāhaḥ ||5.12|| dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne ||5.13|| ekapradeśādiṣu 
bhājyaḥ pudgalānām ||5.14|| asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām ||5.15|| pradeśa-
saṃhāravisargābhyāṃ pradīpavat ||5.16|| 
 
 [There is] ‘abidance’ (avagāha) in the worldly realm (lokākāśa). [There is abidance 
of] motion and rest (dharma-adharma) in the entire (kṛtsna) [worldly realm]. [There 
is] distribution (bhājya) of material elements (pudgala) in one space-point etc. 
(ekapradeśa-ādi). [The abidance] of souls (jīva) is in innumerable parts etc. 
(asaṃkhyeyabhāga-ādi). [It is caused] by contraction (saṃhāra) and expansion 
(visarga) [of] space-points (pradeśa), like a light (pradīpa).  
 
The passage begins by saying that there is ‘abidance’ (avagāha)470 in the worldly 
realm of the cosmos. The subject of the abidance is not mentioned explicitly but 
must be substances, which is the main subject of chapter V. In other words, the 
intended meaning of the sūtra seems to be that the substances have their abode in 
the worldly realm (lokākāśa) but not in the space outside the worldly realm (aloka). 
The principles of motion (dharma) and rest (adharma) are present in the entire 
worldly realm, which facilitates the movement of matter and souls. The material 
elements (pudgala) are dispersed throughout the worldly realm and can take up one, 
two, or more space-points (pradeśa). Individual souls (jīva) can expand and contract 
and their size may grow to the size of the entire worldly realm (TABh 5.15.1 – 
5.15.2). This is compared to the way in which light functions. The bhāṣya explains 
that the light of a lamp can reach the ceiling of a large room but remains small when 
it is placed in a small room (TABh 5.16.3). By expanding itself up to the size of the 
whole worldly realm, the soul can acquire knowledge about the whole world.471 
 
470 The prime meaning of the word ‘avagāha’ is ‘plunging’ or ‘bathing’ (MW). In this passage, 
the term refers to the act of occurring or existing in a specific part of the cosmos. 
471 The bhāṣya mentions that the ultimate expansion of the soul happens to worldly souls 
(saṃsārin) in an advanced spiritual state and to perfected beings (siddha) (TABh 5.16.9). 





Function of the substances  
 
After discussing the loci of the different substances and the space-points that they 
can occupy, the TA explains the functions of the individual substances as follows: 
 
gatisthityupagraho dharmādharmayor upakāraḥ ||5.17|| ākāśasyāva-
gāhaḥ ||5.18|| śarīravāṅmanaḥprāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām ||5.19|| sukhaduḥkha-
jīvitamaraṇopagrahāś ca ||5.20|| parasparopagraho jīvānām ||5.21|| vartanā 
pariṇāmaḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya ||5.22|| 
 
The function (upakāra) of motion and rest (dharmādharma) is the support 
(upagraha) of movement (gati) and inertia (sthiti). [The function] of space (ākāśa) is 
abidance (avagāha). [The function] of material elements (pudgala) is [the support of] 
body, speech, mind, inhalation, and exhalation (śarīra-vāc-manas-prāṇāpāna) and 
the support (upagraha) of pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), life (jīvita), and death 
(maraṇa). [The function] of souls (jīva) is mutual support (parasparopagraha). [The 
function] of time (kāla) is continuation (vartanā), transformation (pariṇāma), 
activity (kriyā), temporal priority (paratva) and posteriority (aparatva). 
 
First, motion (dharma) and rest (adharma) are said to facilitate movement and 
inertia (TA 5.17). Next, space (ākāśa) is said to facilitate ‘abidance’ (avagāha) (TA 
5.18). In other words, it functions as the abode of the other substances. The function 
of the material elements (pudgala) is explained as the support (upagraha) of bodily 
processes, experiences, and states (TA 5.19 – 5.20).472 Next, souls (jīva) are said to 
provide mutual support (paraspara-upagraha) (TA 5.21). The bhāṣya explains this 
idea in the following way: 
 
 
weakens’ (hīyamānaka) and ‘the one that increases’ (vardhamānaka), which are mentioned 
in TABh 1.23.6. See also the discussion of cosmic perception above (§ 3.2). 
472 It is not clear to me why the function of the material elements is explained in terms that 
relate to the human body only. One would expect a more general description of the function 
of matter, such as hardness, weight etc. Such terms are used, however, in the description of 
atoms in TA 5.23 - 5.24 (see § 3.4, The material elements). It is interesting that the 
explanation of the material elements (pudgala) relates to the primary meaning of the word 





parasparasya hitāhitopadeśābhyām upagraho jīvānām iti |  
 
[The function] of souls (jīva) is support (upagraha) for each other by teaching [about 
that which is] beneficial and disadvantageous (hita-ahita-upadeśa) (TABh 5.21.1). 
 
This is a somewhat remarkable passage. So far, the characteristics of the substances 
were mainly explained in ontological terms. The explanation of the function of the 
soul, however, has more to do with ethics. It would have been more consistent if the 
TA had referred to consciousness or the power to animate as the function of the soul 
as a substance.  
 In her analysis of this section of the TA, Ohira mentions that the discussion of 
the functions of the different substances is largely based on canonical sources such 
as the Sthāna and Uttarādhyayana.473 However, the description of the function of the 
soul that is given in the TA does not appear in canonical texts. Hence, this might be 
an innovation of the composer of the TA. The author might have felt the need to 
specify the function of the soul since he also mentions the functions of the other 
substances. In the end, the overall style of the TA is rather systematic and it would 
be odd to leave one of the substances out of the discussion. Since the canonical 
sources do not specify the function of the soul, there was a significant lacuna in the 
theory, which allowed the composer to come up with a new idea.474   
The discussion of the functions of the different substances finishes with a 
discussion of time (kāla), which is said to facilitate continuation (vartanā), 
transformation (pariṇāma), activity (kriyā), anteriority (paratva), and posteriority 
(aparatva) (TA 5.22).475 Since time is not mentioned as one of the substances in TA 
 
473 Ohira 1982: 60. 
474 One may still question why the composer of the TA chose this particular solution, which 
differs strongly from the explanations of the functions of the other substances. It is striking 
that this sūtra became one of the most cited parts of the TA and is even included in an often-
used contemporary Jaina emblem. The influential English translation of the TA by Tatia has 
singled out this sūtra on a separate page following the title page, translated as ‘Souls render 
service to one another’ (Tatia 2011: v). 
475 The bhāṣya has an extensive commentary on the terms ‘paratva’ and ‘aparatva’. It 
distinguishes three different meanings of these terms, related to praiseworthiness 
(praśaṃsā), region (kṣetra), and time (kāla) (TABh 5.22.10). It illustrates these meanings 
with, respectively, the highest and inferior knowledge, remoteness and proximity, and being 
young and old. Since the first two options are irrelevant for the discussion of time, it seems 
that the bhāṣya simply lists the possible meanings of the terms and does not try to explain 
different aspects of the function of time. Therefore, I translate the terms as ‘anteriority’ and 





5.1 – 5.2, it is striking that the TA deals with the function of time immediately 
following the discussion of the function of the five substances. The TA and the TABh 
do not explain why time is included in this section.476 This inconsistency in the 
presentation might indicate that the chapter on ontology was composed at different 
stages.  
 The table below summarises the discussion of the functions of the different 
substances and time, as discussed in TA 5.17 – 5.22.  
 
 
XXV. The functions of the substances and time (TA 5.17 – 5.22) 
Substances (dravya)477 Functions (upakāra)478 
i. dharma (motion) (TA 5.17) gati (movement) 
ii. adharma (rest) (TA 5.17) sthiti (inertia) 
iii. ākāśa (space) (TA 5.18) avagāha (abidance) 
iv. pudgala (material elements)  




prāṇāpāna (inhalation and exhalation) 
sukha (pleasure) 
duḥkha (pain) 
jīvita (life)  
maraṇa (death) 
v. jīva (souls) (TA 5.21) parasparopagraha (mutual support) 
vi. kāla (time) (TA 5.22) 
vartanā (subsistence)  
pariṇāma (transformation) 




‘region’. The length of the commentary on this passage might indicate that the discussion of 
the different meanings of ‘paratva’ and ‘aparatva’ was added at a later stage, perhaps as a 
result of the accidental inclusion of a gloss. 
476 As mentioned previously, the TA says that some teachers classify time as a substance (TA 
5.38). 
477 This list includes time, which is not mentioned as a substance in TA 5.1 - 5.2. 
478 The function of the individual substances is explained as ‘support of’ (upagraha) the items 





The material elements (pudgala): atoms and aggregates 
 
Having discussed the functions of the different substances, the TA continues with a 
discussion of the material elements (pudgala) (TA 5.23 – 5.28). 
 
sparśarasagandhavarṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ ||5.23|| śabdabandhasaukṣmya-
sthaulyasaṃsthānabhedatamaśchāyātapodyotavantaś ca ||5.24||  
 
The material elements (pudgala) possess touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), 
and colour (varṇa); and they possess sound (śabda), connection (bandha), subtlety 
(saukṣmya), largeness (sthaulya), shape (saṃsthāna), partition (bheda), darkness 
(tamas), shade (chāyā), heat (tapas), and light (uddyota). 
 
aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca ||5.25|| saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante ||5.26|| bhedād 
anuḥ ||5.27|| bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ ||5.28|| 
 
[The material elements exist as] atoms (aṇu) and aggregates (skandha). They result 
(utpad) from combination (saṃghāta) [and] disintegration (bheda). An atom (aṇu) 
[results] from disintegration (bheda) [only]. The perceptible [aggregates] (cākṣuṣa) 
[result] from disintegration (bheda) [and] combination (saṃghāta). 
 
The section on the material elements begins with a list of characteristics, which has 
been divided into two sūtras (TA 5.23 – 5.24).479 The bhāṣya introduces this section 
by explaining that the word ‘pudgala’ has different meanings in other schools 
(tantrāntarīya) and can even mean ‘soul’ (jīva). It adds that the TA explains the 
meaning of ‘pudgala’ in TA 5.23 to distinguish its meaning from the way in which 
other traditions use the word (TABh 5.22.16 - 5.22.21). The TABh further provides a 
detailed specification of the varieties of each of the characteristics of the material 
elements that are mentioned in these two sūtras, which are listed in the table below. 
 
479 It is not immediately obvious why the characteristics of the material elements are 
discussed in two separate sūtras. The four characteristics that are mentioned in TA 5.23 are 
all related to the senses (touch, taste, smell, and colour) and describe, as such, phenomenal 
aspects of the material elements. By contrast, most of the characteristics in TA 5.24 describe 
more objective aspects of the material elements, such as size and shape. However, the first 
item that is mentioned in TA 5.24 is sound (śabda), which one would expect, rather, in the 
preceding sūtra, which describes the sensory qualities. The bhāṣya raises the question about 
the separation of the list and explains that the items in TA 5.23 relate to infinitesimal 
particles (paramāṇu) as well as aggregates (skandha) but that the items in TA 5.24 qualify 





TA 5.25 – 5.28 explains that the group of material elements (pudgala) exists of 
atoms (aṇu), which can be combined into aggregates (skandha). When aggregates 
disintegrate, they end up as smaller aggregates and/or individual atoms. Unlike the 
atoms, the aggregates are perceptible. 
 
 
XXVI. Characteristics of material elements (pudgala)  
TA 5.23480 TA 5.24  
sparśa 
(touch) 
kaṭhina (hard)  
śabda (sound)481 
tata (far reaching) 
mṛdu (soft)  vitata (diffused) 
guru (heavy)  ghana (firm) 
laghu (light) śuṣira (hollow) 
śīti (cold)  gharṣa (frictional) 
uṣṇa (hot)  bhāṣa (speaking) 




rūkṣa (rough) visrasābandha (loose) 
rasa 
(taste) 








madhura (sweet) āpekṣika (relative) 
gandha 
(smell) 
surabhi (fragrant) saṃsthāna (shape) 
anekavidha; dīrgha-
hrasva-ādi (manifold; 






kṛṣṇa (black)  caurṇika (pulverised) 
nīla (blue) khaṇḍa (a piece) 
lohita (red)  pratara (layered)482 
pīta (yellow)  
anutaṭa (from the 
sides)483 
śukla (white) tamas (darkness) 
pariṇāmaja (produced 






480 The items in TA 5.23 qualify infinitesimal particles (paramāṇu) and aggregates (skandha). 
The items in TA 5.24 qualify aggregates only (TA 5.24.24 - 5.24.25). 
481 The ṭīkā illustrates the different varieties of sound with different musical instruments, 
such as a drum, a stringed instrument, a bell, and a flute. See also Sanghvi 1974: 195. 
482 Like chopped off layers of mica (Sanghvi 1974: 196). 





Existence and permanence of substance 
 
After listing the characteristics of material elements, the TA discusses existence (sat) 
and permance (nitya) (TA 5.29 – 5.30):  
 
utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat ||5.29|| tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam ||5.30|| 
arpitānarpitasiddheḥ ||5.31|| 
 
Existence484 (sat) is connected with production (utpāda), decay (vyaya), and 
duration (dhrauvya). [An entity that] does not change its state (bhāva), is eternal 
(nitya). [The apparent contradiction] results form the validity of the conventional 
[standpoint] (arpita) and the non-conventional [standpoint] (arpita-anarpita-
siddhi).485 
 
It is hard to grasp the intended meaning of these three sūtras and translators and 
commentators have come up with different interpretations.486 It seems that the 
sūtra refers to different aspects of substance and tries to explain their apparent 
contradiction. The first sūtra says that existence is connected with decay. However, 
TA 5.5 says that the substances are eternal (nitya). This seems to imply that the 
existence of substance contradicts its eternity. The composer of the TA was 
apparently aware of this problem and he explains in TA 5.31 that this contradiction 
results from analysing the subject from two different standpoints. 
   
Connection of material elements (bandha)  
 
The next section in the sūtra is more straightforward and explains how atoms can 
form aggregates (TA 5.32 – 5.36): 
 
 
484 Alternatively, ‘things that exist’. 
485 The bhāṣya explains the ‘arpita’ perspective as a common sense perspective (vyavahārika) 
and the ‘anarpita’ perspective as an uncommon standpoint (avyavahārika) (TABh 5.31.2). 
Sanghvi translates TA 5.31 as follows: ‘Each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for 
as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to 
be something self-contradictory’ (Sanghvi 1974: 206). Tatia notes that this sūtra is based on 
the discussion of substance in the Aṅgapraviṣṭa 3.10.46 (Tatia 200: 136, n. 3). See also Soni 
2003: 29ff. 
486 Sanghvi provides different interpretations of this passage (Sanghvi 1974: 202 - 208). See 





snigdharūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ||5.32|| na jaghanyaguṇānām ||5.33|| guṇasāmye 
sadṛśānām ||5.34|| dvyadhikādiguṇānāṃ tu ||5.35|| bandhe samādhikau 
pāriṇāmikau ||5.36|| 
 
A connection (bandha) [results] from smoothness (snigdha) and roughness 
(rūkṣatva). [Such a connection does] not [take place between material elements 
having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) 
(jaghanyaguṇa). [Likewise, such a connection does not take place] when [there is] 
an evenness of the qualities (guṇasāmya) [between] similar [material elements] 
(sadṛśa) (i.e., two material elements having the same degree of smoothness or 
roughness cannot connect). However, [a connection exists between material 
elements whose] qualities [have a] difference of two or more (i.e., when there is a 
difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or roughness) (dvy-adhika-ādi-
guṇa). [When there is] a connection (bandha), [two material elements whose 
smoothness or roughness is] equal or more (samādhika) are subject to 
transformation (pāriṇāmika). 
 
The text distinguishes two characteristics of material elements,487 i.e., smoothness 
(snigdha) and roughness (rūkṣatva). The intensity of these qualities determines the 
adhesion between the material elements. Only those material elements that have 
opposite qualities in a sufficient degree — i.e., a difference of two or more degrees in 
smoothness or roughness — will connect and will thereby transform into aggregates. 
 
Qualities, modes, and transformation 
  
The last section of the fifth chapter discusses several aspect of substance (dravya), 
which centre around the notion of change (pariṇāma) (TA 5.37 – 5.44). The passage 
reads as follows: 
 
 
487 The sūtra does not mention explicitly that the material elements (pudgala) are the subject 
of the passage. However, the bhāṣya clearly states that the passage deals with the connection 





guṇaparyāyavad dravyam ||5.37|| kālaś cety eke ||5.38|| 
so ’nantasamayaḥ ||5.39|| dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ ||5.40|| tadbhāvaḥ 
pariṇāmaḥ ||5.41|| anādir ādimāṃś ca ||5.42|| rūpiṣv ādimān ||5.43|| 
yogopayogau jīveṣu ||5.44|| 
 
Substance (dravya) has qualities and modes (guṇa-paryāyavat). Time (kāla) is also 
[a substance] according to some. It [consists of] infinitely many moments 
(anantasamaya). Qualities (guṇa) inhere in substance (dravya-āśraya) [and are 
themselves] devoid of qualities (nirguṇa). The existence of these [substances] 
(tadbhāva) [is characterised by] transformation (pariṇāma). [There is 
transformation, pariṇāma] without beginning (anādi) and having a beginning 
(ādimat). [Transformation] with a beginning (ādimat) [applies to substances which 
are] having form (rūpin). Action (yoga) and cognitive operation (upayoga) [cause 
transformation] in the case of souls (jīva). 
 
The passage begins by saying that substances (dravya) have qualities (guṇa) and 
modes (paryāya) (TA 5.37). 488 Qualities (guṇa) are said to inhere in substance and 
they do not have qualities themselves (TA 5.40). In other words, qualities cannot 
inhere in qualities but only in matter. 489 Modes are not further explained in the sūtra 
but the bhāṣya explains modes as ‘other states’ (bhāva-antara) or ‘other 
recognitions’ (saṃjñā-antara) of substance (TABh 5.37.2).490  
In the middle of the discussion of qualities, the TA mentions that some 
teachers say that time is a substance too and that it exists of infinitely many 
moments (TA 5.38 – 5.39).491 It is not entirely clear to me why the TA includes a 
discussion of time at this point even though the notion of time relates to the concept 
of transformation (pariṇāma), which is mentioned in TA 5.41.492 This sūtra says that 
substances undergo transformation, and specifies two sorts of transformation (TA 
5.42). The first type of transformation relates to substances with form (rūpin) (TA 
 
488 See Soni 1991 for a discussion of these three notions in Jaina thought. 
489 Halbfass observes that this sūtra reflects the view of Vaiśeṣikasūtra I.1.15 (Halbfass 1992: 
107, n.21). 
490 As explained in the above analysis of the sources of valid cognition, only the omniscient 
beings can grasp all modes of all substance. 
491 See the beginning of this section (§ 3.4, The substances) for a discussion of the ambiguous 
status of time in the TA. 





5.43). The second type relates to the transformation of the soul, which is caused by 
action (yoga) and cognitive operation (upayoga) (TA 5.44).493  
The inclusion of this topic at the very end of the chapter is rather suspicous, 
especially since the version of the TA in the Sarvārthasiddhi deviates from the 
version that is accompanied by the bhāṣya. The Sarvārthasiddhi simply reads ‘kālaś 
ca’ and omits ‘ity eke’, which indicates that time was seen as a substance by 
Pūjyapāda.494 By contrast, the version of the TA that is accompanied by the bhāṣya 
does not confirm whether time is a substance or not and only mentions that some 
people regard time as a substance. Furthermore, TA 5.42 – 5.44 are fully omitted in 
the Sarvārthasiddhi. Given these textual varieties, and because of the unusual 
position of the discussion of time,495 there are good reasons to treat the last verses of 
the TA with caution. 
To sum up, the fifth chapter of the TA provides a rather common-sensical 
ontological account and the theory is fairly coherent. Yet, the presentation of the 
material is rather unsystematic, which might indicate that the ontological theory in 
the TA has undergone some changes. This is further supported by the fact that the 
version of the fifth chapter of the TA in the Sarvārthasiddhi deviates at several points 
from the version that is accompanied by the bhāṣya. In the next section (§ 3.5), I will 
analyse several passages in the TA, which will further support the idea that the TA 






493 It is not clear to me why these two varieties of transformation are qualified as ‘having a 
beginning’ (ādimat) and ‘without beginning’ (anādi). The underlying idea seems to be that 
the transformation of the soul is beginningless, unlike the transformation of material 
elements. 
494 Tatia 2011: 143. 
495 Since the TA lists the different substances at the very beginning of the chapter (TA 5.1 – 
5.3), it would make more sense if the discussion of time would have been included in the first 





3.5 The Verses in the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya 
 
As discussed in § 2.3, there are different accounts of the authorship of the TABh. 
Some scholars, such as Ohira and Dhaky, think that the TABh is an auto-commentary 
written by Umāsvāti. By contrast, Bronkhorst, Balcerowicz, and others assume that 
the author of the TA did not write the TABh.496 In order to interpret and date the TA 
and the TABh, it is crucial to know whether the author of the sūtras wrote the TABh 
or not. Since the sūtras are composed in a concise manner, many passages are hard 
to interpret, or are open for various explanations. If the TABh was written as an 
auto-commentary, we can assume that the commentator correctly understands the 
sūtras, and we can accept the explanations as authoritative. Yet, if the commentator 
was a different commentator, we have to be more careful in our analysis since it 
might be that the commentator did not fully understand the sūtras, or he might have 
had his own agenda and might have consciously changed the intended meaning of 
the root text.  
Unfortunately, the existing evidence for the authorship of the TA and the 
TABh is rather inconclusive. It seems, however, that previous studies have 
overlooked one aspect of the TABh that is certainly relevant for any discussion of the 
authorship of the bhāṣya. Although the TABh is composed in prose, the text contains 
some passages in verse, which are introduced as citations. As I will explain below, 
these short citations form a serious problem for the view that the TA and the TABh 
were written by the same author as the first Jaina philosophical text in Sanskrit.  
The following section contains an analysis of all the verses that accompany 
the TABh. The first part discusses the different quotations in the TABh. The second 
part deals with other parts of the bhāṣya that are composed in verse but are not 
introduced as citations. In the third part, I provide an analysis of the introductory 
verses (sambandhakārikā) and the colophon (praśasti) that accompany the bhāṣya. 
The authorship and date of these two short texts is contested but most scholars 
assume that these parts are later additions. Since these passages are also composed 
in verse, however, I will analyse whether the verses in the bhāṣya itself can be linked 
to these parts. Apart from that, I will also discuss whether the sambandhakārikās 
and praśasti can tell us anything about the authorship of the TA and the TABh. 
 





Quotations in the TABh 
 
There are three passages that are introduced with the expressions ‘āha ca’ and 
‘uktaṃ ca’, which deviate from the main text. The first instance can be found at the 
end of the first chapter of the bhāṣya at TABh 1.35.42-49, and reads as follows:497  
 
āha ca 
[1.35.42] naigamaśabdārthānām ekānekārthanayagamāpekṣaḥ |  
[1.35.43] deśasamagragrāhī vyavahārī naigamo jñeyaḥ ||1|| 
[1.35.44] yat saṅgṛhītavacanaṃ sāmānye deśato ’tha ca viśeṣe |  
[1.35.45] tat saṅgrahanayaniyataṃ jñānaṃ vidyān nayavidhijñaḥ ||2|| 
[1.35.46] samudāyavyaktyākṛtisattāsaṃjñādiniścayāpekṣam |  
[1.35.47] lokopacāraniyataṃ vyavahāraṃ vistṛtaṃ vidyāt ||3|| 
[1.35.48] sāmprataviṣayagrāhakam ṛjusūtranayaṃ samāsato vidyāt |  
[1.35.49] vidyād yathārthaśabdaṃ viśeṣitapadaṃ tu śabdanayam ||4|| iti || 
 
And one says: Grasping either partially or wholly, depending on the understanding 
from a perspective on objects that are single and many, with reference to meanings 
of common words, this is to be known as the ordinary commonplace perspective 
(naigama) (TABh 1.35.42-43).  
One who knows the perspectives should know that knowledge which is established 
by the collecting perspective (saṅgraha-naya) as the one which is expressive of the 
collective, in general terms, in partial terms, and specific terms (TABh 1.35.44-45).  
He should know the practical perspective (vyavahāra) as broad, established by 
worldly usage, depending on the ascertainment of ‘group, individual, form, existence 
and name etc.’ (TABh 1.35.46-47).  
He should know concisely the linear perspective (ṛjusūtra-naya) as the kind of 
grasping having the present as its range; and he should know the verbal perspective 
(śabda-naya) as the one where word is in accordance with the object, which has 
qualified stages (TABh 1.35.48-49). 
 
This passage occurs in a discussion of the theory of perspectives (nayavāda) and 
gives a brief summary of the five perspectives.498 Unlike the main body of the text, 
 
497 This passage is also given in Part II, with explanatory notes and a discussion of the 
translation. 





which is written in prose, this passage consists of four verses in āryā metre. It is 
clearly demarcated by the introductory phrase ‘āha ca’ and closes with ‘iti’, which 
suggests that we are dealing with a quotation.499 The use of vocabulary in these 
āryās also differs from the overall style of the bhāṣya. For example, the naigama or 
commonplace perspective is qualified as vyavāhārin or ‘ordinary’ in TABh 1.35.42-
43. However, the vyavahāra perspective is also discussed as a separate perspective 
in TABh 1.35.47. This is confusing and does not match the straightforward 
explanations that characterise most parts of the bhāṣya. This strongly suggests that 
we are dealing with a quotation from an external source. 




[1.35.90] vijñāyaikārthapadāny arthapadāni ca vidhānam iṣṭaṃ ca |  
[1.35.91] vinyasya parikṣepān nayaiḥ parīkṣyāṇi tattvāni ||1|| 
[1.35.92] jñānaṃ saviparyāsaṃ trayaḥ śrayanty ādito nayāḥ sarvam | 
[1.35.93] samyagdṛṣṭer jñānaṃ mithyādṛṣṭer viparyāsaḥ ||2|| 
[1.35.94] ṛjusūtraḥ ṣaṭ śrayate mateḥ śrutopagrahād ananyatvāt | 
[1.35.95] śrutakevale tu śabdaḥ śrayate nā’nyac chrutāṅgatvāt ||3|| 
[1.35.96] mithyādṛṣṭyajñāne na śrayate nāsya kaścid ajño ’sti | 
[1.35.97] jñasvābhāvyāj jīvo mithyādṛṣṭir na cāpy ajñaḥ ||4|| 
[1.35.98] iti nayavādāś citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ | 
[1.35.99] laukikaviṣayātītās tattvajñānārtham adhigamyāḥ ||5||500  
 
 
499 One could argue that we are not necessarily dealing with a quotation from an external 
source. As mentioned by Tubb & Boose, it is often the mūlakāra who is the subject of a verb 
in the third person singular such as ‘āha’ in a commentary (Tubb 2007: 227). Likewise, the 
participle ‘ukta’ ‘may mean “stated by the mūlakāra”’ (Tubb 2007: 228). Further, even in the 
case of an auto-commentary, the author ‘normally refers to the mūlakāra as if the mūlakāra 
were another person’ (Tubb 2007: 229). Hence, these quotation marks do not necessarily 
imply that we are dealing with citations from a different work. However, the cited passages 
do not occur in the TA and, as far as I am aware, the passages also do not occur in any other 
text attributed to the author of the TA. It is also unlikely that these verses try to render what 
is intended by the mūlakāra, since in that case there is no reason to write in āryā verse while 
the TA and the TABh are in prose. Hence, the most plausible reading is that we are dealing 
with genuine quotations from an external source.  





Having understood words of single meaning501 and words referring to objects and 
their appropriate classification, having set them out completely, the entities are to 
be examined by the perspectives (naya) (TABh 1.35.90-91).  
The first three perspectives apply to all [types of cognition], i.e., knowledge together 
with its opposite; knowledge results from a right view, delusion results from wrong 
view (TABh 1.35.92-93).  
The linear perspective (ṛjusūtra) applies to six [types of cognition] due to identity, 
since testimony seizes ordinary cognition; but the literal perspective (śabda) applies 
to testimony and absolute knowledge [only] due to the quality of being dependent 
on testimony, not on anything else (TABh 1.35.94-95).  
[The literal perspective] does not apply to wrong view or false knowledge because 
there is not any [soul which is] unknowing of that; and there is also no unknowing 
soul having wrong view, due to the own nature of having knowledge (TABh 1.35.96-
97).  
In this manner, the statements from the different perspectives (nayavāda) are 
manifold; first they appear to be opposed502 and yet they are free from vice; 
surpassing the range of the worldly they are to be studied for the sake of knowledge 
of reality (TABh 1.35.98-99). 
 
These five verses are also written in āryā metre, and form the very last part of the 
first chapter. Just as the previous āryā verses, they summarise the discussion of 
nayavāda. They are introduced in the same way as the first four āryās, even though 
the passage is not closed with ‘iti’. The omission of ‘iti’ might be explained by the fact 
that TABh 1.35.99 is immediately followed by a standard formula which starts with 
‘iti’ and indicates the end of the chapter.503 As such, it is slightly ambiguous whether 
the particle ‘iti’ forms the beginning of a new sentence or simply closes the āryās. 
The third apparent quotation appears in the fifth chapter, and consists of just one 
verse, which deals with the concept of paramāṇu: 
 
 
501 The meaning of the expression ‘ekārthapadāni’ is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps the 
intended meaning is ‘synonyms’. 
502 Alternatively, ‘in their pure form they appear to be opposed’. 
503  ‘iti tattvārthādhigame ’rhatpravacanasaṅgrahe prathamo ’dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ’ (TABh 





uktaṃ ca  
kāraṇam eva tad antyaṃ sūkṣmo nityaś ca paramāṇuḥ |  
ekarasagandhavarṇo dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca || iti |504 
 
And it has been said: ‘The cause is indeed that, the ultimate (antya). The 
infinitesimal particle is subtle and eternal. It has one taste, smell and colour, two 
types of touch and its mark is the effect’ (TABh 5.25.1-2). 
 
This verse is introduced with ‘uktaṃ ca’ instead of ‘āha ca’ and is composed in 
upagīti metre. The fact that these three passages in verse seem to be quotations 
raises the question as to what their possible source can be. If we are indeed dealing 
with quotations and if we follow Ohira’s and Dhaky’s idea that the TABh is an auto-
commentary, then we have to assume that the author cites a source in Sanskrit that 
predates the TA. Since the first passage discusses an exclusively Jaina topic, i.e., 
nayavāda, it has to be derived from a Jaina source. However, the TA is usually seen 
as the first Jaina text in Sanskrit, and there is no evidence that other Jaina 
philosophical texts were written in Sanskrit before the TA.505 Yet, if the TABh is not 
an auto-commentary, the source of the quotations could theoretically postdate the 
TA. But even in that case, it is still not clear which text could have been the source 
since there are no extant Jaina philosophical texts in Sanskrit that predate the TABh 
apart from the TA. Hence, if we are dealing with proper quotations, we have to 
accept that another philosophical Jaina text in Sanskrit existed before the 
composition of the TABh. Further, if one assumes that the TABh is an auto-
commentary, it implies that the TA is not the first Jaina text in Sanskrit. 
 
Other verses in the TABh 
 
The existence of other Jaina philosophical works in Sanskrit is relevant for our 
investigation of Jaina intellectual life at the time of the composition of the TA and the 
TABh, and the position of the TA itself. Unfortunately, there are no other sources 
apart from the TABh that provide any information about these texts. Therefore, we 
can only look at the TABh itself to find out more about these lost sources. One of the 
 
504 See also Part II. 
505 It is also unlikely that the passages are Sanskrit renderings of verses from a Prākrit source. 





questions that need to be addressed is whether the different quotations are derived 
from a single source or not. Since the quotations are written in verse, we can assume 
that the original text was composed in verse. Apart from the three explicit 
quotations, the main body of the TABh has two more passages in verse, which could 
potentially be copied from the same source as the quotations. The first verse 
appears in chapter six:  
 
saṃrambhaḥ sakaṣāyaḥ paritāpanayā bhavet samārambhaḥ | 
ārambhaḥ prāṇivadhaḥ trividho yogas tato jñeyaḥ || 
 
The threefold (trividha) undertaking (yoga) [is] therefore (tatas) to be known (jñeya) 
[as] action (saṃrambha), [which is] accompanied by passion (sa-kaṣāya), 
undertaking (samārambhaḥ), [which] may appear (bhavet) by torment (paritāpanā), 
[and] violent action (ārambha), [which is] the slaughter of living beings (prāṇivadha) 
(TABh 6.9.18-19). 
 
The verse is composed in āryā metre but is not marked as a quotation. However, one 
could question whether this verse was included in the TABh at the time of its 
composition since Siddhasenagaṇi and Haribhadra, two important early 
commentators, do not comment on this verse. Moreover, Siddhasenagaṇi usually 
comments on every word of the TABh.506  
The last passage in verse can be found at the end of the final chapter, at 
TABh 10.7.157-220. This passage consists of 32 verses in anuṣṭubh metre. These 
verses summarise the content of the last chapter, which deals with mokṣa, and 
address some additional problems, such as the question as to whether a bodiless 
being can experience happiness.507 
 There is no reason to assume that the different verses in the TABh are 
derived from a single pre-existent source. First, only three of the five passages are 
introduced as quotations. It is unclear what the character of the verse in chapter six 
 
506 Mody 1903: 142. Kapadia has a slightly different verse, which corresponds with 
manuscript C in Mody.  
Mody has one more passage in āryā metre in chapter five. However, these āryās are part of a 
longer passage that Mody presents in brackets, indicating that this part does not belong to 
the TABh. The whole passage is omitted by Kapadia. Mody’s edition mentions a comment 
found in several manuscripts that identifies this passage as a part of Haribhadra’s 
commentary. Therefore, this passage is omitted in the present analysis.  





is but the verses at the end of the bhāṣya clearly summarise the content of the whole 
chapter and form a suitable ending of the work. It is highly unlikely that such a 
summary can be derived from another source. As such, we can assume that these 
last verses were composed by the author of the bhāṣya, unlike the quotations in the 
first and fifth chapter. The idea that the different passages in verse are not derived 
from the same source is further supported by the fact that these passages are 
composed in different meters. The quotations in the first chapter and the verse in 
the sixth chapter are in āryā, the quotation from the fifth chapter is in upagīti, and 
the last 32 verses of the tenth chapter are in anuṣṭubh.  
 In short, it seems that the TABh contains several passages that were derived 
from various texts. It is possible that some of these passages were added to the 
TABh at a later stage but this must have happened before the composition of the ṭīkā 
(9th cent. CE). Yet, since none of these passages have been identified, it is plausible 
that these verses were derived from older works that have not been preserved. This 
would indicate that there were other Jaina works in Sanskrit at the time of the 
composition of the TABh.  
 
The sambandhakārikās and praśasti 
 
Since we do not have any Sanskrit texts from the Jaina tradition that are composed 
before the TABh apart from the TA, we cannot use the quotations in the TABh to 
answer the question as to whether the TABh was written at a later stage than the TA. 
However, manuscripts of the TABh often include two additions in verse that are 
most relevant for the discussion of the authorship. 508  The first part is an 
introductory section, which is known as the sambandhakārikās. It consists of 31 
verses in āryā metre. The second addition is a praśasti, which is added at the end of 
the work. It consists of six verses in āryā metre and provides information about the 
work and the author. Both parts can be found in Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā.509 However, 
it is unclear who the author of the sambandhakārikās and the praśasti is. Since they 
contain information about the authorship of the text, the title of the work, and the 
 
508 For a discussion of the manuscripts of the TA and the TABh, see Ohira 1982: 1-4. See also 
§ 2.3. 
509 Siddhasenagaṇi does comment on the praśasti, but he does not comment on the 
sambandhakārikās. However, he includes the commentary of Devagupta on these verses in 
his own work (Ohira 1982: 25). Devagupta’s comments on the sambandhakārikās can be 





place of composition, it is important to examine the relationship between these 
passages and the TA/TABh. Further, there is a good reason to compare the style of 
the sambandhakārikās and the praśasti with the verses in the TABh since both 
passages are composed in āryā metre. Even though the sambandhakārikās play an 
important role in the debate about the question as to whether the TABh is an auto-
commentary or not, these 31 verses have not been translated in any European 
language. Therefore, I have provided a translation of this passage in Part II, which 
serves as the basis for the following analysis.  
The sambandhakārikās deal with various topics related to Jaina doctrine and 
the nature of the TA/TABh. The opening verse, which resembles the first sūtra of the 
TA, goes as follows: 510  
 
samyagdarśanaśuddhaṃ yo jñānaṃ viratim eva cāpnoti | 
duḥkhanimittam apīdaṃ tena sulabdhaṃ bhavati janma ||1|| 
 
[For] him who obtains knowledge, which is pure through right worldview, and 
indeed non-passion, for him there is good birth, even though this is the cause of pain 
(SK 1).511 
 
Even though the opening verse of the sambandhakārikās seems to deal with the 
three standard elements of mokṣamārga (i.e., darśana, jñāna, and cāritra), the 
formulation deviates from TA 1.1. First, knowledge (jñāna) plays a central role, 
while right worldview (samyagdarśana) is somehow presented as an aspect in the 
acquisition of knowledge. This raises the question as to why the author of the 
sambandhakārikās chooses to deviate from the way in which mokṣamārga is 
presented in TA 1.1. This deviation would be even more peculiar if these 
introductory verses are composed by the author of the TA and/or TABh. One may 
wonder whether it is possible that the author of the sambandhakārikās consciously 
modified the idea presented in TA 1.1 to stress the paramount importance of jñāna 
in the quest for liberation in line with the views of other philosophical treatises like 
 
510 The first sūtra of the TA states: ‘samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ’, ‘The path to 
liberation [is constituted by] right worldview, [right] knowledge, and [right] conduct’ (see 
also Part II). 





the Nyāyasūtra.512 Apart from the unusual relation between jñāna and darśana in 
sambandhakārikā 1, it is also remarkable that cāritra is not mentioned in the 
sambandhakārikās at all. Of course, one can interpret virati as cāritra since right 
conduct results from non-passion in the Jaina perspective. Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear why the author of the sambandhakārikās opens the introductory verses with 
such an unusual summary of mokṣamārga.  
As demonstrated in the analysis of the philosophical chapters,513 the TABh is 
clearly influenced by Nyāya thought, and one can hardly escape the impression that 
the author of the TABh tries to innovate Jaina doctrine based on the model of more 
influential philosophical treatises, such as the Nyāyasūtra and Vaiśeṣikasūtra. In a 
similar way, the sambandhakārikās use some words that are not very common for 
traditional Jaina texts but clearly resonate with Nyāya doctrine. An illustration of 
this phenomenon can be found in sambandhakārikā 8: 
 
abhyarcanād arhatāṃ manaḥprasādas tataḥ samādhiś ca | 
tasmād api niḥśreyasam ato hi tatpūjanaṃ nyāyyam ||8|| 
 
From the worship of the arhats comes peace of mind, and from that samādhi. And 
from that comes ultimate bliss. Therefore, worship of them is appropriate (SK 8).514  
 
The term ‘ultimate bliss’ (niḥśreyasa) is uncommon for the Jaina tradition, even 
though it is presented in this verse as the highest goal. Yet, niḥśreyasa plays a crucial 
role in Nyāya philosophy.515 The same term is used in sambandhakārikā 16, where 
‘the mark of asceticism’ is described as ‘the means to ultimate bliss’ 
(niḥśreyasasādhakaṃ śramaṇaliṅgam).516 The fact that the term ‘niḥśreyasa’ occurs 
twice in this short introduction to the TABh demonstrates the importance of the 
 
512 The order of darśana, jñāna, and cāritra does not correspond with most canonical 
formulations, in which jñāna is usually the first element, followed by darśana (Ohira 1982: 
55). Therefore, one could also argue that the author of the sambandhakārikās simply favours 
the traditional formulation. However, this does not explain why cāritra is replaced with 
virati. 
513 See § 3.2 – 3.4. 
514 See also Part II. 
515  The Nyāyasūtra states at its beginning: ‘pramāṇaprameya-[...] tattvajñānān 
niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ’ (NS I.1.1), ‘Par la connaissance juste des moyens-de-connaissance-
droite, des objets-de-connaissance-droite [...], on atteint le bonheur indépassable’ (Angot 
2009: 246-247).  





concept to the composer of this passage, which indicates that the author was well 
acquainted with Nyāya thought. Furthermore, this term deviates from the 
terminology in the TA and TABh, which strongly suggests that the 
sambandhakārikās were written by a different hand.517 
After the first half of the sambandhakārikās, which covers the way to 
liberation, the suitability of different kinds of people to achieve liberation, and the 
life of Mahāvīra, who reached the highest goal and who taught the Jaina doctrine, the 
text continues with a salutation to Mahāvīra (sambandhakārikā 21). Then, the 
author introduces the work as a summary of the words of Mahāvīra in verse 22:  
 
tattvārthādhigamākhyaṃ bahvarthaṃ saṃgrahaṃ laghugrantham | 
vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22|| 
 
I will teach this short text, called ‘Tattvārthādhigama’, an important compendium of 
some of the words of the arhat, which is beneficial for students (SK 22). 
 
This verse forms the core of the sambandhakārikās: it mentions the goal and the title 
of the work that the sambandhakārikās introduce. Even though the work is usually 
called ‘Tattvārthasūtra’ or ‘Tattvārthādhigamasūtra’, the text is labelled in the 
sambandhakārikās as ‘Tattvārthādhigama’ which can be translated as ‘A Study of the 
Categories’.518 By using the verb ‘vakṣyāmi’, the author of the sambandhakārikās 
presents himself as the author of the text that the sambandhakārikās introduce. A 
similar expression is used in the final verse of the sambandhakārikās, which ends 
with the words ‘imam [...] mokṣamārgaṃ pravakṣyāmi’, I will teach this path to 
 
517 The tenth chapter of the TA deals with liberation (mokṣa). Instead of the term ‘niḥśreyasa’, 
which is used in the sambandhakārikās, this part of the TABh associates mokṣa with 
‘unsurpassed (anuttara) bliss (sukha)’. The 27th verse of the concluding verses of the tenth 
chapter reads: ‘puṇyakarmavipākāc ca sukham iṣṭendriyārthajam | karmakleśavimokśāc ca 
mokṣe sukham anuttaram || (And by the fruition of good karma there is bliss, produced by a 
desired object of the senses; but by the liberation from the afflictions of karma in mokṣa, 
there is unsurpassed bliss)’ (tr. Zydenbos 1983: 37). 
518 The Śvetāmbara tradition accepts the TABh including the sambandhakārikās as an 
authoritative work, written by Umāsvāti. Therefore, most Śvetāmbara works use the title 
‘Tattvārthādhigama(sūtra)’, based on the title that is mentioned in the sambandhakārikās. 
However, the Digambara tradition does not attribute the TABh and sambandhakārikās to 
Umāsvāti. Therefore, they do not accept the title ‘Tattvārthādhigama(sūtra)’ and use 





liberation’.519 However, this does not imply that the sambandhakārikās were actually 
written by the author of the TA or the TABh. Even though most contemporary 
scholars agree that the TA predates the sambandhakārikās and praśasti, there is no 
consensus about the question as to whether these verses were written by the author 
of the bhāṣya.520  
Even though the sambandhakārikās mention the title of the work that it 
introduces, the sambandhakārikās use ambiguous terms to characterise this work, 
making it hard to determine the relation with the bhāṣya. The work is presented as a 
summary or compendium (saṃgraha) of Mahāvīra’s teachings, and the author 
describes his text as a ‘laghugrantha’. Since the TABh is a relatively extensive 
commentary, it is not an obvious choice to describe the Tattvārthādhigama as a 
‘short text’ if it includes the bhāṣya. Yet, one can argue that the author contrasts the 
teachings of the arhat with the size of his own text, and wants to say that his text is 
relatively short compared to the vast amount of Mahāvīra’s teachings. Such an 
interpretation may seem somewhat far-fatched, especially given the straightforward 
character of the previous verses. However, the next verse seems to go in this 
direction:  
 
mahato ’timahāviṣayasya durgamagranthabhāṣy apārasya | 
kaḥ śaktaḥ pratyāsaṃ jinavacanamahodadheḥ kartum ||23|| 
 
Who, in enunciating a difficult text, is able to make a summary of the great ocean of 
the words of the jina, which is boundless, whose scope is way larger than large (SK 
23)?521 
 
This verse elaborates on the enormous extent of the words of the jina, which makes 
it difficult to decide what ‘laghugrantha’ in sambandhakārikā 22 means exactly. 
Compared to the foregoing part, the style of sambandhakārikā 23 is more poetic and 
 
519 Sambandhakārikā 31. See also Part II. Based on Phoolchandra’s discussion of the 
sambandhakārikās, Zydenbos mentions that the identification ‘of the commentator with the 
author of the original text is not uncommon’. (Zydenbos 1983: 10 – 11, Phoolchandra 1997).  
520 Dhaky claims that the TA, TABh, sambandhakārikās, and praśasti are all written by 
Umāsvāti (Dhaky 1996: 60). Zydenbos attributes the sambandhakārikās and praśasti to the 
author of the bhāṣya but he writes that ‘we may safely assume that the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya 
are not by one and the same author’ (Zydenbos 1983: 10, 12). Ohira holds basically the same 
position as Dhaky even though she mentions that sambandhakārikās 21, 22 and 31 were 
possibly composed first as benedictory verses (Ohira 1982: 26 - 28). 





the verse contains some curious elements. First, the text of the author is described 
as a ‘pratyāsa’. This is a highly unusual word. Haribhadra’s commentary interprets 
‘pratyāsa’ as ‘saṃgraha’, which is used in sambandhakārikā 22.522 But even if we 
follow this interpretation, it does not help in deciding whether this refers to the text 
with the commentary or not. Second, it is very easy to misread the first line of the 
verse. In Devanagari script, the compound ‘durgamagranthabhāṣy-’ is not separated 
from ‘-apārasya’. It is very likely that a reader of the manuscript will read ‘durgama-
grantha-bhāṣya-pārasya’, especially since manuscripts of the sambandhakārikās 
usually contain the TA accompanied by the bhāṣya.523 In this way, one could assume 
that the author of the sambandhakārikās claims to have written a ‘grantha’ and a 
‘bhāṣya’, i.e., a root text and a commentary. This would support the view that the 
bhāṣya is an auto-commentary. Yet, this reading is problematic from a syntactical 
perspective, unlike the less intuitive reading ‘-bhāṣy apārasya’.524 It is tempting to 
think that the author actively tried to create ambiguity. 
Up to sambandhakārikā 22, the text has a logical structure, and the number 
of verses that are used for the various subtopics corresponds to the relative 
importance of these topics. However, the passage that deals with the challenge that 
the author faces in writing a compendium of the words of the jina, is quite elaborate 
and is written in a different style. This is clearly visible in sambandhakārikās 24 – 26, 
where the text compares the challenge of the author with some Herculean tasks:  
 
śirasā giriṃ bibhitsed uccikṣipsec ca sa kṣitiṃ dorbhyām | 
pratitīrṣec ca samudram mitsec ca punaḥ kuśāgreṇa ||24|| 
vyomnīnduṃ cikramiṣen merugiriṃ pāṇinā cikampayiṣet | 
gatyānilaṃ jigīṣec caramasamudraṃ pipāsec ca ||25|| 
khadyotakaprabhābhiḥ so ’bhibubhūṣec ca bhāskaraṃ mohāt | 
yo ’timahāgranthārthaṃ jinavacanaṃ saṃjighṛkṣeta ||26|| 
 
He [who] would desire to comprehend the word of the jina, [which is] the subject of 
a very extensive text (SK 26 cd), 
he could desire to break a mountain with the head, and he could desire to throw up 
the earth with two arms (SK 24 ab). 
 
522 Mody 1903: 30, footnote 3. 
523 A discussion of some of the manuscripts can be found in Ohira 1982: 1 – 6. 





And he could desire to cross the ocean, and further, he could desire to measure [the 
ocean] with the tip of the kuśa grass (SK 24 cd).  
He could desire to move the moon in the sky, [and] he could desire to shake mount 
Meru with one hand (SK 25 ab). 
He could desire to move [along with] the wind [by his own] movement, and he could 
desire to drink the deepest ocean (SK 25 cd). 
And he could desire to surpass the sun with the light of fireflies out of delusion (SK 
26 ab). 
 
Unlike the previous part, the author uses several verses to present a single idea. 
Further, the use of multiple desideratives does not match the style of the previous 
part and does not appear in the TA or TABh. This can be taken as an argument for 
the position that the sambandhakārikās were not written by the author of the TA or 
TABh. However, we can even question whether this passage was written by the 
same hand that wrote the first part of the sambandhakārikās.  
Apart from the difference in style and the unusual length of this passage, it 
also seems to contradict sambandhakārikā 22. While sambandhakārikā 22 states 
that the author wrote a short text (laghugrantha), sambandhakārikā 26 states that 
the word of the jina is the subject of a very extensive text (atimahāgranthārtha). Of 
course, one could argue that the author simply contrasts the size of his own work 
with the overwelming breadth of the subject that he tries to cover. Yet, there is 
another reference to the size of the work, which creates more ambiguity. In 
sambandhakārikā 28, the author mentions ‘the word of the jina in a brief and 
extended form’ (samāsato vyāsataś ca jinavacanam).525 It is not clear from the 
context what this means exactly but one could interpret this as a reference to the 
short sūtra and extended bhāṣya.  
Yet, why does the author not make it more explicit what he means? On the 
one hand, based on sambandhakārikā 22, one gets the impression that the 
sambandhakārikās introduce the sūtra only since the author mentions that he 
composed a short text. On the other hand, it seems that the author of 
sambandhakārikā 23 tries to refer to the bhāṣya, even though the word ‘bhāṣya’ is 
part of an ambiguous compound. In addition, there seems to be a reference to the 
sūtra and bhāṣya at the end of the sambandhakārikās when the author writes about 
 





the subject of his text ‘in a brief and extended form’. These contradictory elements 
might indicate that we are dealing with a text that has different historical layers. 
Even though Ohira attributes the sambandhakārikās to the author of the TABh, she 
already speculates that verse 21, 22, and 31 ‘were originally composed as the 
benedictory verse’ to which the other verses were added.526 However, she fails to 
explain why the author would write his introduction in two stages. 
Even though there is not enough evidence to rule out the possibility that the 
sambandhakārikās were written by a single hand, it seems more likely that there 
were at least two different authors. It is hard to explain the difference in style of 
verses 24 – 26 if the whole text was composed by one person, and the incoherent 
statements about the text that the sambandhakārikās introduce support the view 
that we are dealing with different historical layers. Unfortunately, apart from the 
differences in the content and style of some of the verses in the sambandhakārikās, 
there is not much more evidence to reconstruct the history of this text.527 However, 
it seems reasonable to assume that we are dealing with a text that was written by 
more than one author. This would also explain the strange structure of the 
sambandhakārikās, which can be summarised as follows:528  
 
 
526 Ohira 1982: 27. 
527 The metre of the āryās of the sambandhakārikās, the TABh, and the praśasti is fairly 
regular and does not provide further evidence to distinguish the writings of different authors. 
While the sambandhakārikās have only one vipulā āryā in sambandhakārikā 23, almost half 
of the verses of the praśasti are in vipulā āryā (i.e., praśasti 2, 3, and 5). However, this 
difference can be explained by the fact that the praśasti contains many names, which are 
harder to fit in a metrical scheme. 
In his analysis of the sambandhakārikās, Balcerowicz writes that ‘the style of the sambandha-
kārikās resembles that of the Bhāṣya’, and that ‘there are some stylistic devices in the kārikās 
typical of the prose style of the Bhāṣya, e.g. the frequent use of gerundives (e.g. kās 8, 15, 28, 
etc.) or ablatives of mode that describe their manner of teaching (e.g. samāsato vyāsataś ca in 
kā 28, that are evocative of such phrases as purastāl lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇa 
common to the Bhāṣya, e.g. TBh 1.1)’ (Balcerowicz 2008: 35). However, these similarities in 
style do not necessarily imply that these passages were written by the same author, and even 
if we accept that some of the verses of the sambandhakārikās were written by the author of 
the bhāṣya, we cannot rule out that some parts of the sambandhakārikās were written by a 
different author. 
Some of the manuscripts that were surveyed by Ohira only contain sambandhakārikās 1-9 
and omit the rest of the sambandhakārikās (Ohira 1982: 2-3). It is unclear to me how these 
verses can form an independent and meaningful introduction to the text. 





i. The Jaina ideal  SK529 1 – 3 
ii. Classification of human beings SK 4 – 6 
iii. Nature of the Tīrthakara   SK 7 – 10 
iv. Life of Mahāvīra  SK 11 – 20 
v. Salutation SK 21 
vi. Nature of the work SK 22 
vii. Difficulty of the task of the author SK 23 – 26 
viii. Benefits for the author and others SK 27 – 30 
ix. Nature of the work SK 31 
    
It is somewhat odd that the salutation starts at sambandhakārikā 21, and that the 
statement about the nature of the work in sambandhakārikā 22 is interrupted by 
verse 23-30 and continues at sambandhakārikā 31. In fact, the structure of the text 
seems to suggest that the first historical layer consisted of verses 21, 22, and 31 only, 
which would constitute a proper introduction for the TA:530  
 
kṛtvā trikaraṇaśuddhaṃ tasmai paramarṣaye namaskāram | 
pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīnamohāya ||21|| 
tattvārthādhigamākhyaṃ bahvarthaṃ saṃgrahaṃ laghugrantham | 
vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22|| 
na rte ca mokṣamārgād dhitopadeśo ’sti jagati kṛtsne ’smin | 
tasmāt param imam eveti mokṣamārgaṃ pravakṣyāmi ||31|| 
 
529 SK = sambandhakārikās. 
530 Ohira observes some similarities with the introductory verse of the Sarvārthasiddhi, and 
writes that Pūjyapāda’s maṅgalācaraṇa ‘was directly derived’ from sambandhakārikās 21 
and 31. Pūjyapāda’s introductory verse goes as follows: mokṣamārgasya netāraṃ bhettāraṃ 
karmabhūbṛtām | jñātāraṃ viśvatattvānāṃ vande tadguṇalabdhaye || (‘I bow to the Lord, the 
promulgator of the path to liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower 
of the whole reality, so that I may realize these qualities’) (ed. and tr. S.A. Jain 1992: 1). Even 
though there are some similarities, such as the word ‘mokṣamārga’ in both texts, and ‘jagat’ 
in the sambandhakārikās and ‘viśva’ in the Sarvārthasiddhi, it is hard to tell how these two 
passages relate to each other, and Ohira’s idea that Pūjyapāda used sambandhakārikās 21 
and 31 for his own opening verse seems rather speculative. Nevertheless, Pūjyapāda’s verse 
shows that a short introduction with a reference to mokṣamārga and the jina was as an 






After having made homage to that great sage with purity of the three faculties,  
[to him who is] a most venerable, illustrious hero, whose delusion is gone (SK 21),  
I will teach this short text, called ‘Tattvārthādhigama’, an important compendium of 
some of the words of the arhat, [which is] beneficial for students (SK 22).  
And besides the path to liberation, there is no beneficial teaching in this entire world. 
Therefore, I will teach indeed this very highest path to liberation (SK 31). 
 
Perhaps, these introductory verses used to accompany the TA, together with the 
other āryās that became part of the bhāṣya. They might have been composed 
together with the TA, or between the time of the TA and the TABh.  
However, what could have been the reason for expanding these introductory 
verses? As discussed in § 2.3, the Jaina traditions in the North and the South had 
different ideas about the authorship of the TA and the TABh, and the Jainas in the 
South did not transmit the TABh. Up to the present day, the Digambara tradition 
does not accept the TABh as an authoritative commentary, and they disagree with 
the Śvetāmbara Jains who assume that Umāsvāti wrote the TA and the TABh. It is 
hard to believe that the TA and the TABh were originally composed together and 
that the Jainas in the South embraced the sūtra and rejected the bhāṣya. If these texts 
were written together and contained some elements that were unacceptable to the 
Jaina community, one would expect that the whole text would be considered 
heretical. Therefore, it is much more likely that the TABh was written at a later stage, 
and that the text was received differently in the North and the South.  
The dispute about the authoritativeness of the TABh might have been a 
reason for the Jainas in the North to expand the introductory verses of the TA. If the 
author of the verses that were added to sambandhakārikās 21, 22 and 31 indeed 
tried to legitimate the TABh, it makes perfect sense that he used some ambiguous 
terms to suggest that the author of the introductory verses claims to be the author of 
the sūtra and the bhāṣya. Since sambandhakārikā 22 clearly states that the author 
wrote a short compendium, there was not much space to alter the meaning in such a 
way that the introductory verses also introduce the bhāṣya. However, by comparing 
the length of the text to the enormous amount of the words of the jina, one can argue 
that the term ‘laghugrantha’ in sambandhakārikā 22 only means that the text is 





influence the views of the Jainas in the South since the TABh never acquired an 
authoritative position in the Digambara community. Nevertheless, it gave the 
northern tradition textual evidence to attribute the TABh to the author of the TA.  
For the name of this author, we have to look at the praśasti, which is the first 
source that attributes the TA and the TABh to Umāsvāti. As mentioned above, it is 
unclear who the author of these six verses is and how they relate to the 
sambandhakārikās. The work to which the praśasti is attached is referred to as a 
śāstra, called the ‘Tattvārthādhigama’.531 This corresponds with the title mentioned 
in sambandhakārikā 22, even though the sambandhakārikās refer to the text as a 
‘saṃgraha’ (sambandhakārikā 22), or ‘pratyāsa’ (sambandhakārikā 23) instead of 
‘śāstra’. 532  Praśasti 6 mentions the title ‘tattvādhigama’ instead of 
‘tattvārthādhigama’. The praśasti attributes the Tattv(ārth)ādhigama to ‘vācaka 
Umāsvāti’.533 The name Umāsvāti seems to indicate a Brahmanical background. This 
would also explain why praśasti 3 mentions Umāsvāti’s gotra.534 It is hard to locate 
‘Nyagrodhikā’, which is mentioned as the place of birth of Umāsvāti in praśasti 3, 
since it could refer to any place which has banyan trees. The same verse also 
mentions that Umāsvāti spent some time in Kusumapura, which is another name for 
Pāṭaliputra.535 However, the information in the praśasti should not be taken at face 
value for several reasons. First, the name ‘Umāsvāti’ does not appear in any other 
text that is attributed to him, and the southern tradition did not even attribute the 
TA to him.536 Apart from the praśasti and the later textual tradition, there is no 
evidence that there was an actual writer with the name Umāsvāti, working in 
Pāṭaliputra. Further, the names of the teachers in Umāsvāti’s lineage that are 
mentioned in praśasti 2, Muṇḍapāda and Mūla, are quite odd and do not appear in 
other lineages that mention Umāsvāti.537  
Given the lack of external evidence that supports the information in the 
praśasti and the fact that the names that are mentioned are rather unusual, while 
Umāsvāti’s place of birth remains vague, there is enough reason to doubt the 
 
531 Praśasti 5. 
532 Sambandhakārikā 22 and praśasti 5 both use the phrase ‘tattvārthādhigamākhya’.  
533 Praśasti 5. 
534 Praśasti 3 mentions that Umāsvāti belonged to the Kaubhīṣaṇi gotra. 
535 Ohira suggests that the author of the praśasti preferred the name ‘Kusuma’ for metrical 
reasons (Ohira 1982: 53). 
536 Ohira 1982: 43. For a discussion of the TA in the southern tradition, see § 2.3. 
537 For an overview of the lineages that mention Svāti, which is another name for Umāsvāti 





veracity of the praśasti.538 Since it seems that the extended version of the 
sambandhakārikās was written in an attempt to legitimise the TABh as an auto-
commentary, one can easily imagine that the praśasti was added to substantiate this 
idea, and to attribute both texts to Umāsvāti. 
  
 
538 Based on an analysis of the lineages that are mentioned in other texts, Ohira concludes 
that the praśasti is ‘the authentic record of Umāsvāti’ (Ohira 1982: 53). However, her 
analysis does not provide the evidence needed for this conclusion. The lineages talk about 
‘Svāti’ instead of ‘Umāsvāti’ and they assign Svāti to the Hārita gotra, instead of the 
Kaubhīṣaṇi gotra, which is mentioned in praśasti 3. Furthermore, the teachers that are 





3.6 Conclusion of the Textual Analysis 
 
In the foregoing sections, I have analysed the content of the philosophical chapters 
of the TA and the TABh with a dual purpose in mind. On the one hand, I have tried to 
clarify the philosophical ideas that are conveyed in these texts. On the other hand, I 
have aimed to get more clarity about the intellectual contexts in which the TA and 
the TABh were composed. In addition, I have investigated the verses in the TABh, 
the sambandhakārikās, and the praśasti in order to get a better understanding of the 
authorship of both texts.  
My analysis shows that the epistemological and ontological theories in the 
TA constitute a fairly coherent account that can compete with the views of the other 
philosophical movements that were active at the time of its composition. The TA 
presents a dualistic ontology, in which the soul (jīva) is radically different from all 
other substances (ajīvakāya). It is the centre of knowledge and can occupy an 
innumerable amount of space-points (pradeśa). By expanding its range, the soul can 
acquire direct knowledge of objects in the entire cosmos, which explains why 
liberated beings (kevalin) are omniscient. Yet, the soul that is still bound by karman 
has a limited range and has to rely on indirect means of cognition, such as ordinary 
cognition (mati) and testimony (śruta). 
These theories are not new for the Jaina tradition but the way in which the 
TA presents the Jaina view is rather innovative. Throughout my analysis, I have 
shown that the composer of the TA positions the Jaina perspective as an alternative 
to the views that are expressed in the texts of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions. 
Although the structure of the TA is based on a traditional list of soteriological 
categories (tattva), the TA opens with a chapter on knowledge, a topic that does not 
correspond to any of the tattvas. By opening the TA with a chapter on knowledge, 
the composer of the TA stresses the crucial role of knowledge in his overall 
soteriology. This strongly resembles the view about the relationship between 
knowledge and ultimate bliss (niḥśreyasa) in the Nyāyasūtra. Likewise, the 
classification of the five types of knowledge (jñāna) as the two means of cognitions 
(pramāṇa) indicates that the author of the TA tried to connect the Jaina theory with 
the more dominant epistemological models at his time. The same goes for the way in 





The TABh is mostly in line with the theories held in the TA but some aspects 
of the bhāṣya suggest that the composer of the bhāṣya had a slightly different aim. 
Even though his views are also influenced by Nyāya theories, he seems to place 
more value on the traditional Jaina theories than the composer of the TA. For 
example, he mentions that the TA does not discuss absolute knowledge 
(kevalalajñāna) in the first chapter of the TA, which he apparently interprets as a 
significant omission. Further, the TABh includes longer discussions of the modes of 
analysis (anuyogadvāra) and the theory of viewpoints (naya), which are topics that 
are particular to the Jaina tradition. 
The discussion of the viewpoints at the end of the first chapter seems to 
consist of different historical layers. It is unusually long and rather unsystematic. 
Moreover, this passage mentions that the four pramāṇas that were accepted by the 
Nyāya tradition are also valid means of cognition (TABh 1.35.89) which is 
contradicted in an earlier passage (TABh 1.12.7 – 1.12.14). This supports the idea 
that the bhāṣya contains some later additions. The same goes for the TA itself. For 
example, the unsystematic character of the fifth chapter of the TA suggests that this 
chapter has undergone some changes over the course of time. These changes might 
have been made between the composition of the TA and the TABh but it is also 
possible that some of them were made by the authors of the TABh and the 
Sarvārthasiddhi. The ambiguous status of time (kāla) in the fifth chapter indicates 
that the ontological theory of the Jainas was still in development at the moment of 
the composition of the TA. Moreover, the differences between the passage on time 
(kāla) in the different versions of the TA show that the text of the TA was not 
immune to change after its initial composition. 
In short, my textual analysis of the philosophical sections shows that it is 
unlikely that the TA and the TABh were composed by the same author and that both 
texts include some later additions. This is in line with the outcome of my analysis of 
the sambandhakārikās and praśasti, which shows that these compositions were 
probably composed to legitimise the authority of the bhāṣya as an auto-commentary. 
As such, their value as sources about the authorship of the TA and the TABh is quite 
limited. Yet, the fact that the identity of the authors of the texts is unclear, does not 
imply that we cannot make an attempt at situating both texts in their historical 
intellectual context. In the general conclusion of this study, I will further discuss the 
implications of the outcomes of my textual analysis and will evaluate the position of 







In this study, I have investigated the conceptual content and the historical context of 
the philosophical chapters of the TA and the TABh. In chapter 2, I focused on the 
position of the TA and the TABh in the development of Jaina philosophy, the role of 
the Jainas in the Gupta Period, and the date and authorship of both texts. The main 
outcomes of my investigation of the historical context of these texts can be found in 
the concluding section of chapter 2 (§ 2.4). In chapter 3, I analysed the philosophical 
content of the philosophical sections of the TA and TABh. My analysis of the texts 
indicates that the TA and TABh were composed by different authors and that both 
texts contain different historical layers. This is further supported by my discussion 
of the sambandhakārikās, the praśasti, and the verses in the TABh. A summary of the 
results of my textual analysis can be found in the conclusion of the third chapter 
(§ 3.6). 
Although chapters 2 and 3 address different topics and have a very different 
methodology, they are connected by an overarching aim. As explained in the 
introduction (chapter 1), this study was not only conducted in order to get a better 
understanding of the philosophical views in the TA but also to find out more about 
the position of the Jainas in the Gupta Period. In § 2.2, I discussed the different 
scholarly accounts of the Jainas in the Gupta Period and have argued that the 
existing hypotheses are underdetermined by the available source materials. Since 
the TA and the TABh were composed in the Gupta Period and reflect some 
important changes in the Jaina tradition, I have examined the text of the TA and the 
TABh in order get a better idea of their historical surroundings. This was a 
challenging task since both texts do not explicitly mention any other schools or texts, 
apart from the Jaina scriptures. 
Yet, as I have shown in chapter 3, it is possible to identify some external 
influences by closely examining the arguments and the structure of the TA and the 
TABh. The texts contain several conceptual inconsistencies and odd arguments that 
suggest that their composers borrowed some ideas from other sources. These 
textual anomalies enabled me to get a better understanding of the intellectual 
context of the TA and the TABh and the aims of their authors. 
As mentioned in the conclusion of the third chapter, my analysis shows that 





soteriological text, it opens with a chapter on the theory of knowledge and gives a 
prominent place to epistemology in its soteriology. This is a new development for 
the Jaina tradition and strongly resembles the view on the soteriological purpose of 
knowledge that is expressed in the Nyāyasūtra. Moreover, the epistemological 
discussion in the TA deals predominantly with ordinary cognition (mati), i.e., the 
type of cognition that plays the main role in the epistemological theory of the 
Naiyāyikas and most other schools.539 By contrast, the types of knowledge that are 
particular for the Jaina tradition, such as cosmic perception (avadhi) and mental 
perception (manaḥparyāya), are discussed very briefly.  
It is remarkable that the author of the TA pays relatively little attention to 
some important Jaina subjects and that he is willing to incorporate views and 
concepts from the Nyāya tradition that are new for the Jainas. However, the way in 
which these Nyāya elements are incorporated in the Jaina theory is not always 
successful. In several cases, such as in the analysis of the relationship between 
ordinary cognition and testimony (śruta), it is unclear how these external ideas 
should be interpreted in the overall framework of the TA. The fact that the first 
commentaries struggle to explain the precise meaning of these passages indicates 
that some of the ideas in the TA were far from standard in the Jaina tradition at the 
time of its composition. 
Despite these shortcomings, the author of the TA has succeeded in 
presenting Jaina epistemology in a way that could relate to the views of the other 
schools. This innovative move opened the way for later Jaina authors to write 
philosophical treatises that could directly engage with the philosophical positions of 
rival movements. Yet, it remains a matter of speculation who the rivals of the Jainas 
in the Gupta Period actually were. As I have argued in § 2.2, it is quite unclear what 
the position of the Jainas in the Gupta Period was and in which way they related to 
other religio-philosophical movements.  
My analysis of the TA and TABh suggests that their authors tried to offer an 
alternative that could compete with the ideas of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika tradition, 
which goes against the hypothesis of some scholars who situate the TA mainly in the 
context of a confrontation with the Buddhists.540 Instead, the texts seem to indicate a 
certain rivalry between the Jainas and the Brahmanical movements. The fact that the 
 
539 Ordinary cognition (mati) largely corresponds to the type of cognition that is known as 
‘pratyakṣa’ in most other schools. 





TA deviates from the traditional Jaina texts and embraces the style and models of 
the philosophical texts of the Brahmanical schools, suggests that the TA was written 
in an intellectual environment in which the Brahmanical views were dominant. The 
same can be said about the TABh which suggests that the TABh was composed in a 
similar setting. Yet, we have to be careful about drawing conclusions about the social 
dynamics between the Jainas and the Brahmanical movements based on certain 
trends in their philosophical literature.  
In order to get a better understanding of the social reality that underlies the 
philosophical changes in the Jaina texts from the Gupta Period, we need to know 
more about the way in which philosophy was practiced at that time. The fact that the 
Jaina texts begin to incorporate elements from the Nyāya traditions might indicate 
that the Jainas were competing with other schools to secure royal patronage, as 
suggested by Ohira and Bronkhorst. However, our current understanding of the 
historical practice of Indian philosophy and the way in which philosophical 
traditions relate to social groups is very limited. For example, even though the 
Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views are obviously linked with the Brahmanical tradition, it is 
unclear who the propounders of these theories are. Studies on the history of Indian 
philosophy often talk about the different ‘schools’ but interpreting this term as a 
reference to actual institutes would be an unwarranted reification of this notion.  
The TA and the TABh were evidently composed for a Jaina audience, which 
can be inferred from the fact that the text cannot be understood without previous 
knowledge of many Jaina terms and concepts. Yet, it is also clear that the texts were 
composed for an audience that was acquainted with Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika 
terminology. This raises some important questions. If we assume that Nyāya 
philosophy was only practiced by philosophers with a Brahmanical identity, it is 
hard to explain why the Jainas seem to be acquainted with their texts and ideas. One 
could argue that the texts of rival movements were only studied in order to defeat 
the opponent in a debate, but it is hard to situate the TA in such a scenario. The 
composer of the TA does not treat the Nyāya views with hostility and actually 
transforms the Jaina theory on the basis of Nyāya concepts. This suggests that the 
author had a positive attitude towards the Nyāya tradition. One may question, 
therefore, whether Nyāya philosophy should exclusively be seen as the view 





a general philosophical discipline that was studied by scholars from different socio-
religious backgrounds.541 
This study aimed to situate the philosophical theories in the TA and the 
TABh in the larger context of the history of Indian philosophy. I hope to have 
demonstrated that a conceptual analysis of a philosophical text does not only 
provide a better understanding of the philosophical ideas in the text itself but that it 
can also be a useful tool to investigate the intellectual surroundings of the text. As I 
have mentioned above, my study indicates that there are good reasons to re-
evaluate existing ideas about the boundaries between the philosophical traditions in 
the history of Indian philosophy, and that we should further investigate the way in 
which the different “schools” relate to the different socio-religous groups. This 
cannot be done without an active collaboration of scholars from different disciplines. 
The contemporary study of Indian philosophy is characterised by a divide between 
scholars who are primarily interested in the philosophical ideas that can be found in 
the texts and scholars with expertise of the linguistic and historical aspects of these 
texts. I hope that my study has shown that a collaboration between both sides is 




541 A relevant discussion of the way in which Nyāya philosophy relates to the Brahmanical 
tradition can be found in Preisendanz 2000. However, Preisendanz’s article focuses on the 
dynamics between the religious and philosophical traditions within the Brahmanical realm 
only. I am not aware of any study that clarifies how students from different socio-religious 














The following sections provide an English translation of the philosophical chapters 
of the Tattvārthādhigama (TA) and the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya (TABh).542 In 
addition, this part contains a translation of the sambandhakārikās (SK) and the 
praśasti.543  
The transliteration of the Sanskrit text is primarily based on the edition of 
the TA and TABh by Keshavlal Premchand Mody.544 I have also consulted the edition 
by Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia.545 In a number of cases, I have followed Kapadia’s 
instead of Mody’s reading.546 The differences between the two editions are relatively 
minor and are mentioned in the footnotes. 
The numbering of the sūtras in my transliteration follows Mody’s edition. 
They indicate the chapter and sūtra number. E.g., ‘||1.1||’ is the first sūtra of the first 
chapter. Some of the sūtras have a different number in the version of the TA that is 
accompanied by Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi (SS). These variant numbers are given 
in parentheses.547 The numbers between square brackets in the bhāṣya are my own. 
They correspond to the daṇḍas in Mody’s edition. E.g., the number ‘[1.2.3]’ refers to 
the third sentence of the commentary on the second sūtra of the first chapter of the 
TA.548 An overview of the different abbreviations can be found in the references. 
For my translation of the TA, I have consulted the following translations: 
Jacobi 1906, Sanghvi 1974, and Tatia 2011. For the translation of the praśasti, I have 
consulted Dhaky 1996 and Zydenbos 1983. The bhāṣya and the sambandhakārikās 
 
542 I.e., Chapter I, II.8 – 25, and V. In the general introduction (§ 1), I explain why these parts 
have been selected. 
543 I.e., the introductory verses and colophon that accompany the bhāṣya. 
544 See Mody 1903. 
545 See Kapadia 1926, 1930. Kapadia’s edition also contains Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā.  
546 All deviations from Mody’s edition are mentioned in the footnotes. 
547 E.g., TA 1.22 corresponds to sūtra 1.21 in the Sarvārthasiddhi. I refer to the version of this 
sūtra in the Sarvārthasiddhi as ‘(SS 1.21)’. 
548 In Part I of this study, I refer to these numbers as TA 1.1 and TABh 1.2.3. I have numbered 
the verses of the sambandhakārikās and praśasti in the same way as the TABh. The number 
‘[0.1]’ refers to the first line of the sambandhakārikās. Since the praśasti immediately follows 






have not been translated into a European language before, with the exception of the 
tenth chapter of the bhāṣya.549  
The TA is written in the style of the philosophical sūtra texts and the 
intended meaning of many passages cannot be understood without the help of a 
commentary. Yet, since it is highly unlikely that the TABh was written as an auto-
commentary, we cannot be certain that the interpretation that the TABh offers is in 
line with the meaning that the composer of the TA had in mind when he composed 
the text. Therefore, I have tried to interpret the sūtras of the TA primarily in the 
context of the theories that are provided in the TA itself. 550 
For the same reasons, I have translated most of the technical terms in a 
literal way. As such, my translation of these terms differs from more conventional 
translations, which are often based on later interpretations. For example, I translate 
‘manaḥparyāyajñāna’ as ‘knowledge from mental perception’ instead of the more 
common translation ‘telepathy’. Since the discussions of this notion in the TA and 
the TABh do not say anything about reading the minds of other people, I prefer to 
use a translation whose meaning is less specific. Since many passages in the TA and 
TABh are open to various interpretions, I have aimed to indicate as clearly as 
possible how my English rendering relates to the Sanskrit text. Therefore, I have 
kept my translation very literal and close to the Sanskrit syntax. Although this 
complicates the reading of my translation, I hope that my translation can be of help 
to other scholars who wish to investigate the actual content of the TA and TABh. 
The textual analysis in the third chapter of this study discusses the main 
ideas and concepts that are expressed in the philosophical sections of the TA and 
TABh, which are translated in this part. The order of the topics in my analysis 
corresponds to the order of the topics in the translated passages. As such, the reader 





549 The tenth chapter has been translated by Zydenbos. See Zydenbos 1983.  
550 For some passages, I have based my translation of the TABh on the explanation in 
Siddhasenagaṇi’s ṭīkā (Kapadia 1926, 1930). In these cases, I mention the ṭīkā in the 









samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ ||1.1|| 
1.1 The path to liberation (mokṣa-mārga) [is constituted by] right worldview 
(samyag-darśana), [right] knowledge (jñāna) and [right] conduct (cāritra).552 
 
[1.1.1] samyagdarśanaṃ samyagjñānaṃ samyakcāritram ity eṣa trividho 
mokṣamārgaḥ |  
‘Right worldview (samyag-darśana), right knowledge (samyag-jñāna) and right 
conduct (samyak-cāritra)’ — this (etad) [is] the threefold (trividha) path to 
liberation (mokṣa-mārga).  
[1.1.2] taṃ purastāl lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca vistareṇopadekṣyāmaḥ |  
Later on (purastāt), we will explain (upadekṣyāmaḥ) this (tad) in detail (vistara) 
based on [their] characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa)553 and (ca) classification (vidhāna)554.  
[1.1.3] śāstrānupūrvīvinyāsārthaṃ tūddeśamātram idam ucyate |  
However (tu), this [sūtra] (idam) has been formulated (ucyate) merely as (mātra) a 
brief statement (uddeśa), for the sake of (artha) arrangement (vinyāsa) [in 
accordance with] the order (anupūrvin) [in] the scriptures (śāstra).555 
[1.1.4] etāni ca samastāni mokṣasādhanāni |   
And (ca) these (etad) combined (samasta) [are] the means [to] liberation (mokṣa-
sādhana).  
 
551 Several other titles are used to refer to the Tattvārthādhigama. In this study, I use the title 
that is mentioned in the Sambandhakārikās. For a discussion of the title of the text, see § 2.3, 
Authorship of the TA and the TABh. 
552 For a discussion of this sūtra, see § 3.2 The path to liberation. 
553 ‘Charakterischen Merkmal’, ‘Kennzeichen’, ‘Definition’ (Oberhammer 2006: 100). 
554 ‘Anordnung’, ‘Erklärende Differenzierung’; ‘Er bezeichnet die Anordnung des Stoffes bzw. 
das Nennen der Abschnitte oder Themen einer Darstellung in der ihnen entsprechenden 
Reihenfolge’ (Oberhammer 2006: 141). 






[1.1.5] ekatarābhāve ’py asādhanānīty atas trayāṇāṃ grahaṇaṃ |  
For (iti), even (api) in the absence (abhāva) [of] one of them (ekatara), [they are] 
not leading [to liberation] (a-sādhana); hence (atas) [there should be] adoption 
(grahaṇa) [of] the threefold [means] (traya).  
[1.1.6] eṣāṃ ca pūrvalābhe bhajanīyam uttaraṃ | [1.1.7] uttaralābhe tu niyataḥ 
pūrvalābhaḥ |  
And (ca) in the case of acquisition of the first (i.e., samyag-darśana)556 (pūrva-lābha) 
of these (idam), the latter (i.e., samyag-jñāna and samyak-cāritra) (uttara) [have] to 
be cultivated (bhajanīya). But (tu) in the case of acquisition (lābha) of the latter (i.e., 
samyag-jñāna and samyak-cāritra) (uttara), the obtainment (lābha) [of] the first 
(pūrva) [is] certain (niyata) 
[1.1.8] tatra samyag iti praśaṃsārtho nipātaḥ samañcater vā bhāve557 darśana 
iti |  
In this [sūtra] (tatra) the word (iti) ‘right’ (samyañc) [is] a particle (nipāta), for the 
sake of (artha) commendation (praśaṃsā), or (vā) [it is] ‘worldview’ (darśana) (iti) 
in the state (bhāva) of [the verb] ‘samañc’ (to correspond, i.e., the state of 
corresponding with reality) (samañcati)558. 
[1.1.9] dṛśer avyabhicāriṇī sarvendriyānindriyārthaprāptiḥ etat samyag-
darśanam |  
The obtainment (prāpti) [of] all (sarva) the object[s] (artha) of the organs of sense 
(indriya) and the mind (anindriya) which does not deviate (avyabhicārin) from the 
[right] view559 (dṛśi) — this (etad) [is] right worldview (samyag-darśana).  
[1.1.10] praśastaṃ darśanaṃ samyagdarśanaṃ | [1.1.11] saṅgataṃ vā 
darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam |  
‘Right worldview’ (samyag-darśana) [is] the best (praśasta) worldview (darśana). 
Alternatively (vā), ‘right worldview’ (samyag-darśana) [is] the correct (saṅgata) 
worldview (darśana). 
[1.1.12] evaṃ jñānacāritrayor api ||  
The same (evam) [applies] to knowledge (jñāna) [and] conduct (cāritra) as well 
(api). 
 
556 My interpretation of ‘pūrva’ and ‘uttara’ follows the ṭīkā. 
557 Mody reads ‘bhāvaḥ darśana’, and mentions the variant reading ‘bhāve’. Kapadia places 
the daṇḍa before ‘darśanam iti’.  
558 The form ‘samañcateḥ’ is the gen. sg. of the pres. 3 sg. of sam+√añc. 






tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam ||1.2|| 
1.2 Right worldview (samyagdarśana) [is] confidence (śraddhāna) in the categories 
(artha) of reality (tattva). 
 
[1.2.1] tattvānām arthānāṃ śraddhānaṃ tattvena vārthānāṃ śraddhānaṃ 
tattvārthaśraddhānam tat samyagdarśanam |  
Confidence in the categories of reality (tattva-artha-śraddhāna) [is] confidence 
(śraddhāna) in the categories (artha) of the entities560 (tattva) or (vā) confidence 
(śraddhāna) in the categories (artha) [in terms of] reality (tattvena); that (tad) [is] 
right worldview (samyag-darśana).  
[1.2.2] tattvena bhāvato niścitam ity arthaḥ |  
The meaning [of] (ity artha) ‘tattvena’ [is]: ‘understood (niścita) in terms of [their] 
nature (bhāva)’.561 
[1.2.3] tattvāni jīvādīni vakṣyante |  
The entities (tattva) will be explained (see TA 1.4) (vakṣyante) [to be] the soul (jīva) 
etc. (ādi).  
[1.2.4] ta eva cārthāḥ teṣāṃ śraddhānaṃ teṣu pratyayāvadhāraṇam |  
And (ca) they (tad) [are] indeed (eva) the categories (artha); confidence (śraddhāna) 
in these (tad) [is] ascertainment (avadhāraṇa) [of] trust (pratyaya) with respect to 
these [categories] (tad).  
[1.2.5] tad evaṃ praśamasaṃveganirvedānukampāstikyābhivyaktilakṣaṇaṃ 
tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam iti ||  
In this way (evam), this (tad) confidence in the categories of reality (tattva-artha-
śraddhāna) — whose characteristic (lakṣaṇaṃ) [is] the manifestation (abhivyakti) 
[of] tranquillity (praśama), desire for liberation (saṃvega),562 indifference (nirveda), 




560 The word ‘tattva’ is used in both singular and plural in the bhāṣya. I translate ‘reality’ 
when used in singular and ‘the entities’ when used in plural. See also TABh 1.4.1 and TABh 
1.4.2. 
561 The ṭīkā explains that this is a gloss (vivaraṇa) on the word ‘tattvena’ in the previous 
sentence. 
562 ‘desire for emancipation’ (MW). The term ‘saṃvega’ is mentioned as a variety of body-





tan nisargād adhigamād vā ||1.3|| 
1.3 That (i.e., the right worldview) [arises] by nature (nisarga) or from learning 
(adhigama). 
 
[1.3.1] tad etat samyagdarśanaṃ dvividhaṃ bhavati | [1.3.2] nisarga-
samyagdarśanam adhigamasamyagdarśanaṃ ca |  
That very (tad etad) right worldview (samyag-darśana) exists (bhavati) in two ways 
(dvividha); [i.e.,] right worldview by nature (nisarga-samyag-darśana) and right 
worldview [from] learning (adhigama-samyag-darśana).  
[1.3.3] nisargād adhigamād votpadyate iti dvihetukaṃ dvividham ||  
‘It arises (utpadyate) from nature (nisarga) or (vā) by learning (adhigama)’ (iti), 
[that is the meaning of] ‘twofold’ (dvividha) (see TABh 1.3.1), [i.e.], having two 
causes (dvi-hetuka). 
[1.3.4] nisargaḥ pariṇāmaḥ svabhāvaḥ aparopadeśa ity anarthāntaram |  
‘Nature’ (nisarga), ‘[natural] transformation’ (pariṇāma), ‘innate disposition’ 
(svabhāva), ‘not taught by others’ (apara-upadeśa) (iti), [they are] not different (i.e., 
they are synonyms) (anarthāntara). 
[1.3.5] jñānadarśanopayogalakṣaṇo jīva iti vakṣyate |  
[It] will be explained (see TA 2.8) [that] (iti) ‘the soul (jīva) is characterised (lakṣaṇa) 
[by] the cognitive operation (upayoga) [in the form of] knowledge [and] worldview 
(darśana).’563 
[1.3.6] tasyānādau saṃsāre paribhramataḥ karmata eva karmaṇaḥ svakṛtasya 
bandhanikācanodayanirjarāpekṣaṃ nārakatiryagyonimanuṣyāmarabhava-
grahaṇeṣu vividhaṃ puṇyapāpaphalam anubhavato  
For the one (tad) [who is] wandering about (paribhramat) in beginningless (anādi) 
saṃsāra — for [him who is] experiencing (anubhavat) the varied (vividha) fruit of 
merit and demerit (puṇya-pāpa-phala), depending on (apekṣā, bah.) the bondage 
(bandha) nikācanā,564 rising (udaya), [and] destruction (nirjarā) of the karman made 
by himself (svakṛta), in taking states [of] hellish beings, animals, human beings [and] 
gods (nāraka-tiryagyoni-manuṣya-amara-bhava-grahaṇa), indeed (eva) due to [one’s] 
karman; 
 
563 Tatia translates upayoga as ‘sentience’ (Tatia 2011: 39). TA 2.9 explains the twofold 
character of upayoga (i.e., knowledge and worldview). See also § 3.3, Cognitive operation. 
564 According to Tatia, the term ‘nikācanā’ refers to a karmic process (karaṇa) that is 





jñānadarśanopayogasvābhāvyāt tāni tāni pariṇāmādhyavasāyasthānāntarāṇi 
gacchato ’nādimithyādṛṣṭer api sataḥ  
for [him] going (gacchat) [through] all these (tāni tāni) differences (antara) of 
transformation (pariṇāma), determination (adhyavasāya),565 [and] states (sthāna), 
due to the own nature [of] the cognitive operation [in the form of] knowledge [and] 
worldview (jñāna-darśana-upayoga-svābhāvya), even though (api) he is (sat) 
[someone whose] wrong view [has] no beginning (anādi-mithyā-dṛṣṭi) — 
pariṇāmaviśeṣād apūrvakaraṇaṃ tādṛg bhavati yenāsyānupadeśāt 
samyagdarśanam utpadyate ity etat nisargasamyagdarśanam || 
such (tādṛk) an apūrvakaraṇa [process]566 (apūrva-karaṇa) arises (bhavati) due to a 
particular transformation (pariṇāma-viśeṣa); by this [apūrvakaraṇa process] (yad) 
there arises (utpadyate) right worldview (samyag-darśana) for him (idam) without 
instruction (anupadeśa) — this (etad) [is] right worldview by nature (nisarga-
samyag-darśana). 
[1.3.7] adhigamaḥ abhigama āgamo nimittaṃ śravaṇaṃ śikṣā upadeśa ity 
anarthāntaram |  
‘Learning’ (see TA 1.3) (adhigama), ‘understanding’ (abhigama), ‘tradition’ (āgama), 
‘instruction’ 567  (nimitta), ‘hearing’ (śravaṇa), ‘study’ (śikṣā), [and] ‘teaching’ 
(upadeśa) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., these are synonyms) (anarthāntara). 
[1.3.8] tad evaṃ paropadeśād yat tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ bhavati tad 
adhigamasamyagdarśanam iti ||  
Thus (tad evam), confidence in the categories of reality (tattva-artha-śraddhāna), 
which (yad) arises (bhavati) [as a result of] instruction by others (para-upadeśa), 
that (tad) [is called] right worldview by learning (adhigama-samyag-darśana).  
[1.3.9] atrāha tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam ity uktam | [1.3.10] 
tatra kiṃ tattvam iti | [1.3.11] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It has been] explained (ukta) [that] ‘right 
worldview (samyag-darśana) [is] confidence in the categories of reality (tattva-
artha-śraddhāna)’. Here (tatra), [one may ask]: What (kim) [is] reality (tattva)? At 
this point (atra), it is said (ucyate): 
 
 
565 For a discussion of adhyavasāya in the Jaina theory of karman, see Wiley 2011. 
566 ‘the process by which the soul attains to an unprecedented degree of purity’ (P.S. Jaini 
1998: 337). 





jīvājīvāsravabandhasaṃvaranirjarāmokṣās tattvam ||1.4|| 
1.4 [The categories of] reality (tattva) [are]:  
i. soul (jīva) 
ii. non-soul (i.e., inanimate entities) (ajīva) 
iii. influx (āsrava) 
iv. binding (bandha)  
v. stopping (saṃvara)  
vi. destruction (nirjarā), [and]  
vii. liberation (mokṣa). 
 
[1.4.1] jīvā ajīvā āsravā bandhaḥ saṃvaro nirjarā mokṣa ity eṣa 
saptavidho ’rthas tattvam | [1.4.2] ete vā sapta padārthās tattvāni |  
Souls (jīva), non-souls (i.e., inanimate entities) (ajīva), [types of] influx (āsrava), 
binding (bandha), stopping (saṃvara), destruction (nirjarā), [and] liberation (mokṣa) 
(iti) — this (etad) [is] the sevenfold (saptavidha) category568 (artha), [which is] 
reality (tattva). Or (vā), these (etad) seven (sapta) categories (padārtha) [are] the 
entities (tattva). 
[1.4.3] tāṁl lakṣaṇato vidhānataś ca purastād vistareṇopadekṣyāmaḥ || 
Later on (purastāt), we will explain (upadekṣyāma) them (tad) in detail (vistara) 
based on [their] characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa) and (ca) classification (vidhāna). 
 
nāmasthāpanādravyabhāvatas tannyāsaḥ ||1.5||  
1.5 The analysis of these [categories] (tad-nyāsa) [can be done] from [the 
perspective of]: 
i. name (nāma) 
ii. representation (sthāpanā) 569 
iii. substance (dravya), [and] 
iv. state (bhāva)570.  
 
 
568 It is somewhat odd that ‘artha’ is used in singular in this sentence. For the sake of 
consistency, I have translated ‘artha’ as ‘category’. 
569 Lit. ‘causing to stand’. The bhāṣya refers to a painting or sculpture of the god Indra. (see 
TABh 1.5.8). 





[1.5.1] ebhir nāmādibhiś caturbhir anuyogadvārais teṣāṃ jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ 
nyāso bhavati |  
The analysis (nyāsa) of these (tad) entities (tattva), beginning with soul (jīva-ādi), 
takes place (bhavati) by these (etad) four (catur) doors of examination (anuyoga-
dvāra), [i.e.], name etc. (nāma-ādi). 
[1.5.2] vistareṇa lakṣaṇato vidhānataś cādhigamārthaṃ nyāso nikṣepa ity 
arthaḥ |  
The analysis (nyāsa) for the sake of learning (adhigama-artha), based on [their] 
characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa) and (ca) classification (vidhāna), in detail (vistara) — that 
is the meaning (ity artha) [of] ‘nikṣepa’.  
[1.5.3] tad yathā | [1.5.4] nāmajīvaḥ sthāpanājīvo dravyajīvo bhāvajīvo iti | 
For instance (tad yathā), soul [from the perspective of] name (nāma-jīva), soul [from 
the perspective of] representation (sthāpanā-jīva), soul [from the perspective of] 
substance (dravya-jīva) [and] soul [from the perspective of] state (bhāva-jīva).  
[1.5.5] nāma saṃjñākarma ity anarthāntaram |  
‘Name’ (nāma) [and] ‘giving a name’571 (saṃjñā-karman) (iti) — [these are] not 
different (i.e., these are synonyms) (anarthāntara).  
[1.5.6] cetanāvato ’cetanasya vā dravyasya jīva iti nāma kriyate | [1.5.7] sa 
nāmajīvaḥ ||  
[When] the name (nāma) ‘soul’ (jīva iti) is given (kriyate) to animate (cetanāvat) or 
(vā) inanimate (acetana) substance (dravya), that (tad) [is] soul [from the 
perspective of] name (nāma-jīva). 
[1.5.8] yaḥ kāṣṭapustacitrakarmākṣanikṣepādiṣu sthāpyate jīva iti sa 
sthāpanājīvo devatāpratikṛtivad indro rudraḥ skando viṣṇur iti ||  
The soul (jīva) which (yaḥ) is represented (sthāpyate) [in the case of] visual 
representations (akṣa-nikṣepa)572 [in] wood (kāṣṭa), a clay model (pusta), a painting 
(citra-karman) etc. (ādi) — that (tad) [is] soul [from the perspective of] 
representation (sthāpanā-jīva); like the images of deities (devatā-pratikṛtivat), 
named (iti) Indra, Rudra, Skanda [or] Viṣṇu.573 
 
571 saṃjñākarman = saṃjñākaraṇa (MW). I follow Kapadia’s reading ‘saṃjñākarma’. Mody 
reads ‘saṃjñā karma’. 
572 Lit. ‘deposited in the senses’. 





[1.5.9] dravyajīva iti guṇaparyāyaviyuktaḥ prajñāsthāpito ’nādipāriṇāmika-
bhāvayukto jīva ucyate |  
[When] the soul (jīva) is said (ucyate) [to be] destitute of qualities [and] modes 
(guṇa-paryāya-viyukta), 574  represented by knowledge 575  (prajñā-sthāpita), [and] 
connected with the condition of beginningless transformation (anādi-pāriṇāmika-
bhāva-yukta) — [that is] ‘soul [from the perspective of] substance (dravya-jīva)’ (iti). 
[1.5.10] athavā śūnyo ’yaṃ bhaṅgaḥ |  
However (athavā), this (idam) form of analysis (bhaṅga) [is] pointless (śūnya). 576 
[1.5.11] yasya hy ajīvasya sato bhavyaṃ jīvatvaṃ syāt sa dravyajīvaḥ syāt 
aniṣṭaṃ caitat ||  
For (hi), this (tad) soul [from the perspective of] substance (dravya-jīva) would 
imply (syād) [that] the quality of being a soul (jīvatva) might (syāt) 577 occur (bhavya) 
for that (yad) which is (sat) not-soul (ajīva), and (ca) this (etad) is incorrect (aniṣṭa). 
[1.5.12] bhāvato jīvā aupaśamikakṣāyikakṣāyopaśamikaudayikapāriṇāmika-
bhāvayuktā upayogalakṣaṇāḥ saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca dvividhā vakṣyante || 
From [the perspective of] state (bhāva), souls (jīva) will be said (vakṣyante)578 [to be] 
twofold (dvividha): transmigratory [souls] (saṃsārin) — [which] are connected with 
the states (bhāva-yukta) [that are] resulting from the cessation [of karman] 
(aupaśamika), resulting from the annihilation [of karman] (kṣāyika), resulting from 
the annihilation and cessation [of karman] (kṣāya-upaśamika)579, resulting from the 
manifestation [of karman] (audayika) [and] resulting from a natural disposition 
(pāriṇāmika)580 — [and that are] characterised by [cognitive] operation (upayoga-
lakṣaṇa) and (ca) liberated (mukta). 
 
574 TA 5.37 explains that ‘substance has qualities and modes’ (guṇaparyāyavad dravyam). 
575 The ṭīkā suggests an instrumental relationship between ‘prajñā’ and ‘sthāpita’. The 
meaning of this expression is not entirely clear to me. I have translated ‘stāpita’ in 
accordance with my translation of the term ‘sthāpanā’ (representation), which is frequently 
used in this passage. Perhaps, the intended meaning is ‘mental phenomenon’. Alternatively, 
‘prajñāsthāpita’ can be translated as ‘established by knowledge’. 
576 I.e., analysing the soul from the perspective of dravya does not make any sense. See also 
the following sentence (TABh 1.5.11). 
577 Mody’s K manuscript omits the second ‘syāt’ (Mody 1903: 8). 
578 TA 2.10 explains that there are two types of souls, i.e., ‘worldly and liberated [souls]’ 
(saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca). 
579 Mentioned in TA 2.1 as ‘the mixed state’ (miśra). 





[1.5.13] evam ajīvādiṣu sarveṣv anugantavyam ||  
Likewise (evam), [the different perspectives are] to be applied (anugantavya) to all 
[other categories] (sarva), beginning with non-soul (ajīva-ādi).581 
[1.5.14] paryāyāntareṇāpi nāmadravyaṃ sthāpanādravyaṃ dravyadravyam 
bhāvato dravyam iti |  
Also (api), with regard to (antareṇa) modes (paryāya)582, [there is] ‘substance [from 
the perspective of] name (nāma-dravya), substance [from the perspective of] 
representation (sthāpanā-dravya), substance [from the perspective of] substance 
(dravyadravya) [and] substance (dravya) from [the perspective of] state (bhāva)’ 
(iti). 
[1.5.15] yasya jīvasyājīvasya583 vā nāma kriyate dravyam iti tan nāmadravyam |  
[When] the name (nāma) ‘substance’ (dravya iti) is given (kriyate) to that which 
(yad) [is] soul (jīva) or (vā) non-soul (ajīva), that (tad) is substance [from the 
perspective of] name (nāma-dravya). 
[1.5.16] yat kāṣṭapustacitrakarmākṣanikṣepādiṣu sthāpyate dravyam iti tat 
sthāpanādravyam devatāpratikṛtivad indro rudraḥ skando viṣṇur iti |  
The substance (dravyam) which (yad) is represented (sthāpyate) [in the case of] 
visual representations (akṣa-nikṣepa) [in] wood (kāṣṭa), a clay model (pusta), a 
painting (citra-karman) etc. (ādi), that (tad) [is] substance [from the perspective of] 
representation (sthāpanā-dravya); like the images of deities (devatā-pratikṛtivad), 
named (iti) Indra, Rudra, Skanda [or] Viṣṇu.584  
[1.5.17] dravyadravyaṃ nāma guṇaparyāyaviyuktaṃ prajñāsthāpitaṃ 
dharmādīnām anyatamat |  
‘Substance [from the perspective of] substance’ can be defined as (nāma) [that 
which is] without qualities [and] modes (guṇa-paryāya-viyukta), established by 
knowledge (prajñāsthāpita), [and] different from (anyatama) motion etc. (dharma-
ādi)585. 
 
581 I.e., the other categories that are mentioned in TA 1.4 can also be analysed from the four 
perspectives that are mentioned in TA 1.5. 
582 See TA 5.37 for a discussion of ‘modes’ (paryāya). The meaning of this passage is not 
entirely clear to me. 
583 Mody reads ‘jīvasya vā jīvasya vā’. He mentions a variant reading that omits the first vā. I 
follow Kapadia, who reads ‘jīvasyājīvasya vā’. 
584 Cf. TABh 1.5.8. 
585 I.e. the inanimate entities, which are listed in TA 5.1: motion (dharma), rest (adharma), 





[1.5.18] kecid apy āhur yad dravyato dravyaṃ bhavati tac ca pudgaladravyam 
eveti pratyetavyam |  
Some [people] (kecid) also (api) say (āhuḥ): ‘And (ca) that which (yad) is (bhavati) 
substance (dravya) [from the perspective of] substance (dravya), that (tad) [is] just 
(eva) to be understood (pratyetavya) [as] ‘the substance [of] material elements’ 
(pudgala-dravya) (iti).’ 
[1.5.19] aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca saṅghātabhedebhya utpadyanta iti vakṣyāmaḥ |  
We will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) (see TA 5.25 - 26) [that] (iti) the atoms (aṇu) and (ca) 
the aggregates (skandha) result (utpadyante) from combination and disintegration 
(saṅghāta-bheda). 
[1.5.20] bhāvato dravyāṇi dharmādīni saguṇaparyāyāṇi prāptilakṣaṇāni 
vakṣyante |  
From [the perspective of] state (bhāva), the substances (dravya) will be said (see TA 
5.37) (vakṣyante) [to be]: motion etc. (dharma-ādi) (i.e., the five substances, see TA 
5.1), [provided] with qualities [and] modes (saguṇa-paryāya), [and] characterised 
by reach (prāpti-lakṣaṇa) (i.e., having extension)586. 
[1.5.21] āgamataś ca prābhṛtajño dravyam iti bhavyam āha | [1.5.22] dravyaṃ 
ca bhavye |  
And (ca) based on scripture (āgama), a learned person (prābhṛta-jña)587 names (āha) 
[that which] exists (bhavya) ‘substance’ (dravya) (iti). And (ca) [this is] substance 
(dravya) [in the sense of] ‘that which exists’ (bhavya). 
[1.5.23] bhavyam iti prāpyam āha | [1.5.24] bhū prāptāv ātmanepadī | [1.5.25] 
tad evaṃ prāpyante prāpnuvanti vā dravyāṇi ||  
[He] names (āha) that which exists (bhavya) (iti) as ‘attainable’ (prāpya). [The verb] 
‘√bhū’ (existing) in the middle voice (ātmanepadin) [has the meaning of] ‘reaching’ 
(prāpti). In this respect (tad evam), the substances (dravya) are reached (prāpyante), 
or (vā) they reach (prāpnuvanti) (i.e., they are either contactable or they come into 
contact).  
 
586 Perhaps, ‘prāptilakṣaṇa’ is the opposite of the expression ‘prajñasthāpita’ in TABh 1.5.7 
and TABh 1.5.15. 
587 Lit. someone who knows the āgamas. The term ‘prābhṛta’ refers to a category of texts that 





[1.5.26] evaṃ sarveṣām anādīnām ādimatāṃ ca jīvādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ 
mokṣāntānāṃ tattvādhigamārthaṃ nyāsaḥ kārya iti || 
Likewise (evam), the analysis (nyāsa) [is] to be done (kārya) for all (sarva) states 
(bhāva) of souls etc. (jīva-ādi), [i.e., the categories]588 without beginning (anādi) and 
(ca) having a beginning (ādimat)589, whose end is liberation (mokṣa-ānta), for the 
sake of study of reality (tattva-adhigama-artha) (iti). 
 
pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ ||1.6|| 
1.6 [The categories] can be understood (adhigama) through the means of cognition 
(pramāṇa)590 and the perspectives (naya). 
 
[1.6.1] eṣāṃ ca jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ yathoddiṣṭānāṃ nāmādibhir nyastānāṃ 
pramāṇanayair vistarādhigamo bhavati ||  
And (ca) the full understanding (vistarādhigama) of these (etad) entities (tattva) — 
[i.e.], souls etc. (jīva-ādi) as listed (see TA 1.4) (yathā-uddiṣṭa), [which are] analysed 
(nyasta)591 by name etc. (nāma-ādi) — takes place (bhavati) through the means of 
cognition (pramāṇa) [and] perspectives (naya). 
[1.6.2] tatra pramāṇaṃ dvividhaṃ parokṣaṃ pratyakṣaṃ ca vakṣyate |  
Among them (tatra), the twofold (dvividha) means of cognition (pramāṇa), [i.e.], 
indirect cognition (parokṣa) and (ca) direct cognition (pratyakṣa), will be explained 
(see TA 1.10 – 1.12) (vakṣyate). 
[1.6.3] caturvidham ity eke | [1.6.4] nayavādāntareṇa ||592 
Some (eka) [say that] (iti) [the means of cognition are] fourfold (caturvidha), 593 in 
accordance with (antareṇa) the doctrine of perspectives (naya-vāda). 
 
588 See TA 1.4. 
589 TA 5.42 says: ‘[There is transformation] without beginning and having a beginning’ 
(anādir ādimāṃś ca). 
590 Since a pramāṇa can also lead to false cognition (ajñāna) according to the bhāṣya (see 
TABh 1.12.15), I translate ‘means of cognition’ instead of the more commonly used phrase 
‘means of knowledge’. The difficulty of translating this term partly results from the fact that 
the word ‘pramāṇa’ is used in different ways by different philosophical movements. For 
some traditions it means ‘authoritative means of knowledge’, while for others it does ‘not 
necessarily yield true cognition’ (Gokhale 1993: 675 - 676). The TABh adheres to the latter 
position. 
591 Cf. ‘nyāsa’ in TA 1.5.  
592 Kapadia’s edition omits the daṇḍa between ‘ity eke’ and ‘nayavādāntareṇa’. 






[1.6.5] nayāś ca naigamādayo vakṣyante || [1.6.6] kiṃ cānyat |  
And (ca) the perspectives (naya) will be said (see TA 1.34) (vakṣyante) [to be] the 
commonplace [perspective] etc. (naigama-ādi). Further (kiṃ cānyat):  
 
nirdeśasvāmitvasādhanādhikaraṇasthitividhānataḥ ||1.7||  
1.7 [The categories can also be analysed] based on classification (vidhāna) [into]:  
i. description (nirdeśa) 
ii. ownership (svāmitva) 
iii. cause (sādhana)594 
iv. locus (adhikaraṇa)  
v. duration (sthiti), [and] 
vi. classification (vidhāna). 
 
[1.7.1] ebhiś ca nirdeśādibhiḥ ṣaḍbhir anuyogadvāraiḥ sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ 
jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ vikalpaśo vistareṇādhigamo bhavati | 
And (ca) by these (idam) six (ṣaṣ) doors of examination (anuyoga-dvāra), [i.e.], 
description etc. (nirdeśa-ādi), there is (bhavati) varied (vikalpaśas) understanding 
(adhigama) in detail (vistareṇa) of all (sarva) states (bhāva) [of all] entities (tattva), 
beginning with soul (jīva-ādi).595 
[1.7.2] tadyathā | [1.7.3] nirdeśaḥ | [1.7.4] ko jīvaḥ | [1.7.5] aupaśamikādibhāva-
yukto dravyaṃ jīvaḥ | 
To illustrate (tadyathā), [from the perspective of] description (nirdeśa) — what (kim) 
[is] the soul (jīva)? The soul (jīva) [is] a substance (dravya) connected with states 
(bhāva-yukta), beginning with ‘resulting from the cessation [of karman]’ 
(aupaśamika-ādi) (see TA 2.1). 
[1.7.6] samyagdarśanaparīkṣāyām | [1.7.7] kiṃ samyagdarśanaṃ dravyam |  
[With regard to] the investigation (parīkṣā) [of] right worldview (samyag-darśana): 
What (kim) [is] right worldview (samyag-darśana)? [It is] a substance (dravya). 
 
594 Lit. ‘bringing about’ (MW). My translation of this term is based on Tatia’s translation of 
this sūtra. 
595 The word order in this sentence is somewhat strange. One would rather expect ‘sarveṣāṃ 
bhāvānāṃ’ after ‘jīvādīnāṃ tattvānāṃ’ if the intended meaning is indeed ‘of all states [of all] 





[1.7.8] samyagdṛṣṭijīvo ’rūpī noskandho nogrāmaḥ596 || 
The soul [that possesses] right insight (samyag-dṛṣṭi-jīva) [has] no extension 
(arūpin)597, [having] a quasi-combination [of atoms] (no-skandha), [being] a quasi-
collection (no-grāma).598 
[1.7.9] svāmitvam | [1.7.10] kasya samyagdarśanam iti etad ātmasaṃyogena 
parasaṃyogenobhayasaṃyogena ceti vācyam |  
[From the perspective of] ownership (svāmitva): Who has (kim) right worldview 
(samyag-darśana) (iti)? [It is] to be said (vācya): It [exists] (etad) [in terms of] 
connection with the self (ātma-saṃyoga), [in terms of] connection with the other 
(para-saṃyoga) and (ca) [in terms of] connection with both (ubhaya-saṃyoga) (iti). 
[1.7.11] ātmasaṃyogena jīvasya samyagdarśanam |  
[There is] right worldview (samyag-darśana) of the soul (jīva) [in terms of] 
connection with the self (ātma-saṃyoga); 
[1.7.12] parasaṃyogena jīvasyājīvasya jīvayor ajīvayor jīvānām ajīvānām iti 
vikalpāḥ |  
[In terms of] connection with the other (para-saṃyoga) [there are] the varieties [of 
connection] (vikalpa): 
i. of soul (jīva) [and] non-soul (ajīva) 
ii. of two souls (jīva) [and] two non-souls (ajīva) 
iii. of [many] souls (jīva) [and many] non-souls (ajīva) (iti). 
 
596 Mody separates the prefix ‘no-’ in this passage. I follow Kapadia’s reading, which is in line 
with the way in which ‘no-’ appears in other passages of the TABh (e.g. TABh 1.7.13). 
597 TA 5.4 explains that the substances (dravya) have no extension with the exception of the 
material elements (pudgala). 
598 The intended meaning seems to be that, somehow, there is a connection between the soul 
and material elements (pudgala), even though the soul itself is a substance without extension. 
The peculiar prefix ‘no’ (< na + u, ‘and not’ or ‘partly not’) also appears in other passages of 
the TABh and has the meaning of ‘quasi-’. For example, TABh 1.7.13 makes a distinction 
between ‘jīva’, ‘ajīva’, and ‘nojīva’, which indicates that ‘nojīva’ is different from ‘jīva’ (soul) 





[1.7.13] ubhayasaṃyogena jīvasya nojīvasya jīvayor ajīvayor jīvānām ajīvānām 
iti vikalpā na santi śeṣāḥ santi ||  
Soul (jīva) [and] quasi-soul (nojīva), two souls (jīva) [and] two non-souls (ajīva), 
[many] souls (jīva) [and] many non-souls (ajīva) — [these] (iti) are not (na santi) 
varieties (vikalpa) [in terms of] connection with both (ubhaya-saṃyoga); the 
remaining [combinations] (śeṣa) are (santi).599  
[1.7.14] sādhanam | [1.7.15] samyagdarśanaṃ kena bhavati | [1.7.16] nisargād 
adhigamād vā bhavatīty uktam |  
[From the perspective of] cause (sādhana): By what (kim) does right worldview 
(samyag-darśana) come into existence (bhavati)? It has been said (see TA 1.3) (ukta) 
[that] it arises (bhavati) by nature (nisarga) or (vā) from learning (adhigama) (iti). 
[1.7.17] tatra nisargaḥ pūrvoktaḥ | [1.7.18] adhigamas tu samyagvyāyāmaḥ |  
Among them (tatra), ‘by nature’ (nisarga) has been explained before (pūrva-ukta) 
(see TABh 1.3.4). And (tu) learning (adhigama) [is] right exertion (samyag-vyāyāma). 
[1.7.19] ubhayam api tadāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayeṇopaśamena 
kṣayopaśamābhyām iti ||  
Both (i.e., right worldview by nature and from learning) (ubhaya) also (api) [arise] 
by destruction (kṣaya), by cessation (upaśama) [and] by both destruction [and] 
cessation (kṣaya-upaśama) of karman [that is] covering that (i.e., right worldview)600 
(tad-āvaraṇīya) (iti). 
[1.7.20] adhikaraṇaṃ trividham ātmasannidhānena parasannidhānenobhaya-
sannidhāneneti vācyaṃ |  
[From the perspective of] locus (adhikaraṇa) — [it is] to be said (vācya) [that] (iti) 
[the locus of right worldview is] threefold (trividha):  
i. in the presence of the self (ātma-sannidhāna)  
ii. in the presence of the other (i.e., non-self) (para-sannidhāna)  
iii. in the presence of both (ubhaya-sannidhāna).601 
 
599 The function of the dual and plural forms and the intended meaning of this passage are 
not entirely unclear to me. Perhaps, the intended meaning is that there are only five types of 
connection between substances: (i.) between souls (jīva) and non-souls (i.e. non-living 
substances, such as matter) (ajīva), (ii.) between quasi-souls (no-jīva) and non-souls (ajīva), 
(iii.) between different souls (jīva), (iv.) between different non-souls (ajīva), (v.) between 
different quasi-souls (nojīva). 
600 TA 6.11 lists the different types of ‘knowledge and worldview covering [karman]’ 
(jñānadarśanāvaraṇa). 
601 I.e., samyagdarśana has something to do with the self, has reference to things other than 





[1.7.21] ātmasannidhānam abhyantarasannidhānam ity arthaḥ | [1.7.22] 
parasannidhānaṃ bāhyasannidhānam ity arthaḥ | [1.7.23] ubhaya-
sannidhānaṃ bāhyābhyantarasannidhānam602 ity arthaḥ |  
In the presence of the self (ātma-sannidhāna) — the meaning is (ity artha) ‘in the 
presence of the interior’ (abhyantara-sannidhāna). In the presence of the other 
(para-sannidhāna) — the meaning is (ity artha) ‘in the presence of the exterior’ 
(bāhya-sannidhāna). In the presence of both (ubhaya-sannidhāna) — the meaning is 
(ity artha) ‘in the presence of the exterior [and] the interior’ (bāhya-abhyantara-
sannidhāna).603  
[1.7.24] kasmin samyagdarśanam |604  
Right worldview (samyag-darśana) [is] in what (kim)?  
[1.7.25] ātmasannidhāne tāvat jīve samyagdarśanam jīve jñānam jīve cāritram 
ity etadādi |  
First of all (tāvat), [the varieties of] ‘in the presence of the self (ātma-sannidhāna)’ 
[are]: right worldview (samyag-darśana) in the soul (jīva), [right] knowledge (jñāna) 
in the soul (jīva), [right] conduct (cāritra) in the soul (jīva), and so on (ity etad-ādi). 
[1.7.26] bāhyasannidhāne jīve samyagdarśanam nojīve samyagdarśanam iti 
yathoktā vikalpāḥ |  
The varieties (vikalpa) [of] ‘in the presence of the other (bāhya-sannidhāna)’ [are]: 
‘right worldview (samyag-darśana) in the soul (jīva) [and] right worldview (samyag-
darśana) in the quasi-soul (nojīve)’ (iti) as it is said (yathā-ukta)605. 
[1.7.27] ubhayasannidhāne cāpy abhūtāḥ sadbhūtāś ca yathoktā bhaṅgavikalpā 
iti ||  
And (ca) also (api), the varieties [with respect to] analysis (bhaṅga-vikalpa) [of] ‘in 
the presence of both’ (ubhaya-sannidhāna) are: non-existent (abhūta) and (ca) fully 
existent606 (sad-bhūta)’ (iti), as it is said (yathā-ukta). 
 
602 Kapadia reads ‘abhyantarabāhyayoḥ sannidhānam’. 
603 This passage comments on the previous sentence. It is somewhat strange that the 
composer of the bhāṣya provides a comment on his own text, which might indicate that this 
passage is a later addition. 
604 Kapadia adds ‘ātmasannidhāne parasannidhāne ubhayasannidhāne iti’. 
605 I have not been able to identify the reference of ‘yathokta’ in TABh 1.7.26 and 1.7.27. 
606 The term ‘sadbhūta’ also appears in the commentary on TA 1.8 (TABh 1.8.1, 1.8.8), which 





[1.7.30] sthitiḥ | [1.7.29] samyagdarśanaṃ kiyantaṃ kālam |  
[From the perspective of] duration (sthiti) — right worldview (samyag-darśana) 
[lasts] up to what time (kiyat kāla)? 
[1.7.30] samyagdṛṣṭir dvividhā | [1.7.31] sādiḥ saparyavasānā sādir apary-
avasānā ca |  
Right insight (samyag-dṛṣṭi) [is] twofold (dvividha): 
i. having a beginning (sa-ādi) [and] having an end (sa-paryavasāna), and (ca) 
ii. having a beginning (sa-ādi) [and] not having an end (a-paryavasāna). 
[1.7.32] sādisaparyavasānam eva ca samyagdarśanam |  
And (ca) right worldview (samyag-darśana) [is] only (eva) ‘having a beginning [and] 
having an end (sa-ādi-saparyavasāna)’.  
[1.7.33] tajjaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkṛṣṭena ṣaṭṣaṣṭiḥ sāgaropamāni 
sādhikāni |  
At its lowest (tad-jaghanya) [the duration is] less than an hour (antar-muhūrta); at 
[its] highest (utkṛṣṭa) [it is] more than (sādhika) 66 (ṣaṭṣaṣṭi) ‘ocean-measured’ 
[periods] (sāgara-upamā)607. 
[1.7.34] samyagdṛṣṭiḥ sādiraparyavasānā | [1.7.35] sayogaḥ śaileśīprāptaś ca 
kevalī siddhaśceti ||  
[Concerning] ‘right insight’ (samyag-dṛṣṭi) [that] has a beginning (sa-ādi) [and is] not 
having an end (a-paryavasāna) — [this type of right insight is found in]: 
i. [someone] possessed with yoga (sa-yoga),608 and (ca)  
ii. [in someone] reaching the top [of the guṇasthānas]609 (śaileśī-prāpta) 
iii. the one endowed with absolute knowledge (kevalin), and (ca)  
iv. the perfected being (siddha) (iti). 
 
607 For a discussion of the measurement of time in the TABh, see Tatia 2011: 271-274. 
608 I.e., one of the 14 stages of spiritual development (guṇasthāna). For an overview of the 
guṇasthanas, see, e.g., Tatia 2011: 279 – 285.  





[1.7.36] vidhānam hetutraividhyāt kṣayādi trividhaṃ samyagdarśanam | [1.7.37] 
tadāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇo darśanamohanīyasya ca kṣayādibhyaḥ |  
[From the perspective of] classification (vidhāna) — right worldview (saṃyag-
darśana) [is] threefold (trividha), [resulting] from a triple cause (hetu-traividhya), 
beginning with destruction (kṣaya-ādi). [I.e.], from the destruction etc. (kṣaya-ādi) of 
karman [that is] covering [worldview] (tad-āvaraṇīya) and (ca) deluding worldview 
(darśana-mohanīya).610  
[1.7.38] tadyathā | [1.7.39] kṣayasamyagdarśanam upaśamasamyagdarśanam 
kṣayopaśamasamyagdarśanam iti |  
To illustrate (tad-yathā): ‘the right worldview [resulting from] destruction (kṣaya-
samyag-darśana), the right worldview [resulting from] cessation (upaśama-samyag-
darśana) [and] the right worldview [resulting from] destruction [and] cessation 
(kṣaya-upaśama-samyag-darśana) (iti). 
[1.7.40] atra caupaśamikakṣāyopaśamikakṣāyikāṇāṃ parataḥ parato 
viśuddhiprakarṣaḥ || [1.7.41] kiṃ cānyat | 
And (ca) here (atra), [there is a] higher and higher (paratas paratas) intensity [of] 
purity (viśuddhiprakarṣa) for [respectively someone] with cessation (aupaśamika), 
[someone] with destruction [and] cessation (kṣāya-upaśamika), [and] [someone] 
with destruction (kṣāyika) [of worlview covering and deluding karman]. Further 
(kiṃ cānyat):  
 
satsaṃkhyākṣetrasparśanakālāntarabhāvālpabahutvaiś ca ||1.8|| 
1.8 And by:  
i. existence (sat) 
ii. numeration (saṃkhyā) 
iii. region (kṣetra) 
iv. touching (i.e., reach) (sparśana) 
v. time (kāla) 
vi. interval (antara)611 
vii. state (bhāva), [and] 
viii. quantity612 (alpa-bahutva). 
 
610 See also TABh 1.7.19. 
611 Alternatively, ‘kāla’ and ‘antara’ can also be read together as ‘kālāntara’ (interval). 
However, TABh mentions that there are eight doors of examination (anuyogadvāra). It is 






[1.8.1] sat saṅkhyā kṣetraṃ sparśanaṃ kālaḥ antaraṃ bhāvaḥ alpabahutvam 
ity etaiś ca sadbhūtapadaprarūpaṇādibhir aṣṭābhir anuyogadvāraiḥ 
sarvabhāvānāṃ vikalpaśo vistarādhigamo bhavati |  
And (ca) by these (etad) eight (aṣṭa) doors of examination (anuyoga-dvāra), [namely] 
‘existence (sat), numeration (saṃkhyā), region (kṣetra), touching (i.e., reach) 
(sparśana), time (kāla), interval (antara), state (bhāva), [and] quantity613 (alpa-
bahutva)’ (iti), — [i.e. by exposing]614 that which is true, a sign, a metaphorical 
description etc. (sadbhūta-pada-prarūpaṇādi) — there is (bhavati) full (vistara) 
varied (vikalpaśas) understanding (adhigama) of all states (sarva-bhāva).615 
[1.8.2] katham iti cet ucyate | [1.8.3] sat samyagdarśanaṃ kim asti nāsti astīty 
ucyate |  
If one asks (iti ced): ‘How [are these doors of examination to be applied]?’ (katham), 
[then] it is said (ucyate): [From the perspective of] ‘existence’ (sat) — does right 
worldview (samyag-darśana) exist [or] does is not exist (kim asti na-asti)? [Then] it 
is said (ucyate): It exists (asti) (iti). 
[1.8.4] kvāstīti ced ucyate | [1.8.5] ajīveṣu tāvan nāsti | [1.8.6] jīveṣu tu bhājyam |  
If one asks (iti cet): “Where is it616 (kva-asti)?”, it is said (ucyate): First of all (tāvat), 
it is not (na-asti) in non-souls (ajīva). However (tu), [it is] distributed617 (bhājya) in 
souls (jīva). 
[1.8.7] tadyathā | [1.8.8] gatīndriyakāyayogakaṣāyavedaleśyāsamyaktvajñāna-
darśanacāritrāhāropayogeṣu trayodaśasv anuyogadvāreṣu yathā saṃbhavaṃ 
sadbhūtaprarūpaṇā kartavyā || 
As here follows (tad-yathā), exposing that which is true (sad-bhūta-prarūpaṇā) [is] 
to be done (kartavya) respectively (yathā sambhava) in the case of the thirteen 
(trayodaśa) doors of examination (anuyoga-dvāra), [i.e.]:  
i. transmigration (gati) 
ii. the senses (indriya) 
iii. body (kāya) 
 
612 Tatia translates ‘relative numerical strength’. 
613 Lit. ‘being little or much’. 
614 Cf. ‘sadbhūtaprarūpaṇā’ in TABh 1.8.8. 
615 The word order of this sentence is somewhat strange. The syntax of this passage is similar 
to TABh 1.7.1. 
616 I.e., what is the locus of right worldview? 





iv. activity (yoga) 
v. passion (kaṣāya) 
vi. feelings (veda) 
vii. colouring (leśyā) 
viii. rightness (samyaktva) 
ix. knowledge (jñāna) 
x. worldview (darśana) 
xi. conduct (cāritra) 
xii. taking food (āhāra) 
xiii. [cognitive] operation (upayoga).618 
[1.8.9] saṅkhyeyā | [1.8.10] kiyat samyagdarśanam kiṃ saṅkhyeyam 
asaṅkhyeyam anantam iti | 
[From the perspective of] numeration (saṅkhyeyā) — How many (kiyat) right 
worldviews (samyag-darśana) [are there]? Is it (kim) numerable (saṅkhyeya), 
innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) [or] endlessly many (ananta) (iti)? 
[1.8.11] ucyate | [1.8.12] asaṅkhyeyāni samyagdarśanāni | [1.8.13] 
samyagdṛṣṭayas tv anantāḥ || 
It is said (ucyate): [The number of] right worldviews (samyagdarśana) [is] 
innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) but (tu) [there are] endlessly many (ananta) right 
insights (samyag-dṛṣṭi). 
[1.8.14] kṣetram | [1.8.15] samyagdarśanaṃ kiyati kṣetre | [1.8.16] 
lokasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāge || 
[From the perspective of] place — in a region (kṣetra) of what extent (kiyat) [does] 
right worldview (samyag-darśana) [occur]? [It occurs] in an innumerable part 
(asaṅkhyeya-bhāga) of the cosmos (loka). 
[1.8.17] sparśanam | [1.8.18] samyagdarśanena kiṃ spṛṣṭam |  
[From the perspective of] touching (i.e., reach) (sparśana): What (kim) [is] reached 
(spṛṣṭa) by right worldview (samyag-darśana)?619 
[1.8.19] lokasyāsaṅkheyabhāgaḥ | [1.8.20] samyagdṛṣṭinā tu sarvaloka iti || 
An innumerable part (asaṅkheya-bhāga) of the cosmos (loka). However (tu), the 
whole cosmos (sarva-loka) [is reached] by right insight (samyag-dṛṣṭi) (iti). 
 
618 Several items in this list are also mentioned in TA 2.6, which enumerates 21 states (bhāva) 
of the soul, including four varieties of transmigration (gati), four passions (kaṣāya), and six 
colourings of the soul (leśyā). 





[1.8.21] atrāha samyagdṛṣṭisamyagdarśanayoḥ kaḥ prativiśeṣa iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): What (kim) [is] the difference (prativiśeṣa) 
between right insight and right worldview (samyag-dṛṣṭi-samyag-darśana) (iti)? 
[1.8.22] ucyate | [1.8.23] apāyasaddravyatayā samyagdarśanam apāya 
ābhinibodhikam | [1.8.24] tadyogāt samyagdarśanam |  
It is said (ucyate): Right worldview (samyag-darśana) [arises] from existent 
substance [through] elimination620 (apāya-sad-dravyatā); ‘elimination’ (apāya) [is] 
perceptual apprehension (ābhinibodhika); right worldview (samyag-darśana) 
[arises] from the activity of that (tad-yoga). 
[1.8.25] tat kevalino nāsti | [1.8.26] tasmāt na kevalī samyagdarśanī 
samyagdṛṣṭis tu621 ||  
That (i.e., right worldview) (tad) is not (na-asti) of the one endowed with absolute 
knowledge (kevalin). Therefore (tasmāt), the one endowed with absolute knowledge 
(kevalin) is not [someone] possessing right worldview (samyag-darśanin); however 
(tu), [he does possess] right insight (samyag-dṛṣṭi). 
[1.8.27] kālaḥ | [1.8.28] samyagdarśanaṃ kiyantaṃ kālam iti atrocyate | [1.8.29] 
tad ekajīvena nānājīvaiś ca parīkṣyam |  
[From the perspective of] time (kāla) — How long (kiyat kāla) [does] right 
worldview [last] (samyag-darśana) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): That 
(tad) [is] to be examined (parīkṣya) with respect to an individual soul (eka-jīva) and 
(ca) with respect to all soul[s] (nānā-jīva). 
[1.8.30] tadyathā | [1.8.31] ekajīvaṃ prati jaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkṛṣṭena 
ṣaṭṣaṣṭiḥ sāgaropamāni sādhikāni | [1.8.32] nānājīvān prati sarvāddhā ||  
Namely (tad-yathā), in the case of (prati) an individual soul (eka-jīva) [it is] less than 
an hour (antar-muhūrta) at its lowest (jaghanya), [and] more than (sādhika) 66 
(ṣaṭṣaṣṭi) sāgaropamas at [its] highest (utkṛṣṭa); in the case of (prati) all souls (nānā-
jīva) [it exists] all the time (sarva-addhā).622 
 
620 TA 1.15 lists ‘elimination’ (apāya) as the third phase of ordinary cognition (mati) (for a 
discussion of the phases of ordinary cognition, see § 3.2 Ordinary cognition). The general idea 
of ‘elimination’ is that sensory cognition only becomes knowledge after investigating an 
object of sense and eliminating false ideas, such as the idea of silver in the case of mother-of-
pearl. This passage in the bhāṣya seems to explain that right worldview is ultimately based 
on actual perceptions. For this reason, it is said that the kevalin cannot have right worldview 
(samyagdarśana) (TABh 1.8.25), since he is liberated from all bonds with the material world. 
Instead, the bhāṣya says that he has right insight (samyagdṛṣṭi) (TABh 1.8.26). 
621 Kapadia adds ‘bhavati’, mentioned by Mody as a variant reading. 





[1.8.33] antaram | [1.8.34] samyagdarśanasya ko virahakālaḥ |  
[From the perspective of] interval (antara): What (kim) [is] the time [in] separation 
(viraha-kāla) of right worldview (samyag-darśana) (i.e., the time between two 
instances of right worldview)? 
[1.8.35] ekaṃ jīvaṃ prati jaghanyenāntarmuhūrtam utkṛṣṭena 
upārdhapudgalaparivartaḥ | [1.8.36] nānājīvān prati nāsty antaram ||  
In the case of (prati) an individual (eka) soul (jīva) [it is] less than an hour (antar-
muhūrta) at its lowest (jaghanya) [and] nearly half [the time of] the expiration of 
material elements623 (upa-ardha-pudgala-parivarta) at [its] highest (utkṛṣṭa); in the 
case of (prati) many souls (nānā-jīva) there is no (na-asti) interval (antara).624 
[1.8.37] bhāvaḥ | [1.8.38] samyagdarśanam aupaśamikādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ 
katamo bhāva ucyate | [1.8.39] audayikapāriṇāmikavarjaṃ triṣu bhāveṣu 
bhavati || 
[From the perspective of] state (bhāva): Which (katama) state (bhāva) of the states 
(bhāva) beginning with ‘resulting from the cessation [of karman]’ (aupaśamika-
ādi)625 [is suitable for] right worldview (samyag-darśana)? It is said (ucyate): It 
exists (bhavati) in three (tri) states (bhāva), [i.e., all states] with the exception of 
[the state] resulting from the manifestation [of karman and the state] resulting from 
a natural disposition (audayika-pāriṇāmika-varja).  
[1.8.40] alpabahutvam | [1.8.41] atrāha samyagdarśanānāṃ triṣu bhāveṣu 
vartamānānāṃ kiṃ tulyasaṃkhyatvam626 āhosvid alpabahutvam astīti |  
[From the perspective of] quantity (alpa-bahutva): At this point (atra) one says 
(āha): Is there (kim) a state of having equal numbers (tulya-saṃkhyatva) or is there 
(āhosvit) a state of being little and much (alpa-bahutva) of right worldviews 
(samyag-darśana) existing (vartamāna) in the three (tri) states (bhāva) (iti) (in 
other words, is there a same amount of right worldviews in the three states or not)? 
 
623 According to Tatia, ‘just short of half the time it takes karmic particles to undergo their 
complete course of binding and falling away from the soul’ (Tatia 2011: 11). 
624 In other words, there is always right worldview. 
625 The different states of the soul, including the ‘aupaśamika’ state, are listed in TA 2.1. 





[1.8.42] ucyate | [1.8.43] sarvastokam aupaśamikam | [1.8.44] tataḥ kṣāyikam 
asaṅkhyeyaguṇam |  
It is said (ucyate): [In] the state ‘resulting from the cessation [of karman]’ 
(aupaśamika) [it is] the smallest of all (sarva-stoka). From that (tatas), [it is 
multiplied by] an innumerable number (asaṅkhyeya-guṇa) [in] the state resulting 
from the annihilation [of karman] (kṣāyika). 
[1.8.45] tato ’pi kṣāyopaśamikam asaṅkhyeyaguṇam | [1.8.46] samyagdṛṣṭayas 
tv anantaguṇā iti ||  
Again (api) from that (tatas), [it is multiplied by] an innumerable number 
(asaṅkhyeya-guṇa) [in] the state resulting from the annihilation and cessation [of 
karman] (kṣāya-upaśamika). But (tu) right insights (samyag-dṛṣṭi) [are multiplied by] 
an endless number (ananta-guṇa). 
[1.8.47] evaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nāmādibhir nyāsaṃ kṛtvā pramāṇādibhir 
abhigamaḥ kāryaḥ ||  
Thus (evam), having done (kṛtvā) the analysis (nyāsa) by name etc. (nāma-ādi) of all 
states (sarva-bhāva), the study (abhigama) by the means of cognition etc. (pramāṇa-
ādi) [is] to be done (kārya).  
[1.8.48] uktaṃ samyagdarśanam | [1.8.49] jñānaṃ vakṣyāmaḥ | 
Right worldview (samyag-darśana) [has been] discussed (ukta). [Now] we will 
explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) knowledge (jñāna). 
 
matiśrutāvadhimanaḥparyāyakevalāni jñānam ||1.9|| 
1.9 [The varieties of] knowledge (jñāna) [are]: 
i. ordinary cognition (mati) 
ii. testimony (śruta) 
iii. cosmic perception627 (avadhi) 
iv. mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya),628 [and] 
v. absolute [knowledge]629 (kevala). 
 
627 This term is often translated as ‘clairvoyance’ (e.g., Soni 2000). Literally, the term ‘avadhi’ 
means ‘limit’, which might refer to the range of this variety of knowledge, which consists of 
all extended substance up to the limits of the cosmos (see also TABh 1.26.6 – 1.26.16). 
628 This term is often translated as ‘mind-reading’ (e.g., Tatia 2011). However, ‘mind-reading’ 
usually refers to telepathy, i.e., reading other people’s mind. As will be explained in TA 1.29, 
manaḥparyāya should not be interpreted as telepathy. Sanghvi explains that 
manaḥparyāyajñāna apprehends the shapes or modes (paryāya) that the mind (manas) 






[1.9.1] matijñānaṃ śrutajñānaṃ avadhijñānaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ 
kevalajñānam ity etat mūlavidhānataḥ pañcavidham jñānam | [1.9.2] 
prabhedās tv asya purastād vakṣyante || 
Knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna), knowledge from testimony (śruta-
jñāna), knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna), knowledge from mental 
perception (manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) [and] absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) (iti) — 
thus (etad), knowledge (jñāna) [is] fivefold (pañcavidha) according to the basic 
classification (mūla-vidhāna). And (tu) the varieties (prabheda) of this (idam) will be 
explained (vakṣyante) later on (purastāt). 
 
tat pramāṇe ||1.10|| 
1.10 These [five varieties of knowledge are] the two means of cognition 
(pramāṇa).630 
 
[1.10.1] tad etat pañcavidham api jñānaṃ dve pramāṇe bhavataḥ parokṣaṃ 
pratyakṣaṃ ca || 
That very (tad etad) full (api)631 fivefold (pañcavidha) knowledge (jñāna) [is] the 
two (dvi) means of cognition (pramāṇa), being (bhavataḥ) indirect cognition 
(parokṣa) and (ca) direct cognition (pratyakṣa). 
 
ādye parokṣam ||1.11|| 




629 Often translated as ‘omniscience’ (e.g., Soni 2000). A person who acquires absolute 
knowledge (i.e., a kevalin) will attain liberation at the end of their life (Wiley 2004: 123). 
630 For a discussion of this sūtra, see § 3.2 Classification of the means of cognition.  
631 ‘Putting api after a cardinal expresses the completeness of the number’ (Speijer 1886, 
§ 298). 





[1.11.1] ādau bhavam ādyam | [1.11.2] ādye sūtrakramaprāmāṇyāt 
prathamadvitīye śāsti | [1.11.3] tad evam ādye matijñānaśrutajñāne parokṣaṃ 
pramāṇaṃ bhavataḥ |  
[That] which is (bhava) at the beginning (ādi), that is [the meaning of] ‘first’ (ādya). 
‘The first [two]’ (ādya, du.) — [The author] teaches633 (i.e., he refers to) (śāsti) the 
first and the second [variety of knowledge] (prathama-dvitīya), following the 
authoritativeness of the order in the sūtra (see TA 1.9) (sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya); 
according to that (tad evam), the first two (ādya), [i.e.], knowledge from ordinary 
cognition and knowledge from testimony (mati-jñāna-śruta-jñāna), are (bhavataḥ) 
indirect (parokṣa) means of cognition (pramāṇa). 
[1.11.4] kutaḥ | [1.11.5] nimittāpekṣatvāt | [1.11.6] apāyasaddravyatayā 
matijñānam | [1.11.7] tad indriyānindriyanimittam iti vakṣyate ||  
Why (kutas)? Due to the quality of being dependent on a cause (nimitta-apekṣatva); 
ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna) [arises] from existent substance [through] 
elimination (apāya-sad-dravyatā)634. It will be said (see TA 1.14) (vakṣyate) [that] 
‘this [ordinary cognition] (tad) [is] caused by the organs of sense [and] the mind 
(indriya-anindriya-nimitta).’ 
[1.11.8] tatpūrvakatvāt paropadeśajatvāc ca śrutajñānam || 
Knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) [is an indirect means of cognition] due to 
the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., since knowledge from testimony is 
preceded by ordinary cognition)635 (tat-pūrvakatva), and (ca) due to the quality of 
being caused by the instruction of others (para-upadeśajatva). 
 
pratyakṣam anyat ||1.12|| 




633 The verb form ‘śāsti’ suggests that the author of the bhāṣya did not compose the sūtra. 
Siddhasenagaṇi comments on this issue and acknowledges that this is a problem. 
Nevertheless, he maintains that both texts are composed by the same person. 
634 The same expression occurs in TABh 1.8.23 and TABh 1.31.16. 





[1.12.1] matiśrutābhyāṃ yad anyat trividhaṃ jñānaṃ tat pratyakṣaṃ 
pramāṇaṃ bhavati |  
The threefold (trividha) knowledge (jñāna) that [is] different (yad anyat) from 
ordinary cognition and testimony (mati-śruta),636 that (tad) is (bhavati) direct 
(pratyakṣa) cognition (pramāṇa). 
[1.12.2] kutaḥ | [1.12.3] atīndriyatvāt |  
Why (kutas)? Due to the quality of being beyond [the cognisance] of the senses 
(atīndriyatva).  
[1.12.4] pramīyante ’rthās tair iti pramāṇāni ||  
Since (iti) the objects (artha) are cognised (pramīyante) through them (tad), [they 
are called] ‘means of cognition’ (pramāṇa). 
[1.12.5] atrāha | [1.12.6] iha avadhāritaṃ dve eva pramāṇe pratyakṣaparokṣe 
iti | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Here (iha) [it is] determined (avadhārita) [that] 
the means of cognition (pramāṇa) [are] indeed (eva) two (dvi), [i.e.], direct and 
indirect cognition (pratyakṣa-parokṣa) (iti). 
[1.12.7] anumānopamānāgamārthāpattisambhavābhāvān api pramāṇāni iti 
kecit manyante | [1.12.8] tat katham etad iti | 
Some [people] (kecid) are of the opinion (manyante) [that] (iti) inference, 
comparison, verbal testimony, postulation, equivalence, [and] negation (anumāna-
upamāna-āgama-arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva) [are] also (api) means of cognition 
(pramāṇa).637 How (katham), then (tad), [can] this (etad) [be explained] (iti)? 
[1.12.9] atrocyate | [1.12.10] sarvāṇy etāni matiśrutayor antarbhūtāni, 
indriyārthasannikarṣanimittatvāt | [1.12.11] kiṃ cānyat | 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): All (sarva) these (etad) are within (antarbhūta) 
ordinary cognition and testimony (mati-śruta), due to the quality of being caused by 
the connection of the object with the sense organ (indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-
nimittatva)638. Further (kiṃ cānyat): 
 
636 I.e., avadhi, manaḥparyāya, and kevala (see TA 1.9). 
637 This is a peculiar list, which does not correspond to a known list of pramāṇas that were 
accepted by a specific school. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 Other means of 
cognition. 
638 The term ‘saṃnikarṣa’ refers to ‘the connection of an indriya with its viṣaya or 
object’ (MW). This term plays an important role in the epistemology of the Naiyāyikas. For a 
discussion of this term and the relationship between the theory in the TA and the Nyāyasūtra, 





[1.12.12] apramāṇāny eva vā | [1.12.13] kutaḥ | [1.12.14] mithyādarśana-
parigrahāt viparītopadeśāc ca | 
Or, (vā) [they are] indeed (eva) not means of cognition (apramāṇa). Why (kutas)? 
[Since this results] from the adoption of wrong view (mithyā-darśana-parigraha) 
and (ca) from false teaching (viparīta-upadeśa). 
[1.12.15] mithyādṛṣṭer hi matiśrutāvadhayo niyatam ajñānam eveti vakṣyate |  
Since (hi), it will be said (TA 1.32) (vakṣyate) [that] ordinary cognition, testimony 
[and] cosmic perception (mati-śruta-avadhi) [are] certainly (niyata) false knowledge 
(ajñāna) for someone who has wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi). 
[1.12.16] nayavādāntareṇa tu yathā matiśrutavikalpajāni bhavanti tathā 
parastād vakṣyāmaḥ || 
And (tu), in accordance with the doctrine of perspectives (naya-vāda-antareṇa), we 
will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) later on (parastāt) [that] they are (bhavanti) born from the 
varieties of ordinary cognition and testimony (mati-śruta-vikalpaja). 
[1.12.17] atrāha | [1.12.18] uktaṃ bhavatā matyādīni jñānāni uddiśya tāni 
vidhānato lakṣaṇataś ca purastād vistareṇa vakṣyāma iti | [1.12.19] tad 
ucyatām iti | [1.12.20] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (bhavat) [that] 
‘after having taught (uddiśya) the knowledges (jñāna), beginning with ordinary 
cognition (mati-ādi), we will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) them (tad) below (purastāt) in 
detail (vistareṇa) based on [their] characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa) and (ca) classification 
(vidhāna)’ (see TABh 1.9.2) (iti). That (tad) should [now] be taught (ucyatām) (iti). 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
matiḥ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram ||1.13|| 
1.13 ‘Ordinary cognition’ (mati), ‘remembrance’ (smṛti), ‘recognition’ (saṃjñā), 
‘thought’ (cintā) [and] ‘apprehension’639 (abhinibodha) — [these are] not different 
(i.e., they are synonyms) (anārthantara). 
 
 
639 The primary meaning of the unusual word ‘abhinibodha’ is not given in the standard 
dictionaries. The bhāṣya on this sūtra uses a slightly different form of the word, i.e. 
‘abhinibodhikajñāna’. It is evident that the word is used as a synonym of ‘mati’ (ordinary 
cognition). It is usually translated as ‘apprehension’ (see, e.g., Balcerowicz 2016d: 998), 





[1.13.1] matijñānaṃ smṛtijñānaṃ saṃjñājñānaṃ cintājñānaṃ 
abhinibodhikajñānam ity anarthāntaram || 
‘Knowledge [from] ordinary cognition’ (mati-jñāna), ‘knowledge [from] 
remembrance’ (smṛti-jñāna), ‘knowledge [from] recognition’ (saṃjñā-jñāna), 
‘knowledge [from] thought’ (cintā-jñāna), [and] ‘knowledge [from] apprehension’ 
(abhinibodhika-jñāna) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) 
(anarthāntara). 
 
tad indriyānindriyanimittam ||1.14|| 
1.14 This [ordinary cognition] (tad) [is] caused by the organs of sense [and] the 
mind (indriya-anindriya-nimitta). 
 
[1.14.1] tad etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ bhavati | [1.14.2] indriyanimittam 
anindriyanimittaṃ ca |  
That very (tad etad) ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna) arises (bhavati) in a twofold 
way (dvividha): caused by the organs of sense (indriya-nimitta) and (ca) caused by 
the mind (anindriya-nimitta). 
[1.14.3] tatrendriyanimittaṃ sparśanādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ sparśādiṣu pañcasv 
eva svaviṣayeṣu | [1.14.4] anindriyanimittaṃ manovṛttir oghajñānaṃ ca | 
Among them (tatra), ‘caused by the organs of sense’ (indriya-nimitta) [refers to] the 
respective ranges (svaviṣaya), [which are] indeed (eva) the five [objects of sense] 
(pañca) beginning with the quality of tangibility (sparśa-ādi), which belong to the 
five [senses] (pañca), beginning with the organ of touch (sparśana-ādi). ‘Caused by 




640 Siddhasenagaṇi uses the word ‘sāmānya’ (general, common) to describe this type of 
knowledge, and he compares oghajñāna with the knowledge of a creeper. This is in line with 







1.15 [The phases of ordinary cognition are]:  
i. sense perception (avagraha) 
ii. endeavour to obtain (īhā) 
iii. elimination (apāya),641 [and] 
iv. holding (i.e., keeping in remembrance) (dhāraṇā).642 
 
[1.15.1] tad etat matijñānam ubhayanimittam apy ekaśaḥ caturvidhaṃ 
bhavati | [1.15.2] tadyathā | [1.15.3] avagraha īhā apāyo dhāraṇā ceti |  
That very (tad etad) ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna), even though (api) [it is] caused 
by both (i.e., by the senses and the mind)643 (ubhaya-nimitta), arises (bhavati) in 
every case644 (ekaśas) in a fourfold way (caturvidha). I.e. (tad-yathā), [it arises 
through] sense perception (avagraha), endeavour to obtain (īhā), elimination 
(apāya), and (ca) holding (dhāraṇā) (iti). 
[1.15.4] tatrāvyaktaṃ yathāsvam indriyair viṣayāṇām ālocanāvadhāraṇam 
avagrahaḥ |  
Among them (tatra), sense perception (avagraha) [is] an indistinct (avyakta) 
perceptual ascertainment (ālocana-avadhāraṇa) of the ranges (viṣaya) by the senses 
(indriya), each on their own account (yathāsvam). 
[1.15.5] avagraho grahaṇam ālocanam avadhāraṇam ity anarthāntaram ||  
‘Sense perception’ (avagraha), ‘seizing’ (grahaṇa), ‘perceiving’ (ālocana), [and] 
‘ascertainment’ (avadhāraṇa) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are 
synonyms) (anarthāntara). 
 
641 Sanghvi reads ‘avāya’. He remarks that both readings are possible according to Akalaṅka 
(1974: 4, n. 4). Balcerowicz notes that ‘apāya’ is used in the Śvetāmbara tradition and ‘avāya’ 
in the Digambara tradition (Balcerowicz 2016d: 1001). 
642 My translations of the technical terms in this sūtra are based on the explanation in the 
bhāṣya (TABh 1.15.1 – 1.15.11).  
643 See TABh 1.14.1. 
644 I.e., in the case of the five varieties of ordinary cognition that are caused by the senses and 





[1.15.6] avagṛhīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc cheṣānugamanaṃ niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā645 
īhā |  
Seeking the remainder (śeṣa-anugamana) on the basis of a part of the objects 
[within one’s] range (viṣaya-artha-ekadeśa) in the case of that which is perceived 
(avagṛhīta), [or] the desire to know the particularities [by] inquiry (niścaya-viśeṣa-
jijñāsā), [that is] the ‘endeavour to obtain’ (īhā). 
[1.15.7] īhā ūhā tarkaḥ parīkṣā vicāraṇā jijñāsety anarthāntaram ||  
‘Endeavour to obtain’ (īhā), ‘comprehending’ (ūhā), ‘reasoning’ (tarka), 
‘investigation’ (parīkṣā), ‘consideration’ (vicāraṇā), [and] ‘desire to know’ (jijñāsā) 
(iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (anarthāntara). 
[1.15.8] avagṛhīte viṣaye samyagasamyag iti guṇadoṣavicāraṇā 
adhyavasāyāpanodo ’pāyaḥ |  
[Making] a distinction [between] merits and defects (guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā) [by telling] 
(iti) ‘right’ from ‘wrong’ (samyag-asamyañc) (iti) with respect to the perceived 
(avagṛhīta) range646 (viṣaya) — [that is] elimination (apāya), [which] removes mere 
opinion647 (adhyavasāya-apanoda). 
[1.15.9] apāyo ’pagamaḥ apanodaḥ apavyādhaḥ apetam apagatam apaviddham 
apanuttam ity anarthāntaram ||  
‘Elimination’ (apāya), ‘going away’ (apagama), ‘removing’ (apanoda), ‘driving away’ 
(apavyādha), ‘gone’ (apeta), ‘departed’ (apagata), ‘rejected’ (apaviddha), ‘removed’ 
(apanutta) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) 
(anarthāntaram).648 
[1.15.10] dhāraṇā pratipattir yathāsvaṃ matyavasthānam avadhāraṇaṃ ca |  
‘Holding’ (dhāraṇā) [means] ‘ascertainment’ (pratipatti), ‘properly649 (yathāsvam) 
holding [in] the mind’ (maty-avasthāna), and (ca) ‘retaining’ (avadhāraṇa). 
 
645 Kapadia reads ‘niścayaviśeṣajijñāsā ceṣṭā īhā’. The word ‘ceṣṭā’ can be translated as 
‘activity’, or ‘endeavour’ (MW). Alternatively, it can be analysed as ‘ca + iṣṭa (desired)’. 
Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘ceṣṭā’ as ‘activity’. 
646 See also TABh 1.15.6. 
647 ‘blosse Meinung’ (adhyavasāya) (Böhtlingk 1855). 
648 It is somewhat strange that this list of synonyms contains active and passive word forms 
(apāya, apagama, apanoda, and apavyādha vs. apeta, apagata, apaviddha, and apanutta). 
649 ‘yathāsvam’ can also mean ‘each on their own account’ (MW). Siddhasenagaṇi explains 





[1.15.11] dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇāvasthānaṃ niścayo ’vagamaḥ 
avabodha ity anarthāntaram || 
‘Holding’ (dhāraṇā), ‘assurance’ (pratipatti), ‘the condition of retaining’ 
(avadhāraṇa-avasthāna), ‘inquiry’ (niścaya), ‘understanding’ (avagama), [and] 
‘knowledge’ (avabodha) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) 
(anarthāntara). 
 
bahubahuvidhakṣiprāniśritānukta650dhruvāṇāṃ setarāṇām ||1.16|| 
1.16 [The objects of ordinary cognition appear as] much (bahu), of many sorts 
(bahuvidha), swift (kṣipra), independent (aniśrita), non-verbal651 (anukta) [and] 
constant (dhruva), together with [their] opposites (setara). 
 
[1.16.1] avagrahādayaś catvāro matijñānavibhāgā eṣāṃ bahvādīnām 
arthānāṃ setarāṇāṃ bhavanty ekaśaḥ |  
The four (catūr) varieties of ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-vibhāga) — [i.e.], sense 
perception etc.652 (avagraha-ādi) — exist (bhavanti) for these (idam) objects (artha), 
beginning with much (bahv-ādi), together with [their] opposites (sa-itara), in every 
case (ekaśas).653 
[1.16.2] setarāṇām iti | [1.16.3] sapratipakṣāṇām ity arthaḥ | 
Together with [their] opposites (setara) (iti) — the meaning is (iti artha) ‘with that 
which is opposite’ (sa-pratipakṣa). 
[1.16.4] bahv avagṛhṇāti alpam avagṛhṇāti |  
One perceives (avagṛhṇāti) much654 (bahu) [and] one perceives little (alpa).  
[1.16.5] bahuvidham avagṛhṇāti ekavidham avagṛhṇāti |  
One perceives [something] of many sorts (bahuvidha) [and] one perceives 
[something] of one sort (ekavidha). 
[1.16.6] kṣipram avagṛhṇāti cireṇāvagṛhṇāti |  
One perceives [something] swift (kṣipra) [and] one perceives [something] for a long 
time (cireṇa). 
 
650 Kapadia reads ‘niśritāsandigdhadhruvāṇāṃ’ (‘independent, unambiguous, constant’). 
The reading of Mody corresponds to the reading in the Sarvārthasiddhi. 
651 Literally ‘unspoken’. 
652 See TA 1.15. 
653 In other words, there is avagraha, īhā etc. of the objects that are much, of many sorts etc. 
654 The word bahu seems to have an adverbial function. The same goes for kṣipra etc. in the 





[1.16.7] aniśritam avagṛhṇāti niśritam avagṛhṇāti |  
One perceives [something] independent (aniśrita) [and] one perceives [something] 
dependent (niśrita). 
[1.16.8]655 anuktam avagṛhṇāti uktam avagṛhṇāti |  
One perceives [something] non-verbal (anukta) [and] one perceives [something that 
is] spoken (ukta). 
[1.16.9] dhruvam avagṛhṇāti adhruvam avagṛhṇāti |  
One perceives [something] constant (dhruva) [and] one perceives [something] 
impermanent (adhruva). 
[1.16.10] ity evam īhādīnām api vidyāt || 
In the same way (ity evam), one should also know (api vidyāt) [these varieties] of 
‘the endeavour to obtain’ etc. (see TA 1.15) (īhā-ādi). 
 
arthasya ||1.17|| 
1.17 [There is ordinary cognition]656 of the sense object (artha). 
 
[1.17.1] avagrahādayo matijñānavikalpā arthasya bhavanti || 
The varieties of ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-vikalpa), beginning with sense 
perception (avagraha-ādi), are (bhavanti) of a sense object (artha).657 
 
vyañjanasyāvagrahaḥ ||1.18|| 
1.18 [There is] sense perception (avagraha) of the vyañjana658. 
 
[1.18.1] vyañjanasyāvagraha eva bhavati nehādayaḥ |  
There is (bhavati) indeed (eva) sense perception (avagraha) of the vyañjana, not ‘the 
endeavour to obtain’ etc. (na īhā-ādi).  
 
655 Omitted by Kapadia. See Mody 1903: 28, footnote 3.  
656 It is somewhat strange that ‘artha’ is given in singular since the qualifications of the sense 
object in the previous sūtra are given in plural (TA 1.16). It is also possible that TA 1.17 
should be read together with TA 1.18. For a discussion of this possibility, see § 3.2 Ordinary 
cognition. 
657 In other words, the sense objects are the object of ordinary cognition. 
658 The peculiar term ‘vyañjana’ seems to refer to the physical contact of a sense organ with 
its object. Tatia translates the term ‘vyañjanāvagraha’ as ‘contact-awareness’ (Tatia 1951:35). 





[1.18.2] evaṃ dvividho ’vagraho vyañjanasyārthasya ca | [1.18.3] īhādayas tv 
arthasyaiva || 
Thus (evam), sense perception (avagraha) [is] twofold (dvividha), [i.e.], of the 
vyañjana and (ca) of the sense object (artha). But (tu) ‘the endeavour to obtain’ etc. 
(īhā-ādi) [is] only (eva) of the sense object (artha). 
 
na cakṣuranindriyābhyām ||1.19|| 
1.19 [There is] no [sense perception of the vyañjana]659 by the eyes (cakṣus) or the 
mind (anindriya). 
  
[1.19.1] cakṣuṣā noindriyeṇa ca vyañjanāvagraho na bhavati | [1.19.2] caturbhir 
indriyaiḥ śeśair bhavati |  
There is no (na bhavati) sense perception (avagraha) of the vyañjana by the eye 
(cakṣus) and (ca) the mind (noindriya) 660; [however] there is (bhavati) [sense 
perception of the vyañjana] by the four (catur) other (śeśa) senses (indriya).661  
[1.19.3] evam etat matijñānaṃ dvividhaṃ caturvidham aṣṭāviṃśatividham 
aṣṭaṣaṣṭyuttaraśatavidhaṃ ṣaṭtriṃśattriśatavidhaṃ ca bhavati || 
So (evam), this (etad) ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna) is (bhavati) twofold 
(dvividha), fourfold (caturvidha), 28-fold (aṣṭāviṃśatividha), 168-fold (aṣṭaṣaṣṭy-
uttaraśatavidha) and (ca) 336-fold (ṣaṭtriṃśattriśatavidha).662  
 
śrutaṃ matipūrvaṃ dvyanekadvādaśabhedam ||1.20|| 
1.20 Testimony (śruta) is preceded by ordinary cognition (mati). [It consists of] two 
[varieties], the many [outer limbs] and the twelve [inner limbs].663  
 
 
659 See TA 1.18. 
660 It is remarkable that the bhāṣya uses the word ‘noindriya’ instead of ‘anindriya’, which is 
used in the sūtra. For a discussion of the peculiar word formation ‘noindriya’, see 
§ 3.2 Ordinary cognition.  
661 An overview of this theory is given in § 3.2, table viii. Types of ordinary cognition that have 
vyañjanāvagraha and ix. Objects of the different phases of ordinary cognition. 
662 See § 3.2, table x. (Varieties of ordinary cognition) for a clarification of these numbers. 
663 The ‘inner limbs’ (aṅgapraviṣṭa) and ‘outer limbs’ (aṅgabāhya) refer to specific textual 






[1.20.1] śrutajñānaṃ matijñānapūrvakaṃ bhavati |  
Knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) is (bhavati) preceded by knowledge from 
ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-pūrvaka).  
[1.20.2] śrutam āptavacanaṃ āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanaṃ 
jinavacanam ity anarthāntaram || 
‘Testimony’ (śruta), ‘the words of the āpta’ (āpta-vacana), ‘scriptural tradition’ 
(āgama), ‘teaching’ (upadeśa), ‘tradition’ (aitihya), ‘sacred tradition’ (āmnāya), 
‘sacred writings’ (pravacana), [and] ‘the words of the jina’ (jina-vacana) (iti) — 
[these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (anarthāntara). 
[1.20.3] tad dvividham aṅgabāhyam aṅgapraviṣṭaṃ ca | [1.20.4] tat punar 
anekavidhaṃ dvādaśavidhaṃ ca yathā saṅkhyam |  
That (i.e., testimony) (tad) [is] twofold (dvividha), [i.e.], the [corpus of] outer limbs 
(aṅga-bāhya)664 and (ca) the [corpus of] inner limbs (aṅga-praviṣṭa). That (tad) [is] 
again (punar) manifold (anekavidha) and (ca) twelvefold (dvādaśavidha), according 
to (yathā) numbering (saṅkhya).665 
[1.20.5] aṅgabāhyam anekavidham | [1.20.6] tadyathā | [1.20.7] sāmāyikaṃ 
caturviṃśatistavo vandanaṃ prati-kramaṇaṃ kāyavyutsargaḥ pratyākhyānaṃ 
daśavaikālikaṃ uttarādhyāyāḥ daśāḥ kalpavyavahārau niśītham ṛṣibhāṣitāny 
evam ādi ||  













xii. Ṛṣibhāṣitāni, etc. (evam ādi).666 
 
664 Alternatively, ‘that which is outside the limbs’, i.e., ‘non-canonical’. 
665 For an overview of these texts, see § 3.2, table xi. Testimonial knowledge: The Jaina 
scriptures. 





 [1.20.8] aṅgapraviṣṭaṃ dvādaśavidham | [1.20.9] tadyathā | [1.20.10] ācāraḥ 
sūtrakṛtaṃ sthānaṃ samavāya vyākhyāprajñaptiḥ jñātadharmikathā 
upāsakādhyayanadaśāḥ antakṛddaśāḥ anuttaraupapātikadaśāḥ praśna-
vyākaraṇaṃ vipākasūtraṃ dṛṣṭipāta iti ||  
The [corpus of] inner limbs (aṅga-praviṣṭa) [is] twelvefold (dvādaśavidha). 












xii. Dṛṣṭipāta.  
[1.20.11] atrāha | [1.20.12] matijñānaśrutajñānayoḥ kaḥ prativiśeṣa iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): What (kim) [is] the difference (prativiśeṣa) 
between knowledge from ordinary cognition and knowledge from testimony (mati-
jñāna-śruta-jñāna) (iti)? 
[1.20.13] atrocyate | [1.20.14] utpannāvinaṣṭārthagrāhakaṃ sāmpratakāla-
viṣayaṃ matijñānam | [1.20.15] śrutajñānaṃ tu trikālaviṣayam utpanna-
vinaṣṭānutpannārthagrāhakam ||  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): That which perceives objects [that have been] 
produced [and are] not [yet] destroyed (utpanna-avinaṣṭa-artha-grāhaka), having 
the present time as its range (sāmprata-kāla-viṣaya), [that is] knowledge from 
ordinary cognition (matijñāna); but (tu) knowledge from testimony (śrutajñāna) has 
the three times as its range (trikāla-viṣaya) [and] perceives objects [that have been] 
produced, [that are] destroyed [and are] not [yet] produced (i.e., objects in the past, 
present and future) (utpanna-vinaṣṭa-anutpanna-artha-grāhaka). 
[1.20.16] atrāha | [1.20.17] gṛhṇīmo matiśrutayor nānātvam | [1.20.18] atha 
śrutajñānasya dvividham anekadvādaśavidham iti kiṃ kṛtaḥ prativiśeṣa iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): We understand (gṛhṇīmaḥ) the difference 
(nānātva) between ordinary cognition and testimony (mati-śruta). Now (atha), why 
(kim) [has one] made (kṛta) a difference (prativiśeṣa) [between] the twofold 
(dvividha), manifold, [and] twelvefold (aneka-dvādaśavidha) 667  [varieties] of 
knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) (iti)? 
 





[1.20.19] atrocyate | [1.20.20] vaktṛviśeṣād dvaividhyam |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): The twofold nature (dvaividhya) [results] from 
the difference of speaker (vaktṛ-viśeṣa). 
[1.20.21] yad bhagavadbhiḥ sarvajñaiḥ sarvadarśibhiḥ paramarṣibhir 
arhadbhis tatsvābhāvyāt paramaśubhasya ca pravacanapratiṣṭhāpana-
phalasya tīrthakaranāmakarmaṇo ’nubhāvād uktaṃ bhagavacchiṣyair 
atiśayavadbhir uttamātiśayavāgbuddhisampannair gaṇadharair dṛbdhaṃ tad 
aṅgapraviṣṭam |  
That which (yad) has been spoken (ukta) by the jinas (bhagavat) —  
[who are] the all-knowing (sarva-jña) [and] all-seeing (sarva-darśin) most 
excellent sages (parama-rṣi), the arhats,668 on account of the experience 
(anubhāva) of body-determining karman [related to] the tīrthakara 
(tīrthakara-nāma-karman)669 — which is very positive (parama-śubha) [and] 
the result of which is the establishing of the doctrine (pravacana-
pratiṣṭhāpana-phala) — [and] on account of their own nature (tat-
svābhāvya) — 
[which has been] composed (dṛbdha) by the pupils of the jinas (bhagavat-śiṣya) —  
[who are] the gaṇadharas, having supernatural qualities (atiśayavat),670 
provided with the most eminent speech and mind (uttama-atiśaya-vāg-
buddhi-sampanna) — 
that (tad) [is the corpus] of inner limbs (aṅga-praviṣṭa). 
[1.20.22] gaṇadharānantaryādibhis tv atyantaviśuddhāgamaiḥ parama-
prakṛṣṭavāṅmatibuddhiśaktibhir ācāryaiḥ kālasaṃhananāyurdoṣād alpa-
śaktīnāṃ śiṣyāṇām anugrahāya yat proktaṃ tad aṅgabāhyam iti ||  
And (tu) that which (yad) [is] taught (prokta) by the succession of gaṇadharas etc. 
(gaṇadhara-ānantarya-ādi)671 — 
[who are] the teachers (ācārya), [whose] verbal testimonies [are] 
excessively pure (atyanta-viśuddha-āgama), [whose] powers of speech, 
ordinary cognition and mind [are] most superior (parama-prakṛṣṭa-vāc-
mati-buddhi-śakti) — 
 
668 The terms ‘paramarṣi’ and ‘arhat’ refer to the jina.  
669 This type of karman is listed in TA 8.12. 
670 The word ‘atiśaya’ refers to ‘one of the superhuman qualities attributed to Jaina Arhats’ 
(MW). 
671 Siddhasenagaṇi mentions Jambū as an example. He was the pupil of the gaṇadhara 





for the benefit (anugraha) of the pupils (śiṣya) — 
[whose] power is little (alpaśakti) through defect brought about by time, 
physical structure [and] vital power (kāla-saṃhanana-āyur-doṣa) — 
that (tad) [is the corpus of] outer limbs (aṅgabāhya) (iti). 
[1.20.23] sarvajñapraṇītatvād ānantyāc ca jñeyasya śrutajñānaṃ matijñānān 
mahāviṣayam |  
Knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna), [due to] the quality of being conveyed by 
the all-knowing [beings] (sarvajña-praṇītatva) and (ca) [due to] the infinity 
(ānantya) of [that what is] to be known (jñeya), [has] a greater range (mahā-viṣaya) 
[than] knowledge by ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna). 
[1.20.24] tasya mahāviṣayatvāt tāṃs tān arthān adhikṛtya 
prakaraṇasamāptyapekṣam aṅgopāṅganānātvam |  
And (ca) [there is] a variety of ‘limbs’ and ‘additional limbs’672 (aṅga-upāṅga-
nānātva) — whose reference is the complete acquisition of the subjects (prakaraṇa-
samāpty-apekṣā), referring to (adhikṛtya) the various (tad tad) objects (artha) — 
due to the quality of having a great range (mahāviṣayatva) of this (i.e., of testimony) 
(tad).  
[1.20.25] kiṃ cānyat | [1.20.26] sukhagrahaṇavijñānāpohaprayogārthaṃ ca |  
Moreover (kiṃ cānyat), [there is] also (ca) [a variety of scriptures] for the sake of 
(artha) easy understanding (sukha-grahaṇa), [easy]673 comprehending (vijñāna), 
[easy] reasoning (apoha), and [easy] operation of consciousness (prayoga).674  
[1.20.27] anyathā hy anibaddham aṅgopāṅgaśaḥ samudraprataraṇavad-
duradhyavasānaṃ syāt |  
For (hi), otherwise (anyathā), it would be (syāt) a difficult task (dur-adhyavasāna), 
like crossing the ocean (samudra-prataraṇavat), unattached (anibaddha) to the 
limbs and additional limbs (i.e., without arms and legs) (aṅga-upāṅga). 675 
 
672 The terms ‘aṅga’ and ‘upāṅga’ refer to the inner and outer corpus, which are mentioned 
previously (see TABh 1.20.3). 
673 Siddhasenagaṇi explains that ‘sukha’ qualifies all other elements in the compound. This 
interpretation is in line with the next sentence.  
674 Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘prayoga’ as ‘prayoga-vyāpāra’. The exact meaning of this term is 
unclear to me. 
675 In other words, mastering the different subjects without the help of the scriptures would 
be nearly impossible, just as crossing the ocean. The expression ‘anibaddham aṅgopāṅgaśaḥ’ 





[1.20.28] etena pūrvāṇi vastūni prābhṛtāni prābhṛtaprābhṛtāni adhyayanāny 
uddeśāś ca vyākhyātāḥ ||  
By this 676  (etad), the pūrvas 677 , subjects (vastu), chapters 678  (prābhṛta), 
subdivisions 679  (prābhṛta-prābhṛta), readings (adhyayana), and (ca) brief 
statements (uddeśa), are fully explained (vyākhyāta).680 
[1.20.29] atrāha | [1.20.30] matiśrutayos tulyaviṣayatvaṃ vakṣyati | [1.20.31] 
dravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu iti | [1.20.32] tasmād ekatvam evāstv iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [There is] the quality of being of equal range 
(tulya-viṣayatva) of ordinary cognition and testimony (mati-śruta),681 [since the 
author of the sūtra] will say (vakṣyati)682 that ‘[the domain of ordinary cognition and 
testimony extends] to [all] substances (dravya) [but] not in all modes (a-sarva-
paryāya)’ (iti) (see TA 1.27). Therefore (tasmāt), there must indeed (eva) be (astu) 
the quality of being one (i.e., ordinary cognition and testimony must have the same 
range) (ekatva) (iti). 
[1.20.33] atrocyate | [1.20.34] uktam etat sāmpratakālaviṣayaṃ matijñānaṃ 
śrutajñānaṃ tu trikālaviṣayaṃ viśuddhataraṃ ceti |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): [It has been] said (ukta) [that] this (etad) 
‘knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna) [has] the present time as its range 
(sāmprata-kāla-viṣaya) but (tu) [that] knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) has 
the three times as its range (trikāla-viṣaya)’ (see TABh 1.20.15) and (ca) [that 
knowledge from testimony is] purer (viśuddhatara) (iti).  
 
676 I.e., the limbs (aṅga) and additional limbs (upāṅga) (see TABh 1.20.27). 
677 The term ‘pūrva’ is used in the Jaina tradition with reference to a collection of 14 extinct 
scriptures, which are supposed to contain the oldest teachings of the tīrthaṅkaras (see, e.g., 
Wiley 2004: 176). 
678 The term ‘prābhṛta’ can be used to refer to the chapters of a work (MW). It is also a type 
of texts in the Digambara tradition (see also TABh 1.5.21). However, since the term is 
followed by the term ‘prābhṛtaprābhṛta’, it is more likely that the intended meaning is 
‘chapter’. 
679 The word ‘prābhṛtaprābhṛta’ can be used with reference to subdivisions of chapters 
(MW). 
680  The precise reference of the different terms in this passage is unclear to me. 
Siddhasenagaṇi interprets the terms that follow ‘pūrvāṇi’ as increasingly smaller 
subdivisions of the pūrvas. 
681 In other words, ordinary cognition and testimony have the same range. This is an 
objection to TABh 1.20.15, which says that testimony has a greater range than ordinary 
cognition. 
682 It is remarkable that that the questioner in the bhāṣya refers to a sūtra (TA 1.27) that has 





[1.20.35] kiṃ cānyat | [1.20.36] matijñānam indriyānindriyanimittam ātmano 
jñasvabhāvyāt pāriṇāmikaṃ | [1.20.37] śrutajñānaṃ tu tatpūrvakam 
āptopadeśād bhavatīti || 
Moreover (kiṃ cānyat): Knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna) [is] caused 
by the senses and the mind (indriya-anindriya-nimitta), resulting from a natural 
disposition (pāriṇāmika) due to the own nature of knowing (jña-svabhāvya) of the 
self (ātman) (i.e., since knowing is the essence of the self); but (tu) knowledge from 
testimony (śruta-jñāna), [which is] preceded by that (tat-pūrvaka), arises (bhavati) 
from the teaching of the āptas (āpta-upadeśa) (iti). 
[1.20.38] atrāha | [1.20.39] uktaṃ śrutajñānam | [1.20.40] athāvadhijñānaṃ kim 
iti | [1.20.41] atrocyate || 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) [has 
now been] discussed (ukta). Now (atha), what (kim) [is] knowledge from cosmic 
perception (avadhi-jñāna) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
dvividho ’vadhiḥ ||1.21|| 
1.21683 Cosmic perception (avadhi) [has] two varieties (dvividha).  
 
[1.21.1] bhavapratyayaḥ kṣayopaśamanimittaś ca || tatra 
[The two varieties of cosmic perception are]: [cosmic perception that] originates in 
birth (see TA 1.22) (bhava-pratyaya), and (ca) [cosmic perception that is] caused by 
the destruction [and] cessation [of karman] (kṣaya-upaśama-nimitta). Among them 
(tatra): 
 
bhavapratyayo nārakadevānām ||1.22|| 
1.22 (SS 1.21) Hellish beings and gods [have cosmic perception that is] caused by 
birth (bhava-pratyaya). 
 
[1.22.1] nārakāṇāṃ devānāṃ ca yathāsvaṃ bhavapratyayam avadhijñānaṃ 
bhavati |  
There is (bhavati) knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna) caused by 
birth (bhava-pratyaya) for hellish beings (nāraka) and (ca) gods (deva), in their own 
way (yathāsvam). 
 





[1.22.2] bhavapratyayaṃ bhavahetukaṃ bhavanimittam ity arthaḥ |  
‘Caused by birth’ (bhava-pratyaya): The meaning [is] (iti artha) ‘effected by birth 
(bhava-hetu) [or] dependent on birth’ (bhava-nimitta).  
[1.22.3] teṣāṃ hi bhavotpattir eva tasya hetur bhavati pakṣiṇām 
ākāśagamanavat na śikṣā na tapa iti || 
Since (hi) the cause (hetu) of it (i.e., of cosmic perception) (tad) is (bhavati) indeed 
(eva) produced as a consequence of birth (bhava-utpatti) for them (tad), like flying 
(ākāśa-gamanavat) for birds (pakṣin), [it arises] without learning (na śikṣā) [and] 
without austerity (na tapa) (iti). 
 
yathoktanimittaḥ ṣaḍvikalpaḥ śeṣāṇām ||1.23||  
1.23 (SS 1.22) The other [beings] (śeṣa) [have cosmic perception] that is caused 
(nimitta) as it is said (see TABh 1.21.1) (yathā-ukta).684 [This variety of cosmic 
perception has] six forms (ṣaḍ-vikalpa). 
 
[1.23.1] yathoktanimittaḥ kṣayopaśamanimitta ity arthaḥ | [1.23.2] tad etad 
avadhijñānaṃ kṣayopaśamanimittaṃ ṣaḍvidhaṃ bhavati śeṣāṇām685 |  
‘Caused as it is said’ (yathā-ukta-nimitta): The meaning [is] (ity artha) ‘caused by the 
destruction [and] cessation [of karman] (see TABh 1.21.1)’ (kṣaya-upaśama-nimitta).  
That very (tad etad) knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna) [that is] 
caused by the destruction [and] cessation [of karman] (kṣaya-upaśama-nimitta) 
exists (bhavati) in a sixfold way (ṣaḍvidha) for the other beings (śeṣa).  
[1.23.3] śeṣāṇām iti nārakadevebhyaḥ śeṣāṇāṃ tiryagyonijānāṃ manuṣyāṇām 
ca |  
‘The other [beings]’ (see TA 1.23) (śeṣa) (iti) [refers to beings] different (śeṣa) from 
hellish beings and gods (nāraka-deva), [beings] born from the wombs of animals 
(tiryañc-yoni-ja) and (ca) human beings (manuṣya). 
 
684 It is remarkable that the sūtra refers to the bhāṣya. For a discussion of this passage, see 
§ 2.3 Is the TABh an auto-commentary. 





[1.23.4] avadhijñānāvaraṇīyasya karmaṇaḥ kṣayopaśamābhyāṃ bhavati 
ṣaḍvidham | [1.23.5] tadyathā | [1.23.6] anānugāmikaṃ ānugāmikaṃ 
hīyamānakaṃ, vardhamānakaṃ anavasthitaṃ avasthitam iti |  
[It] arises (bhavati) from the destruction [and] cessation (kṣaya-upaśama) of 
karman that is covering knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna-
āvaraṇīya), in a sixfold way (ṣaḍvidham). Namely (tad-yathā): 
i. the one that is not following (an-ānugāmika) 
ii. the one that is following (ānugāmika) 
iii. the one that weakens (hīyamānaka) 
iv. the one that increases (vardhamānaka) 
v. the one that is not continuous (an-avasthita), [and] 
vi. the one that is continuous (avasthita) (iti). 
[1.23.7] tatrānānugāmikaṃ yatra kṣetre sthitasyotpannaṃ tataḥ pracyutasya 
pratipatati praśnādeśapuruṣajñānavat ||  
Among them (tatra), [there is] ‘the one that is not following’ (an-ānugāmika) 
whenever (yatra) [cosmic perception that is] produced (utpanna) for [someone who 
is] staying (sthita) in a region (kṣetra) goes away (pratipatati) [when that person is] 
gone away (pracyuta) from that [place] (tatas); like the knowledge of a person 
[when there is a] teaching of a lesson686 (praśna-ādeśa-puruṣa-jñānavat). 
[1.23.8] ānugāmikaṃ yatra kvacid utpannaṃ kṣetrāntaragatasyāpi na 
pratipatati bhāskaraprakāśavat ghaṭaraktabhāvavac ca ||  
[There is] ‘the one that is following’ (ānugāmika), [which can be] produced (utpanna) 
in any place (yatra kvacid) [but] does not go away (na pratipatati) for [that person], 
even when [that person has] gone to another place (kṣetra-antara-gata ... api), like 
the brightness of the sun (bhāskara-prakāśavat) and (ca) like the condition of being 
coloured687 of a jar (ghaṭa-rakta-bhāvavat). 
 
686 The meaning of this simile is unclear to me. Perhaps, it refers to a situation in which 
students are connected with knowledge when they are listening to a teacher but forget about 
the teaching when they leave the class. 





[1.23.9] hīyamānakam asaṃkhyeyeṣu dvīpeṣu samudreṣu pṛthivīṣu vimāneṣu 
tiryag ūrdhvam adho vā yad utpannaṃ kramaśaḥ saṃkṣipyamāṇaṃ 
pratipatati ā aṅgulāsaṃ saṃkhyeyabhāgāt pratipataty eva vā 
paricchinnendhanopādānasaṃtaty agniśikhāvat ||  
[There is] ‘the one that weakens’ (hīyamānaka), which (yad), [after being] produced 
(utpanna) with regard to688 innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) islands (dvīpa), oceans 
(samudra), lands (pṛthivī), vimāna-heavens (vimāna) — horizontal (tiryañc), 
upwards (ūrdhvam), or (vā) below (adhas) — goes away (pratipatati), gradually 
(kramaśas) contracting (saṃkṣipyamāṇa) up to an innumerable part of a finger’s 
breadth (ā aṅgula-asaṅkhyeya-bhāga); or (vā), it goes indeed away (pratipatati eva) 
like a multitude (saṃtati) of fire flames (agni-śikhāvat) [that is] dependent (upādāna) 
on fuel that has diminished (paricchinna-indhana). 
[1.23.10] vardhamānakaṃ yad aṅgulasyāsaṃkhyeyabhāgādiṣūtpannaḥ 
vardhate ā sarvalokāt adharottarāraṇinirmathanotpann689opāttaśuṣkopacīya-
mānādhīyamānendhanarāśyagnivat ||  
[There is] ‘the one that increases’ (vardhamānaka), which (yad) [is] produced 
(utpanna) with regard to an innumerable part etc. (asaṃkhyeya-bhāga-ādi) of a 
finger’s breadth (aṅgula) [and] increases (vardhate) up to the whole world (ā 
sarvalokāt), like a fire (agnivat) from a heap of fuel (indhana-rāśi) [that is] gathered 
(upātta690), dried up (śuṣka), accumulated (upacīyamāna), [and] placed in a fire 
(ādhīyamāna) [that is] risen (utpanna) by rubbing (nirmathana) the lower and 
upper piece of wood [used for kindling fire] (adhara-uttara-araṇi) 691. 
[1.23.11] anavasthitaṃ hīyate vardhate vardhate hīyate ca pratipatati 
cotpadyate ceti punaḥ punar ūrmivat ||  
‘The one that is not continuous’ (anavasthita) diminishes (hīyate) [and] increases 
(vardhate), and (ca), [it] increases [and] (vardhate) diminishes (hīyate) (i.e., it 
fluctuates constantly); and (ca) it goes away (pratipatati) and (ca) is produced 
[again] (utpadyate) (iti), like a wave (ūrmivat) [that is coming and going] again and 
again (punar punar). 
 
688 In other words, the range of this type of cosmic perception includes innumerable islands, 
oceans, etc. 
689 Kapadia reads ‘nirmathanāsannopātta’ (from near hand, āsanna). 
690 ‘contracted fr. upā-datta’ (MW) 
691 The term ‘araṇi’ refers to ‘the piece of wood used for kindling fire by attrition’; ‘generally 






[1.23.12] avasthitaṃ yāvati kṣetre utpannaṃ bhavati tato na pratipataty ā ke-
valaprāpteḥ692 ā bhavakṣayād vā jātyantarasthāyi vā693 bhavati liṅgavat ||23||  
‘The one that is continuous’ (avasthita) is (bhavati) produced (utpanna) in whatever 
(yāvat) region (kṣetra), it does not go away (na pratipatati) from there (tatas) [and] 
it remains (avatiṣṭate) up to the reaching of absolute knowledge (ā kevala-prāpti); 
[it] is (bhavati) either (vā) remaining [till] the next birth (jāti-antara-sthāyin) or (vā) 
up to the termination of [one’s] state (ā bhava-kṣaya), like gender (liṅgavat). 
[1.23.13] uktam avadhijñānam | [1.23.14] manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ vakṣyāmaḥ | 
Knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna) [has now been] discussed (ukta). 
[Next], we will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) knowledge from mental perception (manaḥ-
paryāya-jñāna). 
 
ṛjuvipulamatī manaḥparyāyaḥ ||1.24|| 
1.24 (SS 1.23) Mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya) [has] two [varieties], [i.e.], direct 
perception (ṛju-mati) [and] extensive perception (vipula-mati). 694 
 
[1.24.1] manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ dvividham | [1.24.2] ṛjumatimanaḥparyāya-
jñānam vipulamatimanaḥparyāyajñānaṃ ca ||  
Knowledge from mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) is twofold (dvividha), 
[i.e.], knowledge from direct mental perception (ṛju-mati-manaḥparyāya-jñāna) and 
(ca) knowledge from extensive mental perception (vipula-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-
jñāna). 
[1.24.3] atrāha | [1.24.5] ko ’nayoḥ prativiśeṣa iti | [1.24.6] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): What (kim) [is] the difference (prativiśeṣa) 
[between] these two (idam) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
viśuddhyapratipātābhyāṃ tadviśeṣaḥ ||1.25|| 
1.25 (SS 1.24) The difference between them [results] from purity (viśuddhi) and 
permanence695 (a-pratipāta).  
 
 
692 Kapadia reads ‘kevalaprāpter avatiṣṭhate’.  
693 Kapadia omits the second ‘vā’. 
694 Tatia translates ‘simple’ and ‘complex’. See also § 3.2 Cosmic perception, mental perception, 
and absolute knowledge. See also the discussion of these terms in § 3.2 Cosmic perception, 
mental perception, and absolute knowledge. 





[1.25.1] viśuddhikṛtaś cāpratipātakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativiśeṣaḥ | [1.25.2] 
tadyathā | [1.25.3] ṛjumatimanaḥparyāyād 696  vipulamatimanaḥparyāya-
jñānaṃ viśuddhataram | [1.25.4] kiṃ cānyat |  
The difference (prativiśeṣa) [between] these two (idam) is brought about by purity 
(viśuddhi-kṛta) and (ca) is brought about by permanence (a-pratipāta-kṛta).  
Namely (tad-yathā), knowledge from extensive mental perception (vipula-mati-
manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) [is] purer (viśuddhatara) than [knowledge] from direct 
mental perception (ṛju-mati-manaḥ-paryāya). Further (kiṃ cānyat): 
[1.25.5] ṛjumatimanaḥparyāyajñānaṃ pratipataty api bhūyo vipulamati-
manaḥparyāyajñānam tu na pratipatatīti || 
Knowledge from direct mental perception (ṛju-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) goes 
away (pratipatati) again (api bhūyas)697 but (tu) knowledge from extensive mental 
perception (vipula-mati-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) does not go away (na pratipatati). 
[1.25.6] atrāha | [1.25.7] athāvadhimanaḥparyāyajñānayoḥ kaḥ prativiśeṣa iti | 
[1.25.8] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), what (kim) [is] the difference 
(prativiśeṣa) [between] cosmic perception and mental perception (avadhi-manaḥ-
paryāya-jñāna) (iti)? At this point (atra), it is said (ucyate):  
 
viśuddhikṣetrasvāmiviṣayebhyo ’vadhimanaḥparyāyayoḥ ||1.26|| 
1.26 (SS 1.25) [The difference between] cosmic perception (avadhi) and mental 
perception (manaḥ-paryāya) [results] from purity (viśuddhi), region (kṣetra), owner 
(svāmin), [and] range (viṣaya).  
 
[1.26.1] viśuddhikṛtaḥ kṣetrakṛtaḥ svāmikṛto viṣayakṛtaś cānayor viśeṣo 
bhavaty avadhimanaḥparyāyajñānayoḥ |  
The difference (viśeṣa) [between] this (idam) knowledge from cosmic perception 
and mental perception (avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) is (bhavati):  
i. brought about by purity (see TABh 1.25.1) (viśuddhi-kṛta)  
ii. brought about by region (kṣetra-kṛta) 
iii. brought about by owner (svāmi-kṛta), and (ca)  
iv. brought about by range (viṣaya-kṛta). 
 
696 Kapadia reads ‘ṛjumatimanaḥparyāyajñānād’. 





[1.26.2] tadyathā | [1.26.3] avadhijñānāt manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ viśuddha-
taram |  
Namely (tad-yathā), knowledge from mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) [is] 
more pure (viśuddhatara) than knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna). 
[1.26.4] yāvanti hi rūpīṇi dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte tāni manaḥparyāyajñānī 
viśuddhatarāṇi manogatāni jānīte || [1.26.5] kiṃ cānyat |  
For (hi), as many (yāvat) extended (rūpin) substances698 (dravya) [as] the one with 
knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñānin) knows (jānīte), so many (tad) 
the one endowed with knowledge from mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya-jñānin) 
knows (jānīte) [as] more699 refined (viśuddhatara) thoughts (manas-gata). Further 
(kiṃ cānyat): 
[1.26.6] kṣetrakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativiśeṣaḥ | [1.26.7] avadhijñānam 
aṅgulasyāsaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣūtpannaṃ bhavaty ā sarvalokāt | [1.26.8] 
manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyakṣetra eva bhavati nānyakṣetra iti || [1.26.9] 
kiṃ cānyat |  
And (ca) [concerning] the difference (prativiśeṣa) between these two700 (idam) 
resulting from region (kṣetrakṛta): Knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhijñāna) 
is (bhavati) produced (utpanna) in an innumerable part etc. (asaṃkhyeya-bhāga-ādi) 
of a finger’s breadth (aṅgula), up to the whole world (ā sarvalokāt)701. In contrast 
(tu), knowledge from mental perception (manaḥparyāya-jñāna) exists (bhavati) only 
(eva) in the region of men (manuṣyakṣetra), [and] not (na) in another region 
(anyakṣetra) (iti). Moreover (kiṃ cānyat): 
[1.26.10] svāmikṛtaś cānayoḥ prativiśeṣaḥ | [1.26.11] avadhijñānaṃ saṃyatasya 
asaṃyatasya vā702 sarvagatiṣu bhavati |  
And (ca) [concerning] the difference (prativiśeṣa) between these two (idam) 
resulting from the owner (svāmikṛta): Clairvoyant knowledge (avadhijñāna) exists 
(bhavati) for [beings with] restraint (saṃyata)703 or (vā) [beings] without restraint 
(asaṃyata), in all varieties of transmigration (sarvagati).  
 
698 For a discussion of the substances (dravya), see TA 5.1 - 5.3. 
699 The suffix ‘-tara’ can also mean ‘particularly’, instead of ‘more’. However, given the 
meaning of the term ‘viśuddhatara’ in the previous sentence (TABh 1.26.2), I translate ‘more’. 
700 I.e., manaḥparyāyajñāna and avadhijñāna (see TABh 1.26.1). 
701 See also TABh 1.23.10. 
702 Kapadia reads ‘asaṃyatasya, [saṃyatāsaṃyatasya ca] (vā)’. 






[1.26.12] manaḥparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyasaṃyatasyaiva bhavati nānyasya || 
[1.26.13] kiṃ cānyat |  
By contrast (tu), knowledge from mental perception (manaḥparyāya-jñāna) exists 
(bhavati) only (eva) for beings with restraint that are human (i.e., not for gods and 
hellish beings)704 (manuṣyasaṃyata), [and] not (na) for another (anya). Moreover 
(kiṃ cānyat): 
[1.26.14] viṣayakṛtaś cānayoḥ prativiśeṣaḥ | [1.26.15] rūpidravyeṣv 
asarvaparyāyeṣv avadher viṣayanibandho bhavati | [1.26.16] tadanantabhāge 
manaḥparyāyasyeti ||  
And (ca) [concerning] the difference (prativiśeṣa) between these two (idam) 
resulting from the range (viṣaya-kṛta): The scope of the range705 (viṣaya-nibandha) 
of cosmic perception (avadhi) exists (bhavati) with respect to all extended 
substances (rūpi-dravya), [but] not in all modes (a-sarva-paryāya) (see TA 1.27). [It 
will be said] (see TA 1.29) [that] (iti) [the domain of] mental perception (manaḥ-
paryāya) [extends to] an infinitesimal part (ananta-bhāga) of that (tad).  
[1.26.17] atrāha | [1.26.18] uktaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānam | [1.26.19] atha 
kevalajñānaṃ kim iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Knowledge from mental perception (manaḥ-
paryāya-jñāna) [has now been] discussed (ukta). Now (atha), what (kim) [is] 
absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) (iti)? 
[1.26.20] atrocyate | [1.26.21] kevalajñānaṃ daśame ’dhyāye vakṣyate | [1.26.22] 
mohakṣayāt jñānadarśanāvaraṇāntarāyakṣayāc ca kevalam iti ||  
At this point (atra), it is said (ucyate): Absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) will be 
discussed (vakṣyate) in the tenth (daśama) chapter (adhyāya). [It will be said that] 
(see TA 10.1) ‘absolute knowledge (kevala) [results] from the destruction [of] 
deluding [karman] (moha-kṣaya) and from the destruction [of] knowledge[covering], 
worldview-covering, [and] obstacle-creating [karman] (jñāna-darśana-āvaraṇa-
antarāya-kṣaya)’ (iti). 
 
704 See also TABh 1.26.9. Knowledge from mental perception (manaḥparyāyajñāna) only 
occurs in the human realm (manuṣyakṣetra). 





[1.26.23] atrāha | [1.26.24] eṣāṃ matijñānādīnāṃ jñānānāṃ kaḥ kasya 
viṣayanibandha iti | [1.26.25] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra), one says (āha): Of these (etad) [varieties of] knowledge (jñāna), 
beginning with ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-ādi), what (kim) scope of the range 
(see TABh 1.26.15) (viṣaya-nibandha) [is there] for whom (kim) (iti)? At this point 
(atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
matiśrutayor nibandhaḥ sarvadravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu ||1.27|| 
1.27 (SS 1.26) The scope (nibandha) of ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony 
(śruta) [includes] all substances (sarva-dravya) [but] not in all modes (a-sarva-
paryāya). 
 
[1.27.1] matijñānaśrutajñānayor viṣayanibandho bhavati sarvadravyeṣv 
asarvaparyāyeṣu |  
The scope of the range (viṣaya-nibandha) of knowledge from ordinary cognition 
(mati-jñāna) and knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) exists (bhavati) with 
respect to all substances (sarva-dravya) [but] not in all modes (a-sarva-paryāya). 
[1.27.2] tābhyāṃ hi sarvāṇi dravyāni jānīte na tu sarvaiḥ paryāyaiḥ || 
For (hi), one knows (jānīte) all (sarva) substances (dravya) by these two706 (tad) but 
(tu) not (na) by707 all (sarva) modes (paryāya). 
 
rūpiṣv avadheḥ ||1.28|| 
1.28 (SS 1.27) [The scope of the range] of cosmic perception (avadhi) [includes all 
things] that have extension (rūpin). 
 
[1.28.1] rūpiṣv eva dravyeṣv avadhijñānasya viṣayanibandho bhavati 
asarvaparyāyeṣu |  
The scope of the range (viṣaya-nibandha) of knowledge from cosmic perception 
(avadhi-jñāna) exists (bhavati) indeed708 (eva) with respect to the substances 
(dravya) that have extension (rūpin), but not in all modes (a-sarva-paryāya). 
 
706 I.e., matijñāna and śrutajñāna. 
707 The meaning of the instrumental case is not entirely clear to me. Perhaps, the intended 
meaning is ‘[accompanied] by all modes’.  





[1.28.2] suviśuddhenāpy avadhijñānena rūpīṇy eva dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte 
tāny api na sarvaiḥ paryāyair iti || 
Even when (api) the one endowed with clairvoyant knowledge (avadhi-jñānin) 
knows (jānīte) the substances (dravya) that have indeed (eva) extension (rūpin) by a 
very pure (su-viśuddha) cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna), even then (api), [he can] 
not (na) [know] them (tad) by all (sarva) modes (paryāya) (iti). 
 
tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya ||1.29|| 
1.29 (SS 1.28) [The scope] of mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya) [extends to] an 
infinitesimal part (tad-ananta-bhāga) of that (see TABh 1.29.1).  
 
[1.29.1] yāni rūpīṇi dravyāṇy avadhijñānī jānīte tato ’nantabhāge 
manaḥparyāyasya viṣayanibandho bhavati |  
The scope of the range (viṣaya-nibandha) of mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya) 
exists (bhavati) with respect to an infinitesimal part (ananta-bhāga) of that (tatas), 
[i.e.], the substances (dravya) that have extension (rūpin), which (yad) the one 
endowed with knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñānin) knows (jānīte) 
(see TABh 1.28.1).  
[1.29.2] avadhijñānaviṣayasyānantabhāgaṃ manaḥparyāyajñānī jānīte rūpi-
dravyāṇi manorahasyavicāragatāni ca mānuṣa 709 kṣetraparyāpannāni vi-
śuddhatarāṇi ceti || 
The one endowed with knowledge from mental perception (manaḥ-paryāya-jñānin) 
knows (jānīte) an infinitesimal part (ananta-bhāga) of the range of knowledge from 
cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna-viṣaya) — [i.e.], extended substances (rūpi-dravya), 
and (ca) the movements of thought, [which are] hidden in the mind (mano-rahasya-
vicāra-gata), and (ca) [that which is] beyond the human region (mānuṣa-kṣetra-
paryāpanna) — [as] more refined [thoughts]710 (viśuddhatara) (iti). 
 
sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasya ||1.30|| 
1.30 (SS 1.29) [The scope] of absolute knowledge (kevala) [extends to] all modes of 
all substances (sarva-dravya-paryāya).  
 
 
709 Mody mentions the variant reading ‘manuṣya-’ The term ‘manuṣyakṣetra’ also appears in 
TABh 1.26.9. 





[1.30.1] sarvadravyeṣu sarvaparyāyeṣu ca kevalajñānasya viṣayanibandho 
bhavati |  
The scope of the range (viṣaya-nibandha) of absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) 
exists (bhavati) with respect to all substances (sarva-dravya) and (ca) in all modes 
(sarva-paryāya). 
[1.30.2] taddhi sarvabhāvagrāhakaṃ saṃbhinnalokālokaviṣayam |  
For (hi), that [absolute knowledge] (tad) is the seizer of everything (sarva-bhāva-
grāhaka), [whose] range [is] both the world and that which is beyond the world 
(sambhinna-loka-aloka-viṣaya). 
[1.30.3] nātaḥ paraṃ jñānam asti | [1.30.4] na ca kevalajñānaviṣayāt paraṃ 
kiṃcid anyaj jñeyam asti | 
There is (asti) no (na) higher (para) knowledge (jñāna) than this (atas). And (ca) 
there is (asti) not (na) something else (kiñcid anya) to be known (jñeya) [that is] 
higher (para) than the range of absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna-viṣaya).  
[1.30.5] kevalaṃ paripūrṇaṃ samagram asādhāraṇaṃ nirapekṣaṃ viśuddhaṃ 
sarvabhāvajñāpakaṃ lokālokaviṣayam anantaparyāyam ity arthaḥ || 
‘Absolute’ (kevala) — The meaning is (ity artha): ‘complete’ (paripūrṇa), ‘entire’ 
(samagra), ‘extra-ordinary’ (asādhāraṇa), ‘independent’ (nirapekṣa), ‘pure’ 
(viśuddha), ‘causing to know everything’ (sarva-bhāva-jñāpaka), ‘[whose] range is 
the world and that which is beyond the world’ (loka-aloka-viṣaya), ‘[whose] modes 
[are] infinite’ (ananta-paryāya). 
[1.30.6] atrāha | [1.30.7] eṣāṃ matijñānādīnāṃ yugapad ekasmiñ jīve kati 
bhavantīti | [1.30.8] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): How much (kati) of these (idam) [varieties of 
knowledge], beginning with knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-ādi), 
exist (bhavanti) simultaneously (yugapad) in one (eka) soul (jīva)? At this point 
(atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasminn ā caturbhyaḥ ||1.31|| 
1.31 (SS 1.30) One up to four [varieties of knowledge] (eka-ādi …. ā catur) can be 






[1.31.1] eṣāṃ matyādīnāṃ jñānānām ādita ekādīni bhājyāni yugapad ekasmiñ 
jīve ā caturbhyaḥ |  
Starting from (āditas) the [varieties] of knowledge (jñāna), beginning with ordinary 
cognition (mati-ādi), one up to four (eka-ādi …. ā catur) of these (tad), can be shared 
(bhājya) simultaneously (yugapad) in one (eka) soul (jīva). 
[1.31.2] tadyathā – kasmiṃścij jīve matyādīnām ekaṃ bhavati | [1.31.3] 
kasmiṃścij jīve dve bhavataḥ | [1.31.4] kasmiṃścit trīṇi bhavanti | [1.31.5] 
kasmiṃścic catvāri bhavanti | 
To illustrate (tad-yathā), in some (kaścid) soul[s] (jīva) there is (bhavati) one (eka) 
of the [varieties of knowledge, i.e.], ordinary cognition etc. (mati-ādi). In some 
(kaścid) soul[s] (jīva) there are (bhavataḥ) two (dvi). In some (kaścid) there are 
(bhavanti) three (tri). In some (kaścid) there are (bhavanti) four (catur). 
[1.31.6] śrutajñānasya tu matijñānena niyataḥ sahabhāvas tatpūrvakatvāt |  
However (tu), the concomitance (sahabhāva) of knowledge from testimony 
(śrutajñāna) with knowledge from ordinary cognition (matijñāna) [is] certain 
(niyata) due the quality of being preceded by that (i.e., ordinary cognition precedes 
testimony) (tat-pūrvakatva). 
[1.31.7] yasya śrutajñānaṃ tasya niyataṃ matijñānam | [1.31.8] yasya tu 
matijñānaṃ tasya śrutajñānaṃ syād vā na veti ||  
For whom (yaḥ) [there is] knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna), for [that person] 
(tad) [there is] certainly (niyata) knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna). 
But (tu) for whom (yaḥ) [there is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna), 
for him (tad) knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) might either exist (syāt vā) or 
not (na vā) (iti). 
[1.31.9] atrāha | [1.31.10] atha kevalajñānasya pūrvair matijñānādibhiḥ kiṃ 
sahabhāvo bhavati nety711 ucyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), is there (kim ... bhavati) 
concomitance (saha-bhāva) of absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) with the foregoing 
[varieties of knowledge] (pūrva), [i.e.], knowledge from ordinary cognition etc. 
(mati-jñāna-ādi)? It is said (ucyate): ‘[This is] not [the case]’ (na) (iti). 
 





[1.31.11] kecid ācāryā vyācakṣate | [1.31.12] nābhāvaḥ | [1.31.13] kiṃ tu 
tadabhibhūtatvād akiṃcitkarāṇi bhavantīndriyavat |  
Some (kecid) teachers (ācārya) explain (vyācakṣate) [that there is] no absence [of 
the other varieties of knowledge for the one endowed with absolute knowledge] 
(na-abhāva); nevertheless (kiṃ tu), due to the quality of surpassing them (tad-
abhibhūtatva), they are (bhavanti) non-functional712 (akiñcitkara), like the senses 
(indriyavat).713 
[1.31.14] yathā vā vyabhre nabhasi āditya udite bhūritejastvād 
ādityenābhibhūtāny anyatejāṃsi jvalanamaṇicandranakṣatraprabhṛtīni 
prakāśanaṃ prati akiṃcitkarāṇi bhavanti tadvad iti |  
Or (vā), just as (yathā) when the sun (āditya) rises (udita) in the cloudless (vyabhra) 
sky (nabhas), the other lights (anya-tejas) — beginning with shining jewels, the 
moon, and the stars (jvalana-maṇi-candra-nakṣatra-prabhṛtin), [which are] 
surpassed (abhibhūta) by the sun (āditya), due to the quality of being a great light 
(bhūri-tejastva) — become (bhavanti) likewise (tadvat) non-functional (akiñcitkara) 
with regard to (prati) [that which is] illuminating (prakāśana) (iti). 
[1.31.15] kecid apy āhuḥ | [1.31.16] apāyasaddravyatayā matijñānaṃ 
tatpūrvakaṃ śrutajñānam avadhijñānamanaḥparyāyajñāne ca 
rūpidravyaviṣaye tasmān naitāni kevalinaḥ santīti ||  
Some (kecid) also (api) say (āhuḥ): ‘Knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-
jñānaṃ) [arises] from existent substance [through] elimination714  (apāya-sad-
dravyatā); Knowledge from testimony (śruta-jñāna) [is] preceded by that 
(tatpūrvaka); And (ca) knowledge from cosmic perception [and] knowledge from 
mental perception (avadhi-jñāna-manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna) — [their] range [consists of] 
substances having form (rūpi-dravya-viṣaya). Hence (tasmāt), these (etad) exist not 
(na santi) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (kevalin)’ (iti). 
[1.31.17] kiṃ cānyat | [1.31.18] matijñānādiṣu caturṣu paryāyeṇopayogo 
bhavati na yugapat |  
Moreover (kiṃ cānyat): In the case of the four [varieties of knowledge]715 (catur), 
beginning with ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-ādi), [cognitive] operation (upayoga) 
takes place (bhavati) successively (paryāyeṇa), not simultaneously (na yugapad). 
 
712 a-kiṃcid-kara: ‘not able to do anything’, ‘insignificant’ (MW). 
713 For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2 Concomitance of the varieties of knowledge. 
714 See also TABh 1.8.23 and TABh 1.11.6. 





[1.31.19] saṃbhinnajñānadarśanasya tu bhagavataḥ kevalino yugapat 
sarvabhāvagrāhake nirapekṣe kevalajñāne kevaladarśane cānusamayam 
upayogo bhavati ||  
But (tu) [cognitive] operation (upayoga) takes place (bhavati) simultaneously 
(yugapad) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (kevalin), [which is] the 
jina (bhagavat), [whose] knowledge and worldview [are] combined (sambhinna-
jñāna-darśana); [in other words, cognitive operation takes place] jointly 
(anusamaya) with respect to absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna) — [which is] the 
seizer of everything 716  (sarva-bhāva-grāhaka) [and which is] independent 717 
(nirapekṣa) — and (ca) with respect to absolute worldview (kevala-darśana). 
[1.31.20] kiṃ cānyat | [1.31.21] kṣayopaśamajāni catvāri jñānāni pūrvāṇi 
kṣayād eva kevalam | [1.31.22] tasmān na kevalinaḥ śeṣāṇi jñānāni bhavantīti || 
Moreover (kiṃ cānyat): The former (pūrva) four (catur) [varieties of] knowledge 
(jñāna) [are] born from the destruction and cessation [of karman] (kṣaya-upaśama-
ja); absolute knowledge (kevala) [is born] from destruction [of karman] (kṣaya) 
alone (eva). Hence (tasmāt), the other (śeṣa) [varieties of] knowledge (jñāna) exist 
not (na bhavanti) for the one endowed with absolute knowledge (kevalin) (iti). 
 
matiśrutāvadhayo viparyayaś ca ||1.32|| 
1.32 (SS 1.31) [There is knowledge from] ordinary cognition (mati), testimony 
(śruta), [and] cosmic perception (avadhi), and the opposite (viparyaya). 
 
[1.32.1] matijñānaṃ śrutajñānam avadhijñānam iti | [1.32.2] viparyayaś ca 
bhavaty ajñānaṃ cety arthaḥ | 
[There is] knowledge from ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna), knowledge from 
testimony (śruta-jñāna), [and] knowledge from cosmic perception (avadhi-jñāna) 
(iti). And (ca) there is (bhavati) the opposite (viparyaya). The meaning (ity artha) [is] 
‘false knowledge’ (ajñāna). 
[1.32.3] jñānaviparyayo ’jñānam iti |  
The opposite of knowledge (jñāna-viparyaya) is false knowledge (ajñāna). 
 
716 See also TABh 1.30.2. 
717 Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘nirapekṣa’ as ‘independent of the indriyas’. He interprets this as 
a qualification of both kevalajñāna and kevaladarśana. The same goes for ‘sarvabhāva-
grāhaka’. However, these two terms are used in TABh 1.30.2 and TABh 1.30.5 with reference 





[1.32.4] atrāha | [1.32.5] tad eva jñānaṃ tad evājñānam iti | [1.32.6] nanu 
cchāyātapavac chītoṣṇavac ca tadatyantaviruddham iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): That (tad) [is] indeed (eva) knowledge (jñāna) 
[and] that (tad) [is] indeed (eva) false knowledge (ajñāna) (iti); surely (nanu) [there 
is] an extreme opposition of them (tad-atyanta-viruddha) like shade [and] sunshine 
(chāyā-ātapavat) and (ca) like cold [and] hot (śīta-uṣṇavat) (iti). 
[1.32.7] atrocyate | [1.32.8] mithyādarśanaparigrahād viparītagrāhakatvam 
eteṣām |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): [There is] the quality of being a seizer of the 
opposite (viparīta-grāhakatva) of them (i.e., the varieties of knowledge) (etad), due 
to the adoption of wrong view (mithyā-darśana-parigraha).718 
[1.32.9] tasmād ajñānāni bhavanti | [1.32.10] tadyathā | [1.32.11] matyajñānaṃ 
śrutājñānaṃ vibhaṅgajñānam iti |  
The [varieties of] false knowledge (ajñāna) arise (bhavanti) from that (tasmāt). 
Namely (tad-yathā), false knowledge from ordinary cognition (maty-ajñāna), false 
knowledge from testimony (śruta-ajñāna), [and] deceptive knowledge (i.e., the 
opposite of avadhi) (vibhaṅgajñāna) (iti). 
[1.32.12] avadher719 viparīto vibhaṅga ity ucyate || 
It is said (ucyate) that (iti) deceptive knowledge (vibhaṅga) [is] the opposite 
(viparīta) [of] cosmic perception (avadhi). 
[1.32.13] atrāha | [1.32.14] uktaṃ bhavatā samyagdarśanaparigṛhītaṃ 
matyādijñānaṃ bhavaty anyathā720 ’jñānam eveti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (bhavat) (see 
TABh 1.32.1 – 1.32.6) [that] ‘knowledge, beginning with ordinary cognition (mati-
ādi-jñāna), is (bhavati) obtained by right worldview (samyag-darśana-parigṛhīta) 
[and that] everything contrary to this (anyathā) [is] indeed (eva) false knowledge 
(ajñāna)’ (iti). 
 
718 Cf. TABh 1.12.14. 
719 The edition of Modi has ‘avadhir’ even though he mentions ‘avadher’ as a variant reading. 
Since the word is followed by ‘viparīta’, I choose the reading with the ablative ending.  





[1.32.15] mithyādṛṣṭayo ’pi ca bhavyāś cābhavyāś cendriyanimittān aviparītān 
sparśādīn upalabhante upadiśante ca sparśaṃ sparśa iti rasaṃ rasa iti | 
[1.32.16] evaṃ śeṣān | [1.32.16] tat katham etad iti |  
And although (api ca) [they may have] wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi), [both those who 
are] suitable for liberation721 (bhavya) and (ca) [those who are] not suitable for 
liberation (abhavya) perceive (upalabhante) [that which is perceptible by the sense 
of] touch etc. (sparśa-ādi) without mistakes (aviparīta), caused by senses (indriya-
nimitta). And (ca) they point out (upadiśante): “[there is] touching (sparśa) [of] a 
tangible object (sparśa)” (iti)722, “[there is] tasting (rasa) [of] taste (rasa)” (iti), [and] 
likewise (evam) [in the case of] the remaining [senses] (śeṣa). Then (tad), how 
(katham) [is] this [possible] (etad) (iti)?723 
[1.32.17] atrocyate | [1.32.18] teṣāṃ hi viparītam etad bhavati | 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): surely (hi), this (etad) is (bhavati) false 
(viparīta) for them (tad).724 
 
sadasator aviśeṣād yadṛcchopalabdher unmattavat ||1.33|| 
1.33 (SS 1.32) [Erroneous cognition results] from accidental-perception (yadṛccha-
upalabhdi) because of indistinction (aviśeṣa) between [things that are] real and 
unreal (sad-asat), like a madman (unmattavat).725 
 
[1.33.1] yathonmattaḥ karmodayād upahatendriyamatir viparītagrāhī bhavati 
so ’śvaṃ gaur ity adhyavasyati gāṃ cāśva iti loṣṭaṃ suvarṇam iti suvarṇam 
loṣṭa iti loṣṭaṃ ca loṣṭa iti suvarṇaṃ suvarṇam iti tasyaivam aviśeṣeṇa loṣṭaṃ 
suvarṇaṃ suvarṇaṃ loṣṭam iti viparītam adhyavasyato niyatam ajñānam eva 
bhavati – tadvan mithyādarśanopahatendriyamater matiśrutāvadhayo ’py 
ajñānaṃ bhavanti || 
Just as (yathā) a madman (unmatta), whose senses and mind are damaged 
(upahata-indriya-mati) from the rising of karman (karma-udaya), is (bhavati) 
perceiving the opposite (viparīta-grāhin). He (tad) determines (adhyavasyati) a 
 
721 TA 2.7 says: ‘[There are] the qualities of being suitable (i.e. for liberation) and unsuitable 
(abhavya) etc. [in the case] of the soul etc.’ (jīvabhavyābhavyatvādīni ca). 
722 Alternatively, ‘they name tangible objects tangible’ etc. That is, they teach them as they 
are. 
723 Put differently, how is it possible that people with a wrong view make right observations? 
724 In other words, this is false knowledge. 





horse [as a] cow (go) (aśva) (iti) and (ca) a cow (go) [as] a horse (aśva) (iti), gold 
(suvarṇa) [as] clay (loṣṭa) (iti) [and] clay (loṣṭa) [as] gold (suvarṇa) (iti), and 
[sometimes]726 (ca) [he determines] clay (loṣṭa) [as] clay (loṣṭa) (iti) [and] gold 
(suvarṇa) [as] gold (suvarṇa) (iti). Thus (evam), [that] is (bhavati) certainly (niyata ... 
eva) false knowledge (ajñāna) for him (tad) [who is] determining (adhyavasyat) the 
opposite (viparīta) without distinction (aviśeṣeṇa), [saying] ‘clay (loṣṭa) [is] gold 
(suvarṇa) [and] gold (suvarṇa) [is] clay (loṣṭa)’ (iti). 
In the same way (tadvat), ordinary cognition, testimony, and cosmic perception 
(mati-śruta-avadhi) of [a person] whose senses and mind are damaged [due to] 
wrong worldview (mithyā-darśana-upahata-indriya-mati) are (bhavanti) also (api) 
false knowledge (ajñāna). 
[1.33.2] uktaṃ jñānaṃ | [1.33.3] cāritraṃ navame ’dhyāye vakṣyāmaḥ | [1.33.4] 
pramāṇe cokte | [1.33.5] nayān vakṣyāmaḥ | [1.33.6] tadyathā | 
[So far] knowledge (jñāna) [has been] discussed (ukta). We will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) 
conduct (cāritra) in the ninth (navama) chapter (adhyāya). And (ca) the two means 
of cognition (pramāṇa) [have been] discussed (ukta). [Now] we will explain 
(vakṣyāmaḥ) the perspectives (naya). Namely (tad-yathā): 
 
naigamasaṅgrahavyavahārarjusūtraśabdā nayāḥ ||1.34|| 
1.34 (SS 1.33, variant)727 The perspectives (naya) [are]: 
i. the commonplace [perspective] (naigama) 
ii. the collecting [perspective] (saṅgraha) 
iii. the practical [perspective] (vyavahāra) 
iv. the linear [perspective] (ṛju-sūtra)  
v. the literal [perspective] (śabda).728 
 
 
726 This reading is based on Siddhasenagaṇi’s interpretation. 
727  The Sarvārthasiddhi adds ‘samabhirūḍhaivambhūta’ (naigamasaṃgrahavyavahāra-
ṛjusūtraśabdasamabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ) (Sarvārthasiddhi 1.33). For a discussion of this 
variant reading, see § 3.2 The perspectives. 





[1.34.1] naigamaḥ saṅgrahaḥ vyavahāraḥ ṛjusūtraḥ śabda ity ete pañcanayā 
bhavanti | [1.34.2] tatra 
‘The commonplace [perspective] (naigama), the collecting [perspective] (saṅgraha), 
the practical [perspective] (vyavahāra), the linear [perspective] (ṛju-sūtra) [and] the 
literal [perspective] (śabda)’ (iti) — these (etad) are (bhavanti) the five (pañca) 
perspectives (naya). Among them (tatra): 
 
ādyaśabdau dvitribhedau ||1.35|| 
1.35729 The first [perspective] (i.e., the commonplace perspective, naigama) (ādya) 
[and] the literal perspective (śabda) [have respectively] two [and] three varieties 
(dvi-tribheda). 
 
[1.35.1] ādya iti sūtrakramaprāmāṇyān naigamam āha | 
[The author of the sūtra] refers (āha) to the commonplace [perspective] (naigama) 
[as] ‘the first’ (ādya iti), following the authoritativeness of the order [in] the sūtra 
(sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya). 
[1.35.2] sa dvibhedo deśaparikṣepī sarvaparikṣepī ceti | 
This [perspective] (i.e., naigama) (sa) [has] two varieties (dvibheda): [the one that is] 
encompassing partially (deśa-parikṣepin) and (ca) [the one that is] encompassing 
everything (sarva-parikṣepin) (iti).730 
[1.35.3] śabdas tribhedaḥ sāmprataḥ samabhirūḍha evambhūta iti ||  
The literal perspective (śabda) has three varieties (tribheda): the present [viewpoint] 
(sāmprata), the etymological [viewpoint] (samabhirūḍha), [and] the exact 
[viewpoint] (evam-bhūta) (iti). 
[1.35.4] atrāha | [1.35.5] kim eṣāṃ lakṣaṇam iti | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): What (kim) is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of 
these? 
 
729 This sūtra is not included in the Sarvārthasiddhi. 





[1.35.6] atrocyate | [1.35.7] nigameṣu ye ’bhihitāḥ śabdās teṣām arthaḥ 
śabdārthaparijñānaṃ ca deśasamagragrāhī naigamaḥ |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): The object (artha) and (ca) the ascertainment 
of the meaning of the words731 (śabda-artha-parijñāna) of those (tad) words (yad 
śabda) [that are] employed (abhihita) in ‘daily undertakings’ (nigama), [that is] the 
commonplace [perspective] (naigama), which is grasping either partially or wholly 
(deśa-samagra-grāhin). 
[1.35.8] arthānāṃ sarvaikadeśagrahaṇaṃ saṅgrahaḥ |  
Seizing [both] the whole and the part732 (sarva-ekadeśa-grahaṇa) of objects (artha), 
[that is] the collecting [perspective] (saṅgraha). 
[1.35.9] laukikasama upacāraprāyo vistṛtārtho vyavahāraḥ | 
The practical [perspective] (vyavahāra) [is] equal to the [view of] worldly men733 
(laukika-sama), applied in a pragmatic way734 (upacāra-prāya), having a broad 
meaning (vistṛta-artha). 
[1.35.10] satāṃ sāmpratānām arthānām abhidhānaparijñānam ṛjusūtraḥ | 
The linear [perspective] (ṛjusūtra) [is] the ascertainment of the name (abhidhāna-
parijñāna) of objects (artha) existing (sat) presently (i.e., not in the past or future) 
(sāmprata). 
[1.35.11] yathārthābhidhānaṃ śabdaḥ | 
The literal perspective (śabda) [is] the designation in accordance with reality 
(yathārtha-abhidhāna). 
[1.35.12] nāmādiṣu prasiddhapūrvāc chabdād arthe pratyayaḥ sāmprataḥ | 
The present [viewpoint] (i.e., the first variety of ‘śabda’) (sāmprata) [is] the idea 
(pratyaya) in the case of an object (artha) [from] a literal perspective (śabda), 
preceded by being known (i.e., whose conventional meaning is already fixed)735 
(prasiddha-pūrva), with respect to name etc.736 (nāma-ādi). 
 
731 It is unclear to me what the precise meaning of ‘artha’ and ‘śabdārthaparijñāna’ is in this 
context. Perhaps the author tries to differentiate between the sense (śabdārtha-parijñāna) 
and reference (artha) of a word. 
732 Siddhasenagaṇi analyses ‘sarvaikadeśagrahaṇaṃ’ as a dvandva compound. 
733 Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘laukika’ as worldly people. 
734  Alternatively, ‘by way of metaphor’. Siddhasenagaṇi refers to metaphors in his 
commentary on this passage. However, this perspective deals with objects in a practical way. 
See also TABh 1.35.29. 
735 Cf. TABh 1.35.31. 





[1.35.13] satsv artheṣv asaṅkramaḥ samabhirūḍhaḥ | 
The etymological [viewpoint] (samabhirūḍha) [is] non-going together (i.e., making 
distinctions) (asaṅkrama) in the case of objects (artha) [that are] existent (sat). 
[1.35.14] vyañjanārthayor evambhūta iti ||  
The exact [viewpoint] (evam-bhūta) [makes a distinction]737 between the sign 
(vyañjana)738 [and] the object739 (vyañjana-artha) (iti).  
[1.35.15] atrāha | [1.35.16] uddiṣṭā bhavatā naigamādayo nayāḥ | [1.35.17] 
tan740 nayā iti kaḥ padārtha iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): The perspectives (naya) beginning with [the 
perspective of] the common man (naigama-ādi) [have now been] listed (uddiṣṭā) by 
you (bhavat). What (kim) [is] the meaning (pada-artha) [of] the there (tad) 
[mentioned term] (iti) ‘perspectives’ (naya)?  
[1.35.18] atrocyate | [1.35.19] nayāḥ prāpakāḥ kārakāḥ sādhakā nirvartakā 
nirbhāsakā upalambhakā vyañjakā ity anarthāntaram | 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): ‘Perspectives’ (lit. ‘leading’) (naya), ‘[that 
which is] causing to reach’ (prāpaka), ‘[that which is] causing to make’ (kāraka), 
‘[that which is] causing to accomplish’ (sādhaka), ‘[that which is] causing to bring 
about’ (nirvartaka), ‘[that which is] causing to illuminate’ (nirbhāsaka), ‘[that which 
is] causing to perceive’ (upalambhaka), ‘[that which is] causing to appear’ 
(vyañjaka) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms).  
[1.35.20] jīvādīn padārthān nayanti prāpnuvanti kārayanti sādhayanti 
nirvartayanti nirbhāsayanti upalambhayanti vyañjayantīti nayāḥ ||  
The perspectives lead (nayanti), [i.e.], reach (prāpnuvanti), cause to make 
(kārayanti), cause to accomplish (sādhayanti), cause to bring about (nirvartayanti), 
cause to illuminate (nirbhāsayanti), cause to perceive (upalambhayanti), and cause 
to clarify (vyañjayanti) the categories (padārtha), beginning with soul (jīva-ādi) (iti).  
 
737 See the previous sentence (TABh 1.35.13). 
738 For a discussion of the term ‘vyañjana’, see § 3.2 Ordinary cognition. The meaning of the 
term in this context seems to be ‘sign’ or ‘word’. However, the term has a different meaning 
in the theory of perception in the TA (see TA 1.8). See also TABh 1.35.33. 
739 Cf. TABh 1.18.2: ‘Thus, sense perception [is] twofold, [i.e.], of the vyañjana and of the 
sense object’ (evaṃ dvividho ’vagraho vyañjanasyārthasya ca).  





[1.35.21] atrāha | [1.35.22] kim ete tantrāntarīyā vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva 
codakapakṣagrāhiṇo matibhedena vipradhāvitā iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [Are] (kim) these (etad) [perspectives] the 
proponents (vādin) of other sects741 (tantrāntarīya) or (āhosvit) [proponents of] our 
own school (svatantra) [who are] taking the side of the objector (codaka-pakṣa-
grāhin), [and who are] running in different directions (i.e., disagreeing) 
(vipradhāvita) by difference in opinion (mati-bheda) (iti)? 
[1.35.23] atrocyate | [1.35.24] naite tantrāntarīyā nāpī svatantrāḥ matibhedena 
vipradhāvitāḥ |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): These (etad) [perspectives are] not (na) [the 
proponents belonging to] other schools (tantrāntarīya) nor (na-api) [proponents 
belonging to] our own school (svatantra) [who are] running in different directions 
(i.e., disagreeing) (vipradhāvita) by difference in opinion (mati-bheda). 
[1.35.25] jñeyasya tv arthasyādhyavasāyāntarāṇy etāni |  
On the contrary (tu), these (etāni) [are] different apprehensions (adhyavasāya-
antara) of the object (artha) to be known (jñeya). 
[1.35.26] tadyathā | [1.35.27] ghaṭa ity ukte yo ’sau ceṣṭābhinirvṛtta 
ūrdhvakuṇḍalauṣṭhāyatavṛttagrīvo ’dhastāt parimaṇḍalo jalādīnām āharaṇa-
dhāraṇasamartha uttaraguṇanirvartanānirvṛtto dravyaviśeṣas tasminn 
ekasmin viśeṣavati tajjātīyeṣu vā sarveṣv aviśeṣāt parijñānaṃ naigamanayaḥ | 
To illustrate (tad-yathā), the understanding (parijñāna) [when the word] ‘pot’ 
(ghaṭa) (iti) [is] said (ukta) — [i.e.], that [object] (adas) which (yad) [is] resulting 
from activity (ceṣṭā-abhinirvṛtta), having round handles on top (ūrdhva-kuṇḍala-
auṣṭha) [and] a stretched circular neck (āyata-vṛtta-grīvā), with a globe 
(parimaṇḍala) below (adhastāt), [which is] fit for taking and holding (āharaṇa-
dhāraṇa-samartha) of water etc. (jala-ādi), completed by the application of other 
qualities (i.e., colour etc.) (uttara-guṇa-nirvartanā-nirvṛtta), having some specific 
material (dravya-viśeṣa) — [as] that (tad) single (eka) particularised742 [object] 
(viśeṣavat) or (vā) [as] all [objects] (sarva) of the class of that (taj-jātīya) in general 
(aviśeṣāt), [that is] the commonplace perspective (naigama-naya). 
 
741 Siddhasenagaṇi mentions the Vaiśeṣika tradition as an example. 





[1.35.28] ekasmin vā bahuṣu vā nāmādiviśeṣiteṣu sāmpratātītānāgateṣu 
ghaṭeṣu sampratyayaḥ saṅgrahaḥ | 
The understanding (sampratyaya) in the case of pots (ghaṭa) [as being] either (vā) 
one (eka) or (vā) many (bahu), specified by name etc. (nāma-ādi-viśeṣita), [existing 
in] the present, past, and future743 sāmprata-atīta-anāgata), [that is] the collecting 
[perspective] (saṅgraha). 
[1.35.29] teṣv eva laukikaparīkṣakagrāhyeṣūpacāragamyeṣu yathāsthūlārtheṣu 
sampratyayo vyavahāraḥ | 
The understanding (sampratyaya) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (tad eva) [as] 
having a broad meaning (yathā-sthūla 744 -artha), to be understood by the 
investigator [for the sake] of worldly matters (laukika-parīkṣaka-grāhya), to be 
understood in a pragmatic way 745  (upacāra-gamya), [that is] the practical 
[perspective] (vyavahāra). 
[1.35.30] teṣv eva satsu sāmprateṣu sampratyayaḥ ṛjusūtraḥ | 
The understanding (sampratyaya) [in the case of] the very same [pots] (tad eva) [as] 
existing (sat) at present (sāmprata), [that is] the linear [perspective] (ṛju-sūtra). 
[1.35.31] teṣv eva sāmprateṣu nāmādīnām anyatamagrāhiṣu prasiddha-
pūrvakeṣu ghaṭeṣu sampratyayaḥ sāmprataḥ śabdaḥ | 
The understanding (sampratyaya) [in the case of] the very same (tad eva) pots 
(ghaṭa) [that are] present (sāmprata), [which are] previously known746 (prasiddha-
pūrvaka) expressive of any (anyatama-grāhin) of [the modes of analysis] beginning 
with name (nāma-ādi), [that is] the present (sāmprata) literal perspective (śabda). 
[1.35.32] teṣām eva sāmpratānām adhyavasāyāsaṅkramo vitarkadhyānavat 
samabhirūḍhaḥ | 
The delimitation of the apprehension (adhyavasāya-asaṅkrama) [in the case of] the 
very same [pots] (tad eva) [that are] present (sāmprata), as in vitarka meditation747 
(vitarka-dhyānavat), [that is] the etymological [viewpoint] (samabhirūḍha).748  
 
743 Lit. ‘gone’ (atīta) and ‘not arrived’ (anāgata). 
744 yathāsthūla: ‘not detailed’ (MW).  
745 Cf. TABh 1.35.9.  
746 I.e., whose conventional meaning has already been fixed. Cf. TABh 1.35.12. 
747 I.e., focused on singleness. The ninth chapter of the TA discusses vitarka meditation (TA 
9.41, TA 9.43, and TA 9.45). 





[1.35.33] teṣām eva vyañjanārthayor anyonyāpekṣārthagrāhitvam evambhūta 
iti ||  
The quality of understanding objects [by] mutual dependence (anyonya-apekṣā-
artha-grāhitva) of the sign749 (vyañjana) [and] the object750 (vyañjana-artha) [in the 
case of] the very same [pots] (tad eva), [that is] the exact [viewpoint] (evam-bhūta). 
[1.35.34] atrāha | [1.35.35] evam idānīm ekasminn arthe ’dhyavasāyanānātvān 
nanu vipratipattiprasaṅga iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): In this way (evam), [is there] not (nanu) the 
unwanted consequence of a contradiction (vipratipatti-prasaṅga) at this point 
(idānīm), due to the difference of apprehensions (adhyavasāya-nānātva) in the case 
of a single (eka) object (artha) (iti)?  
[1.35.36] atrocyate | [1.35.37] yathā sarvam ekaṃ sadaviśeṣāt  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): Just as (yathā) everything (sarva) [is] a unity 
(eka) on account of non-distinction [with respect to] existence (sad-aviśeṣa);751 
sarvaṃ dvitvaṃ jīvājīvātmakatvāt  
everything (sarva) [is] twofold (dvitva) on account of the quality of being 
characterised by soul and non-soul (jīva-ajīva-ātmakatva);  
sarvaṃ tritvaṃ dravyaguṇaparyāyāvarodhāt 
everything (sarva) [is] threefold (tritva) on account of the delimitation of qualities, 
modes and substance (dravya-guṇa-paryāya-avarodha);  
sarvaṃ catuṣṭvaṃ752 caturdarśanaviṣayāvarodhāt  
everything (sarva) [is] fourfold (catuṣṭva) on account of the delimitation of the range 
of the four views753 (catur-darśana-viṣaya-avarodha); 
sarvaṃ pañcatvaṃ astikāyāvarodhāt754  
everything (sarva) [is] fivefold (pañcatva) on account of the delimitation of the [five] 
categories (astikāya-avarodha);  
 
749 Siddhasenagaṇi interprets vyañjana as ‘word’ (śabda). 
750 Perhaps the intended meaning is that the exact viewpoint analyses the relationship 
between word and the nature of objects. For example, when people bake, they can be called 
‘baker’. 
751 In other words, seen from the perspective of existence, everything is the same, i.e. existent. 
752 Kapadia reads ‘catuṣṭayaṃ’. 
753 The reference of these four views eludes me. Perhaps it refers to the eye, the ear, the 
tongue, and touch. Alternatively, it might refer to the four modes of analysis (TA 1.5). 
754 Kapadia reads ‘pañcāstikāyātmakatvāt’ (‘on account of the quality of being characterised 





sarvaṃ ṣaṭtvaṃ ṣaḍdravyāvarodhād iti |  
everything (sarva) [is] sixfold (ṣaṭtva) on account of the delimitation of the six 
substances (ṣaḍ-dravya-avarodha). 
[1.35.38] yathaitā na vipratipattayo ’tha cādhyavasāyasthānāntarāṇy etāni 
tadvan nayavādā iti | 
Just as (yathā) these (etad) [are] not (na) contradictory (vipratipatti) but (ca) these 
(etad) [are] rather (atha) different states of apprehension (adhyavasāya-sthāna-
antara), likewise (tadvat), the statements [from the different] perspectives (naya-
vāda) [are not incompatible] (iti). 
[1.35.39] kiṃ cānyat | [1.35.40] yathā matijñānādibhiḥ pañcabhir jñānair 
dharmādīnām astikāyānām anyatamo ’rthaḥ pṛthak pṛthag upalabhyate 
paryāyaviśuddhiviśeṣād utkarṣeṇa na ca tā755 vipratipattayaḥ bhavanti tadvan 
nayavādāḥ |  
Further (kiṃ cānyat): Just as (yathā) any (anyatama) object (artha) of the categories 
(asti-kāya), beginning with motion (dharma-ādi), is perceived (upalabhyate) 
separately (pṛthak pṛthak) by the five (pañca) knowledges (jñāna), beginning with 
knowledge from ordinary cognition (see TA 1.9) (mati-jñāna-ādi), [resulting] from a 
difference in the purity of the modes (paryāya-viśuddhi-viśeṣa), gradually 
(utkarṣeṇa), and (ca) these (tad) are (bhavanti) not (na) contradictory (vipratipatti), 
likewise (tadvat), the statements [from the different] perspectives (naya-vāda) [are 
not incompatible] (iti). 
[1.35.41] yathā vā pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko ’rthaḥ 
pramīyate svaviṣayaniyamāt na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā 
iti |  
Or (vā), just as (yathā) one (eka) object (artha) is understood (pramīyate) by the 
means of cognition (pramāṇa), [i.e.], direct cognition, inference, comparison and 
verbal testimony (pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āptavacana) — and these (tad) are 
(bhavanti) not (na) contradictory (vipratipatti) on account of the limitation of their 
respective ranges (svaviṣaya-niyama) — likewise (tadvat), the statements [from the 
different] perspectives (naya-vāda) [are not incompatible] (iti). 
 






[1.35.42] naigamaśabdārthānām ekānekārthanayagamāpekṣaḥ |  
[1.35.43] deśasamagragrāhī vyavahārī naigamo jñeyaḥ ||1|| 
And (ca) one says (āha): Grasping either partially or wholly757 (deśa-samagra-
grāhin), depending on the understanding [from] a perspective on objects that are 
single and many (eka-aneka-artha-naya-gama-apekṣaḥ) [with reference to] 
meanings of common words (naigama-śabda-artha), [this is] to be known (jñeya) [as] 
the ordinary758 (vyavahārin) commonplace [perspective] (naigama). 
[1.35.44] yat saṅgṛhītavacanaṃ sāmānye deśato ’tha ca viśeṣe |  
[1.35.45] tat saṅgrahanayaniyataṃ jñānaṃ vidyān nayavidhijñaḥ ||2|| 
One who knows the perspectives (naya-vidhijña) should know (vidyāt) that (tad) 
knowledge (jñāna) [which is] established759 by the collecting perspective (saṅgraha-
naya-niyata) [as the one] which (yad) [is] expressive of the collective (saṅgṛhīta-
vacana), in general terms (sāmānya), in partial terms (deśatas), and (ca) specific 
terms (viśeṣa).760 
[1.35.46] samudāyavyaktyākṛtisattāsaṃjñādiniścayāpekṣam |  
[1.35.47] lokopacāraniyataṃ vyavahāraṃ vistṛtaṃ vidyāt ||3|| 
[He] should know (vidyāt) the practical [perspective] (vyavahāra) [as] broad 
(vistṛta), established by worldly usage (loka-upacāra-niyata), depending on the 
ascertainment of ‘group, individual, form, existence, name, etc.’ (samudāya-vyakty-
ākṛti-sattā-saṃjñā-ādi-niścaya-apekṣa).761 
 
756 It is remarkable that this passage is introduced with ‘āha ca’, which suggests that the 
verses that follow are quoted from another source. For a discussion of this issue, see § 3.5 
Quotations in the TABh. 
757 See TABh 1.35.7. 
758 It is somewhat strange that the author uses the word ‘vyavahārin’ to qualify the naigama 
perspective since the vyavahāra perspective is discussed separately (see TABh 1.35.47). This 
suggests that this passage was written by a different author. 
759 Alternatively, ‘delimited’ (niyata). 
760 It is unclear to me how ‘sāmānye deśato ’tha ca viśeṣe’ should be analysed, and the syntax 
allows for several interpretations. The word ‘deśatas’ can be interpreted as a third option, 
apart from ‘sāmānya’ and ‘viśeṣa’. Alternatively, it might qualify ‘viśeṣa’, or ‘sāmānya’ and 
‘viśeṣa’. The vocabulary suggests a link with the Vaiśeṣika theory of universals and 
particulars. 
761 It is unclear to me what the source of this list is. In his study on Vaiśeṣika philosophy, 
Halbfass writes that in ‘early Nyāya, ākṛti is defined as the “mark” (liṅga) of the universal 
(jāti). [...] In classical Mīmāṃsā and some grammatical traditions, ākṛti can be used as a 





[1.35.48] sāmprataviṣayagrāhakam ṛjusūtranayaṃ samāsato vidyāt |  
[1.35.49] vidyād yathārthaśabdaṃ viśeṣitapadaṃ tu śabdanayam ||4|| iti || 
[He] should know (vidyāt) concisely (samāsatas) the linear perspective (ṛju-sūtra-
naya) [as the kind of] grasping [having] the present [as its] range (sāmprata-viṣaya-
grāhaka); and (tu) [he] should know (vidyāt) the verbal perspective (śabda-naya) 
[as the one in which] a word [is] in accordance with the object (yathā-artha-śabda), 
which has qualified stages762 (viśeṣita-pada). 
[1.35.50] atrāha | [1.35.51] atha jīvo nojīvaḥ ajīvo no’jīva763 ity ākārite kena 
nayena ko ’rthaḥ pratīyata iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), if [the words] (iti) ‘soul’ (jīva), 
‘quasi-soul’ (nojīva), ‘non-soul’ (ajīva), [or] ‘quasi-non-soul’ (no-ajīva) are brought 
into play (ākārita), which (kim) object (artha) is understood (pratīyate) by which 
(kim) perspective (naya)? 
[1.35.52] atrocyate | [1.35.53] jīva ity ākārite naigamadeśasaṅgrahavyavahāra-
rjusūtrasāmpratasamabhirūḍhaiḥ pañcasv api gatiṣv anyatamo jīva iti 
pratīyate |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): [When] the word ‘soul’ (jīva iti) is brought into 
play (ākārita), any (anyatama) soul (jīva iti) is understood (pratīyate) — in all (api) 
the five (pañca) varieties of transmigration (gati)764 — by the commonplace 
[perspective] (naigama), the collecting [perspective] (saṅgraha) [with respect to] 
the part765 (deśa), the practical [perspective] (vyavahāra), the linear [perspective] 
(ṛju-sūtra), the present [viewpoint] (sāmprata), [and] the etymological [viewpoint] 
(samabhirūḍha).766  
[1.35.54] kasmāt | [1.35.55] ete hi nayā jīvaṃ praty aupaśamikādiyukta-
bhāvagrāhiṇaḥ |  
Why (kasmāt)? Since (hi) these (etad) perspectives (naya) [are] grasping the states 
of existence, connected with ‘the state resulting from the cessation’ [of karman] etc. 
(aupaśamika-ādi-yukta-bhāva-grāhin), applied to (prati) the soul (jīva). 
 
762 It is not clear to me what the intended meaning is. Perhaps this refers to the three 
varieties of śabda, i.e., sāmprata, samabhirūḍha, and evambhūta. 
763 Kapadia reads ‘noajīva’.. 
764 Siddhasenagaṇi explains: animals, hell-beings, humans, gods, and siddhas. 
765 TABh 1.35.69 explains that it is pointless to analyse the words ‘soul’ (sg.) or ‘souls’ (du., 
pl.) from the saṅgraha perspective with respect to the whole (sarva). 





[1.35.56] nojīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ jīvasya vā deśapradeśau |  
‘Quasi-soul’ (nojīva iti) [implies] inanimate substance (ajīva-dravya), or (vā) larger 
and smaller parts767 (deśa-pradeśa) of the soul (jīva).  
[1.35.57] ajīva ity ajīvadravyam eva | 
‘Non-soul’ (ajīva iti) [implies] only (eva) inanimate substance (ajīva-dravya). 
[1.35.58] no’jīva iti jīva eva tasya vā deśapradeśāv iti ||  
‘Quasi-non-soul’ (no’jīva iti) [implies] indeed (eva) soul (jīva), or (vā) larger and 
smaller parts (deśa-pradeśa) for this [soul] (tad) (iti). 
[1.35.59] evambhūtanayena tu jīva ity ākārite bhavastho jīvaḥ pratīyate |  
But (tu) [when] the word ‘soul’ (jīva iti) is brought into play (ākārita) from the exact 
perspective (evam-bhūta-naya), the soul (jīva) is understood (pratīyate) [as] being 
in existence (bhava-stha). 
[1.35.60] kasmāt | [1.35.61] eṣa hi nayo jīvaṃ praty audayikabhāvagrāhaka 
eva |  
Why (kasmāt)? For (hi) this (etad) perspective (naya) [is] only (eva) grasping the 
state [resulting from] the manifestation [of karman] (audayika-bhāva-grāhaka), 
applied to the soul (jīva prati). 
[1.35.62] jīvatīti jīvaḥ prāṇiti prāṇān dhārayatīty arthaḥ |  
‘The soul (jīva) lives (jīvati)’ (iti) — ‘[it] lives’ (prāṇiti), ‘[it] continues living’ (prāṇān 
dhārayati),768 [that is] the meaning (ity artha). 
[1.35.63] tac ca jīvanaṃ siddhe na vidyate tasmād bhavastha eva jīva iti |  
And (ca) that (tad) [which is] being alive (jīvana) is not seen (na vidyate) [in the case 
of] the perfected being (siddha); therefore (tasmāt), [the word] ‘soul’ [from the exact 
perspective]769 (jīva iti) [is] only (eva) [understood as] being in existence (bhava-
stha).770 
[1.35.64] nojīva ity ajīvadravyaṃ siddho vā |  
[The word] ‘quasi-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (nojīva iti) [refers to] inanimate 
substance (ajīva-dravya), or (vā) the perfected being (siddha). 
 
767 The term ‘pradeśa’ also occurs in the fifth chapter of the TA as ‘space-points’. The word 
seems to have a more general meaning in this context. Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘deśapradeśa’ 
as larger and smaller parts (see also TABh 1.35.67). 
768 √dhṛ with prānān: 'to preserve soul’, ‘continue living’ (MW). 
769 See above (TABh 1.35.59). 





[1.35.65] ajīva ity ajīvadravyam eva |  
[The word] ‘non-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (ajīva iti) [refers] indeed (eva) 
[to] inanimate substance (ajīva-dravya). 
[1.35.66] no’jīva iti bhavastha eva jīva iti |  
[The word] ‘quasi-non-soul’ [from the exact perspective] (no-ajīva iti) [refers] 
indeed (eva) [to] ‘soul’ (jīva iti) [as] being in existence (bhava-stha). 
[1.35.67] samagrārthagrāhitvāc cāsya nayasya nānena deśapradeśau gṛhyete |  
And (ca) on account of the quality of seizing the objects entirely (samagra-artha-
grāhitva) of this (idam) perspective771 (naya), larger and smaller parts772 (deśa-
pradeśa) are not (na) perceived (gṛhyete) by it (idam). 
[1.35.68] evaṃ jīvau jīvā iti dvitvabahutvākāriteṣv api | [1.35.69] 
sarvasaṅgrahaṇe773 tu jīvo nojīvaḥ774 ajīvo no’jīvo jīvau nojīvau ajīvau no’jivau 
ity ekadvitvākāriteṣu śūnyam | 
The same applies (evam) also (api) [when the words] (iti) ‘two souls’ (jīva) [and] 
‘[many] souls’ (jīva) [are] brought into play [on account of] the quality of being 
[respectively] dual and plural (dvitva-bahutva-ākārita).775 But (tu) in the case of 
grasping the whole776 (sarva-saṅgrahaṇa), [when the words] (iti) ‘soul’ (jīva), ‘quasi-
soul’ (nojīva), ‘non-soul’ (ajīva), ‘quasi-non-soul’ (no-ajīva), ‘two souls’ (jīva), ‘two 
quasi-souls’ (nojīva), ‘two non-souls’ (ajīva) [and] ‘two quasi-non-souls’ (no-ajiva) 
[are] brought into play [on account of] the quality of being single or dual (eka-dvitva-
ākārita), [it is] pointless777 (śūnya). 
 
771 I.e., evambhūtanaya. 
772 See also TABh 1.35.56. 
773 Since this passage deals with the perspectives, including the ‘saṅgraha’ perspective, it is 
somewhat strange that the text reads ‘sarvasaṅgrahaṇe’. Moreover, TABh 1.35.53 mentions 
‘deśasaṅgraha’, and this seems to be the opposite of that term. Siddhasenagaṇi reads 
‘sarvasaṅgraheṇa’.  
774 Kapadia’s edition has a daṇḍa at this point (nojīvaḥ | ajīvo). The fact that Mody’s edition 
reads ‘nojīvaḥ ajīvo’ instead of ‘nojīvo ’jīvo’, suggests that there was originally a daṇḍa 
between these two words. However, it is unclear to me how the reading in Kapadia’s edition 
can be interpreted. 
775 In other words, one can also apply the above analysis to the dual and plural forms of the 
words ‘jīva’. 
776 Cf. TABh 1.35.53. 





[1.35.70] kasmāt | [1.35.71] eṣa hi nayaḥ saṅkhyānantyāj jīvānāṃ bahutvam 
evecchati yathārthagrāhī |  
Why (kasmāt)? Since (hi) this (etad) perspective (naya), [which is] grasping in 
accordance with reality (yathā-artha-grāhin), indeed (eva) seeks for (icchati) the 
quality of being many (bahutva) of souls (jīva), on account of the infinity of the 
number [of souls] (saṅkhyā-anantya). 
[1.35.72] śeṣās tu nayāḥ jātyapekṣam ekasmin bahuvacanatvaṃ bahuṣu ca 
bahuvacanaṃ sarvākāritagrāhiṇa iti |  
But (tu) the remaining (śeṣa) perspectives (naya), [which are] seizing all that is 
brought into play (sarva-ākārita-grāhin), [seek for] plurality778 (bahu-vacanatva), 
[which is] depending on genus (jāty-apekṣa), [even when referring to] a single thing 
(eka), and (ca) for the plural number (bahu-vacana) in the case of many (bahu) 
(iti).779 
[1.35.73] evaṃ sarvabhāveṣu nayavādādhigamaḥ780 kāryaḥ | 
Likewise (evam), the approach781 of the statements [from the different] perspectives 
(naya-vāda-adhigama) [is] to be done (kārya) in the case of all states (sarva-bhāva). 
[1.35.74] atrāha | [1.35.75] atha pañcānāṃ jñānānāṃ782 saviparyayāṇāṃ kāni 
ko nayaḥ śrayata783 iti | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), which (kim) perspective (naya) 
applies to784 (śrayate) which (kim) of the five (pañca) [varieties of] knowledge 
(jñāna) together with [their] opposites785 (sa-viparyaya) (iti)? 
 
778 bahuvacana: ‘the pl. number, the case endings and personal terminations in the pl. 
number’ (MW).  
779 The meaning seems to be that plurality is always implied by the other perspectives, even 
when these perspectives are applied to a singular object. 
780 Kapadia reads ‘nayavādānugamaḥ’. 
781 I translate ‘adhigama’ as ‘learning’ in the rest of the chapter. However, this translation 
does not fit very well in this passage, which might explain why Kapadia’s edition reads 
‘anugama’. 
782 Kapadia omits ‘jñānānāṃ’. 
783 Kapadia reads ‘samāśrayata’. 
784 Lit. ‘rests on’, ‘clings to’ (< √śri) (MW).  





[1.35.76] atrocyate | [1.35.77] naigamādayas trayaḥ sarvāṇy aṣṭau śrayante | 
[1.35.78] ṛjusūtranayo matijñānamatyajñānavarjāni ṣaṭ ||  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): The three [perspectives] (tri), beginning with 
the commonplace [perspective] (naigama-ādi), apply to (śrayante) all (sarva) eight 
[varieties of knowledge]786 (aṣṭa); the linear perspective (ṛju-sūtra-naya) [applies to] 
six (ṣaṣ), leaving out knowledge from ordinary cognition and false knowledge from 
ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-maty-ajñāna-varja). 
[1.35.79] atrāha | [1.35.80] kasmān matiṃ saviparyayāṃ na śrayata iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Why (kasmāt) does [the linear perspective] not 
apply to (na śrayate) ordinary cognition (mati) together with its opposite (sa-
viparyaya) (iti)? 
[1.35.81] atrocyate | [1.35.82] śrutasya saviparyayasyopagrahatvāt | [1.35.83] 
śabdanayas tu dve eva śrutajñānakevalajñāne śrayate | 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): [The linear perspective does not apply to 
ordinary cognition together with its opposite] due to the quality of seizing 
(upagrahatva) of scriptural [knowledge] (śruta) together with its opposite787 (sa-
viparyaya). And (tu) the literal perspective (śabda-naya) applies (śrayate) only (eva) 
to two [varieties of knowledge] (dvi), [i.e.], knowledge from testimony and absolute 
knowledge (śruta-jñāna-kevala-jñāna). 
[1.35.83] atrāha | [1.35.84] kasmān netarāṇi śrayata iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Why (kasmāt) does [it] not apply to (na śrayate) 
other [varieties of knowledge] (itara) (iti)? 
[1.35.85] atrocyate | [1.35.86] matyavadhimanaḥparyāyāṇāṃ śrutasyaivopa-
grāhakatvāt | [1.35.87] cetanājñasvābhāvyāc ca sarvajīvānāṃ nāsya kaścin 
mithyādṛṣṭir ajño vā jīvo vidyate | 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): Due to the quality of being a seizer 
(upagrāhakatva) of [this] very (eva) testimony (śruta) of ordinary cognition, cosmic 
perception and mental perception788 (maty-avadhi-manaḥ-paryāya). And (ca) due to 
the own nature [and] intelligence789 (cetanā-jña-svābhāvya) of all souls (sarva-jīva), 
 
786 I.e. five varieties of knowledge and three types of false knowledge (see TABh 1.32.11). 
787 In other words, the linear perspective (ṛjusūtra) can be applied to knowledge from 
testimony and false knowledge from testimony, but not to knowledge from ordinary 
cognition. 
788 In other words, since knowledge from testimony includes ordinary cognition, cosmic 
perception, and mental perception. 





[there is] not (na) seen (vidyate) any (kaścid) soul (jīva) that has790 (idam) wrong 
view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) or (vā) false knowledge (ajña).791 
[1.35.88] tasmād api viparyayān na śrayata iti |  
Therefore (tasmāt) [it] also (api) does not apply to (na śrayate) the opposites 
(viparyaya) (iti). 
[1.35.89] ataś ca pratyakṣānumānopamānāptavacanānām api prāmāṇyam 
abhyanujñāyata iti | āha ca –  
And (ca) hence (atas), the authoritativeness (prāmāṇya) of direct perception, 
inference, comparison, and verbal testimony (pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-āpta-
vacana) [is] also (api) approved (abhyanujñāyate) (iti).792 And (ca) one says (āha) –  
[1.35.90] vijñāyaikārthapadāny arthapadāni ca vidhānam iṣṭaṃ ca |  
[1.35.91] vinyasya parikṣepān nayaiḥ parīkṣyāṇi tattvāni ||1|| 
Having understood (vijñāya) words of single meaning793 (eka-artha-pada) and (ca) 
words referring to objects (artha-pada), and (ca) [their] appropriate (iṣṭa) 
classification794 (vidhāna), having set them out (vinyasya) completely (parikṣepāt), 
the entities (tattva) [are] to be examined (parīkṣya) by the perspectives (naya).  
[1.35.92] jñānaṃ saviparyāsaṃ trayaḥ śrayanty ādito nayāḥ sarvam | 
[1.35.93] samyagdṛṣṭer jñānaṃ mithyādṛṣṭer viparyāsaḥ ||2|| 
The first (āditas) three (tri) perspectives (naya) apply to (śrayanti) all795 (sarva), 
[i.e.], knowledge (jñāna) together with its opposite (sa-viparyāsa). Knowledge 
(jñāna) [results] from right view (samyag-dṛṣṭi), delusion (viparyāsa) [results] from 
wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi). 
 
790 I interpret ‘asya’ as ‘jīvasya’. However, it is not entirely clear to me what the reference of 
‘asya’ in this sentence is. 
791 Cf. TABh 1.35.96 – 1.35.97. 
792 It is remarkable that the four means of cognition that are accepted by the Nyāya tradition 
are said to be valid. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.2, The perspectives.  
793 Perhaps ‘synonyms’. 
794 Siddhasenagaṇi refers to the four modes of analysis (nāma, sthāpana, etc.). 





[1.35.94] ṛjusūtraḥ ṣaṭ śrayate mateḥ śrutopagrahād ananyatvāt | 
[1.35.95] śrutakevale tu śabdaḥ śrayate nānyac chrutāṅgatvāt ||3|| 
The linear perspective (ṛju-sūtra) applies to (śrayate) six796 (ṣaṣ) due to identity 
(ananyatva), [i.e.], due to the seizing of testimony (śruta-upagraha) of ordinary 
cognition797 (mati). And (tu) the literal perspective (śabda) applies to (śrayate) 
testimony [and] absolute knowledge798 (śruta-kevala) due to the quality of being 
dependent on testimony (śruta-aṅgatva), not on anything else (na-anyat). 
[1.35.96] mithyādṛṣṭyajñāne na śrayate nāsya kaścid ajño ’sti | 
[1.35.97] jñasvābhāvyāj jīvo mithyādṛṣṭir na cāpy ajñaḥ799 ||4|| 
[The literal perspective]800 does not apply to (na śrayate) wrong view or false 
knowledge (mithyā-dṛṣṭy-ajñāna) [because] there is not (na asti) any (kaścid) false 
knowledge (ajña) for [the soul] (idam). The soul (jīva) [is] not (na) ignorant (ajña) 
and (ca) also (api) [not] having false view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi), due to the own nature of 
having knowledge (jña-svābhāvya). 
[1.35.98] iti nayavādāś citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ | 
[1.35.99] laukikaviṣayātītās tattvajñānārtham adhigamyāḥ ||5|| 
In this manner (iti), the statements [from the different] perspectives (naya-vāda) 
[are] manifold801 (citra), first they appear to be opposed (kvacid viruddhā iva), and 
(ca) yet (atha), [they are] free from vice (viśuddha). Surpassing the worldly range 
(laukika-viṣaya-atīta) [they are] to be studied (adhigamya) for the sake of 
knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna-artha). 
[1.35.100] iti tattvārthādhigame ’rhatpravacanasaṅgrahe prathamo ’dhyāyaḥ 
samāptaḥ ||802 
Thus (iti), the first (prathama) chapter (adhyāya) of the Tattvārthādhigama, [which 




796 According to Siddhasenagaṇi, the varieties of knowledge with the exception of knowledge 
from ordinary cognition (mati). 
797 I.e., because testimony (śruta) is preceded by ordinary cognition (mati) (see TA 1.20). 
798 See also TABh 1.35.83. 
799 Kapadia reads ‘cāpyasti’. 
800 See TABh 1.35.83. 
801 The word ‘citra’ also means ‘excellent’ (MW). 









[2.0.1] atrāha | [2.0.2] uktaṃ bhavatā jīvādīni tattvānīti | [2.0.3] tatra ko jīvaḥ 
kathaṃlakṣaṇo veti | [2.0.4] atrocyate | [...] 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): You have mentioned (uktaṃ bhavatā) ‘[the 
categories of] reality (tattva) beginning with soul (jīva-ādi)’ (see TA 1.4) (iti). Here 
(tatra), [one may ask]: ‘What (kim) [is] the soul (jīva), or (vā), how [is it] 
characterised (kathaṃ-lakṣaṇa) (iti)?’ At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): [...]803 
 
upayogo lakṣaṇam ||2.8|| 
2.8 [Cognitive] operation (upayoga) [is] the characteristic [of the soul] (lakṣaṇa). 
 
[2.8.1] upayogo lakṣaṇaṃ jīvasya bhavati |  
[Cognitive] operation (upayoga) is (bhavati) the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the soul 
(jīva). 
 
sa dvividho ’ṣṭacaturbhedaḥ ||2.9|| 
2.9 This [cognitive operation] (tad) is twofold (dvividha), [having] eight [and] four 
varieties (aṣṭa-caturbheda). 
 
[2.9.1] sa upayogo dvividhaḥ sākāro ’nākāraś ca jñānopayogo darśanopayogaś 
cety arthaḥ |  
This (tad) [cognitive] operation (upayoga) [is] twofold (dvividha): having shape 
(sākāra) and (ca) shapeless (anākāra).804 The meaning is (ity artha): [cognitive] 
operation [in the form of] knowledge (jñāna-upayoga) and (ca) [cognitive] 
operation [in the form of] worldview (darśana-upayoga). 
 
803 The second chapter of the TA deals with the soul. The first sūtras (TA 2.1 - 2.7), which 
follow the opening sentences of the bhāṣya, deal with the states of the soul (bhāva) and the 
Jaina theory of karman. They are not included in this study. 
804 I.e., representational and non-representational. For a discussion of this passage, see § 3.3, 





[2.9.2] sa punar yathāsaṅkhyam aṣṭacaturbhedo bhavati |  
This [twofold cognitive operation] (tad) is (bhavati) again (punar) respectively 
(yathā-saṅkhyam) eight- and fourfold (aṣṭa-caturbheda). 
[2.9.3] jñānopayogo ’ṣṭavidhaḥ | [2.9.4] tadyathā | [2.9.5] matijñānopayogaḥ 
śrutajñānopayogo ’vadhijñānopayogo manaḥparyāyajñānopayogaḥ kevalajñā-
nopayogo matyajñānopayogaḥ śrutājñānopayoga vibhaṅgajñānopayoga iti |  
[Cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge (jñāna-upayoga) [is] eightfold 
(aṣṭavidha). Namely (tad-yathā): 
i. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from ordinary cognition 
(mati-jñāna-upayoga) 
ii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from testimony (śruta-
jñāna-upayoga) 
iii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] cosmic knowledge (avadhi-jñāna-
upayoga) 
iv. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] mental knowledge (manaḥ-paryāya-
jñāna-upayoga)  
v. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] absolute knowledge (kevala-jñāna-
upayoga) 
vi. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] false knowledge from ordinary 
cognition (maty-ajñāna-upayoga)  
vii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] false knowledge from testimony (śruta-
ajñāna-upayoga)  
viii. [cognitive] operation [in the form of] deceptive knowledge805 (vibhaṅga-
jñāna-upayoga) (iti). 
[2.9.6] darśanopayogaś caturbhedaḥ | [2.9.7] tadyathā | [2.9.8] cakṣur-
darśanopayogo ’cakṣurdarśanopayogo ’vadhidarśanopayogaḥ kevala-
darśanopayoga iti |  
[Cognitive] operation [in the form of] worldview (darśana-upayoga) [has] four 
varieties (caturbheda). Namely (tad-yathā): 
 [cognitive] operation [in the form of] visual worldview (cakṣur-darśana-
upayoga)  
 [cognitive] operation [in the form of] non-visual806 worldview (acakṣur-
darśana-upayoga)  
 





 [cognitive] operation [in the form of] cosmic worldview (avadhi-darśana-
upayoga)  
 [cognitive] operation [in the form of] absolute worldview (kevala-darśana-
upayoga) (iti). 
 
saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca ||2.10|| 
2.10 [There are] worldly (saṃsārin) and liberated (mukta) [souls]. 
 
[2.10.1] te jīvāḥ samāsato dvividhā bhavanti saṃsāriṇo muktāś ca | [2.10.2] kiṃ 
cānyat |  
Succinctly (samāsatas), these (tad) souls (jīva) are (bhavanti) twofold (dvividha): 
worldly (saṃsārin) and liberated (mukta). Further (kiṃ cānyat): 
 
samanaskāmanaskāḥ ||2.11|| 
2.11 [Souls exist] with minds (samanaska) and without minds (amanaska). 
 
[2.11.1] samāsatas ta807 eva jīvā dvividhā bhavanti samanaskāś cāmanaskāś ca | 
[2.11.2] tān parastād vakṣyāmaḥ ||  
Succinctly (samāsatas), these (tad) souls (jīva) are (bhavanti) twofold (dvividha): 
with minds (samanaska) and without minds (amanaska). We will explain 
(vakṣyāmaḥ) them (tad) later on (see TA 2.25) (parastāt). 
 
saṃsāriṇas trasasthāvarāḥ ||2.12|| 
2.12 Worldly souls (saṃsārin) [are] mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthāvara).  
 
[2.12.1] saṃsāriṇo jīvā dvividhā bhavanti trasāḥ sthāvarāś ca | [2.12.2] tatra 
Worldly souls (saṃsārin) are (bhavanti) twofold (dvividha): mobile (trasa) and (ca) 
immobile (sthāvara). Among them (tatra): 
 
806 It is not entirely clear to me what the intended meaning of ‘cakṣus-’ and ‘acakṣus-’ in this 
context is. Siddhasenagaṇi interprets ‘acakṣus-’ as the other senses, which I follow in my 
translation. This distinction resembles TA 1.14, which says that ordinary cognition is caused 
by the organs of sense and the mind (indriya-anindriya-nimitta). Siddhasenagaṇi illustrates 
acakṣurdarśanopayoga with the example of feeling a snake behind one’s back. 






pṛthivyabvanaspatayaḥ sthāvarāḥ ||2.13||808 
2.13 Earth (pṛthivī), water (ap), [and] plants809 (vanaspati) [are] immobile [souls] 
(sthāvara). 
 
[2.13.1] pṛthivīkāyikā apkāyikā vanaspatikāyikā ity ete trividhā sthāvarā jīvā 
bhavanti |  
These (etad) immobile (sthāvara) souls (jīva) are (bhavanti) threefold (trividha):  
i. earth-bodied (pṛthivī-kāyika)  
ii. water-bodied (ap-kāyika) [and] 
iii. plant-bodied (vanaspati-kāyika) (iti). 
[2.13.2] tatra pṛthivīkāyo ’nekavidhaḥ śuddhapṛthivīśarkarāvālukādiḥ |  
Among them (tatra), the earth-bodied [immobile souls] (pṛthivī-kāya) [are] manifold 
(anekavidha), beginning with pure earth, small stones, [and] sand (śuddha-pṛthivī-
śarkarā-vāluka-ādi). 
[2.13.3] apkāyo ’nekavidho himādiḥ | 
The water-bodied [immobile souls] (ap-kāya) [are] manifold (anekavidha), 
beginning with snow (hima-ādi). 
[2.13.4] vanaspatikāyo ’nekavidhaḥ śaivalādiḥ || 
The plant-bodied [immobile souls] (vanaspati-kāya) [are] manifold (anekavidha), 
beginning with śaivala810 (śaivala-ādi). 
 
tejovāyū dvīndriyādayaś ca trasāḥ ||2.14||811 
2.14 Fire (tejas), air (vāyu), and (ca) [beings with] two or more senses (dvi-indriya-
ādi) [are] mobile [souls] (trasa). 
 
[2.14.1] tejaḥkāyikā aṅgārādayaḥ |  
The fire-bodied [mobile souls] (tejaḥ-kāyika) [are] charcoal812 etc. (aṅgāra-ādi). 
 
808 The Sarvārthasiddhi has a different reading and includes fire- and air-bodied beings in the 
class of immobile souls (SS 2.13-14).  
809 The primary meaning of ‘vanaspati’ is ‘tree’ (MW). However, the explanation of 
‘vanaspati-kāya’ in TABh 2.13.4 clearly indicates that the term refers to the category of plants 
in general. 
810 ‘Blyxa Octandra’, ‘a kind of duck-weed or green moss-like plant growing in pools’ (MW). 






[2.14.2] vāyukāyikā utkalikādayaḥ |  
The air-bodied [mobile souls] (vāyukāyika) [are] the outgoing etc.813 (utkalikā-ādi).  
[2.14.3] dvīndriyās trīndriyāś caturindriyāḥ pañcendriyā ity ete trasā bhavanti | 
[Beings with] two senses (dvi-indriya), [beings with] three senses (tri-indriya), 
[beings with] four senses (catur-indriya) [and] [beings with] five senses (pañca-
indriya) (iti) — these (etad) are (bhavanti) mobile (trasa). 
[2.14.4] saṃsāriṇas trasāḥ sthāvarā ity ukte etad uktaṃ bhavati muktā naiva 
trasā naiva sthāvarā iti || 
When it is said (see TA 2.12) (ity ukta) ‘worldly souls (saṃsārin) [are] mobile (trasa) 
[and] immobile (sthāvara)’, this (etad) is (bhavati) said (ukta): ‘liberated [souls] 
(mukta) [are] neither (na-eva) mobile (trasa) nor (na-eva) immobile (sthāvara)’ (iti). 
 
pañcendriyāṇi ||2.15|| 
2.15 [There are] five senses (pañca-indriya). 
 
[2.15.1] pañcendriyāṇi bhavanti | [2.15.2] ārambho niyamārthaḥ 
ṣaḍādipratiṣedhārthaś ca ||  
[There] are (bhavanti) five senses (pañca-indriya). The beginning [of the subject]814 
(ārambha) [is] for the sake of restriction (i.e., of the number of senses) (niyama-
artha) and (ca) for the sake of exclusion of six etc. (ṣaḍ-ādi-pratiṣedha-artha).  
[2.15.3] indriyaṃ | [2.15.4] indraliṅgam indradiṣṭam indradṛṣṭam indrasṛṣṭam 
indrajuṣṭam iti vā815 |  
‘Sense’ (indriya) [means] ‘mark of the soul’ (indra-liṅga), ‘directed by the soul’ 
(indra-diṣṭa), ‘perceived by the soul’ (indra-dṛṣṭa), ‘brought forth by the soul’ (indra-
sṛṣṭa), or (vā) ‘welcomed by the soul’ (indra-juṣṭa)’ (iti). 
 
812 It is somewhat strange that charcoal is seen as a mobile soul. Perhaps the idea is that 
charcoal is inhabited by fire-bodied mobile souls. The classification in the Sarvārthasiddhi, 
which classifies fire-bodied souls as immobile (SS 2.13), is easier to understand. 
813 Siddhasenagaṇi explains: ‘Air (vāyu) [has the following] varieties (bheda): eastern, 
western etc. (prācya-pratīcya-ādi), [and] outgoing (utkalikā), circular etc. (maṇḍalikā-ādi) 
(prācyapratīcyādyutkalikāmaṇḍalikādibhedo vāyuḥ). 
814 I.e., TA 2.15, which opens the passage on the senses. 
815 This is a quote from Pāṇini 5.2.93. However, Umāsvāti skips ‘indradatta’ and adds 





[2.15.5] indro jīvaḥ sarvadravyeṣv aiśvaryayogād viṣayeṣu vā paramaiśvarya-
yogāt |  
The soul (jīva) [is called] ‘indra’ on account of the power (aiśvarya-yoga) with 
respect to all substances (sarvadravya), or (vā) on account of the highest power 
(parama-aiśvarya-yoga) with respect to the range [of the senses] (viṣaya). 
[2.15.6] tasya liṅgam indriyaṃ liṅganāt sūcanāt pradarśanād upaṣṭambhanād 
vyañjanāc ca jīvasya liṅgam indriyam || 
The sense (indriya) [is] the mark (liṅga) of this (tad), [i.e.], the sense (indriya) [is] 
the mark (liṅga) of the soul (jīva) [on account of its] marking (liṅgana), indicating 




2.16.1 [The five senses are] twofold (dvividha). 
 
[2.16.1] dvividhānīndriyāṇi bhavanti | [2.16.2] dravyendriyāṇi bhāvendriyāṇi 
ca || [2.16.3] tatra 
[The five] senses (indriya) are (bhavanti) twofold (dvividha), [i.e.], the sense 
organs816 (dravya-indriya) and (ca) the sense faculties (bhāva-indriya).817 Among 
them (tatra): 
 
nirvṛttyupakaraṇe dravyendriyam ||2.17|| 
2.17 The sense organ (dravya-indriya) [consists of] the ‘manifestation’ (nirvṛtti) [and] 
the ‘instrument’ (upakaraṇa). 
 
[2.17.1] nirvṛttīndriyam upakaraṇendriyaṃ ca dvividhaṃ dravyendriyam |  
The sense organ (dravya-indriya) [is] twofold (dvividha), [i.e.], the manifested sense 
(nirvṛtti-indriya) and (ca) the instrumental sense (upakaraṇa-indriya). 
[2.17.2] nirvṛttir aṅgopāṅganāmanirvartitānīndriyadvārāṇi karmaviśeṣa-
saṃskṛtāḥ śarīrapradeśāḥ |  
The ‘manifestation’ (nirvṛtti) [is] the regions of the body (śarīra-pradeśa) [that are] 
conditioned [by] a particular type of karman818 (karma-viśeṣa-saṃskṛta), [i.e.], the 
 
816 Literally ‘material sense’. 





apertures [of] the senses (indriyadvāra) [that are] brought about (nirvartita) [by] 
body determining [karman that causes] the limbs and additional limbs819 (aṅga-
upāṅga-nāma). 
[2.17.3] nirmāṇanāmāṅgapratyayā mūlaguṇanirvartanety arthaḥ ||  
The meaning is (ity artha): [whose] accomplishment [is due to] the basic virtues820 
(mūla-guṇa-nirvartana) [and whose] cause821 (pratyaya) [of] the body-parts (aṅga) 
[is the karman that causes] the formation [of the body]822 (nirmāṇa-nāma). 
[2.17.4] upakaraṇaṃ bāhyam abhyantaraṃ ca | [2.17.5] nirvartitasyānupa-
ghātānugrahābhyām upakārīti || 
The ‘instrument’823 (upakaraṇa) [is] outer (bāhhya) and (ca) interior (abhyantara). 
[Is is] assisting (upakārin) [by] not-obstructing (anupaghāta) [and] favouring 
(anugraha) [that which is] brought about (nirvartita)824 (iti). 
 
labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam ||2.18|| 
2.18 The sense faculty (bhāva-indriya) [consists of] acquisition (labdhi) and 
[cognitive] operation (upayoga). 
 
[2.18.1] labdhir upayogaś ca bhāvendriyaṃ bhavati |  
The sense faculty (bhāvendriya) is (bhavati) acquisition (labdhi) and (ca) [cognitive] 
operation (upayoga). 
 
818  Alternatively, ‘for a particular type of action’. However, Siddhasenagaṇi glosses 
‘karmaviśeṣa’ as ‘nāmakarman’. 
819 I.e., a particular type of body determining karman (aṅgopaṅganāmakarmani). For a 
discussion of the 93 varieties of nāmakarman, see Glasenapp 1925: 188ff. 
820 In the Śvetāmbara tradition, the word ‘mūlaguṇa’ usually refers to the list of aṇuvrata, i.e., 
the minor vows that a householder should observe. See Williams 1963: 50ff for a discussion 
of the different lists of mūlaguṇa. 
821 Siddhasenagaṇi glosses ‘nimitta’. 
822 Glasenapp explains nirmāṇanāmakarman as the karman that ‘causes that the parts of a 
being are in the right place’ (Glasenapp 1925: 190).  
823 I.e., the dravyendriya as instrument (see TA 2.17). 
824 Perhaps the intended meaning is ‘brought about [by aṅgopaṅganāmakarman]’ (see 






[2.18.2] labdhir nāma gatijātyādināmakarmajanitā tadāvaraṇīyakarma-
kṣayopaśamajanitā cendriyāśrayakarmodayanirvṛttā ca jīvasya bhavati |  
[That which is] called (nāma) ‘acquisition’ (labdhi), is (bhavati) [that which is]:  
i. produced (janita) by body-determining karman (nāmakarman), beginning 
with [the varieties of] transmigration [and] birth (gati-jāti-ādi), and (ca)  
ii. produced (janita) by both destruction [and] cessation (kṣaya-upaśama) of 
karman [that is] covering that (i.e., knowledge- and worldview)825 (tad-
āvaraṇīya-karman), and (ca) 
iii. resulting (nirvṛtta) from the rising (udaya) of karman [that is] attached to 
the senses (indriya-āśraya-karman), of the soul (jīva). 
[2.18.3] sā pañcavidhā | [2.18.4] tadyathā | [2.18.5] sparśanendriyalabdhiḥ 
rasanendriyalabdhiḥ ghrāṇendriyalabdhiḥ cakṣurindriyalabdhiḥ śrotrendriya-
labdhir iti || 
It (i.e., labdhi) (tad) [is] fivefold (pañcavidha). Namely (tad-yathā): 
i. acquisition [related to] the sense of touch (sparśana-indriya-labdhi)  
ii. acquisition [related to] the sense of taste (rasana-indriya-labdhi) 
iii. acquisition [related to] the sense of smell (ghrāṇa-indriya-labdhi) 
iv. acquisition [related to] the sense of sight (cakṣus-indriya-labdhi) 
v. acquisition [related to] the sense of hearing (śrotra-indriya-labdhi) (iti). 
 
upayogaḥ sparśādiṣu ||2.19||826 
2.19 [Cognitive] operation (upayoga) relates to touch (i.e., touchable objects) 
(sparśa) etc. 
 
[2.19.1] sparśādiṣu matijñānopayoga ity arthaḥ |  
The meaning is (ity artha): [Cognitive] operation [in the form of] knowledge from 
ordinary cognition (mati-jñāna-upayoga) with respect to touch etc. (sparśa-ādi) 
[2.19.2] uktam etad upayogo lakṣaṇam |  
It (etad) has been said (see TA 2.8) (ukta) [that] ‘[cognitive] operation (upayoga) [is] 
the characteristic [of the soul] (lakṣaṇa)’.  
[2.19.3] upayogaḥ praṇidhānam āyogas tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāma ity arthaḥ ||  
 
825 See, e.g., TABh 1.7.19. 





‘[Cognitive] operation’ (upayoga) — the meaning is (ity artha): ‘directing’827 
(praṇidhāna), ‘joining’ (āyoga), ‘becoming’ (tad-bhāva), ‘developing’ (pariṇāma). 
[2.19.4] eṣāṃ ca satyāṃ nirvṛttāv upakaraṇopayogau bhavataḥ | [2.19.5] 
satyāṃ ca labdhau nirvṛttyupakaraṇopayogā bhavanti | [2.19.6] 
nirvṛttyādīnām ekatarābhāve viṣayālocanaṃ na bhavati |  
And (ca) among these (i.e., nirvṛtti, upakaraṇa, labdhi, and upayoga)828 (idam), when 
there is (satī) the manifestation (nirvṛtti), [then] there are (bhavatas) the instrument 
and cognitive operation (upakaraṇa-upayoga). And (ca) when there is (satī) 
acquisition (labdhi), there are (bhavanti) the manifestation, the instrument, and 
cognitive operation (nirvṛtti-upakaraṇa-upayoga). [There] is (bhavati) no (na) 
perception of the range [of the senses] (viṣaya-ālocana) in the absence of one 
(ekatara-abhāva) of the ‘manifestation’ etc. (nirvṛtti-ādi).829 
[2.19.7] atrāha | [2.19.8] uktaṃ bhavatā pañcendriyānīti | [2.19.9] tat kāni 
tānīndriyānīty ucyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (bhavat) [that] 
‘[there are] five senses (pañca-indriya)’ (see TA 2.15) (iti). Now (tad), which (kim) 
[are] these (tad) senses (indriya)? It is said (ucyate): 
 
sparśanarasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇi ||2.20|| 
2.20 [The five senses are]:  
i. [sense of] touch (sparśana) 
ii. [sense of] taste (rasana) 
iii. [sense of] smell (ghrāṇa) 
iv. [sense of] sight (cakṣus) [and] 
v. [sense of] hearing (śrotra). 
 
[2.20.1] sparśanaṃ rasanaṃ ghrāṇaṃ cakṣuḥ śrotram ity etāni pañcendriyāṇi |  
[Sense of] touch (sparśana), [sense of] taste (rasana), [sense of] smell (ghrāṇa), 
[sense of] sight (cakṣus), [and] [sense of] hearing (śrotra) (iti) — these (etad) [are] 
the five senses (pañca-indriya). 
 
827 pra+ni+√dhā: ‘to turn or direct (the eyes or thoughts) upon’ (MW). 
828 See TA 2.17 – 2.18.  
829 Sanghvi explains the order as follows: labdhi is a prerequisite for nirvṛtti. Again, nirvṛtti is 
a prerequisite for upakaraṇa and upayoga. Upayoga is the combination of labdhi, nirvṛtti and 






sparśarasagandhavarṇaśabdās teṣām arthāḥ ||2.21|| 
2.21 The objects (artha) of them (i.e., of the senses) (tad) [are]: 
i. touch (sparśa) 
ii. taste (rasa) 
iii. smell (gandha) 
iv. colour (varṇa) 
v. and sound (śabda). 
 
[2.21.1] eteṣām indriyāṇām ete sparśādayo ’rthā bhavanti yathāsaṅkhyam ||  
These (etad) objects (artha), beginning with touch (sparśa-ādi), are (bhavanti) 
respectively (yathāsaṅkhyam) [the objects] of these (etad) senses (indriya).  
 
śrutam anindriyasya ||2.22|| 
2.22 Testimony (śruta) [is the object] of the mind (anindriya). 
 
[2.22.1] śrutajñānaṃ dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ noindriyasyārthaḥ |  
Knowledge from testimony (śrutajñāna) [is] twofold (dvividha), [i.e.], manifold [and] 
twelvefold (see TABh 1.20.3 – 1.20.4) (aneka-dvādaśavidha). [It is] the object (artha) 
of the mind (noindriya).830 
[2.22.2] atrāha | [2.22.3] uktaṃ bhavatā pṛthivyabvanaspatitejovāyavo 
dvīndriyādayaś831 ca nava jīvanikāyāḥ | [2.22.4] pañcendriyāṇi ceti | [2.22.5] tat 
kiṃ kasyendriyam iti | [2.22.6] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TA 2.13 – 
2.14) (bhavat) [that] earth (pṛthivī), water (ap), plants (vanaspati), fire (tejas), air 
(vāyu), and (ca) [beings with] two senses etc. (dvi-indriya-ādi) [are] the nine classes 
of souls (jīva-nikāya). And [is has also been said by you] (ca) [that there are] five 
senses (pañca-indriya) (see TA 2.15) (iti). Now (tad), which sense (kim ... indriya) 
[belongs to] which [class of beings] (kim) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
830 The bhāṣya reads ‘noindriya’ instead of ‘anindriya’. The same phenomenon occurs in 
TABh 1.19.1. For a discussion of this peculiar word formation, see § 3.2 Ordinary cognition. 






vāyvantānām ekam ||2.23|| 
2.23 [Souls] up to the air[-bodied]832 (vāyv-anta) [have] one [sense] (i.e., touch) 
(eka).833 
 
[2.23.1] pṛthivyādīnāṃ vāyvantānāṃ jīvanikāyānām ekam evendriyaṃ 
sūtrakramaprāmāṇyāt prathamaṃ sparśanam evety arthaḥ |  
The meaning [is] (ity artha): [There is] only (eva) one (eka) sense (indriya) for the 
classes of souls (jīva-nikāya) beginning with earth (pṛthivī-ādi) up to air (vāyu-anta). 
Following the authoritativeness of the order [in] the sūtra (sūtra-krama-prāmāṇya), 
the first [is] indeed (eva) sense of touch (sparśana). 
 
kṛmipipīlikābhramaramanuṣyādīnām ekaikavṛddhāni ||2.24|| 
2.24 [The number of senses of] worms (kṛmi), ants (pipīlikā), bees (bhramara), 
human beings (manuṣya) etc. (ādi) increases one by one (i.e., worms have two 
senses, ants three etc.) (ekaika-vṛddha). 
 
[2.24.1] kṛmyādīnāṃ pipīlikādīnām bhramarādīnāṃ manuṣyādīnām ca 
yathāsaṅkhyam ekaikavṛddhānīndriyāṇi bhavanti |  
The senses (indriya) of  
i. [the class of souls] beginning with worms (kṛmi-ādi),  
ii. [the class of souls] beginning with ants (pipīlikā-ādi),  
iii. [the class of souls] beginning with bees (bhramara-ādi), and (ca)  
iv. [the class of souls] beginning with human beings (manuṣya-ādi)  
are (bhavanti) respectively (yathāsaṅkhyam) increasing one by one (ekaika-vṛddha). 
[2.24.2] yathākramam | [2.24.3] tadyathā | [2.24.4] kṛmyādīnāṃ apādika-
nūpurakagaṇḍūpadaśaṅkhaśuktikāśambūkājalūkāprabhṛtīnām ekendriye-
bhyaḥ pṛthivyādibhya ekena vṛddhe sparśanarasanendriye bhavataḥ |  
Successively834 (yathākramam) — Namely (tad-yathā): The senses of touch and taste 
(sparśana-rasana-indriya) are (bhavatas) increased (vṛddha) by one (eka) from [the 
class of souls] beginning with earth etc. (pṛthivī-ādi) for [the class of souls] 
 
832 The Sarvārthasiddhi reads ‘vanaspatyantānām’, ‘up to the plant-bodied’. 
833 For a discussion of this passage, see §3.3, Number of senses in classes of beings. 





beginning with worms835 (kṛmi-ādi) — [i.e.], beginning with (prabhṛtin) apādika, 
nūpuraka, gaṇḍūpada, conch-shells (śaṅkha), śuktikā, śambūkā, [and] leeches 
(jalūkā).836 
[2.24.5] tato ’py ekena vṛddhāni pipīlikārohiṇikāupacikākunthūtuburukatra-
pusabījakarpāsāsthikāśatapadyutpatakatṛṇapatrakāṣṭahārakaprabhṛtīnāṃ 
trīṇi sparśanarasanaghrāṇāni |  
Again (api), from that (i.e., the class of souls beginning with worms) (tatas), the 
three (tri) [senses of] touch, taste, [and] smell (sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa) [are] 
increased (vṛddha) by one (eka) for [the class of souls] beginning with (prabhṛtin) 
ants (pipīlikā), rohiṇikā, upacikā, kunthū, tuburuka, trapusabīja, karpāsāsthikā, 
centipedes (śatapadī), utpataka, tṛṇapatra, [and] kāṣṭa-hāraka. 
 [2.24.6] tato ’py ekena vṛddhāni bhramara-vaṭara-sāraṅga-makṣikā-puttikā-
daṃśa-maśaka-vṛścika-nandyāvarta-kīṭa-pataṅgādīnāṃ catvāri sparśana-
rasanaghrāṇacakṣūṃṣi |  
Again (api), from that (i.e., the class of souls beginning with ants) (tatas), the four 
(catur) [senses of] touch, taste, smell, [and] sight (sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣus) 
[are] increased (vṛddha) by one (eka) for [the class of souls] beginning with (ādi) 
bees (bhramara), vaṭara, sāraṅga, flies (makṣikā), puttikā, gnats (daṃśa), mosquitos 
(maśaka), scorpions (vṛścika), nandyāvarta, worms (kīṭa), [and] moths (pataṅga). 
 [2.24.7] śeṣāṇām ca tiryagyonijānāṃ matsyoragabhujaṅgapakṣicatuṣ-
padānāṃ sarveṣāṃ ca nārakamanuṣyadevānāṃ pañcendriyāṇīti ||  
And (ca) [there are] five (pañca) senses (indriya) for the remaining [classes of souls] 
(śeṣa), [i.e.]: 
i. [beings] born from the womb of an animal (tiryag-yoni-ja) and (ca)  
ii. all (sarva) fishes, snakes, serpents, birds, [and] quadrupeds (matsya-uraga-
bhujaṅga-pakṣi-catuṣpada) [and] 
iii. hellish beings, human beings, [and] gods (nāraka-manuṣya-deva) (iti). 
 
835 In other words, the class of souls that includes worms etc. has one sense more than the 
class of souls that includes earth etc.  





[2.24.8] atrāha | [2.24.9] uktaṃ bhavatā dvividhā jīvāḥ | [2.24.10] samanaskā 
amanaskāś ceti | [2.24.11] tatra ke samanaskā iti | [2.24.12] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TABh 2.11.1) 
(bhavat) [that] souls (jīva) [are] twofold (dvividha): with minds (samanaska) and 
without minds (amanaska). Among them (tatra), which [souls] (kim) [are provided] 
with minds (samanaska)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
saṃjñinaḥ samanaskāḥ ||2.25|| 
2.25 Conscious [beings] (saṃjñin) [are provided] with minds (samanaska). 
 
[2.25.1] saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñāyāṃ saṃjñino jīvāḥ samanaskā bhavanti |  
Souls (jīva) [that are] conscious (saṃjñin) with respect to the awareness of 
deliberation837  (saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā) are (bhavanti) [provided] with minds 
(samanaska). 
[2.25.2] sarve nārakadevā garbhavyutkrāntayaś ca manuṣyās tiryagyonijāś ca 
kecit ||  
[I.e.], all (sarva) hellish beings and gods (nāraka-deva), and (ca) [beings] born from 
the womb (garbhavyutkrānti), [and] human beings (manuṣya), and (ca) some838 
(kecid) [beings] born from the womb of animals (tiryagyoni-ja). 
[2.25.3] īhā 839 pohayuktā guṇadoṣavicāraṇātmikā saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā | 
[2.25.4] tāṃ prati saṃjñino vivakṣitāḥ |  
The awareness of deliberation (saṃpradhāraṇa-saṃjñā), the nature of which [is] the 
distinction [between] merits and defects 840  (guṇa-doṣa-vicāraṇā-ātmikā), [is] 
connected with desire and exclusion (īhā-apoha-yuktā). [Souls are] said (vivakṣita) 
[to be] ‘conscious’ (see TA 2.15) (saṃjñin) with respect to (prati) this (i.e., 
saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā) (tad). 
 
837 I.e., with moral consciousness (see TABh 2.25.3). According to Sanghvi, the term 
‘saṃpradhāraṇasaṃjñā’ refers to ‘reflection over the merits and demerits of things’ (Sanghvi 
1974: 95-96). 
838 The Sanskrit is ambiguous; it is not clear whether kecid should be connected with both 
manuṣya and tiryagyonija or only with the latter. Siddhasenagaṇi connects kecid with 
tiryagyonija only. 
839 Mody reads īhopoha-. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘īhā-’. 





[2.25.5] anyathā hy āhārabhayamaithunaparigrahasaṃjñābhiḥ sarva eva jīvāḥ 
saṃjñina iti || 
For (hi), otherwise (anyathā),  all (sarva) souls (jīva) [would be] indeed (eva) 











[5.0.1] uktā jīvāḥ | [5.0.2] ajīvān vakṣyāmaḥ ||  
Souls (jīva) have been discussed (ukta). [Now] we will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) non-
souls (i.e., inanimate entities) (ajīva).841 
 
ajīvakāyā dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ ||5.1|| 
5.1 The inanimate entities842 (ajīva-kāya) [are]: 
i. motion (dharma) 
ii. rest (adharma) 
iii. space (ākāśa) [and]  
iv. material elements843 (pudgala). 
 
[5.1.1] dharmāstikāyo ’dharmāstikāya ākāśāstikāyāḥ pudgalāstikāya ity 
ajīvakāyāḥ | [5.1.2] tān lakṣaṇataḥ parastād vakṣyāmaḥ |  
We will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) them (tad) below (see TABh 5.16.11) (parastāt) based 
on [their] characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa). The category of motion (dharma-astikāya), the 
category of rest (adharma-astikāya), the category of space (ākāśa-astikāya) and the 
category of material elements (pudgala-astikāya) — [these are] (iti) the inanimate 
entities (ajīvakāya). 
[5.1.3] kāyagrahaṇaṃ pradeśāvayavabahutvārtham addhāsamaya-
pratiṣedhārthaṃ ca || 
The expression ‘entity’ (kāya-grahaṇa) [denotes] the plurality of space-points and 
parts (pradeśa-avayava844-bahutva-artha) and (ca) the exclusion of ‘real-time’845 
(addhā-samaya-pratiṣedha-artha).  
 
841 For a discussion of the different substances in the TA, see § 3.4, The substances. 
842 I translate ‘kāya’ as ‘entity’. The primary meaning ‘body’ does not fit in this context, since 
the list of entities (kāya) also includes space, motion, and rest. 
843 The word ‘pudgala’ consistently appears in plural in the TA. Therefore, I translate 
‘material elements’.  
844 The word ‘avayava’ is also used in Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which postulates ‘[a] “whole” 
(avayavin) as an entity over and above its constituent parts (avayava)’ (Halbfass 1992: 94). 
845 Jacobi translates the term ‘addhāsamaya’ as ‘real-time’ (Uttarādhyayana 35: 5-6). He 






dravyāṇi jīvāś ca ||5.2|| 
5.2 [These inanimate entities] together with (ca) the souls (jīva) are the substances 
(dravya). 
 
[5.2.1] ete dharmādayaś catvāro prāṇinaś ca pañca dravyāni ca bhavantīti |  
And (ca) these (etad) four [entities] (catur), beginning with motion (dharma-ādi), 
together with (ca) the living [entities] (prāṇin) are (bhavanti) the five (pañca) 
substances (dravya) (iti). 
[5.2.2] uktaṃ hi matiśrutayor nibandho dravyeṣv asarvaparyāyeṣu 
sarvadravyaparyāyeṣu kevalasyeti ||  
Indeed (hi), it has been said (see TA 1.27, 1.30) (ukta) [that] ‘the binding (i.e., the 
range) (nibandha) of ordinary cognition (mati) and testimony (śruta) [extends to all] 
substances (dravya)846 [but] not in all modes (asarva-paryāya)’ and ‘[the domain of] 
absolute knowledge (kevala) [extends to] all modes of all substances (sarva-dravya-
paryāya)’. 
 
nityāvasthitāny arūpāṇi ||5.3||847 
5.3 [These substances] are eternal (nitya), fixed848 (avasthita) [and] formless (arūpa). 
 
 
moment is existent. And a moment cannot be divided’ (Jacobi 1885: 208, n1). Time is not 
included in the list of ‘entities’ (kāya) or ‘substances’ (dravya) in TA 5.1, even though TA 5.38 
mentions that some people regard time as a substance. 
846 TA 1.27 reads ‘sarvadravyeṣu’.  
847 Siddhasenagaṇi discusses several interpretations of this sūtra and mentions the variant 
reading ‘rūpīṇi’, which is also given in Mody. Kapadia adds ‘ca’ after arūpāṇi. It is unclear to 
me why the sūtra presents ‘nitya’ and ‘avasthita’ in compound, unlike ‘arūpa’. The syntax is 
somewhat odd if the author is trying to express that the five dravyas have these three 
qualities, as the bhāṣya suggests. In fact, there are two other possibilities to translate this 
sūtra:  
I. ‘The formless [substances] [are] eternal and fixed.’  
II. ‘[The five substances are] eternal and fixed. [There are] formless [substances].’ (By 
contrast, the material elements do have form. See TA 5.4). 
However, both alternatives are contradicted by TABh 5.3.5. 





[5.3.1] etāni dravyāṇi nityāni bhavanti | [5.3.2] tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam iti 
vakṣyate ||  
These (etad) substances (dravya) are (bhavanti) eternal (nitya). It will be said (see 
TA 5.30) (vakṣyate) [that] ‘[that] whose state is not changing (tad-bhāva-avyaya), [is] 
eternal (nitya)’ (iti). 
[5.3.3] avasthitāni ca | [5.3.4] na hi kadācit pañcatvaṃ bhūtārthatvaṃ ca 
vyabhicaranti ||  
And (ca) [these substances are] fixed (avasthita). For (hi), [they] never (na ... kadācit) 
transgress (vyabhicaranti) the quality of being five (pañcatva) and (ca) the quality of 
being real (bhūtārthatva). 
[5.3.5] arūpāṇi ca | [5.3.6] naiṣāṃ rūpam astīti | [5.3.7] rūpaṃ mūrtir 
mūrtyāśrayāś ca sparśādaya iti || 
And (ca) [these substances are] formless (arūpa).849 [There] is (asti) no (na) form 
(rūpa) for them (idam). ‘Form’ (rūpa) [is] ‘embodiment’ (mūrti), and (ca) [the 
objects of the senses (see TA 2.21)] beginning with touch (sparśa-ādi) [are] 
dependent on embodiment (mūrti-āśraya) (iti). 
 
rūpiṇaḥ pudgalāḥ ||5.4|| 
5.4 [However], material elements (pudgala) [are] having form (rūpin). 
 
[5.4.1] pudgalā eva rūpiṇo bhavanti | [5.4.2] rūpam eṣām asty eṣu vāstīti 
rūpiṇaḥ || 
Only (eva)850 material elements (pudgala) are (bhavanti) having form (rūpin). 
[There] is (asti) form (rūpa) for them (idam), or (vā), [there] is (asti) [form] in the 
case of them (idam) — [that is the meaning of] (iti) ‘having form’ (rūpin). 
 
ākāśād ekadravyāṇi ||5.5|| 
5.5 [The substances] up to space (i.e., motion, rest and space) (ā-ākāśa)851 [are] 
unique substances (eka-dravya). 
 
 
849 Alternatively, ‘And there are formless [substances].’ See the footnote on TA 5.3. 
850 Alternatively, ‘material elements are indeed (eva) having form’. 





[5.5.1] ā ākāśād dharmādīny ekadravyāṇy eva bhavanti | [5.5.2] pudgalajīvās tv 
anekadravyāṇīti || 
[The substances] up to space (ā ākāśa), beginning with motion (dharma-ādi) are 
(bhavanti) indeed (eva) unique substances (ekadravya). However (tu), material 
elements [and] souls (pudgala-jīva) [are] non-unique substances (aneka-dravya). 
 
niṣkriyāṇi ca ||5.6|| 
5.6 And [they] (i.e., motion, rest, and space) (ca) [are] inactive (niṣkriya). 
 
[5.6.1] ā ākāśād eva dharmādīni niṣkriyāṇi bhavanti | [5.6.2] pudgalajīvās tu 
kriyāvantaḥ | [5.6.3] kriyeti gatikarmāha |  
[The substances] up to space (ā ākāśa), beginning with motion (dharma-ādi) are 
(bhavanti) indeed (eva) inactive (niṣkriya). However (tu), material elements [and] 
souls (pudgala-jīva) [are] active (kriyāvat). It has been said (āha)852 [that] ‘action’ 
(kriyā) (iti) [is] ‘the action of going’853 (gati-karman). 
[5.6.4] atrāha | [5.6.5] uktaṃ bhavatā pradeśāvayavabahutvaṃ kāyasaṃjñam 
iti | [5.6.6] tasmāt ka eṣāṃ dharmādīnāṃ pradeśāvayavaniyama iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TABh 5.1.3) 
(bhavat) [that] the term ‘entity’ (kāya-saṃjña) [denotes] ‘the plurality of space-
points and parts’ (pradeśa-avayava-bahutva) (iti). Therefore (tasmāt), what (kim) [is] 
the limitation (i.e., number) of space-points and parts (pradeśa-avayava-niyama) for 
these (idam) [substances] beginning with motion (dharma-ādi)?  
[5.6.7] atrocyate | [5.6.8] sarveṣāṃ pradeśāḥ santy anyatra paramāṇoḥ | [5.6.9] 
avayavās tu skandhānām eva |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): For all [substances] (sarva) there are (santi) 
space-points (pradeśa), except for an infinitesimal particle (parama-aṇu). However 
(tu), [there are] parts854 (avayava) for the aggregates (skandha) only (eva). 
 
852 Siddhasenagaṇi comments that ‘āha’ refers to the author of the sūtra. However, I have not 
been able to identify the source of this reference. 
853 Alternatively, ‘the karman of transmigration’. Siddhasenagaṇi explains that the author of 
the bhāṣya uses an alternative root, i.e., ‘gam-dhātu’ instead of ‘kṛ-dhātu’. 





[5.6.10] vakṣyate hy aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante iti || 
[5.6.11] tatra 
For (hi), it will be said (see TA 5.25, TA 6.26) (vakṣyate) [that] ‘[material elements 
exist as] atoms (aṇu) and aggregates (skandha)’ [and that] ‘[they] result (utpad) 
from combination (saṃghāta) [and] disintegration (bheda)’ (iti). Among them (i.e., 
the substances) (tatra): 
 
asaṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśā dharmādharmayoḥ ||5.7|| 
5.7 [There are] innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) space-points (pradeśa) for motion [and] 
rest (dharma-adharma). 
 
[5.7.1] pradeśo nāmāpekṣikaḥ sarvasūkṣmas tu paramāṇor avagāha iti || 
[That which is] called (nāma) ‘space-point’ (pradeśa) [is] relative855 (āpekṣika). 
However (tu), the abidance856 (avagāha) of the infinitesimal particle (parama-aṇu) 
[is] most subtle (sarva-sūkṣma).857 
 
jīvasya ca ||5.8|| 
5.8 Likewise (see TA 5.7) (ca), [there are innumerable space-points] for the soul 
(jīva). 
  
[5.8.1] ekajīvasya cāsaṅkhyeyāḥ pradeśā bhavantīti || 
Likewise (ca), [there] are (bhavanti) innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) space-points 
(pradeśa) for an individual soul (eka-jīva). 
 
ākāśasyānantāḥ ||5.9|| 
5.9 There are infinitely many [space-points] (ananta) for space (ākāśa). 
 
[5.9.1] lokālokākāśasyānantāḥ pradeśāḥ | [5.9.2] lokākāśasya tu 
dharmādharmaikajīvais tulyāḥ || 
The worldly realm and that which is beyond the world (loka-aloka-ākāśa) have 
infinitely many (ananta) space-points (pradeśa). However, [the space-points] of the 
 
855 TABh 5.24.5 distinguishes relative (āpekṣika) and ultimate (antya) subtlety of matter.  
856 For an explanation of the term ‘abidance’ (avagāha), see TA 5.12. 
857 For a discussion of the size of space-points (pradeśa) and the infinitesimal particle 





worldly realm (loka-ākāśa) [are] equal to (tulya) [the space-points occupied by] 
motion, rest, and souls (dharma-adharma-jīva).858 
  
saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyāś ca pudgalānām ||5.10|| 
5.10 [There are infinitely many] 859  and (ca) numerable (saṅkhyeya) [and] 
innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) [space-points] for material elements (pudgala). 
 
[5.10.1] saṅkhyeyā asaṅkhyeyā anantāś ca pudgalānāṃ pradeśā bhavanti | 
[5.10.2] anantā iti vartate || 
There are (bhavanti) numerable (saṅkhyeya), innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) and (ca) 
infinitely many (ananta) space-points (pradeśa) for material elements (pudgala). 
[The expression] ‘infinitely many’ (ananta iti) is present (i.e., is carried over from 
TA 5.9) (vartate).860 
 
nāṇoḥ ||5.11|| 
5.11 [There are] no [space-points] for an atom (aṇu). 
  
[5.11.1] aṇoḥ pradeśā na bhavanti | [5.11.2] anādir amadhyo ’pradeśo hi 
paramāṇuḥ || 
There are (bhavanti) no (na) space-points (pradeśa) for an atom (aṇu). For (hi), the 
infinitesimal particle (paramāṇu) [is] without beginning (anādi), without centre 
(amadhya), [and] without space-point (apradeśa).861  
 
lokākāśe ’vagāhaḥ ||5.12|| 
5.12 [There is] abidance (avagāha)862 in the worldly realm (loka-ākāśa). 
 
[5.12.1] avagāhinām avagāho lokākāśe bhavati || 
The abidance (avagāha) of [those entities that are] abiding (avagāhin) is (bhavati) in 
the worldly realm (lokākāśa). 
 
858 In other words, the space-points in loka are innumerable but not infinitely many. The 
space-points in aloka are infinitely many. 
859 See TABh 5.10.2. 
860 For an explanation of the meaning of ‘vartate’, see Tubb & Boose 2007: 165-166. 
861 See also TABh 5.14.1. 
862 The prime meaning of the word ‘avagāha’ is ‘plunging’ or ‘bathing’ (MW). In this passage, 






dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne ||5.13|| 
5.13 [There is abidance of] motion [and] rest (dharma-adharma) in the entire 
(kṛtsna) [worldly realm]. 
 
[5.13.1] dharmādharmayoḥ kṛtsne lokākāśe ’vagāho bhavatīti || 
There is (bhavati) abidance (avagāha) of motion [and] rest (dharma-adharma) in 
the entire (kṛtsna) [worldly realm]. 
 
ekapradeśādiṣu bhājyaḥ pudgalānām ||5.14|| 
5.14 [There is] distribution (bhājya) of material elements (pudgala) in one space-
point etc. (eka-pradeśa-ādi).  
 
[5.14.1] apradeśasaṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyānantapradeśānāṃ pudgalānām ekādiṣv 
ākāśapradeśeṣu bhājya ’vagāhaḥ |  
Abidance (avagāha) [is] distribution (bhājya) of material elements (pudgala) — 
[which are] without space-points, with numerable, innumerable, and infinitely many 
space-points (apradeśa-saṅkhyeya-asaṅkhyeya-ananta-pradeśa) — in [a number of] 
units of space863 (ākāśa-pradeśa), beginning with one (eka-ādi).864 
[5.14.2] bhājyo vibhājyo vikalpa ity anarthāntaram |  
‘Distribution’ (bhājya), ‘to be divided’ (vibhājya), ‘arranged’ (vikalpa) (iti) — [these 
are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (anarthāntara).865 
[5.14.3] tadyathā | [5.14.4] paramāṇor ekasminn eva pradeśe | [5.14.5] 
dvyaṇukasyaikasmin dvayoś ca | [5.14.6] tryaṇukasyaikasmin dvayos triṣu ca |  
Namely (tadyathā):  
i. [the abidance] of the infinitesimal particle (paramāṇu) [is] only (eva) in one 
(eka) space-point (pradeśa); 
ii. [the abidance] of [an aggregate of] two atoms (dvi-aṇuka) [is] in one (eka) 
and (ca) two (dvi) [space-points]; 
 
863 The general meaning of ‘pradeśa’ in this chapter of the TA is ‘space-points’. However, it 
seems that the author of the bhāṣya tries to explain this notion by describing space-points as 
‘ākāśa-pradeśa’, which I translate in this passage as ‘units of space’. 
864 In other words, material elements occupy one or more space-points (see TABh 5.15.4 – 
5.14.6). 





iii. [the abidance] of [an aggregate of] three atoms (tri-aṇuka) [is] in one (eka), 
two (dvi), and (ca) three (tri) [space-points]. 
 
[5.14.7] evaṃ caturaṇukādīnāṃ saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyapradeśasyaikādiṣu 
saṅkhyeyeṣv asaṅkhyeyeṣu ca | [5.14.8] anantapradeśasya ca || 
Likewise (evam), [the abidance] of  
i. [an aggregate of] four atoms etc. (catur-aṇuka-ādi)  
ii. [an aggregate] whose space-point[s] 866  (pradeśa) [are] numerable 
(saṅkhyeya)  
iii. [and an aggregate whose space-points are] innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) 
[is respectively] in 
i. one [space-point] etc. (eka-ādi),  
ii. numerable (saṅkhyeya), and (ca)  
iii. innumerable (asaṅkhyeya) [space-points].  
And (ca) [the same applies] to [an aggregate] whose space-points [are] infinitely 
many (ananta-pradeśa). 
 
asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām ||5.15|| 
5.15 [The abidance] of souls (jīva) [is] in innumerable parts etc. (asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-
ādi). 
 
[5.15.1] lokākāśapradeśānām asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavati | 
[5.15.2] ā sarvalokād iti || 
There is (bhavati) abidance (avagāha) of souls (jīva) in innumerable parts867 etc. 
(asaṃkhyeya-bhāga-ādi) of the space-points in the worldly realm (loka-ākāśa-
pradeśa), up to the whole world (ā sarva-loka). 
[5.15.3] atrāha | [5.15.4] ko hetur asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho 
bhavatīti | [5.15.5] atrocyate || 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): What (kim) is (bhavati) the cause (hetu) [of the 
fact that] ‘there is (bhavati) abidance (avagāha) of souls (jīva) in innumerable parts 
etc. (asaṅkhyeya-bhāga-ādi)868 (iti)’? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
866 It is unclear to me why the word ‘-pradeśasya’ appears in a singular rather than plural 
form. 
867 Siddhasenagaṇi analyses the compound as a karmadhāraya. 






pradeśasaṃhāravisargābhyāṃ pradīpavat ||5.16|| 
5.16 [It is caused] by contraction (saṃhāra) [and] expansion (visarga) [of] space-
points (pradeśa), like a light869 (pradīpa). 
 
[5.16.1] jīvasya hi pradeśānāṃ saṃhāravisargāv iṣṭau pradīpasyeva |  
For, contraction (saṃhāra) [and] expansion (visarga) of the space-points (pradeśa) 
of the soul (jīva) [are] desired (iṣṭa), like (iva) [the contraction and expansion] of a 
light (pradīpa). 
[5.16.2] tadyathā | [5.16.3] tailavartyagnyupādānapravṛddhaḥ pradīpo 
mahatīm api kūṭāgāraśālāṃ prakāśayaty aṇvīm api māṇikāvṛtaḥ māṇikāṃ 
droṇāvṛto droṇam āḍhakāvṛtaścāḍhakaṃ prasthāvṛtaḥ prasthaṃ pāṇyāvṛto 
pāṇim iti |  
Namely (tadyathā), a light (pradīpa) [whose] increase [is] dependent on fuel, a wick 
and fire (taila-vartī-agni-upādāna-pravṛddha), illuminates (prakāśayati) also (api) a 
big (mahat) room [of] a house [up to] the top (kūṭa-agāra870-śāla), as well as (api) a 
small [room] (aṇvī). [To illustrate], 
 [when there is] a māṇika871 [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a māṇika 
(māṇika-āvṛta); 
 [when there is] a droṇa872 [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a droṇa (droṇa-
āvṛta); 
 and (ca) [when there is] an āḍhaka873 [of fuel], [the light is] limited by an 
āḍhaka (āḍhaka-āvṛta); 
 [when there is] a prastha874 [of fuel], [the light is] limited by a prastha 
(prastha-āvṛta);  




869 I.e., like the reach of a light, which adapts to the size of the space in which the light is 
placed. 
870 Or: āgāra. 








[5.16.4] evam eva pradeśānāṃ saṃhāravisargābhyāṃ jīvo mahāntam aṇuṃ vā 
pañcavidhaṃ śarīraskandhaṃ dharmādharmākāśapudgalajīvapradeśa-
samudāyaṃ vyāpnotīty avagāhata ity arthaḥ |  
Exactly so (evam eva), the soul (jīva) pervades (vyāpnoti)  
 a big (mahānta) or (vā) small [space] (aṇu),  
 the fivefold (pañcavidha) types of the body875 (śarīra-skandha),  
 [or] the totality of space-points of motion, rest, space, material elements, and 
souls (dharma-adharma-ākāśa-pudgala-jīva-pradeśa-samudāya)  
by contraction [and] expansion (saṃhāravisarga) [of] space-points (pradeśa); ‘it 
abides’ (avagāhate) — [that is] the meaning (i.e., of vyāpnoti) (ity artha). 
[5.16.5] dharmādharmākāśajīvānāṃ paraspareṇa pudgaleṣu ca vṛttir na 
virudhyate ’mūrtatvāt ||  
The activity (vṛtti) of motion, rest, space, and souls (dharma-adharma-ākāśa-
pudgala-jīva) and (ca) [the activity] in the case of876 the material elements (pudgala) 
is not (na) mutually (paraspara) obstructed (virudhyate), on account of the absence 
of form (amūrtatva).  
[5.16.6] atrāha | [5.16.7] sati pradeśasaṃhāravisargasaṃbhave kasmād 
asaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu jīvānām avagāho bhavati naikapradeśādiṣv iti | [5.16.8] 
atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): If it is (sat) caused877 by contraction [and] 
expansion [of] space-points (pradeśa-saṃhāra-visarga-saṃbhava), why (kasmāt) is 
[there] (bhavati) abidance (avagāha) of souls (jīva) in innumerable parts etc.878 
(asaṃkhyeya-bhāga-ādi) [but] not (na) in a single space-point etc. (eka-pradeśa-ādi) 
(iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
875 TA 2.37 lists the five types of body as follows: ‘[The varieties of] body [are]: the gross 
[body] (audārika), [the body that is] subject to change (vaikriya), the conveyance [body] 
(āhāraka), the fiery [body], (taijasa) [and] the karmic [body] (kārmaṇa)’ (audārika-
vaikriyāhārakataijasakārmaṇāni śarīrāṇi). 
876 My interpretation of this sentence is based on Siddhasenagaṇi’s analysis of the syntax. 
877 See TABh 5.15.4 (ko hetur) and TA 5.16. 





[5.16.9] sayogatvāt saṃsāriṇām caramaśarīratribhāgahīnāvagāhitvāc ca 
siddhānām iti |  
Due to the quality of being possessed with yoga879 (sayogatva) of worldly souls 
(saṃsārin) and (ca) due to abidance [of] the final body, [which is] free from the 
three parts880 (carama-śarīra-tri-bhāga-hīna-avagāhitva), of the perfected beings 
(siddha).881 
[5.16.10] atrāha | [5.16.11] uktaṃ bhavatā dharmādīn astikāyān parastāl 
lakṣaṇato vakṣyāma iti (5.1) | [5.16.12] tat kim eṣāṃ lakṣaṇam iti | [5.16.13] 
atrocyate 
At this point (atra) one says (āha) — [The following] has been said (ukta) by you 
(see TABh 5.1.1 - 5.1.2) (bhavat): ‘We will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) the categories 
(astikāya) beginning with motion (dharma-ādi) below (parastāt), based on [their] 
characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa)’. Now (tad), what (kim) [are] the characteristic[s] 
(lakṣaṇa) of them (idam) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
gatisthityupagraho dharmādharmayor upakāraḥ ||5.17|| 
5.17 The function (upakāra) of motion and rest (dharma-adharma) [is] the support 
(upagraha) [of] movement (gati) and inertia882 (sthiti). 
 
[5.17.1] gatimatāṃ gateḥ sthitimatāṃ ca sthiter upagraho dharmādharmayor 
upakāro yathāsaṅkhyam |  
The support (upagraha) of movement (gati) of [those entities] having movement 
(gatimat, gen.pl.) and (ca) [the support] of inertia (sthiti) of [those entities] having 
inertia (sthitimat), [that is] the function (upakāra) of motion and rest (dharma-
adharma) respectively (yathā-saṅkhyam). 
[5.17.2] upagraho nimittam apekṣā kāraṇaṃ hetur ity anarthāntaram |  
‘Support’ (upagraha), ‘condition’ (nimitta), ‘requirement’ (apekṣā), ‘ground’ 
(kāraṇa), ‘reason’ (hetu) (iti) — [these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) 
(anarthāntara). 
 
879 See also TABh 1.7.35. 
880 My analysis of the compound follows Siddhasenagaṇi’s interpretation. 
881 It is not entirely clear to me how this passage answers the question that is raised in the 
previous sentence (TABh 5.16.7). 
882 In TA 1.7 ‘sthiti’ has been translated as ‘duration’. However, in this passage ‘sthiti’ refers 





[5.17.3] upakāraḥ prayojanaṃ guṇo ’rtha ity anarthāntaram || 
‘Function’ (upakāra), ‘purpose’ (prayojana), ‘quality’ (guṇa), ‘use’ (artha) (iti) — 
[these are] not different (i.e., they are synonyms) (anarthāntara). 
 
ākāśasyāvagāhaḥ ||5.18|| 
5.18 [The function, upakāra] of space (ākāśa) [is] abidance883 (avagāha). 
 
[5.18.1] avagāhināṃ dharmādharmapudgalajīvānām avagāha ākāśasyopa-
kāraḥ | [5.18.2] dharmādharmayor antaḥpraveśasaṃbhavena pudgalajīvānām 
saṃyogavibhāgaiś ceti || 
The function (upakāra) of space (ākāśa) [is] abidance (avagāha) of motion, rest, 
material elements, and souls (dharma-adharma-pudgala-jīva). [It is] made possible 
by permeation884 (antaḥpraveśa-saṃbhava) of motion and rest (dharma-adharma) 
and (ca) by the varieties of connection885 (saṃyoga-vibhāga) of material elements 
[and] souls (pudgala-jīva). 
 
śarīravāṅmanaḥprāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām ||5.19|| 
5.19 [The function] of material elements (pudgala) [is] body, speech, mind, 
inhalation, [and] exhalation (śarīra-vāc-manas-prāṇa-apāna) [...]886 
 
[5.19.1] pañcavidhāni śarīrāṇy audārikādīni vāṅ manaḥ prāṇāpānāv iti 
pudgalānām upakāraḥ |  
The function (upakāra) of material elements (pudgala) [is]: the fivefold (pañcavidha) 
[varieties] of bodies (śarīra), beginning with the gross [body]887 (audārika-ādi), 
speech (vāc), mind (manas), inhalation, [and] exhalation (prāṇa-apāna).  
[5.19.2] tatra śarīrāṇi yathoktāni |  
Among them (tatra), the [varieties of] bodies (śarīra) [are] as it is said (see TA 2.37) 
(yathokta). 
 
883 See also TA 5.12. 
884 Böhtlink translates ‘antaḥpraveśa’ as ‘das Hinenschlüpfen’ (Böhtlingk 1855). 
885 See also TABh 1.7.10. 
886 The list continues in TA 5.20. 





[5.19.3] prāṇāpānau ca nāmakarmaṇi vyākhyātau |  
And (ca) inhalation [and] exhalation (prāṇa-apāna) are explained (TA 8.12) 888 
(vyākhyāta) in [the discussion of] body-determining karman (nāma-karman). 
[5.19.4] dvīndriyādayo jihvendriyayogād889 bhāṣātvena gṛhṇanti nānye |  
[Beings with] two senses etc. (dvi-indriya-ādi) understand (gṛhṇanti) by the quality 
of being [provided with] language (bhāṣātva), because [they are] provided with 
speech [and] mind (jihvā-indriya-yoga), not (na) others (i.e., not one-sensed beings) 
(anya). 
[5.19.5] saṃjñinaś ca manastvena gṛhṇanti nānye iti |  
And (ca) conscious [beings] (see TA 2.25) (saṃjñin) understand (gṛhṇanti) by the 
quality of being [provided with] a mind (manastva), not (na) others890 (anya). 
 [5.19.6] vakṣyate hi sakaṣāyatvāj jīvaḥ karmaṇo yogyān pudgalān ādatta iti || 
kiṃ cānyat 
Indeed (hi), it will be said (see TA 8.2) (vakṣyate) [that] ‘due to the quality of being 
with passions (sakaṣāyatva) the soul (jīva) attracts (ādatte) material elements 
(pudgala) appropriate to (yogya) karmic activity (karman)’ (iti). Further (kiṃ 
cānyat): 
 
sukhaduḥkhajīvitamaraṇopagrahāś ca ||5.20|| 
5.20 [...] and the support891 (upagraha) [of] pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), life 
(jīvita), [and] death (maraṇa). 
 
[5.20.1] sukhopagraho duḥkhopagraho jīvitopagraho maraṇopagrahaś ceti 
pudgalānām upakāraḥ |  
The function (upakāra) of material elements (pudgala) [is] the support of pleasure 
(sukha-upagraha), the support of pain (duḥkha-upagraha), the support of life (jīvita-
upagraha), and (ca) the support of death (maraṇa-upagraha) (iti). 
[5.20.2] tadyathā | [5.20.3] iṣṭāḥ sparśarasagandhavarṇaśabdāḥ 
sukhasyopakāraḥ | [5.20.4] aniṣṭā dukhasya |  
 
888 TA 8.12 lists 42 varieties of body-determining karman. One of these varieties is ‘breath’ 
(ucchvāsa). 
889 Kapadia reads ‘saṃyogād’. 
890 I.e., not the beings without a mind (amanaska) (see TA 2.11 and TA 2.25). 





Namely (tad-yathā), [objects of] touch, tastes, smells, colours, and sounds892 (sparśa-
rasa-gandha-varṇa-śabda) [that are] desirable (iṣṭa) — [their] function (upakāra) [is 
the support] of pleasure (sukha). [The function of the objects of the senses that are] 
undesirable (aniṣṭa) [is the support] of pain (dukha). 
[5.20.5] snānācchādanānulepanabhojanādīni vidhiprayuktāni jīvitasyānapa-
vartanaṃ cāyuṣkasya | [5.20.6] viṣaśastrāgnyādīni maraṇasyāpavartanaṃ 
cāyuṣkasya || 
[Actions] performed according to rule (vidhi-prayukta), beginning with bathing, 
clothing, anointing, and eating (snāna-ācchādana-anulepana-bhojana-ādi) – [their 
function is] sustenance893 (an-apavartana) of life (jīvita) and (ca) of life span 
determining karman894 (āyuṣka). [Objects beginning with] poison, weapons, [and] 
fire (viṣa-śastra-agni) – [their function is] death (maraṇa) and (ca) the removal 
(apavartana) of life span determining karman (āyuṣka). 
[5.20.7] atrāha | [5.20.8] upapannaṃ tāvad etat sopakramāṇām 
apavartanīyāyuṣām | [5.20.9] athānapavartyāyuṣāṃ katham iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): First of all (tāvat), this (etad) [is] appropriate 
(upapanna) for [those whose] lives [can] be shortened (apavartanīya-āyus), [who 
are provided] with life span reducing factors895 (sa-upakrama). Now (atha), how [is 
this] (kim) for [those whose] lives cannot be shortened896 (anapavartya-āyus) (iti)? 
[5.20.10] atrocyate | [5.20.11] teṣām api jīvitamaraṇopagrahaḥ pudgalānām 
upakāraḥ | [5.20.12] katham iti cet tad ucyate | [5.20.13] karmaṇaḥ 
sthitikṣayābhyām | [5.20.14] karma hi paudgalam iti |  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): The function (upakāra) of these (tad) material 
elements (pudgala) [is] also (api) the support of life and death897 (jīvita-maraṇa-
upagraha). If one asks (iti ced) “How?” (katham), then (tad) it is said (ucyate): By 
maintenance and destruction (sthiti-kṣaya) of karman. For (hi), karman [is] material 
(paudgala) (iti). 
 
892 I.e., the objects of the senses (see TA 2.21). 
893 Lit. ‘non-removal’. 
894 This type of karman is listed in TA 8.5. 
895 The term ‘upakrama’ is discussed in the bhāṣya on TA 2.52 and refers to factors that 
reduce one’s life span (Balcerowicz 2016c: 165). It is also mentioned in the Ṭhāṇaṁgasutta 
as one of the six states ‘according to the manner in which karman can be operated upon’ 
(Balcerowicz 2016c: 163). 
896 The term ‘anapavartyāyus’ is also used in TA 2.52. The life span of some classes of beings 
cannot be shortened. 





[5.20.15] āhāraś ca trividhaḥ sarveṣām evopakurute | [5.20.16] kiṃ kāraṇam |  
And (ca) the threefold (trividha) livelihood (āhāra) assists (upakurute) all (sarva). 
What (kim) [is] the reason [for this] (kāraṇa)? 
[5.20.17] śarīrasthityupacayabalavṛddhiprītyarthaṃ hy āhāra iti ||  
Indeed (hi), livelihood (āhāra) [is] for the sake of maintenance, growth, strength, 
flourishing, [and] satisfaction [of] the body (śarīra-sthity-upacaya-bala-vṛddhi-prīty-
artha). 
[5.20.18] atrāha | [5.20.19] gṛhṇīmas tāvad dharmādharmākāśapudgalā 898 
jīvadravyāṇām upakurvantīti | [5.20.20] atha jīvānāṃ ka upakāra iti | [5.20.21] 
atrocyate |  
At this point (atra), one says (āha): So far (tāvat), we understand (gṛhṇīmaḥ) [that] 
motion, rest, space, and material elements (dharma-adharma-ākāśa-pudgala) assist 
(upakurvanti) the animate substances (jīva-dravya) (iti). Now (atha), what (kim) [is] 
the function (upakāra) of souls (jīva) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
parasparopagraho jīvānām ||5.21|| 
5.21 [The function] of souls (jīva) [is] mutual support (paraspara-upagraha).899 
 
[5.21.1] parasparasya hitāhitopadeśābhyām upagraho jīvānām iti |  
[The function] of souls (jīva) [is] the support (upagraha) by teaching (upadeśa) 
[about that which is] beneficial and disadvantageous (hita-ahita-upadeśa) for each 
other (paraspara). 
[5.21.2] atrāha | [5.21.3] atha kālasyopakāraḥ ka iti | [5.21.4] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), what (kim) [is] the function 
(upakāra) of time (kāla) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
vartanā pariṇāmaḥ kriyā paratvāparatve ca kālasya ||5.22|| 
5.22 [The function, upakāra] of time (kāla) [is] beginning 900  (vartanā), 




898 Kapadia reads -pudgalajīva-.  
899 It seems that the TA is the first text that makes this claim. For a discussion of this sūtra, 
see § 3.4, Function of the substances. 





[5.22.1] tadyathā | [5.22.2] sarvabhāvānāṃ vartanā kālāśrayo vṛttiḥ |  
Namely (tad-yathā), the beginning (vartanā) of all things (sarvabhāva) [is] a state 
(vṛtti) [that is] dependent on time (kāla-āśraya). 
[5.22.3] vartanā utpattiḥ sthitiḥ prathamasamayāśrayā ity arthaḥ ||  
‘Beginning’ (vartanā), ‘occurrence’ (utpatti), ‘the state (sthiti) [that is] depending on 
the first moment’ (prathama-samaya-āśraya) — [that is] the meaning (ity artha).901 
[5.22.4] pariṇāmo dvividhaḥ | [5.22.5] anādir ādimāṃś ca | [5.22.6] taṃ 
parastād vakṣyāmaḥ ||  
Transformation (pariṇāma) [is] twofold: without beginning (anādi) and (ca) having 
a beginning (ādimat). We will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) this (tad) later on (see TA 5.42) 
(parastāt). 
[5.22.7] kriyā gatiḥ | [5.22.8] sā trividhā | [5.22.9] prayogagatir visrasā902gatir 
miśriketi ||  
Activity (kriyā) [is] movement (gati). It (tad) [is] threefold: beginning movement 
(prayoga-gati), declining movement (visrasā-gati), [and] mixed [movement] 
(miśrika) (iti). 
[5.22.10] paratvāparatve trividhe praśaṃsākṛte kṣetrakṛte kālakṛte iti |  
The quality of being uppermost and the quality of being lowermost903 (paratva-
aparatva) [are] threefold (trividha): resulting from praiseworthiness (praśaṃsā-
kṛta), resulting from region (kṣetra-kṛta), resulting from time (kāla-kṛta) (iti).904 
[5.22.11] tatra praśaṃsākṛte paro dharmaḥ paraṃ jñānaṃ aparo ’dharma905 
aparam ajñānam iti | 
Among them (tatra), resulting from praiseworthiness (praśaṃsā-kṛte) [are]:  
i. the uppermost (para) dharma  
ii. the uppermost (para) knowledge (jñāna) 
iii. the lowermost (apara) adharma, [and] 
 
901 The syntactical structure of this sentence is not entirely clear to me. I interpret ‘prathama-
samaya-āśrayā’ as a bahuvrīhi compound that qualifies ‘sthiti’. However, it is also possible 
that ‘sthiti’ is given as a separate synonym. 
902 Mody reads ‘viśrasāgatir’ and mentions ‘visrasāgatir’ as a variant reading. Kapadia reads 
‘visrasāgatir’. The word seems to be derived from the verbal root ‘√sras’ (falling, dropping). 
Therefore, I follow the reading ‘visrasāgatir’.  
903 In TA 5.22 I translate ‘[temporal] priority (paratva) and posteriority (aparatva)’ since 
both terms are clearly related to the function of time. However, the bhāṣya comments on 
those terms in a more general way. 
904 The bhāṣya seems to point out that the terms ‘paratva’ and ‘aparatva’ can refer to moral, 
geographical, and temporal differences. 





iv. the lowermost (apara) false knowledge (ajñāna) (iti). 
[5.22.12] kṣetrakṛte ekadikkālāvasthitayor viprakṛṣṭaḥ paro bhavati 
sannikṛṣṭo ’paraḥ |  
Resulting from region (kṣetra-kṛta) — [Amongst two things that are] placed in a 
single space [and] time (eka-diś-kāla-avasthita), remote (viprakṛṣṭa) is (bhavati) the 
uppermost (para), proximate (sannikṛṣṭa) [is] the lowermost (apara). 
[5.22.13] kālakṛte dviraṣṭavarṣād varṣaśatikaḥ paro bhavati varṣaśatikād 
dviraṣṭavarṣo ’paro bhavati ||  
Resulting from time (kālakṛta) — Someone of hundred years (varṣa-śatika) is 
(bhavati) higher (i.e., older) (para) than someone of sixteen years (dvi-aṣṭan-varṣa). 
Someone of sixteen years906 (dvi-aṣṭan-varṣa) is (bhavati) lower (i.e., younger) than 
someone of hundred years (varṣaśa-tika). 
[5.22.14] tad evaṃ praśaṃsākṣetrakṛte paratvāparatve varjayitvā vartanādīni 
kālakṛtāni kālasyopakāra iti ||  
Thus (tad evam), with the exception of (varjayitvā) the quality of being uppermost 
and lowermost [that are] resulting from praiseworthiness and region (praśaṃsā-
kṣetra-kṛta), the function (upakāra) of time (kāla) [are the things] resulting from 
time (kāla-kṛta), i.e., beginning etc. (vartanā-ādi) (iti). 
[5.22.15] atrāha | [5.22.16] uktaṃ bhavatā śarīrādīni pudgalānām upakāra iti | 
[5.22.17] pudgalān iti ca tantrāntarīyā jīvān paribhāṣante | [5.22.18] 
sparśādirahitāś cānye | [5.22.19] tat katham etad iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): You have mentioned (uktaṃ bhavatā) [that] the 
function (upakāra) of material elements (pudgala) [are] the body etc. (śarīra-ādi) 
(see TA 5.19). Yet (ca), other schools907 (tantrāntarīya) teach (paribhāṣante) [that] 
(iti) souls (jīva) [are] material elements (pudgala). And (ca) others (anya) [teach 
that they are] destitute of touch etc. (sparśa-ādi-rahita). Then (tad), how (katham) 
[is] this [possible] (etad) (iti)? 
 
906 Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘dvyaṣṭan’ as ‘sixteen’ (ṣoḍaśavarṣa). 





[5.22.20] atrocyate | [5.22.21] etadādivipratipattipratiṣedhārthaṃ viśeṣa-
vacanavivakṣayā cedam ucyate || 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): For the sake of exclusion of contradictory 
[views] beginning with this908 (etad-ādi-vipratipatti-pratiṣedha-artha) and (ca) by 
the wish to explain909 the different teachings (viśeṣa-vacana-vivakṣā), this (idam) is 
said (ucyate): 
 
sparśarasagandhavarṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ ||5.23|| 
5.23 The material elements (pudgala) possess:  
i. touch (sparśa) 
ii. taste (rasa) 
iii. smell (gandha) [and]  
iv. colour (varṇa); 
 
[5.23.1] sparśaḥ rasaḥ gandhaḥ varṇa ity evaṃlakṣaṇāḥ pudgalā bhavanti |  
Touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), [and] colour (varṇa) (iti) — the 
material elements (pudgala) are (bhavanti) characterised in this way (evam-
lakṣaṇa). 
[5.23.2] tatra sparśo ’ṣṭavidhaḥ kaṭhino mṛdur gurur laghuḥ śīti uṣṇaḥ 
snigdhaḥ rūkṣa iti |  
Among them (tatra), touch (sparśa) [is] eightfold (aṣṭavidha): 
i. hard (kaṭhina)  
ii. soft (mṛdu)  
iii. heavy (guru)  
iv. light (laghu) 
v. cold (śīti)  
vi. hot (uṣṇa)  
vii. smooth (snigdha) [and] 
viii. rough (rūkṣa) (iti). 
 
908 I.e., the alternative views that are mentioned in TABh 5.22.17 – 5.22.18. 






[5.23.3] rasaḥ pañcavidhas tiktaḥ kaṭuḥ kaṣāyo ’mlo madhura iti |  
Taste (rasa) [is] fivefold (pañcavidha):  
i. bitter (tikta) 
ii. sharp (kaṭu) 
iii. astringent (kaṣāya) 
iv. acid (amla) [and] 
v. sweet (madhura) (iti). 
[5.23.4] gandho dvividhaḥ surabhir asurabhiś ca |  
Smell (gandha) [is] twofold (dvividha): 
i. fragrant (surabhi) and (ca) 
ii. non-fragrant (asurabhi). 
[5.23.5] varṇaḥ pañcavidhaḥ kṛṣṇo nīlo lohitaḥ pītaḥ śukla iti || [5.23.6] kiṃ 
cānyat |  
Colour (varṇa) [is] fivefold (pañcavidha): 
i. black (kṛṣṇa)  
ii. blue (nīla) 
iii. red (lohita)  
iv. yellow (pīta) [and] 
v. white (śukla) (iti).  




5.24 And910 [the material elements] possess:  
i. sound (śabda) 
ii. connection (bandha) 
iii. subtlety (saukṣmya) 
iv. largeness (sthaulya) 
v. shape (saṃsthāna) 
vi. partition (bheda) 
vii. darkness (tamas) 
viii. shade (chāyā) 
 






ix. heat (tapas) [and]  
x. light (uddyota). 
 
[5.24.1] tatra śabdaḥ ṣaḍvidhaḥ tato vitato ghanaḥ śuṣiro gharṣo bhāṣa iti ||  
Among them (tatra), sound (śabda) [is] sixfold (ṣadvidha):911 
i. far reaching (tata) 
ii. diffused912 (vitata)  
iii. firm (ghana) 
iv. hollow (śuṣira)913  
v. frictional (gharṣa), [and] 
vi. spoken (bhāṣa) (iti). 
[5.24.2] bandhas trividhaḥ | [5.24.3] prayogabandho visrasābandho914 miśra iti |  
Connection (bandha) [is] threefold (trividha):  
i. yoked connection915 (prayoga-bandha) 
ii. loose connection (visrasā-bandha), [and]  
iii. mixed [connection] (miśra) (iti). 
[5.24.4] snigdharūkṣatvād bhavatīti vakṣyate || 
It will be said (see TA 5.32) (vakṣyate) [that a connection of material elements] 
arises (bhavati) due to smoothness and roughness (snigdha-rūkṣatva) (iti). 
[5.24.5] saukṣmyaṃ dvividham antyam āpekṣikaṃ ca |  
Subtlety (saukṣmya) [is] twofold (dvividha): ultimate (antya), and (ca) relative 
(āpekṣika). 
[5.24.6] antyaṃ paramāṇuṣv eva | [5.24.7] āpekṣikaṃ dvyaṇukādiṣu 
saṃghātapariṇāmāpekṣaṃ bhavati |  
Ultimate [subtlety] (antya) [is] only (eva) in the infinitesimal particles (paramāṇu). 
Relative [subtlety] (āpikṣika) exists (bhavati) dependent on combination916 [and] 
transformation (saṃghāta-pariṇāma-apekṣā) in the case of [aggregates] beginning 
with [an aggregate of] two atoms (dvi-aṇuka-ādi).  
 
911 Siddhasenagaṇi explains each sound with the example of a musical instrument. E.g., the 
sound of a drum is ‘far reaching (tata), the sound of a lute is ‘diffused’ (vitata), etc. 
912 Alternatively, ‘not far reaching’.  
913 = ‘suṣira’ (MW). 
914 Mody reads ‘viśrasābandha’. I follow Kapadia’s edition, which reads ‘visrasābandha’. Cf. 
TABh 5.22.9. 
915 Siddhasenagaṇi explains this as related to the soul (jīva-vyāpāra). 





[5.24.8] tadyathā | [5.24.9] āmalakād badaram iti || 
Namely (tadyathā): a jujube (badara) [compared with] a gooseberry (i.e., a jujube is 
relatively subtle compared to a gooseberry) (āmalaka) (iti). 
[5.24.10] sthaulyam api dvividham antyam āpekṣikaṃ ca |  
Largeness (sthaulya) [is] also (api) twofold (dvividha): ultimate (antya) and (ca) 
relative (āpekṣika). 
[5.24.11] saṃghātapariṇāmāpekṣam eva bhavati | [5.24.12] tatrāntyaṃ 
sarvalokavyāpini mahāskandhe bhavati | [5.24.13] āpekṣikaṃ badarādibhya 
āmalakādiṣv iti ||  
It exists (bhavati) indeed (eva) dependent on combination [and] transformation 
(saṃghāta-pariṇāma-apekṣā). Among them (tatra), ultimate [largeness] (antya) 
exists (bhavati) in the great aggregate917 (mahā-skandha), [which is] pervading the 
whole world (sarva-loka-vyāpin). Relative [largeness] (āpekṣika) [exists] in 
gooseberries etc. (āmalaka-ādi) [compared to] jujubes etc. (badara-ādi) (iti). 
[5.24.14] saṃsthānam anekavidham | [5.24.15] dīrghahrasvādyanitthantva918-
paryantam ||  
Shape (saṃsthāna) [is] manifold (anekavidha): including indefinite [shapes]919, 
beginning with long and short (dīrgha-hrasva-ādy-anitthantva-paryanta). 
[5.24.16] bhedaḥ pañcavidhaḥ | [5.24.17] autkārikaḥ caurṇikaḥ khaṇḍaḥ 
prataraḥ anutaṭa iti ||  
Partition (bheda) [is] fivefold:920 
i. split (autkārika)  
ii. pulverised (caurṇika)  
iii. a piece (khaṇḍa)  
iv. layered921 (pratara)  
v. from the sides922 (anutaṭa) (iti). 
 
917 The precise meaning of ‘mahāskandha’ is not clear to me. Perhaps it refers to the 
conceptual opposite of a paramāṇu. 
918 Mody reads ‘-anitthatva-’. Kapadia has the correct reading ‘anitthantva’. 
919 Lit. ‘not-thusness’ (an-itthantva <ittham). Sanghvi refers to the shapes of clouds (Sanghvi 
1974: 196). 
920 My translation of the following terms is based on Sanghvi’s interpretation (Sanghvi 1974: 
196). 
921 Like chopped off layers of mica (Sanghvi 1974: 196). 





[5.24.18] tamaśchāyātapoddyotāś ca pariṇāmajāḥ ||  
And (ca) darkness, shade, heat, [and] light (tamas-chāyā-tapas-uddyota) [are] 
produced by transformation (pariṇāma-ja).923 
[5.24.19] sarva evaite sparśādayaḥ pudgaleṣu eva bhavantīti | [5.24.20] ataḥ 
pudgalās tadvantaḥ ||  
All these (sarva etad) [characteristics]924 beginning with touch (sparśa-ādi) exist 
(bhavanti) indeed (eva) in the very (eva) material elements (pudgala) (iti). Hence 
(atas), the material elements (pudgala) [are] like that (tadvat). 
[5.24.21] atrāha | [5.24.22] kim arthaṃ sparśādīnāṃ śabdādīnāṃ ca pṛthak 
sūtrakaraṇam iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Why (kim artham) [is] the composition of the 
sūtra (sūtra-karaṇa) separate (pṛthak) for [the objects of the senses] beginning with 
touch (sparśa-ādi) and (ca) for [the objects of the senses] beginning with sound 
(śabda-ādi) (iti)?925 
[5.24.23] atrocyate | [5.24.24] sparśādayaḥ paramāṇuṣu skandheṣu ca 
pariṇāmajā eva bhavantīti | [5.24.25] śabdādayas tu skandheṣv eva bhavanty 
anekanimittāś cety ataḥ pṛthak karaṇam ||  
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): [The objects of the senses] beginning with 
touch (sparśa-ādi) exist (bhavanti) indeed (eva), produced by transformation926 
(pariṇāma-ja), in [the case of] the infinitesimal particles (paramāṇu) and (ca) 
aggregates927 (skandha). However (tu), [the objects of the senses] beginning with 
sound (śabda-ādi) exist (bhavanti) only (eva) in [the case of] aggregates (skandha). 
And (ca) [they are] caused differently (aneka-nimitta) (iti). Hence (atas), the 
composition [of the sūtras] (karaṇa) [is] separate (pṛthak).  
[5.24.26] ta ete pudgalāḥ samāsato dvividhā bhavanti | [5.24.27] tadyathā 
Succinctly (samāsatas), these (tad) very (etad) material elements (pudgala) are 
(bhavanti) twofold (dvividha), namely (tadyathā): 
 
aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca ||5.25|| 
5.25 [The material elements exist as] atoms (aṇu) and aggregates (skandha). 
 
923 It is somewhat strange that this explanation differs from the previous explanations, which 
all mention different varieties. 
924 See TABh 5.23.1: ‘lakṣaṇa’. 
925 In other words, why are TA 5.23 and TA 5.24 separated? 
926 See TABh 5.24.18. 






[5.25.1] uktaṃ ca kāraṇam eva tad antyaṃ928 sūkṣmo nityaś ca paramāṇuḥ |  
[5.25.2] ekarasagandhavarṇo dvisparśaḥ kāryaliṅgaś ca || [5.25.3] iti |929  
And (ca) [it has been] said (ukta):  
‘The cause (kāraṇa) [is] indeed (eva) that (tad), the ultimate (antya). The 
infinitesimal particle (paramāṇu) [is] subtle (sūkṣma) and (ca) eternal (nitya).  
[It has] one taste, smell, [and] colour (eka-rasa-gandha-varṇa), two [types of] 
touch930 (dvi-sparśa), and (ca) its mark [is] the effect (kārya-liṅga) (iti).’ 
[5.25.4] tatrāṇavo ’baddhāḥ skandhās tu baddhā eva ||  
Among them (tatra), the atoms (aṇu) [are] unconnected (abaddha) but (tu) the 
aggregates (skandha) [are] indeed (eva) connected (baddha). 
[5.25.5] atrāha | [5.25.6] kathaṃ punar etad dvaividhyaṃ bhavatīti | [5.25.7] 
atrocyate | [5.25.8] skandhās tāvat | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Again (punar), why (katham) does this (etad) 
exist (bhavati) in a twofold manner (dvaividhya)? At this point (atra) it is said 
(ucyate): First of all (tāvat), [with respect to] the aggregates (skandha):  
 
saṃghātabhedebhya utpadyante ||5.26|| 
5.26 They (i.e., the aggregates) result (utpad) from combination (saṃghāta) [and] 
disintegration (bheda). 
 
[5.26.1] saṃghātād bhedād saṃghātabhedād iti | [5.26.2] ebhyas tribhyaḥ 
kāraṇebhyaḥ skandhā utpadyante dvipradeśādayaḥ | 
From combination (saṃghāta), from disintegration (bheda), [and] from combination 
and disintegration (saṃghāta-bheda) — the aggregates (skandha) beginning with 
[those having] two space-points (dvi-pradeśa-ādi) result (utpadyante) from these 
(idam) three (tri) causes (kāraṇa). 
[5.26.3] tadyathā | [5.26.4] dvayoḥ paramāṇvoḥ saṃghātād dvipradeśaḥ |  
Namely (tad-yathā): [An aggregate having] two space-points (dvi-pradeśa) [results] 
from combination (saṃghāta) of two (dvi) infinitesimal particles (paramāṇu). 
 
928 Alternatively, one can read ‘antyaṃsūkṣmo’ in compound, as ‘ultimately subtle’. 
929 It is unclear to me what the source of this verse in upagīti metre is. For a discussion of this 
quotation, see § 3.5. Quotations in the TABh. 





[5.26.5] dvipradeśasyāṇoś ca saṃghātāt tripradeśaḥ |  
[An aggregate having] three space-points (tri-pradeśa) [results] from combination 
(saṃghāta) of [an aggregate that has] two space-points (dvi-pradeśa) and (ca) an 
atom (aṇu). 
[5.26.6] evaṃ saṅkhyeyānām asaṅkhyeyānām anantānāṃ931 ca pradeśānāṃ 
saṃghātāt tāvatpradeśāḥ ||  
Likewise (evam), from the combination (saṃghāta) of numerable (saṅkhyeya), 
innumerable (asaṅkhyeya), and (ca) infinitely many (ananta) space-points (pradeśa), 
[result aggregates having] such a number of space-points (tāvat-pradeśa). 
[5.26.7] eṣām eva bhedād dvipradeśaparyantāḥ ||  
[Aggregates] ending with two space-points (i.e., two or more) (dvi-pradeśa-paryanta) 
[result] from disintegration (bheda) indeed (eva) of these (idam). 
[5.26.8] eta eva saṃghātabhedābhyām ekasāmāyikābhyāṃ dvipradeśādayaḥ 
skandhā utpadyante |  
These (etad) very same (eva) aggregates (skandha), beginning with [aggregates 
having] two space-points (dvi-pradeśa-ādi), [result] from single-momentary (eka-
sāmāyika) combination and disintegration (saṃghāta-bheda). 
[5.26.9] anyasya saṃghātenānyato bhedeneti ||  
[I.e.], by combination (saṃghāta) with another (anya) [and] by disintegration 
(bheda) from another (anyatas) (iti).932 
[5.26.10] atrāha | [5.26.11] atha paramāṇuḥ katham utpadyate iti | [5.26.12] 
atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), how (katham) does the infinitesimal 
particle (paramāṇu) arise (utpadyate)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
bhedād anuḥ ||5.27|| 
5.27 An atom (aṇu) [results] from disintegration (bheda) [only]. 
 
 
931 Mody reads ‘anantām anantānantānāṃ’ and mentions the variant reading ‘anantānām 
anantānām’. However, in other passages of the bhāṣya the list is simply ‘saṅkhyeya, 
asaṅkhyeya, ananta’ (see, for example, TABh 1.8.9 and TABh 5.10.1). Kapadia omits ‘ananta’ 
but gives the variant reading ‘anantānām anantānantānām’ in the footnote. 






[5.27.1] bhedād eva paramāṇur utpadyate na saṃghātād iti || 
The infinitesimal particle (paramāṇu) results (utpadyate) indeed (eva) from 
disintegration (bheda), not (na) from combination (saṃghāta). 
 
bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ ||5.28|| 
5.28 The perceptible [aggregates] (cākṣuṣa) [result] from disintegration (bheda) 
[and] combination (saṃghāta). 
 
[5.28.1] bhedasaṃghātābhyāṃ cākṣuṣāḥ skandhā utpadyante |  
The aggregates (skandha) [that are] perceptible (cākṣuṣa) result (utpadyante) from 
disintegration (bheda) [and] combination (saṃghāta). 
[5.28.2] acākṣuṣās tu yathoktāt saṃghātād bhedāt saṃghātabhedāc ceti ||  
However (tu), [the aggregates that are] imperceptible (acākṣuṣa) [result] ‘from 
combination (saṃghāta), from disintegration (bheda), and (ca) from combination 
and disintegration (saṃghātabheda)’ (iti), as it is said (see TABh 5.26.1) (yathokta). 
[5.28.3] atrāha | [5.28.4] dharmādīni santīti kathaṃ gṛhyate iti |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): How (katham) is [the saying that] (iti) 
[substances] beginning with motion933 (dharma-ādi) are existent (santi) understood 
(gṛhyate) (iti)?  
[5.28.5] atrocyate | [5.28.6] lakṣaṇataḥ || [5.28.7] kiṃ ca sato lakṣaṇam iti | 
[5.28.8] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): based on the characteristic (lakṣaṇa). And (ca) 
what (kim) is the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of existence (sat)? At this point (atra) it is 
said (ucyate): 
 
utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat ||5.29|| 
5.29 Existence934 (sat) [is] endowed with (yukta) production (utpāda), decay (vyaya), 
[and] duration (dhrauvya). 
 
 
933 See TA 5.1. 





[5.29.1] utpādavyayābhyāṃ dhrauvyeṇa ca yuktaṃ sato lakṣaṇam yad 
utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato ’nyad asad iti ||935 
The characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of existence (sat) [is] endowed with (yukta) production 
and decay (utpāda-vyaya), and (ca) duration (dhrauvya). That which (yad) is 
produced (utpadyate), that which (yad) decays (vyeti), and (ca) that which (yad) [is] 
enduring (dhruva), that (that) [is] existent (sat). Hence (atas), [that which is] 
different [from this] (anya) [is] non-existent (asad) (iti). 
[5.29.2] atrāha | [5.29.3] gṛhṇīmas tāvad evaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ sad iti | [5.29.4] idaṃ 
tu vācyaṃ tat kiṃ nityam āhosvid anityam iti | [5.29.4] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): So far (tāvat), we understand (gṛhṇīmaḥ) [that] 
existence (sat) [is] thus (evam) characterised (lakṣaṇa) (iti). However (tu), this 
(idam) [is] to be said (vācya): [Is] it (i.e., existence) (tad kim) eternal (nitya) or 
(āhosvid) non-eternal (anitya) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
tadbhāvāvyayaṃ nityam ||5.30|| 
5.30 [An entity that] does not change its state (tad-bhāva-avyaya), [is] eternal (nitya). 
 
[5.30.1] yat sato bhāvān na vyeti na vyeṣyati tan nityam iti | 
That which (yad) does not change (na vyeti) [and] will not change (na vyeṣyati) from 
the state (bhāva) of existence (sat), that (tad) [is] eternal (nitya) (iti). 
 
arpitānarpitasiddheḥ ||5.31|| 
5.31 [The apparent contradiction] results from the validity (siddhi) of the 




935 This reading follows Kapadia. Mody reads ‘utpādavyayau dhrauvyaṃ ca yuktaṃ sato 
lakṣaṇam’. After this sentence, Mody adds a substantial passage between square brackets 
(Mody 1903: 131-133). This passage seems to be a later addition and is omitted by Kapadia. 
However, the last sentence of the omitted part (yad utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat 
sat ato ’nyad asad iti) is given by Kapadia, immediately following ‘sato lakṣaṇam’ (yad 
utpadyate yad vyeti yac ca dhruvaṃ tat sat ato ’nyad asad iti). 
936 It seems that the author tries to explain the apparent contradiction between TA 5.5, which 
says that substance is eternal, and TA 5.29, which says that substance is connected with 
decay. For a discussion of this sūtra, see Soni 2003: 29ff. The terms ‘arpita’ and ‘anarpita’ are 
explained in TABh 5.31.2 as ‘vyāvahārika’ and ‘avyāvahārika’ (see below). See also § 3.4, 





[5.31.1] sac ca trividham api nityaṃ cobhe937 api arpitānarpitasiddheḥ |  
And (ca) existence (sat) [is] also (api) threefold (see TA 5.29) (trividha), [namely] 
eternal (see TA 5.30)938 (nitya) and (ca) also (api) both939 (ubhe), [which] results 
from the validity (siddhi) of the conventional [standpoint] (arpita) and the non-
conventional [standpoint] (anarpita). 
[5.31.2] arpitaṃ vyāvahārikam anarpitam avyāvahārikaṃ940 cety arthaḥ |  
‘Conventional’ (arpita) [is the standpoint that is] relating to common life 
(vyāvahārika) and (ca) ‘non-conventional’ (anarpita) [is the standpoint that is] not 
relating to common life (avyāvahārika) — that is the meaning (ity artha). 
[5.31.3] tac ca941 sac caturvidham | [5.31.4] tadyathā | [5.31.5] dravyāstikaṃ 
mātṛkāpadāstikam utpannāstikaṃ paryāyāstikam iti |  
And (ca) that (tad) existence (see TABh 5.31.1) (sat) [is] fourfold (caturvidha). 
Namely: 
i. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] substance (dravya-āstika) 
ii. [the view on] existence [from] the linguistic perspective942 (mātṛkā-pada-
āstika)  
iii. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] production (utpanna-āstika) 
iv. [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] transformation (paryāya-
āstika) (iti). 
[5.31.6] eṣām arthapadāni dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā sat | [5.31.7] asan 
nāma nāsty eva dravyāstikasya || 
The objects 943(artha-pada) of these [perspectives] (idam) [are as follows]:  
For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] substance (dravya-āstika) —  
Either (vā) a [single] substance (dravya), or (vā) two substances (dravya, du.), or (vā) 
[many] substances (dravya, pl.) [are] existent (sat); [that which is] called (nāma) 
non-existence (asat), [that] does not exist (nāsti) indeed (eva).  
 
 
937 Mody reads ‘ca ubhe’. 
938 Is ‘nitya’ interpreted as ‘dhrauvya’ (see TA 5.29)? 
939 This seems to refer to TA 5.29, which says that existence is also endowed with production 
and decay. 
940 Kapadia reads ‘anarpitavyāvahārika’. 
941 Kapadia reads ‘tatra’. 
942 Lit. ‘letters and words’. 





[5.31.8] mātṛkāpadāstikasyāpi | [5.31.9] mātṛkāpadaṃ vā mātṛkāpade vā 
mātṛkāpadāni vā sat | [5.31.10] amātṛkāpadaṃ vā amātṛkāpade vā 
amātṛkāpadāni vā asat ||  
And likewise (api), for [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] letters and 
words (mātṛkā-pada-āstika) — Either (vā) a [single] linguistic [entity] (mātṛkā-
pada), or (vā) two linguistic entities, (mātṛkā-pada, du.), or (vā) [many] linguistic 
[entities] (mātṛkā-pada, pl.) [are] existent (sat); Either (vā) a [single] non[-existent] 
linguistic expression (amātṛkā-pada), or (vā) two non-[existent] linguistic 
expressions (amātṛkāpada, du.), or (vā) [many] non[-existent] linguistic expressions 
(amātṛkā-pada, pl.) [are] non-existent (asat). 
[5.31.11] utpannāstikasya | [5.31.12] utpannaṃ votpanne votpannāni vā sat | 
[5.31.13] anutpannaṃ vānutpanne vānutpannāni vāsat944 ||  
For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] production (utpanna-āstika) —  
either (vā) [a single object that is] produced (utpanna), or (vā) two [objects that are] 
produced (utpanna, du.), or (vā) [many objects that are] produced (utpanna, pl.) [are] 
existent (sat); either (vā) [a single object that is] not produced (anutpanna), or (vā) 
two [objects that are] not produced (anutpanna, du.), or (vā) [many objects that are] 
not produced (anutpanna, pl.) [are] non-existent (asat). 
[5.31.14] arpite ’nupanīte na vācyaṃ sad ity asad iti vā |  
When the conventional [standpoint]945 (arpita) [is] not applied (anupanīta), [it] 
should not be said (na vācya) [to be] existent (sat) or (vā) non-existent (asat) (iti).946 
[5.31.15] paryāyāstikasya sadbhāvaparyāye vā sadbhāvaparyāyayor vā sad-
bhāvaparyāyeṣu vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā sat | [5.31.16] 
asadbhāvaparyāye vā asadbhāvaparyāyayor vā asadbhāvaparyāyeṣu vā 
ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vāsat |  
For [the view on] existence [from the perspective of] transformation (paryāya-
āstika) — Either (vā) a [single] substance (dravya), or (vā) two substances (dravya, 
du.), or (vā) [many] substances (dravya, pl.) pointed out (ādiṣṭa) [with respect to] 
either (vā) a transformation of the real state (sad-bhāva-paryāya), or (vā) two 
transformations of the real state (sad-bhāva-paryāya, du.), or (vā) [many] 
 
944 Kapadia reads ‘vā ’sat’. 
945 See also TABh 5.31.2. 
946 Cf. TABh 5.31.17. The meaning seems to be that things are either existent or non-existent 






transformations of the real state (sad-bhāva-paryāya, pl.) [are] existent (sat); Either 
(vā) a [single] substance (dravya), or (vā) two substances (dravya, du.), or (vā) 
[many] substances (dravya, pl.) pointed out (ādiṣṭa) [with respect to] either (vā) a 
non-transformation of the real state (asad-bhāva-paryāya), or (vā) two non-
transformations of the real state (asad-bhāva-paryāya, du.), or (vā) [many] non-
transformations of the real state (asad-bhāva-paryāya, pl.) [are] non-existent (asat).  
[5.31.17] tadubhayaparyāye vā tadubhayaparyāyayor vā tadubhayaparyāyeṣu 
vā ādiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vā dravye vā dravyāṇi vā na vācyaṃ sad ity asad iti vā | 
[5.31.18] deśādeśena vikalpayitavyam iti ||  
Either (vā) a [single] substance (dravya), or (vā) two substances (dravya, du.), or (vā) 
[many] substances (dravya, pl.) pointed out (ādiṣṭa) [with respect to] either (vā) a 
transformation of both of them947 (tad-ubhaya-paryāya), or (vā) two transfor-
mations of both of them (tad-ubhaya-paryāya, du.), or (vā) [many] transformations 
of both of them (tad-ubhaya-paryāya, pl.), should not be said (na vācya) [to be] 
existent (sat iti) or (vā) non-existent (asat iti). 948  It should be explained 
(vikalpayitavya) by the application949 (ādeśa) of partial [viewpoints] (deśa). 
[5.31.19] atrāha | [5.31.20] uktaṃ bhavatā saṃghātabhedebhyaḥ skandhā 
utpadyante iti | [5.31.21] tat kiṃ saṃyogamātrād eva saṃghāto bhavati | 
[5.31.22] āhosvid asti kaścid viśeṣa iti | [5.31.23] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TA 5.26) 
(bhavat) [that] the aggregates (skandha) result (utpadyante) from combination and 
disintegration (saṃghāta-bheda). Now (tad), is (bhavati) combination (saṃghāta) in 
fact (eva) [resulting from] connection only (saṃyoga-mātra)? Or (āhosvid), is (asti) 
[there] something (kiṃcid) specific [to the connection]950 (viśeṣa) (iti)? At this point 
(atra) it is said (ucyate): 
[5.31.24] sati saṃyoge baddhasya saṃghāto bhavatīti ||  
When there is (sat) a connection (saṃyoga), there is (bhavati) a combination 
(saṃghāta) with [an aggregate that is] connected951 (baddha). 
 
947 I.e., sadbhāva and asadbhāva (see TABh 5.31.15 – 5.31.16). 
948 In other words, from the perspective of transformation, the labels ‘existent’ and ‘non-
existent’ cannot be applied to a substance that is subject to both transformation and non-
transformation. 
949 Siddhasenagaṇi interprets the compound as ‘deśa-ādeśena’. The term ‘ādeśa’ seems to be 
related to ‘ādiṣṭa’ in the previous sentence. 
950 Siddhasenagaṇi explains ‘viśeṣa’ as ‘saṃyogaviśeṣa’. 





[5.31.25] atrāha | [5.31.26] atha kathaṃ bandho bhavatīti | [5.31.27] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Now (atha), how (katham) [does] a connection 
(bandha) arise (bhavati) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
snigdharūkṣatvād bandhaḥ ||5.32|| 
5.32 A connection (bandha) [results] from smoothness (snigdha) and roughness 
(rūkṣatva).  
 
[5.32.1] snigdharūkṣayoḥ pudgalayoḥ spṛṣṭayor bandho bhavatīti |  
A connection (bandha) exists (bhavati) [between] two material elements (pudgala) 
[that are] smooth and rough (snigdha-rūkṣa) [and that are] touching [each other] 
(spṛṣṭa).  
[5.32.2] atrāha | [5.32.3] kim eṣa ekānta iti | [5.32.4] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [Does] this (kim etad) [happen] invariably 
(ekānta iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
na jaghanyaguṇānām ||5.33|| 
5.33 [Such a connection does] not (na) [take place between material elements 
having a] low [degree] of [these] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) 
(jaghanya-guṇa). 
 
[5.33.1] jaghanyaguṇasnigdhānāṃ jaghanyaguṇarūkṣāṇāṃ ca paraspareṇa 
bandho na bhavatīti ||  
A mutual (paraspara) connection (bandha) does not exists (na bhavati) [between 
material elements having] a low smooth quality (jaghanya-guṇa-snigdha) and (ca) 
[material elements having] a low rough quality (jaghanya-guṇa-rūkṣa) (iti). 
[5.33.2] atrāha | [5.33.3] uktaṃ bhavatā jaghanyaguṇavarjānāṃ snigdhānāṃ 
rūkṣeṇa rūkṣāṇāṃ ca snigdhena saha bandho bhavatīti | [5.33.4] atha 
tulyaguṇayoḥ kim atyantapratiṣedha iti | [5.33.5] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TABh 5.32.1) 
(bhavat) [that] a connection (bandha) exists (bhavati) [between] smooth [material 
elements] (snigdha) [and] rough [material elements] (rūkṣa) and (ca) [between] 
rough [material elements] (rūkṣa) and (saha) smooth [material elements] (snigdha), 
with the exception of [those whose] quality [is] low (jaghanya-guṇa-varja). Now 





elements that have an] equal [degree] of [these] qualities (tulya-guṇa) (iti)? At this 
point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
[5.33.6] na jaghanyaguṇānām ity adhikṛtyedam ucyate || 
Referring to (adhikṛtya) [the sūtra that says] (see TA 5.33) ‘[Such a connection does] 
not (na) [take place between material elements having a] low [degree] of [these] 
qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (jaghanya-guṇa)’ (iti), this (idam) is said 
(ucyate): 
 
guṇasāmye sadṛśānām ||5.34|| 
5.34 [Likewise, such a connection does not take place] when [there is] an evenness 
of the qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) (guṇa-sāmya) between similar 
[material elements] (sadṛśa).952 
 
[5.34.1] guṇasāmye sati sadṛśānāṃ bandho na bhavati |  
When there is (sat) an evenness of the qualities (guṇa-sāmya), there is (bhavati) no 
(na) connection (bandha) between similar [material elements] (sadṛśa).  
[5.34.2] tadyathā | [5.34.3] tulyaguṇasnigdhasya tulyaguṇasnigdhena 
tulyaguṇarūkṣasya tulyaguṇarūkṣeṇeti |  
Namely (tad-yathā),  
i. between a [material element whose] smoothness [is] of equal quality (tulya-
guṇa-snigdha) [and another material element whose] smoothness [is] of 
equal quality (tulya-guṇa-snigdha), [and] 
ii. between a [material element whose] roughness [is] of equal quality (tulya-
guṇa-rūkṣa) [and another material element whose] roughness [is] of equal 
quality (tulya-guṇa-rūkṣa) (iti). 
[5.34.4] atrāha | [5.34.5] sadṛśagrahaṇaṃ kim apekṣate iti | [5.34.6] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): To what (kim) does the expression ‘similar’ 
(sadṛśa-grahaṇa) refer (apekṣate)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
[5.34.7] guṇavaiṣamye sadṛśānāṃ bandho bhavatīti ||  
A connection (bandha) exists (bhavati) [between] similar [material elements] 
(sadṛśa) [when there is] a diversity of qualities (guṇa-vaiṣamya) (iti). 
 
952 In other words, two material elements that have the same degree of smoothness or 





[5.34.8] atrāha | [5.34.9] kim aviśeṣeṇa guṇavaiṣamye sadṛśānāṃ bandho 
bhavatīti | [5.34.10] atrocyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): Is it so [that] (kim) a connection (bandha) exists 
(bhavati) between similar [material elements] (sadṛśa) [when there is] a diversity of 
qualities (guṇa-vaiṣamya) without exception (aviśeṣeṇa) (iti)? At this point (atra) it 
is said (ucyate): 
 
dvyadhikādiguṇānāṃ tu ||5.35|| 
5.35 However (tu), [a connection exists between material elements whose] qualities 
(i.e., smoothness and roughness) [have a] difference of two or more953 (dvy-adhika-
ādi-guṇa). 
 
[5.35.1] dvyadhikādiguṇānāṃ tu sadṛśānāṃ bandho bhavati |  
A connection (bandha) exists (bhavati) [between] similar [material elements] 
(sadṛśa) [whose] qualities (i.e., smoothness and roughness) [have] a difference of 
two or more (i.e., when there is a difference of at least two degrees in smoothness or 
roughness) (dvy-adhika-ādi-guṇa). 
 
[5.35.2] tadyathā | [5.35.3] snigdhasya dviguṇādyadhikasnigdhena | [5.35.4] 
dviguṇādyadhikasnigdhasya snigdhena | [5.35.5] rūkṣasyāpi dviguṇādy-
adhikarūkṣeṇa | [5.35.6] dviguṇādyadhikarūkṣasya rūkṣeṇa |  
Namely (tad-yathā): 
i. [between] a smooth [material element] (snigdha) [and another material 
element whose] smoothness [is] different by two or more degrees (dvi-guṇa-
ādi-adhika-snigdha) [and] 
ii. [between] a [material element whose] smoothness [is] different by two or 
more degrees (dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-snigdha) [and another] smooth [material 
element] (snigdha); 
And likewise (api): 
i. [between] a rough [material element] (rūkṣa) [and another material element 
whose] roughness [is] different by two or more degrees (dvi-guṇa-ādi-
adhika- rūkṣa) [and] 
 





ii. [between a material element whose] roughness [is] different by two or more 
degrees (dvi-guṇa-ādi-adhika-rūkṣa) [and another] rough [material element] 
(rūkṣa). 
[5.35.7] ekādiguṇādhikayos tu sadṛśayor bandho na bhavati |  
However (tu), a connection (bandha) does not exist (na bhavati) [between] two 
similar [material elements] (sadṛśa) whose difference is one or less [than one] 954 
degree (eka-ādi-guṇa-adhika). 
[5.35.8] atra tu śabdo vyāvṛttiviśeṣaṇārthaḥ pratiṣedhaṃ vyāvartayati 
bandhaṃ ca viśeṣayati ||  
Here (i.e., in the foregoing sentence) (atra) the word (śabda) ‘however’ (tu) [is] an 
indication of exclusion [and] specification (vyāvṛtti-viśeṣaṇa-artha); it singles out 
(vyāvartayati) an exception (pratiṣedha) and (ca) it specifies (viśeṣayati) the 
connection (bandha). 
[5.35.9] atrāha | [5.35.10] paramāṇuṣu skandheṣu ca ye sparśādayo guṇās te 
kiṃ vyavasthitās teṣv āhosvid avyavasthitā iti | [5.35.11] atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): These (tad) qualities (guṇa), beginning with 
touch (sparśa-ādi), which (yad) [exist] in the case of infinitesimal particles 
(paramāṇu) and (ca) in the case of aggregates (skandha), [are they] (kim) fixed 
(vyavasthita) or (āhosvid) not fixed (avyavasthita) to these [infinitesimal particles 
and aggregates] (tad)?955 At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
[5.35.12] avyavasthitāḥ | [5.35.13] kutaḥ | [5.35.14] pariṇāmāt ||  
[They are] not fixed (avyavasthita). Why (kutas)? On account of transformation 
(pariṇāma). 
[5.35.15] atrāha | [5.35.16] dvayor api badhyamānayor guṇavattve sati kathaṃ 
pariṇāmo bhavatīti | [5.35.17] ucyate | 
At this point (atra) one says (āha): When there is (sat) the state of possessing a 
quality (guṇavattva) for two [material elements] (dvi) that are connected956 
(badhyamāna), how (katham) does a transformation (pariṇāma) exist (bhavati) (iti)? 
At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
954 It seems that the suffix ‘ādi’ means ‘or less than one’ in this context, unlike the previous 
sentences, in which it means ‘or more’. 
955 See also TABh 5.24.24 – 5.24.25. 






bandhe samādhikau pāriṇāmikau ||5.36|| 
5.36 [When there is] a connection (bandha), [two material elements whose 
smoothness or roughness is] equal [or] more (samādhika) [are] subject to 
transformation (pāriṇāmika). 
 
[5.36.1] bandhe sati samaguṇasya samaguṇaḥ pariṇāmako bhavati | [5.36.2] 
adhikaguṇo hīnasyeti ||  
When there is (sat) a connection (bandha) [with a material element] whose quality 
is equal (sama-guṇa), [the material element] whose quality is equal (samaguṇa) 
becomes (bhavati) subject to transformation (pāriṇāmika); [when there is a 
connection] [with a material element] whose quality is less (hīna), [the material 
element] whose quality is more (adhika-guṇa) [becomes subject to development] 
(iti). 
[5.36.3] atrāha | [5.36.4] uktaṃ bhavatā dravyāṇi jīvāś ceti (5.2) | [5.36.5] tat 
kim uddeśata eva dravyāṇāṃ prasiddhir āhosvil lakṣaṇato ’pīti | [5.36.6] 
atrocyate |  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TA 5.2) 
(bhavat) [that] ‘[the inanimate entities] together with (ca) the souls (jīva) are the 
substances (dravya).’ Now (tad), [is there] (kim) only (eva) an explanation 
(prasiddhi) of the substances (dravya) by a brief statement (uddeśa) or (āhosvid) 
also (api) based on [their] characteristic[s] (lakṣaṇa) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is 
said (ucyate):  
 
[5.36.7] lakṣaṇato ’pi prasiddhiḥ tad ucyate – 
[There is] also (api) an explanation (prasiddhi) based on [their] characteristic[s] 
(lakṣaṇa). It (tad) is said (ucyate): 
 
guṇaparyāyavad dravyam ||5.37|| 
5.37 Substance (dravya) has qualities [and] modes (guṇa-paryāyavat).957 
 
 






[5.37.1] guṇān lakṣaṇato vakṣyāmaḥ | [5.37.2] bhāvāntaraṃ saṃjñāntaraṃ ca 
paryāyaḥ | [5.37.3] tadubhayaṃ yatra vidyate tad dravyam |  
We will explain (vakṣyāmaḥ) the qualities (guṇa) based on [their] characteristic[s] 
(lakṣaṇa). Another state (bhāva-antara) and (ca) another recognition (saṃjñā-
antara) – [that is] a mode (paryāya). Where (yatra) the combination of them (i.e., of 
a quality and a mode) (tad-ubhaya) is seen (vidyate), that (tad) [is] substance.  
[5.37.4] guṇaparyāyā asya santy asmin vā santīti guṇaparyāyavat ||  
 ‘Having qualities [and] modes’ (guṇa-paryāyavat) [means that] (iti) qualities [and] 
modes (guṇaparyāya) exist (santi) for this (idam) or (vā) they exist (santi) in the 
case of it (idam). 
 
kālaś cety eke ||5.38|| 
5.38 Time (kāla) [is] also [a substance] (ca) according to some (iti eke). 
 
[5.38.1] eke tv ācāryā vyācakṣate kālo ’pi dravyam iti || 
And (tu) some (eka) teachers (ācārya) explain (vyācakṣate) [that] time (kāla) [is] 
also (api) a substance (dravya) (iti).  
 
so ’nantasamayaḥ ||5.39|| 
5.39 That (i.e., time) (tad) [consists of] infinitely [many] moments (ananta-samaya). 
 
[5.39.1] sa caiṣa kālo ’nantasamayaḥ | [5.39.2] tatraika eva vartamāna-
samayaḥ | [5.39.3] atītānāgatayos tv ānantyam ||  
And (ca) ‘that’ (tad) [refers to] this (etad) time (kāla), [which consists of] infinitely 
[many] moments (anantasamaya). Among them (i.e., the dravyas) (tatra), [time is] a 
single substance (see TA 5.5) (eka), [which has] moments [that are] existent 
(vartamāna-samaya). And (tu) [there is] infinity (anantya) of past and future 
[moments] (atīta-anāgata).  
[5.39.4] atrāha | [5.39.5] uktaṃ bhavatā guṇaparyāyavaddravyam iti | [5.39.6] 
tatra ke guṇā iti | [5.39.7] atrocyate  
At this point (atra) one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TA 5.37) 
(bhavat) [that] ‘substance (dravya) has qualities [and] modes (guṇa-paryāyavat)’ 
(iti). Among them (tatra), what (kim) [are] qualities (guṇa) (iti)? At this point (atra) 






dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ ||5.40||958 
5.40 Qualities (guṇa) inhere in substance959 (dravya-āśraya) [and are themselves] 
devoid of qualities (i.e., qualities cannot inhere in qualities but only in matter) 
(nirguṇa).  
 
[5.40.1] dravyam eṣām āśraya iti dravyāśrayāḥ | [5.40.2] naiṣāṃ guṇāḥ santīti 
nirguṇāḥ |  
Substance (dravya) [is] the locus (āśraya) of them (i.e., of qualities) (idam) (iti) — 
[that is the meaning of] ‘inhering in substance’ (dravya-āśraya). [There] are no (na 
santi) qualities (guṇā) for them (i.e., for qualities) (idam) (iti) — [that is the meaning 
of] ‘devoid of qualities’ (nirguṇa). 
 
[5.40.3] atrāha | [5.40.4] uktaṃ bhavatā bandhe samādhikau pāriṇāmikau iti 
(5.36) | [5.40.5] tatra kaḥ pariṇāma iti | [5.40.6] atrocyate  
At this point (atra), one says (āha): [It] has been said (ukta) by you (see TA 5.36) 
(bhavat) [that] ‘[the material elements whose smoothness or roughness is] equal [or] 
more (samādhika) [are] subject to transformation (pāriṇāmika) [when there is] a 
connection (bandha)’ (iti). Here (i.e., in this sūtra) (tatra), what (kim) [is] 
transformation (pariṇāma) (iti)? At this point (atra) it is said (ucyate): 
 
tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ||5.41|| 
5.41 The existence of these [substances]960 (tad-bhāva) [is characterised by] 
transformation (pariṇāma). 
 
[5.41.1] dharmādīnāṃ dravyāṇāṃ yathoktānāṃ ca guṇānāṃ svabhāvaḥ 
svatattvaṃ pariṇāmaḥ | [5.41.2] sa dvividhaḥ | 
Transformation (pariṇāma) [is] the essence (svabhāva) [or] own nature (svatattva) 
of the substances (dravya) beginning with motion (dharma-ādi) — as it is said 
(yathokta) — and (ca) of the qualities (guṇa). This [transformation] (tad) [is] 
twofold (dvividha): 
 
958 Halbfass suggests that this sūtra reflects VS I.1.15 (Halbfass 1992: 107, n.21). See also 
§ 3.4, Qualities, modes, and transformation. 
959 Lit. ‘whose locus is matter’ (bah.).  






anādir ādimāṃś ca ||5.42|| 
5.42 [There is transformation] without beginning (anādi) and having a beginning 
(ādimat).961 
 
[5.42.1] tatrānādir arūpiṣu dharmādharmākāśajīveṣv iti | 
Among them (tatra), [transformation] without beginning (anādi) [applies to] motion, 
rest, space, and souls (dharma-adharma-ākāśa-jīva), [which are] formless (arūpin) 
(iti). 
 
rūpiṣv ādimān ||5.43|| 
5.43 [Transformation] with a beginning (ādimat) [applies to substances that are] 
having form (rūpin). 
 
[5.43.1] rūpiṣu tu dravyeṣu ādimān | [5.43.2] pariṇāmo ’nekavidhaḥ 
sparśapariṇāmādir iti || 
And (tu) [transformation] with a beginning (ādimat) [applies to] substances (dravya) 
that are] having form (rūpin). Transformation (pariṇāma) [is] manifold 
(anekavidha), beginning with the transformation of touch (sparśa-pariṇāma-ādi) 
(iti). 
 
yogopayogau jīveṣu ||5.44|| 
5.44 [There is] action [and] cognitive operation (yoga-upayoga) in the case of souls 
(jīva). 
 
[5.44.1] jīveṣv arūpiṣu api satsu yogopayogau pariṇāmāv ādimantau bhavataḥ |  
Action [and] cognitive operation (yoga-upayoga) are (bhavatas) the two 
transformations (pariṇāma) having a beginning (ādimat), in the case of the souls 
(jīva), being (sat) indeed (api) formless (arūpin). 
[5.44.2] tatropayogaḥ pūrvoktaḥ |  
Among them (tatra), cognitive operation (upayoga) has been discussed before (see 
TA 2.19) (pūrvokta). 
 





[5.44.3] yogas tu parastād vakṣyate || 
And (tu) action (yoga) will be explained (vakṣyate) later on (see TA 6.1) (parastāt). 
iti tattvārthadhigame ’rhatpravacanasaṅgrahe pañcamo ’dhyāyaḥ samāptaḥ || 
Thus (iti), the fifth (pañcama) chapter (adhyāya) of the Tattvārthādhigama, [which 











[The Jaina ideal]963 
 
[0.1] samyagdarśanaśuddhaṃ yo jñānaṃ viratim eva cāpnoti | 
[0.2] duḥkhanimittam apīdaṃ tena sulabdhaṃ bhavati janma ||1|| 
  
[For] him who (yaḥ) obtains (āpnoti) knowledge (jñāna), [which is] pure [through] 
right worldview (samyak-darśana-śuddha),964and (ca) indeed (eva) non-passion 
(virati), for him (tad) there is (bhavati) good (sulabdha) birth (janman), even though 
(api) this (idam) [is] the cause of pain (duḥkha-nimitta). 
 
[0.3] janmani karmakleśair anubaddhe ’smiṃs tathā prayatitavyam | 
[0.4] karmakleśābhāvo yathā bhavaty eṣa paramārthaḥ ||2|| 
 
Pains have to be taken (prayatitavya) in this (idam) birth (janman), [which is] 
connected with (anubaddha) the afflictions of karman (karma-kleśa), in such a way 
that (yathā ... tathā) the absence of the afflictions of karman (karma-kleśa-abhāva) 
occurs (bhavati); this (etad) [is] the highest aim (parama-artha). 
 
[0.5] paramārthālābhe vā doṣeṣv ārambhakasvabhāveṣu | 
[0.6] kuśalānubandham eva syād anavadyaṃ yathā karma ||3|| 
 
Or (vā), when there is no acquirement of the highest aim (paramārtha-alābha), 
[when there are] faults (doṣa), [being] the inherent nature of someone who 
 
962 The verses of this introductory text are labelled ‘sambandhakārikāḥ’ at the end of the 
passage. See SK 0.63.  
963 The description of the content of the sections of the sambandhakārikās is based on Ohira 
1982: 27. 
964 Alternatively, one could interpret the compound as ‘samyagdarśanaṃ śuddham’. The 
general content of this verse deviates from TA 1.1 (samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāṇi 
mokṣamārgaḥ), in which darśana and jñāna seem to play an equal role. It is remarkable that 
‘virati’ is mentioned instead of ‘cāritra’. For a discussion of this verse, see § 3.5, The 





performs [violent activities]965 (ārambhaka-svabhāva), [pains have to be taken] in 
such a way (yathā) [that] karman might be (syāt) faultless (anavadya), [having] 
indeed (eva) a suitable966 connection (kuśala-anubandha).  
 
[Classification of human beings] 
 
[0.7] karmāhitam iha cāmutra cādhamatamo naraḥ samārabhate | 
[0.8] iha phalam eva tv adhamo vimadhyamas tūbhayaphalārtham ||4|| 
 
The very lowest (adhamatama) man (nara) undertakes (samārabhate) evil deeds 
(karma-ahita) here (iha ca) and there (i.e., the next life) (amutra ca). But (tu) the 
low [man] (adhama) [undertakes deeds which give] fruit (phala) here (iha) only 
(eva). And (tu) the exactly mediocre967 [man] (vi-madhyama) [undertakes deeds] for 
the sake of the fruit in both [lives] (ubhaya-phala-artha).  
 
[0.9] paralokahitāyaiva pravartate madhyamaḥ kriyāsu sadā | 
[0.10] mokṣāyaiva tu ghaṭate viśiṣṭamatir uttamaḥ puruṣaḥ ||5|| 
 
The middling [man] (madhyama) always (sadā) engages (pravartate) in actions 
(kriyā) for the sake of the future world (paralokahita) only (eva), while (tu) the 
highest (uttama) man (puruṣa), having excellent cognition (viśiṣṭa-mati) is suitable 
(ghaṭate) for liberation (mokṣa) only (eva).  
 
[0.11] yas tu kṛtārtho ’py uttamam avāpya dharmaṃ parebhya upadiśati | 
[0.12] nityaṃ sa uttamebhyo ’py uttama iti pūjyatama eva ||6|| 
 
But (tu) [he] who (yaḥ) has indeed accomplished [his] goal (kṛta-artha api), having 
obtained (avāpya) the highest (uttama), teaches (upadiśati) the dharma to others 
(para). He (tad) [is] always (nityam) the highest (uttama) of the very highest 
(uttama api). Thus (iti), [he is] indeed (eva) the most venerable (pūjyatama). 
 
 
965 The term ‘ārambha’ has a very negative connotation in Jainism, and carries the meaning 
of violent action (Johnson 1995: 38).  
966 The term ‘kuśala’ is not very common in Jainism but frequently appears in Buddhist texts. 





[Nature of the Tīrthakara] 
 
[0.13] tasmād arhati pūjām arhann evottamottamo loke | 
[0.14] devarṣinarendrebhyaḥ pūjyebhyo ’py anyasattvānām ||7|| 
 
Therefore (tasmāt), the arhat alone (eva), [who is] the very highest (uttamottama) 
in this world (loka), is worthy (arhati) of veneration (pūjā) [from] gods, sages, and 
lords (deva-rṣi-narendra), even though (api) [they are] worthy of veneration (pūjyā) 
[from] other beings (anya-sattva) [themselves].  
 
[0.15] abhyarcanād arhatāṃ manaḥprasādas tataḥ samādhiś ca | 
[0.16] tasmād api niḥśreyasam ato hi tatpūjanaṃ nyāyyam ||8|| 
 
From the worship (abhyarcana) of the arhats (arhat) [comes] peace of mind 
(manaḥ-prasāda), and (ca) from that (tatas) samādhi. And from that (tasmāt api) 
[comes] ultimate bliss968 (niḥśreyasa). Therefore (atas hi), worship of them (tat-
pūjanaṃ) is appropriate (nyāyya).  
 
[0.17] tīrthapravartanaphalaṃ yat proktaṃ karma tīrthakaranāma | 
[0.18] tasyodayāt kṛtārtho ’py arhaṃs tīrthaṃ pravartayati ||9|| 
 
That which [is] (yad) called (prokta) ‘body-determining karman [related to] the 
tīrthakara’969 (tīrthakara-nāma) [has] the commencement of a ford [as its] result 
(tīrtha-pravartana-phala). From the occurrence (udayāt) of that (tad), the arhat, 
having his goal accomplished (kṛtārtha), also (api) proceeds to initiate (pravartayati) 
a ford (tīrtha). 
 
 
968 This term is uncommon for the Jaina tradition. See also § 3.5, The sambandhakārikās and 
praśasti.  





[0.19] tatsvābhāvyād eva prakāśayati bhāskaro yathā lokam | 
[0.20] tīrthapravartanāya pravartate tīrthakara evam ||10|| 
 
Just as (yathā) the sun (bhāskara) illuminates (prakāśayati) the world (loka) out of 
its own nature (tat-svābhāvya), in the same way (evam) the tīrthakara is occupied 
with970 (pravartate) making a ford (tīrtha-pravartana). 
 
[Life of Mahāvīra] 
 
[0.21] yaḥ śubhakarmā sevanabhāvitabhāvo bhaveṣv anekeṣu | 
[0.22] jajñe jñātekṣvākuṣu siddhārthanarendrakuladīpaḥ ||11|| 
 
He who [is] (yaḥ) of virtuous conduct971 (śubha-karman), whose being is pervaded 
by serving (sevana-bhāvita-bhāva) in many (aneka) lives (bhava), was born (jajñe) 
in the well-known Ikṣvāku [clan] (jñāta-ikṣvāku), [being] the lamp of the lineage of 
kings whose goals are accomplished (siddhārtha-narendra-kula-dīpa) 
 
[0.23] jñānaiḥ pūrvādhigatair apratipatitair matiśrutāvadhibhiḥ | 
[0.24] tribhir api śuddhair yuktaḥ śaityadyutikāntibhir ivenduḥ ||12|| 
 
... endowed (yukta) with knowledge (jñāna), acquired previously (pūrvādhigata), 
which does not disappear972 (apratipatita), [being] ordinary cognition, testimony, 
and cosmic perception (mati-śruta-avadhi), which [are] all three (tri api) pure 
(śuddha), like (iva) the moon (indu), [which is endowed] with coolness, splendour, 
and brightness (śaitya-dyuti-kānti), ... 
 
[0.25] śubhasārasattvasaṃhananavīryamāhātmyarūpaguṇayuktaḥ | 
[0.26] jagati mahāvīra iti tridaśair guṇataḥ kṛtābhikhyaḥ ||13|| 
 
... endowed with auspiciousness, energy, strength, firmness, power, magnanimity, 
beauty, and virtue (śubha-sāra-sattva-saṃhanana-vīrya-māhātmya-rūpa-guṇa-
 
970 The middle voice fits the ‘svābhāvya’ character of the activity. 
971 Alternatively, ‘auspicious karman’. 





yukta), [who] is made famous (kṛta-abhikhyā) as ‘Mahāvīra’ (mahāvīra iti) in this 
world (jagat) by the gods (tridaśa) because of his virtues (guṇa), ...  
 
[0.27] svayam eva buddhatattvaḥ sattvahitābhyudyatācalitasattvaḥ | 
[0.28] abhinanditaśubhasattvaḥ sendrair lokāntikair devaiḥ ||14|| 
 
... he himself (svayam) indeed (eva), whose essence is enlightened (buddha-tattva),  
whose strength is unshakable, [who is] engaged in beneficial [deeds] for [other] 
beings (sattva-hita-abhyudyata-acalita-sattva), whose auspicious essence is 
venerated (abhinandita-śubha-sattva) by the lokāntika gods973 (lokāntika deva), 
including Indra (sa-indra), ... 
 
[0.29] janmajarāmaraṇārttaṃ jagad aśaraṇam abhisamīkṣya niḥsāram | 
[0.30] sphītam apahāya rājyaṃ śamāya dhīmān pravavrāja ||15|| 
 
... after having seen (abhisamīkṣya) the world (jagat) [being] without refuge 
(aśaraṇa), without essence (niḥsāra), afflicted by birth, old age, and death (janma-
jarā-maraṇa-ārtta), the wise one (dhīmat) renounced the world (pravavrāja), for the 
sake of peace (śama), leaving behind (apahāya) a prosperous (sphīta) kingdom 
(rājya). 
 
[0.31] pratipadyāśubhaśamanaṃ niḥśreyasasādhakaṃ śramaṇaliṅgam | 
[0.32] kṛtasāmāyikakarmā vratāni vidhivat samāropya ||16|| 
 
After taking up (pratipadya) the mark of asceticism (śramaṇaliṅga), [which is] 
destroying [that which is] inauspicous (aśubhaśamana), [and which is] the means to 
ultimate bliss (niḥśreyasa-sādhaka), [he who is] engaged in the performance of 
sāmāyika 974  (kṛta-sāmāyika-karman), after undertaking (samāropya) the vows 
(vrata) according to the rules (vidhivat), ... 
 
 
973 TA 4.25 explains that the lokāntika gods dwell in Brahmaloka (brahmalokālayā lokāntikāḥ) 
(Mody 1903: 112). 





[0.33] samyaktvajñānacāritrasaṃvaratapaḥsamādhibalayuktaḥ | 
[0.34] mohādīni nihatyāśubhāni catvāri karmāṇi ||17|| 
 
... endowed with righteousness, knowledge, stopping, 975  asceticism, samādhi, 
power 976  (samyaktva-jñāna-cāritra-saṃvara-tapaḥ-samādhi-bala-yukta), having 
destroyed (nihatya) four (catur) [types of] inauspicous (aśubhāni) karman, 
beginning with deluding [karman]977 (moha-ādi), ... 
 
[0.35] kevalam adhigamya vibhuḥ svayam eva jñānadarśanam anantam | 
[0.36] lokahitāya kṛtārtha ’pi deśayām āsa tīrtham idam ||18|| 
 
... after having attained (adhigamya) absolute knowledge (kevala), [which is] 
unlimited (ananta) knowledge and worldview (jñāna-darśanam), the lord (vibhu) 
himself (svayam eva), even though (api) he has accomplished his goals (kṛta-artha), 
taught (deśayām āsa) this (idam) path (tīrtha)978 for the benefit of this world (loka-
hita), ... 
 
[0.37] dvividham anekadvādaśavidhaṃ mahāviṣayam amitagamayuktam | 
[0.38] saṃsārārṇavapāragamanāya duḥkhakṣayāyālam ||19|| 
 
... [i.e.], the twofold (dvividha), manifold, [and] twelvefold [varieties of knowledge 
from testimony] 979  (aneka-dvādaśavidha), having great range (mahā-viṣaya), 
endowed with many perspectives980 (amita-gama-yukta), [being] adequate for the 
annihilation of pain (duḥkha-kṣayāya-alam), in order to go to the other shore of the 
ocean of saṃsāra (saṃsāra-arṇava-pāra-gamana). 
 
 
975 I.e., of karmic influx (see TA 1.4).  
976 Alternatively, ‘power acquired by austerities’ (tapo[bala]) and ‘force of meditation’ 
(samādhibala). 
977 This type of karman is listed in TA 10.1. See also TABh 1.26.22. 
978 Alternatively, ‘showed this ford’.  
979 I.e., the canonical Jaina scriptures. See TABh 1.20.18. 





[0.39] granthārthavacanapaṭubhiḥ prayatnavadbhir api vādibhir nipuṇaiḥ | 
[0.40] anabhibhavanīyam anyair bhāskara iva sarvatejobhiḥ ||20|| 
 
[It] cannot be surpassed (anabhibhavanīya) by other (anya) skilful (nipuṇa) teachers 
(vādin), even (api) [not by those] who are diligent (prayatnavat) [and] skilful [with 
respect to] the meaning and words of scripture (grantha-artha-vacana-paṭu), just 




[0.41] kṛtvā trikaraṇaśuddhaṃ tasmai paramarṣaye namaskāram | 
[0.42] pūjyatamāya bhagavate vīrāya vilīnamohāya ||21|| 
 
After having made (kṛtvā) homage (namaskāra) to that (tad) great sage (parama-rṣi) 
with purity of the three faculties982 (tri-karaṇa-śuddham), [to him who is] a most 
venerable (pūjyatama) illustrious (bhagavat) hero (vīra), whose delusion is gone 
(vilīna-moha), ... 
 
[Nature of the work] 
 
[0.43] tattvārthādhigamākhyaṃ bahvarthaṃ saṃgrahaṃ laghugrantham | 
[0.44] vakṣyāmi śiṣyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadeśasya ||22|| 
 
..., I will teach (vakṣyāmi) this (idam) short text (laghu-grantha), called 
‘Tattvārthādhigama’ (tattvārtha-adhigamā-ākhya) — an important983 (bahu-artha) 
compendium (saṃgraha) of some984 of the words of the arhat (arhat-vacana-
ekadeśa), [which is] beneficial for students (śiṣya-hita). 
 
[Difficulty of the task of the author] 
 
 
981 Ohira writes that SK 21, 22, and 31 are the ‘essential three kārikās’, and observes that the 
maṅgalācaraṇa in the Sarvārthasiddhi was ‘directly derived from SK 21 and 31’ (Ohira 1982: 
29-30). See also § 3.5. 
982 I.e., body, speech, and mind. See, e.g., Balcerowicz 2008: 36. 
983 Lit. ‘having much meaning’.  





[0.45] mahato ’timahāviṣayasya durgamagranthabhāṣy985 apārasya | 
[0.46] kaḥ śaktaḥ pratyāsaṃ jinavacanamahodadheḥ kartum ||23|| 
 
Who (kim), in enunciating a difficult text (durgama-grantha-bhāṣin), [is] able (śakta) 
to make (kartum) a summary986 (pratyāsa) of the great ocean of the words of the 
jina (jina-vacana-maha-udadhi), [which is] boundless (apāra), [whose] scope [is] 
way larger (atimahā-viṣaya) [than] large (mahat)? 
 
[0.47] śirasā giriṃ bibhitsed uccikṣipsec ca sa kṣitiṃ dorbhyām | 
[0.48] pratitīrṣec ca samudram mitsec ca punaḥ kuśāgreṇa ||24|| 
 
[He who would desire to comprehend the word of the jina, which is the subject of a 
very extensive text],987 he (tad) could desire to break (bibhitset) a mountain (giri) 
with the head (śiras), and (ca) he could desire to throw up (uccikṣipset) the earth 
(kṣiti) with two arms (dos), and (ca) he could desire to cross (pratitīrṣet) the ocean 
(samudra), and (ca) further (punar), he could desire to measure (mitset) [the ocean] 
with the tip of the kuśa grass (kuśa-agra) ... 
 
[0.49] vyomnīnduṃ cikramiṣen merugiriṃ pāṇinā cikampayiṣet | 
[0.50] gatyānilaṃ jigīṣec caramasamudraṃ pipāsec ca ||25|| 
 
... [and] he could desire to move (cikramiṣet) the moon (indu) in the sky (vyoman), 
[and] he could desire to shake (cikampayiṣet) mount Meru (merugiri) with one hand 
(pāṇi), [and] he could desire to move (jigīṣet) [along with] the wind [by his own] 
movement988 (gaty-ānila), and (ca) he could desire to drink (pipāset) the deepest 
ocean (carama-samudra) ... 
 
 
985 There are different ways to analyse ‘durgamagranthabhāṣyapārasya’. It is tempting to 
read ‘-bhāṣya-pārasya’ since the sambandhakārikās seem to introduce the main text (grantha) 
and the bhāṣya. However, this is syntactically unlikely. Therefore, ‘-bhāṣy apārasya’ seems to 
be the correct word division. For a discussion of this verse, see § 3.5, The sambandhakārikās 
and the praśasti. 
986 This is an unusual word. Haribhadra interprets ‘pratyāsa’ as ‘saṃgraha’ (Mody 1903: 30, 
footnote 3). 
987 See SK 0.52. 





[0.51] khadyotakaprabhābhiḥ so ’bhibubhūṣec ca bhāskaraṃ mohāt | 
[0.52] yo ’timahāgranthārthaṃ jinavacanaṃ saṃjighṛkṣeta ||26|| 
 
... and (ca) he (tad) could desire to surpass (abhibubhūṣet) the sun (bhāskara) with 
the light of fireflies (khadyotaka-prabhā) out of delusion (mohāt). He [who] (yaḥ) 
would desire to comprehend (saṃjighṛkṣeta)989 the word of the jina (jinavacana), 
[which is] the subject of a very extensive text (atimahā-grantha-artha), [he could 
desire to ... (see SK 0.47 – 0.52)] 
 
[Benefits for the author and others] 
 
[0.53] ekam api tu jinavacanād yasmān nirvāhakaṃ padaṃ bhavati | 
[0.54] śrūyante cānantāḥ sāmāyikamātrapadasiddhāḥ ||27|| 
 
Because (yasmāt), even though990 (api tu) one (eka) state (pada) which brings about 
deliverance (nirvāhaka) comes into being (bhavati)991 from the word of the jina 
(jina-vacana), yet (ca), infinitely [many] (ananta) are heard (śrūyante) [to have] 
accomplished a state consisting of sāmāyika (sāmāyika-mātra-pada-siddha), ... 
  
[0.55] tasmāt tatprāmāṇyāt samāsato vyāsataś ca jinavacanam | 
[0.56] śreya iti nirvicāraṃ grāhyaṃ dhāryaṃ ca vācyaṃ ca ||28|| 
 
... therefore (tasmāt), from the authority of that992 (tat-prāmāṇya), the word of the 
jina (jina-vacana) in a brief (samāsa) and (ca) extended [form] (vyāsatas), should be 
accepted (grāhya), without doubt (nirvicāra), [thinking] ‘[this is] the best (sreyas)’ 




989 Middle voice, metri causa. 
990 Alternatively, ‘in fact’.  
991 In other words, the highest accomplishing state becomes possible. 





[0.57] na bhavati dharmaḥ śrotuḥ sarvasyaikāntato hitaśravaṇāt | 
[0.58] bruvato ’nugrahabuddhyā vaktus tv ekāntato bhavati ||29|| 
 
There is no (na bhavati) exclusive993 (ekāntatas) dharma for the hearer (śrotṛ) from 
the act of hearing [which is] beneficial (hita-śravaṇa) for all (sarva). However (tu), 
[that] final [dharma] (ekāntatas) comes into being (bhavati) [for someone who is] 
speaking (vaktṛ) because the mind (buddhi) of the speaker (bruvat) is promoting a 
good thing994 (anugraha).  
 
[0.59] śramam avicintyātmagatam tasmāc śreyaḥ sadopadeṣṭavyam | 
[0.60] ātmānaṃ ca paraṃ ca hi hitopadeṣṭānugṛhnāti ||30|| 
 
Therefore (tasmāt), the bliss of final emancipation (śreyas) should always (sadā) be 
taught (upadeṣṭavya) without thinking about (avicintya) the trouble (śrama) for 
oneself (ātmagata). Certainly (hi), someone who teaches [that which is] beneficial 
(hita-upadeṣṭṛ) favours (anugṛhṇāti) himself (ātman) as well as (ca ... ca) the other 
(para). 
 
[Nature of the work] 
 
[0.61] na rte ca mokṣamārgād dhitopadeśo ’sti jagati kṛtsne ’smin | 
[0.62] tasmāt param imam995eveti mokṣamārgaṃ pravakṣyāmi ||31|| 
 
And (ca) besides (na ṛte) the path to liberation (mokṣamārga), there is (asti) no (na) 
beneficial teaching (hita-upadeśa) in this (idam) entire (kṛtsna) world (jagat). 
Therefore (tasmāt), I will teach (pravakṣyāmi) indeed (eva) this (idam) very (iti) 
highest (para) path to liberation (mokṣa-mārga). 
 
[0.63] iti sambandhakārikāḥ samāptāḥ || 
Thus (iti), the introductory verses (sambandha-kārikā) [are now] completed 
(samāpta). 
 
993 I.e., focused on one thing.  
994 Lit. ‘from the mind, [which is] showing favour (anugraha-buddhi), of the speaker (bruvat)’. 









[10.7.224] vācakamukhyasya śivaśriyaḥ prakāśayaśasaḥ praśiṣyeṇa | 
[10.7.225] śiṣyeṇa ghoṣanandikṣamaṇasyaikādaśāṅgavidaḥ ||1|| 
 
[This compendium was composed by vācaka Umāsvāti],996 the pupil of the pupil 
(praśiṣya) of Śivaśrī, [whose] fame [is] widely known (prakāśa-yaśas), [who is] the 
best among the vācakas (vācaka-mukhya), the pupil (śiṣya) of kṣamaṇa Ghoṣanandin, 
knower of the eleven main scriptural texts997 (ekādaśa-aṅga-vid) ... 
 
[10.7.226] vācanayā ca mahāvācakakṣamaṇamuṇḍapādaśiṣyasya | 
[10.7.227] śiṣyeṇa vācakācāryamūlanāmnaḥ prathitakīrteḥ ||2|| 
 
... and (ca) [based on] the interpretation998 (vācanā) of the pupil of mahāvācaka 
kṣamaṇa Muṇḍapāda999 (mahā-vācaka-kṣamaṇa-muṇḍapāda-śiṣya), the pupil (śiṣya) 
of vācaka ācārya Mūla (vācaka-ācārya-mūla-nāman) [whose] fame [is] known 
(prathita-kīrti), ... 
 
[10.7.228] nyagrodhikāprasūtena viharatā puravare kusumanāmni | 
[10.7.229] kaubhīṣaṇinā svātitanayena vātsīsutenārghyam ||3|| 
 
... [who was] born in Nyagrodhikā (nyagrodhikā-prasūta), [who was] spending time 
(viharat) in the chief town (puravara) called Kusuma 1000  (kusuma-nāman), 
[belonging to the] Kaubhīṣaṇi[-gotra] (kaubhīṣaṇi), the son of Svāti (svāti-tanaya), 
[and] Vātsī (vātsī-suta).1001 
 
 
996 See 10.7.232 – 10.7.233. 
997 I.e., eleven out of the twelve ‘inner limbs’ or ‘aṅgas’ (see TA 1.20). 
998 Lit. ‘by the lesson/recitation’.  
999 The names Mūla and Muṇḍapāda (lit. the venerable baldhead) are unusual for Jaina 
ascetics.  
1000 I.e., Pāṭaliputra. 
1001 It seems that ‘arghyam’ has to be taken with the next verse. This is exceptional and does 





[10.7.230] arhadvacanaṃ samyaggurukrameṇāgataṃ samupadhārya | 
[10.7.231] duḥkhārtaṃ ca durāgamavihatamatiṃ lokamavalokya ||4|| 
 
[After having] reflected (samupadhārya) on the priceless (arghya)1002 word of the 
arhat (arhat-vacana), [which] arrived (āgata) through the succession of right 
teachers1003 (samyak-guru-krama), after having seen (avalokya) the people (loka) 
[whose] mind [is] impeded by wicked teachings1004 (dur-āgama-vihata-mati) and (ca) 
[who are] afflicted by pain (duḥkha-ārta), ... 
 
[10.7.232] idam uccairnāgaravācakena sattvānukampayā dṛbdham | 
[10.7.233] tattvārthādhigamākhyaṃ spaṣṭam umāsvātinā śāstram ||5|| 
 
... this (idam) compendium (śāstra), called ‘Tattvārthādhigama’ (tattva-artha-
adhigama-ākhyā) [was] composed (dṛbdha)1005 in an intelligible way (spaṣṭa) out of 
compassion for the living beings (sattva-anukampā) by vācaka Umāsvāti of the 
uccairnāgara [śākhā]1006 (uccais-nāgara-vācaka ... umāsvāti). 
 
[10.7.234] yas tattvādhigamākhyaṃ jñāsyati ca kariṣyate ca tatroktam | 
[10.7.235] so ’vyābādhasukhākhyaṃ prāpsyaty acireṇa paramārtham ||6|| 
 
He who (yaḥ) will know (jñāsyati) [this compendium] called ‘Tattvādhigama’ 
(tattva-adhigama-ākhyā) and (ca) also (ca) does (kariṣyate) what is said (ukta) 
therein (tatra), he (tad) will soon (acireṇa) attain (prāpsyati) the highest goal 
(parama-artha), [which is also] called unimpeded happiness (avyābādha-sukha-
ākhyā).
 
1002 The word ‘arghya’ appears in verse 3. 
1003 In other words, the teachings of the arhat were passed down by the succession of 
teachers. 
1004 Alternatively, ‘whose ordinary cognition (mati) is hindered (vihata) by the difficult 
verbal testimonies (durāgama)’. 
1005 Unlike ‘saṃdṛbdha’, ‘dṛbdha’ is not a common word. 
1006 Translation based on Dhaky 1996: 60. Zydenbos mistranslates ‘the lofty nāgaravācaka 










MW See: Monier-Williams 1899 
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Early Jaina Epistemology: A Study of the Philosophical Chapters of the 
Tattvārthādhigama; With an English Translation of the Tattvārthādhigama-
bhāṣya I, II.8 - 25, and V. 
 
This thesis provides an analysis and translation of the oldest extant philosophical 
treatise in the Jaina tradition. The Tattvārthādhigama (A Study of the Fundamental 
Categories) provides a systematic overview of the Jaina view on epistemology, 
ontology, and ethics. The text situates human beings in an overall cosmology and 
explains how the soul can reach liberation from the eternal cycle of rebirths. This 
study deals primarily with the ideas about knowledge in the Tattvārthādhigama, 
which can be found in the first, second, and fifth chapter. 
The first part of this study consists of three chapters. The first chapter forms 
an introduction to this thesis and discusses the research questions, methodology, 
and the position of the Tattvārthādhigama in the history of philosophy from a global 
perspective. The second chapter situates the Tattvārthādhigama and the first 
commentary on this text, the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya, in their historical context. 
This chapter deals with the role of both texts in the development of Jaina philosophy, 
the history of the Jainas in the Gupta Period, and the authorship of both texts. The 
third chapter forms the core of this thesis and offers a conceptual analysis of the 
content of Tattvārthādhigama I, II.8 – 25, and V.  
The second part of this study contains an English translation from the 
original Sanskrit text of the Tattvārthādhigama. This part also provides the first 
English translation of the commentary on these passages from the 
Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya. 
This thesis demonstrates that the Tattvārthādhigama offers a coherent 
philosophical system that was strongly influenced by the Nyāya tradition. 
Nevertheless, this study also shows the Tattvārthādhigama has a unique character 
and that it played a crucial role in the further development of the philosophical 








Vroege Jaina epistemologie: Een studie van de filosofische hoofdstukken van 
de Tattvārthādhigama; Met een Engelse vertaling van de Tattvārthādhigama-
bhāṣya I, II.8 – 25, en V. 
 
Dit proefschrift bevat een analyse en vertaling van de oudst overgeleverde 
filosofische tekst uit de Jaina traditie. De Tattvārthādhigama (Een studie van de 
fundamentele categorieën) biedt een systematisch overzicht van de Jaina theorieën 
op het gebied van epistemologie, ontologie, en ethiek. Het werk als geheel situeert 
de mens in de kosmos en schetst de weg naar bevrijding van de ziel uit de eeuwige 
cyclus van wedergeboortes. Deze studie richt zich voornamelijk op de ideeën over 
kennis in de Tattvārthādhigama, welke te vinden zijn in het eerste, tweede, en vijfde 
hoofdstuk.  
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie hoofdstukken. Het eerste 
hoofdstuk vormt de inleiding van deze studie, en behandelt de onderzoeksvragen, 
de methodologie, en de plaats van de Tattvārthādhigama in de algemene 
geschiedenis van de filosofie. Het tweede hoofdstuk situeert de Tattvārthādhigama 
en het eerste commentaar op deze tekst, de Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya, in hun 
historische context. Hierbij wordt er ingegaan op de plaats van beide teksten in de 
ontwikkeling van Jaina filosofie, de geschiedenis van de Jainas in de Gupta Periode, 
en het auteurschap van beide teksten. Het derde hoofdstuk vormt de kern van dit 
proefschrift en biedt een conceptuele analyse van de inhoud van Tattvārthādhigama 
I, II.8 – 25, en V. Het tweede deel van deze studie bestaat uit een Engelse vertaling 
van deze passages uit het Sanskriet. Dit deel biedt tevens de eerste Engelse vertaling 
van het commentaar op deze passages uit de Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya. 
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat de Tattvārthādhigama een coherent filosofisch 
systeem bevat dat in sterke mate door de Nyāya traditie is beïnvloed. Niettemin 
toont deze studie aan dat de filosofie in de Tattvārthādhigama een uniek karakter 
heeft, en dat de tekst een cruciale rol in de verdere ontwikkeling van de filosofische 
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